fifteen days on demurrage; the freighter on detaining her on demurrage for the fifteen days and paying for the same, is in the same condition at the end of that time, in which he would otherwise have been at the end of the fourteen days.'

But if the whole agreed period for loading has expired, and no cargo has been provided, or if before any demurrage has been incurred there has been a definite refusal by the charterer to supply a cargo, and the shipowner still chooses to keep the ship at the port, he will do so at his own risk, and will not be entitled to additional damages for the subsequent detention."

And in all cases where the charterer has failed to perform his contract, the shipowner is bound to do what may be reasonable to mitigate the consequent loss to himself. If he can get cargo from other persons, and so earn freight in place of that agreed for by the charter-party, he ought to do so. What may be reasonably required from him in this regard must depend upon the circumstances of the particular case.3

The owners of a ship chartered her on a voyage from Cadiz to Guyaquil, and the freighters agreed to provide a cargo for a homeward voyage, or pay a sum of money with a proviso, that in the event of the non-arrival of another ship at Guyaquil, then they should not be bound to provide that cargo.

1 Connor v. Smythe, 5 Taunt. 653.

2 Blight v. Page, 3 B. & P. 295n; Dimech v. Corlett, 12 Moo. P. C. 199. 3 Carver, 2nd Ed. s. 270.

Final Sailing.

The latter mentioned ship did not arrive at Guyaquil within the time allowed to the first vessel for running days, and she took another cargo; but the delay did not arise from any act of the freighters.

The Court held that the word "non-arrival" meant non-arrival within such time as suited the purposes of the first mentioned ship, and conscquently, that the freighters were not liable to damages for not providing a homeward-bound cargo.1

The term "final sailing of the vessel from the port of loading" stated in a charter-party as the period for payment of the freight or part of it, means the final departure from the port and being at sea ready to proceed on her voyage, and not merely having the clearances on board, and being ready to sail.

In determining the point at which a vessel has "finally sailed" the circumstances of the particular port of loading must be considered; and where the vessel was wrecked after having her clearances on board, and had left the dock gates, and had reached a ship canal between high and low water, where she was subject to certain regulations under a local act, and where she was liable to be stopped by the harbour master, it was held that she had not finally sailed within the meaning of the charter-party.

Parke, B. said "In this case, the question for our decision arises upon the terms of a charter-party by which a ship called the 'General Chasse' was char

1 Soames v. Lonergan, 2 L. J. K. B. 106.

Roelandts v. Harrison, 23 L. J. Ex. 169.

tered to go to Cardiff, and proceed to load at Cardiff a full and complete cargo of coals, not exceeding what she could reasonably stow and carry to the port of landing, and there to discharge the cargo to be taken from alongside the vessel according to the custom of the port, at the expense of the freighters; the freight to be paid three-fourths in cash on the final sailing of the vessel from the port of lading. The question is, whether the period had arrived when three-fourths of the freight was to be paid in cash, which was to be paid on the final sailing of the vessel from the port of lading. It appeared from the statement in the case that the vessel was got ready for sea and had got her clearances from the custom house, and proceeded from the dock at Cardiff which communicates with the sea at high water by means of dock gates, and from the dock gates down to the low-water mark there was a shipcanal made, but before passing that ship canal, the vessel could not get to sea, and in the ship canal vessels are towed backwards and forwards by steam tugs, the regulations of the port preventing any sails being hoisted, and the vessel was liable to be stopped by the harbour master. She proceeded from the dock gates, having passed the dock-gates, proceeded partly along the ship canal and then took the ground, and after her removal from the ground on the rising of the tide, she proceeded to the dockgates, and she took the ground at the dock gates, and afterwards became a total wreck. The question

is whether that period of time had arrived at which three-fourths of the freight was to be paid. If it had been three-fourths to be paid at the time of sailing of the vessel from the port of lading simply, then according to several cases on insurance law, the sailing is determined to be that period of time when the vessel breaks ground, at that time fully fit for sea, having the cargo on board which she intends to carry, with a competent crew, and having permission to leave by having the custom house clearances on board. If that had been the criterion in this case, we think the vessel might possibly be considered as having broken ground; but that is a point of some doubt. Certainly, she was fit for sea in every other respect, and probably a warranty to sail by a given time would have been complied with, but we all think, upon reading this charter-party, that something more is meant than the sailing of the vessel, because they use the term 'the final sailing of the vessel,' and we are not at liberty to reject that term; and we must consider that it is adopted with reference to the particular port of Cardiff where the vessel is to take on board her cargo, and that it means something more than merely having the clearances on board and being ready, and that it means her final departure from that port, and being out of the limits of that artificial port, and being at sea ready to proceed upon her voyage. That she was not, and therefore we think the time had not arrived at which the plaintiff was entitled to receive three-fourths of his

freight, and we distinguish this case from those that were cited on behalf of the plaintiff, saying that all those which were applicable were insurance cases relating to 'sailing' merely, that is, to warranty of sailing; this is the construction of the charter-party with another term added to it, that is final sailing.' And with reference to the circumstances of the port, we do not think this vessel can be considered as having finally sailed from her port of lading. The verdict, therefore, will be for the defendants."

By a charter-party two-thirds of the freight was payable "ten days after the final sailing of the vessel from her last port." The ship started on her voyage from Cardiff docks, and proceeded as far as a spot 300 yards beyond the junction of the artificial channel leading from the docks with the river Taff, where she was damaged by a collision which obliged her to put back for repairs. After ten days the shipowners sued the charterers for the twothirds freight:-Held, that the spot where the collision occurred was within the port of Cardiff, and therefore the ship had not sailed from the port within the meaning of the charter-party, and the freight was not payable.1

To sail is a technical word and means "start on a voyage."2

A warranty to sail, without the word "from," is not complied with by the vessel's raising her anchor,

S. S. Garston Co. v. Hickie, L.R. 15 Q.B.D.580; 5 Asp. M.L.C. 499. 2 Valente v. Gibbs, 28 L.J.C.P.229; Barker v. McAndrew, 34 L.J.C.P. 195,