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ready to deliver, and they are to be counted consecutively; but if the phrase "working days" is introduced then the days cease to be of necessity consecutive days, for the occurence of a Sunday would prevent the days from being consecutive.1

Where it was agreed by a charter-party that a vessel, then at Pembroke, should proceed to Cardiff, take in, amongst other articles, a quantity of coals, and proceed thence to Alexandria, the merchant to be allowed forty running days, to commence on the 16th instant, with ten days demurrage at 77. per diem; and by a subsequent agreement the vessel should take in the coals at Pembroke, where she was instead of at Cardiff:-Held, that the ingredients of the charter-party with regard to the port of Cardiff, originally mentioned, were also applicable to the substituted port of Pembroke. Consequently that the running days, which were to commence on, and be computed from, the 16th, if the vessel had gone to Cardiff, were to commence on and be computed from the same day at the substituted port of Pembroke.2

Working days exclude Sundays, Good Friday and Christmas-day, and Custom-house holidays. "Lying days" mean working days, and exclude Sundays.3 But weather-working days exclude all days from the lay-days in which cargo cannot be worked on

1 Nielsen v. Wait, L. R. 16 Q. B. D. 67; 55 L. J. Q. B. 87; Caffarini v. Walker, Ir. R. 10 C. L. 250; McIntosh v. Sinclair, Ir. R. 11 C. L. 456; Brown v. Johnson, 10 M. & W. 331.

2 Jackson v. Galloway, 8 L. J. C. P. 29.

3 Commercial Steam Ship Co. v. Boulton, 3 Asp. M, L. C. N. S. 111.

account of the weather. "Weather permitting" does not include thunder storms. The fair construction of these words is "sea-weather."1

The weather which interferes to save demurrage must be weather which if there were cargo to load would be an obstacle to the loading of the vessel.

A part of a day or hour counts as a whole day or hour.2

A charterer will not be excused from paying demurrage where the delay in loading has been occasioned by frost, or ice, when it appears that the frost would not have prevented the loading had the cargo been ready at the dock or place of shipment named in the charter-party, notwithstanding the exception that detention by frost is not to be reckoned as lay-days; but where there is, in a proved state of facts, an inevitable necessity that something should be done in order that there should be a loading at the place agreed upon, as, for instance, that the goods should be brought down part of a river from the only place from which they can be brought, even though that place is a considerable distance off, yet it being practically, according to known mercantile usage, the only place from which they can be brought to be loaded, the parties must be held to have contemplated that the goods should be loaded from that place in the usual manner, unless there was an unavoidable impediment and the char

Stephens v. Harris, 6 Asp. M. L. C. 193; Thiis v. Byers, L.R. 1 Q. B. D. 244; Holman v. Peruvian Nitrate Co., 5 Sc. Sess. Cas. (4th Ser.) 657.

2 Commercial S. S. Co. v. Boulton, L. R. 10 Q.B. 346; Hough v. Athya, 6 Sc. Sess. Cas. (4th Ser.) 961.

terers in such case would not be liable for demurrage.1

In the S. S. "County of Lancaster" v. Sharp,2 the consignees under a bill of lading which made the goods deliverable to them, "paying freight and all other conditions as per charter-party," refused to pay demurrage at the port of loading and due under the terms of the charter-party, but accepted delivery of the goods. The consignees were, and were known to the shipowners to be, acting only as agents. In an action by the shipowners, it was held, that the consignees were not liable.

Where a charter-party is silent as to the time within which the cargo is to be unloaded at the port of destination, the law implies that the merchant and the shipowner shall each use reasonable despatch in performing his part of the contract; and where the landing of the cargo by the merchant is rendered impossible by a cause over which he has no control, he is not liable to pay the damages for the delay.3

If the discharge is effected by a dock company, who do the work of discharging for both shipowners and charterers, and delay is occasioned, in consequence of the quay being blocked with cargo from other vessels, beyond the time in which a vessel might have been discharged, assuming that the

1 Kay v. Field, L. R. 10Q. B. D. 241; 52 L.J.Q.B. 17; Grant v. Coverdale, L. R. 9 App. Cas. 470; 53 L. J. Q. B. 462.

2 L. R. 24 Q. B. D. 158; 59 L. J. Q. B. 22.

3 Ford v. Cotesworth, 39 L. J. Q. B. 188.

dock was free and there was no obstruction, the charterer will not be liable for demurrage for the delay which has taken place, when it appears that the vessel has been discharged as fast as she could deliver, having regard to the customary way in which that discharge takes place.

Barnes, J., in" the Jaederen" said :-" It appears to me that shipowners when they enter a dock of this character, and place themselves in the hands of the dock company to carry out the discharge in accordance to what appears to be the invariable practice of the port, must, in so doing, leave these agents to deal with the matter in the customary way; and when they assert that the vessel has not been discharged as fast as she could deliver, it rests upon them to prove this."

Unless otherwise stipulated, the computation of time begins with the arrival of the ship at the usual or designated place of discharge in the port of destination.2

Where a vessel was to proceed to Dieppe and deliver a cargo of coals alongside consignee's or railway wharf, where she may safely deliver, as ordered, cargo to be discharged in forty-eight running hours, &c. Demurrage over and above the said lying time at 10s. per hour. The ship arrived in the dock at

1 L. R. (1892) P. 351; 61 L. J. Ad. 89.

Parker v.

2 Kell v. Anderson, 10 M. & W. 498; Leer v. Yates, 3 Taunt. 387; Winlo, 27 L. J. Q. B. 49; Bastifell v. Lloyd, 31 L. J. Ex. 413; Brereton . Chapman, 7 Bing. 559; Niemann v. Moss, 29 L.J.Q.B. 206; Brown v. Johnson, 10 M. & W. 331; Pyman v. Dreyfus, L. R. 21 Q. B. D. 152; Harris v. Jacobs, L. R. 15 Q. B. D. 247.

Dieppe, and was ordered to discharge at the railway wharf, but in consequence of all the discharging berths being occupied, she was not berthed at the railway wharf until twenty-four hours after her arrival in the dock. In an action by the shipowner against the charterers for demurrage:-Held that the voyage was not completed, and the lying time did not commence under the charter-party until the ship was berthed at the railway wharf, and therefore that the defendants were not liable to pay demurrage for delay in respect of the period which elapsed between the ship's arrival in the dock at Dieppe and her being berthed at the railway wharf.1

When the number of lay-days is fixed for loading or discharging, that number will be strictly adhered to and enforced, whether the merchant be to blame or not, and each individual consignee of any portion of a cargo of a general ship, will be liable for the entire demurrage arising from the ship being delayed by such portion of the cargo not being taken delivery of. Thus, where the defendant's portion of the cargo was stowed at the bottom of the hold, and in consequence of the consignees of upper portions of the cargo not being ready to take delivery as soon as the ship was ready to discharge, the defendants were not able to clear their portions of the cargo within the time stipulated by the charter, according to which demurrage became payable by the conditions of the bills of lading. The ship was delayed for three days, and the plaintiff sued to recover three Murphy v. Coffin, L. R. 12 Q. B. D. 87,

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