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whether sea-going or not, who makes the stipulation. And as the master's ordinary responsibilities are not lessened or taken away by sec. 516, by the fact of his being an owner or part-owner of the vessel, he is excluded from the benefit of the limitation, unless "fire" is specially excepted in the charter-party.

It was held in a case where goods had been destroyed by fire while on board a lighter not belonging to the owners of the ship, for the purpose of being conveyed from the shore to the ship, that it did not come within the meaning of the statute 26, Geo. III., c. 86, sec. 2, which has been re-enacted by the above statute, and that the owners were responsible for them as at common law.1

Where fire did not form one of the exceptions in the bill of lading, it was held that if the goods are not in the ship, but put out of it on shore, and without notice to the consignees, where they are destroyed by fire, the only defence of the owners is at common law,2 as "fire" is not within the exceptions "perils of the seas" or dangers of the river."3

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Where the goods are landed and warehoused, and it appears that the shipowner still retains the custody and possession of them, not as a warehouseman, but as a common carrier, he will be liable as such for any loss or injury arising from fire, unless he can show that he is exempted by the charter-party.

1 Morewood v. Pollok, 22 L. J. Q. B. 250.

Bourne v. Gatliffe, 7 M. & G. 850.

The New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchant's Bank,

How. 344;

Garrison v. Memphis Insurance Co., 19 How. 312; Airey v. Merrill, 2 Cur.

C. C. 8; Cox v. Peterson, 30 Ala. 608; Ang. on Car. s. 166 (a.)

4 Ching Hong v. Sing Moh, I. L. R. 4 Cal. 736.

The use of the word "other" before "dangers and accidents of the seas" &c., in the charter-party does not render "fire" a peril of the sea, or limit it to fire on board the ship.

Where a portion of the cargo shipped by the charterer is destroyed by fire during the loading of the vessel, the owners cannot insist upon the charterer reloading cargo to take the place of that which was burned; neither can the charterer insist upon reloading such portion of the cargo, each party, as regards those bales shipped and burned, having pro tanto fulfilled their respective obligations under the charter-party. The charterer would be under no liability to pay freight for the bales burned, which the owners had lost. The space which had been occupied by the burned cargo becomes vacant space in the ship, and the only obligation then attaching to the charterer is to fill up the residue of the space in the ship, and when this is done the charterer will be held to have loaded a full and complete cargo. Thus, where the defendants chartered the plaintiff's ship for the carriage of a full cargo of jute at 17. 17s. 6d. per ton. By the charter-party, which contained the usual exception of "fire," it was stipulated that the captain should sign bills of lading at any rate of freight without prejudice to the charter-party or to the owner's lien, provided that the bill of lading freight in the aggregate should fully cover the freight due under the charter-party (5,6007.). The defendants shipped 1,519 tons under bills of lading, making freight payable at 17. 58.

per ton. A fire broke out, which destroyed 1,000 tons of the goods so shipped, and delayed the sailing of the ship. The defendants refused to load any more goods, upon which the plaintiffs filled up the ship with goods-some at 17. 5s. per ton, some at a lower rate. In an action by the plaintiffs for breach of the charter-party, in not loading a full cargo:Held, affirming the decision of Pollock, B., that the space occupied by the goods destroyed by fire was taken out of the charter-party, the defendants not being liable to pay freight in respect of such goods, nor bound nor entitled to ship fresh cargo to fill up the space which had been occupied by them, and that the freight which the plaintiff's received from other persons for goods carried in such space belonged to the plaintiffs, and ought not to be taken into account in reduction of the damages recoverable from the defendants. Held, further, that the fire only absolved the defendants from payment of the freight, which would have been payable on the goods destroyed by fire according to the bills of lading, and that after the fire, the total amount of freight, for which the defendants were liable, was 5,6007; less 17. 58. per ton, on the 1,000 tons destroyed by fire, not 5,6007; less the charter freight of 17. 17s. 6d. per ton, on such 1,000 tons.1

The proximate cause of heat cannot be brought within the legal import of the exception of dangers of the seas.2

Aitken v. Ernsthausen, L. R. (1894) 1 Q. B. 773.

The Freedom, L. R. 3. P. C. 594,

Ice, Frost.

Where a vessel was frozen into the port during the loading, and could not sail, owing to the ice, for some time after the loading was finished, it was held, that the charterer was not liable to pay for that delay.1

The charter-party in Kay v. Field2 stipulated that the plaintiff's ship should proceed to Cardiff East Bute Dock, and there load a full and complete cargo of rails: detention of frost, floods, &c., not to be reckoned as lay-days. There are two docks at Cardiff-the East and West Bute Docks which are connected by a short canal, and also by a railway which runs along the quays round both of the docks. The West, but not the East, Bute Dock was connected by a junction canal with another canal-the G. canal. There are five or six manufacturers of rail iron at Cardiff, all of whom, with the exception of the charterer's agents had wharves either in the East or West Bute Docks; and who were accustomed to load vessels in the East Bute Dock either from the quays or from lighters alongside the vessels. The charterer's agents had their wharf for the deposit of iron on the G. canal, and, in order to load a vessel in the East Bute Dock, were accustomed to bring their iron in lighters from their wharf on the G. canal, along the junction canal into the West Bute Dock, thence along the short canal into the East Bute Dock, where the vessel to be loaded was berth

1 Pringle v. Mollett, 6 M. & W. 80.

2 L. R. 10 Q. B. D. 241; 52 L. J. Q. B. 17; Grant v. Coverdale, L. R. 9 App. Cas. 170; 53 L. J. Q. B. 462.

ed. The whole cargo of iron was deposited at the agent's wharf in anticipation of the arrival of the plaintiff's ship which, on arrival, was berthed in the East Bute Dock, but the loading by means of lighters was interrupted for fifteen days by a frost, which covered with ice the junction canal leading from the agent's wharf to the West Bute Dock. In an action by the shipowners for demurrage, Brett, L. J., in delivering judgment for the plaintiffs, said :"The charter-party in this case is made not with freighter's agents, nor by one of the five or six manufacturers of iron rail, but it is made by an ordinary charterer. Under the terms of that charter the ship is to proceed not to Cardiff, but to Cardiff East Bute Dock, and there to load, in the customary manner, a full and complete cargo of iron. The shipowner here has no means of knowing from which of these many manufacturers the railway iron will come; he cannot tell whether it is deposited in the East Bute Dock, or in the West Bute Dock, or at the wharf belonging to freighter's agents. The duty of the shipowner, under this charter-party, is to take the ship to Cardiff East Bute Dock, and when he has done that, and put her in a berth ready to be loaded, his duty is over. It then becomes the duty of the charterer, immediately the ship is in her berth ready to load, to begin to load her cargo, or else to pay demurrage for the delay. The first question in this case is whether this charter-party ought to be construed with relation to the

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