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in each case.
Time is saved by getting from A. to B. if a man runs in one hour instead of walking in two. But nobody suggests that this is the meaning. It is admitted on both sides, and is clear, that 'time saved' means if the ship is ready earlier than she would be if the charterer worked up to his maximum obligation only; all the time by which she is the sooner ready is time saved within the meaning of the charter-party. Then the question is by how much time is she sooner ready? The answer is, by nine times twenty-four hours. Really the reason of the thing is that way. The owner would sail away by what has happened 216 hours sooner than he would have done, but for the defendants' despatch. Suppose that taking the maximum liability, the charterer had till and on a certain day, say Thursday, to load without incurring demurrage. Suppose he began at 6 A.M., and finished at midday, then he would at least have saved the rest of that day let us call it seven hours. Now suppose by working all Wednesday night and Thursday morning, the loading was finished at 6 A.M.; he would have saved thirteen hours. Then, suppose he finished at 3 A. M.; would he not have saved sixteen hours? and so if he finished on Wednesday at 7 P.M.; he would have saved twenty-four hours. It was admitted by the plaintiff that demurrage was to be paid on this footing; then why not the despatch money?"
In the case of the S.S. "Glendevon" belonging to
1 L. R. (1893) P. 269.
the plaintiffs, the steamer carried a cargo of 2,103 tons of coals belonging to the defendants, the owners of the South Derwent Colliery, from Newcastle to Lisbon, under a charter-party dated November 17, 1892, the material portions of which were as fol lows:-The steamer to be discharged at the rate of two hundred tons per day weather permitting (Sundays and Fête days excepted) according to the custom of the port of discharge, and if sooner discharged to pay at the rate of 8s. 4d. per hour for every hour saved . . . Demurrage twenty pounds for every day's detention in discharging, and in same proportion for any part of such day over and above the days allowed as aforesaid, except in case of riot, &c., &c., or other accidents which may prevent the discharging of such steamer.' The discharge of the 'Glendevon' was commenced at 7 A.M. on December 2, and completed at 5 P.M. on December 7, or (excluding Sunday, December 4,) in 106 hours; but the time allowance for the discharge was 252 hours, which (excluding December 8, a fête day, and December 11, a Sunday) would bring the time for discharge up to 7 P.M., on December 15, and the plaintiffs, the owners of the Glendevon,' therefore credited the defendants, the charterers, with 607. 16s. Sd. for 146 hours' despatch. The defendants, however, included the fête day (December 8,) and the Sunday (December 11,) as also saved to the ship, making in all 194 hours saved; and they therefore claimed to deduct from the balance of freight due a further sum of 201. for 48 hours' despatch. On July 5, 1893, the learned
judge of the Newcastle County Court gave judg ment for the plaintiffs, holding that the contract between the parties should be read as excluding Sundays and fête days altogether from the calculation of despatch.' It was held, that Sundays and fête days were excluded both in the computation of the time allowed for discharging, and in that of the time saved, so that despatch money, by way of set off to a claim for freight, was only payable, by the plaintiffs to the defendants, on the difference between the number of hours actually occupied by the defendants in the discharge, and the total number of hours which the charter-party allowed them."
In modern charters a lien is very frequently given Lien. by a general clause that the shipowner is to have "an absolute lien on the cargo for the recovery of all freight, dead freight, and demurrage." Such a clause covers all freight payable during the voyage, so that the lien may attach to outward cargo for the charter freight, or part of it, although it may be agreed that that shall be calculated upon the homeward cargo.1
That the shipowner, and the master, as his agent, have a lien on the goods carried in their ship for the freight, is a proposition which appears never to have been disputed.2
The lien of the owners is as perfect for the hire of the vessel stipulated in the charter-party, as it is for the freight stipulated in the bill of lading. In
1 Gilkison v. Middleton, 26 L. J. C. P. 209.
2 Parsons on Sh. Vol. 1 174 n.2.
both cases the claim is privileged in the same degree and to the same extent.1
As long as the goods remain in the possession of the master, the shipowners, and their agent, the master has a lien on them at common law, not only for freight due, but also for general average, and this lien is given to the master without any provision for it being made either in the bill of lading or otherwise, and he cannot be compelled to part with the goods until such freight be paid."
The essential foundation of the right of lien is possession. The right of retaining possession of the cargo until the freight of the ship was discharged, appears to have been allowed to the master by most of the Maritime Codes of Europe, and according to the principle by which all liens by the Common Law are regulated, if the master once voluntarily part with the possession of the goods out of his own, or his agent's hands, he loses his lien upon them, and cannot afterwards reclaim them; but a master who has delivered a portion of a cargo on payment of a sum on account of freight, may detain the balance of the cargo for the balance of the freight. And any part may be detained for the freight of all that is consigned to the same person, even though some part may have been previously removed into a lighter alongside a ship which has been sent by the consignee, but which the master
1 Parsons on Sh. Vol. 1, 175.
2 Cargo ex Galam, 33 L. J. Ad. 97; Sodergren v. Flight, 6 East. 622; Kirchner v. Venus, 7 W. R. 456.
3 Cross on lien, p.p. 4, 288, 289.
* Perez v. Alsop, 3. F. & F. 188.
has fastened to the ship's side to prevent its final removal.1
Where the agreed time of payment of the freight is not contemporaneous with the time of delivery of the cargo there is no implied right of lien."
In Black v. Rose, the main point was, whether the shipowner was entitled to require payment of freight as the goods were delivered into the merchants' boats over the ship's side, or whether he was bound to deliver the whole cargo into the boats, and wait till it was brought on shore before he had his freight. By the charter-party the master undertook to load and take a cargo to Galle, at so much per bag, the cargo to be taken alongside and to be taken from the ship's tackles at the port of discharge free of risk and expense to the ship. After some cargo had been delivered at Galle, the master required the merchant to pay daily the freight for the amount of cargo delivered each day over the ship's side into the merchants' boats, and refused to deliver more cargo on the merchants refusing to pay on delivery as required. It was held as a general principle, that when there is no express stipulation as to the time and manner of payment of freight, the master is not bound to part with the goods until his freight is paid, and that the master was bound to deliver, and the merchant to receive, at the ship's side, and the
1 Ward v. Felton, 1 East. 507; Sodergren v. Flight, cited in Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East. 622; Ang. on Car. s. 370.
Allison v. Bristol Mar. Ins. Co., L. R. 1 App. Cas. 225.