duct of the master.1 Also if the master acts contrary to instructions, though for the benefit of the owner, in consequence of which the vessel is lost." So also will an intentional breach of blockade without owner's authority be an act of barratry.3 As the shipowner is exempted from liability by the present exception from all losses arising from the barratry of the master or mariners, the owner of the goods looks to the underwriter in such cases, and the instances are very rare in which the question under the charter-party or bill of lading, has been judicially determined: and in those cases where the insurer has successfully defended an action on the policy on the ground that the loss did not arise from the barratry of the master or mariners, the same has been covered by other exceptions in the bill of lading. 5 It has been ruled that an act of the master, not amounting to a fraudulent violation or wilful abandonment of his duty to his owner is not barratry, nor is the stowage of goods on deck in contravention of the shipper's orders a barratrous act. Where the master has acted with the assent of the owners, his acts are not barratrous. But the mere fact of his being a part-owner will not pre V. Arcangelo v. Thompson, 2 Camp. 620. 2 Moss v. Byrom, 6 T. R. 379. 3 Goldschmidt v. Whitmore, 3 Taunt. 508. + Cossman v. The British America Assurance Co., 57 L. J. P. C. 17. Williams v. Suffolk Sea Ins. Co., 3 Summers 514. Atkinson v. G. W. Ins. Co., 27 L. T. 103. Nutt v. Bourdieu, 1 T.R. 323; Hobbs v. Hannam, 3 Camp. 93; Stamma Brown, 2 Str. 1174, Fire. vent the possibility of his committing barratry as against the other part-owners. And if the ship has been chartered, so as to give the charterer possession and control of her for the time being, acts may be committed against him which will be barratrous, although the shipowner may have ordered or assented to them; a loss by scuttling would, under a policy on goods, be barratry, although the scuttling were done with the knowledge of the shipowner, if it was without the knowledge of the freighter.3 The exception of "fire" is important in relation to the liability of the common carrier for goods destroyed by that means, though accidentally; and, as it is no protection where there is actual fault or privity on the part of the owner, it coincides in effect with the statutory limitation contained in the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854,5 which provides : "That no owner of any sea-going ship, or share therein, shall be liable to make good any loss or damage that may happen without his actual fault or privity, (that is to say) 1. Of or to any goods, merchandize, or other things whatsoever, taken in or put on board any such ship, by reason of any fire happening on board such ship," and the exception will extend beyond this to every owner of a ship, 1 Jones v. Nicholson, 10 Ex. 28. 2 Soares v. Thornton, 7 Taunt. 627. 3 Ionides v. Pender, 27 L. T. 244; The Chasca, L. R. 4 A. & E. 446. Forward v. Pittard, 1 T. R. 27; Trent Navigation Co. v. Wood, 4 Doug. 287. 5 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 503. whether sea-going or not, who makes the stipulation. And as the master's ordinary responsibilities are not lessened or taken away by sec. 516, by the fact of his being an owner or part-owner of the vessel, he is excluded from the benefit of the limitation, unless "fire" is specially excepted in the charter-party. It was held in a case where goods had been destroyed by fire while on board a lighter not belonging to the owners of the ship, for the purpose of being conveyed from the shore to the ship, that it did not come within the meaning of the statute 26, Geo. III., c. 86, sec. 2, which has been re-enacted by the above statute, and that the owners were responsible for them as at common law.1 Where fire did not form one of the exceptions in the bill of lading, it was held that if the goods are not in the ship, but put out of it on shore, and without notice to the consignees, where they are destroyed by fire, the only defence of the owners is at common law,2 as "fire" is not within the exceptions "perils of the seas" or "dangers of the river." Where the goods are landed and warehoused, and it appears that the shipowner still retains the custody and possession of them, not as a warehouseman, but as a common carrier, he will be liable as such for any loss or injury arising from fire, unless he can. show that he is exempted by the charter-party.* 1 Morewood v. Pollok, 22 L. J. Q. B. 250. Bourne v. Gatliffe, 7 M. & G. 850. The New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchant's Bank, 6 How. 344; Garrison v. Memphis Insurance Co., 19 How. 312; Airey v. Merrill, 2 Cur. C. C. 8; Cox v. Peterson, 30 Ala. 608; Ang. on Car. s. 166 (a.) Ching Hong v. Sing Moh, I. L. R. 4 Cal. 736. The use of the word "other" before "dangers and accidents of the seas" &c., in the charter-party does not render "fire" a peril of the sea, or limit it to fire on board the ship. Where a portion of the cargo shipped by the charterer is destroyed by fire during the loading of the vessel, the owners cannot insist upon the charterer reloading cargo to take the place of that which was burned; neither can the charterer insist upon reloading such portion of the cargo, cach party, as regards those bales shipped and burned, having pro tanto fulfilled their respective obligations under the charter-party. The charterer would be under no liability to pay freight for the bales burned, which the owners had lost. The space which had been occupied by the burned cargo becomes vacant space in the ship, and the only obligation then attaching to the charterer is to fill up the residue of the space in the ship, and when this is done the charterer will be held to have loaded a full and complete cargo. Thus, where the defendants chartered the plaintiff's ship for the carriage of a full cargo of jute at 17. 17s. 6d. per ton. By the charter-party, which contained the usual exception of "fire," it was stipulated that the captain should sign bills of lading at any rate of freight without prejudice to the charter-party or to the owner's lien, provided that the bill of lading freight in the aggregate should fully cover the freight due under the charter-party (5,6007.). The defendants shipped 1,519 tons under bills of lading, making freight payable at 17. 58. per ton. A fire broke out, which destroyed 1,000 tons of the goods so shipped, and delayed the sailing of the ship. The defendants refused to load any more goods, upon which the plaintiffs filled up the ship with goods-some at 17. 5s. per ton, some at a lower rate. In an action by the plaintiff's for breach of the charter-party, in not loading a full cargo:Held, affirming the decision of Pollock, B., that the space occupied by the goods destroyed by fire was taken out of the charter-party, the defendants not being liable to pay freight in respect of such goods, nor bound nor entitled to ship fresh cargo to fill up the space which had been occupied by them, and that the freight which the plaintiff's received from other persons for goods carried in such space belonged to the plaintiffs, and ought not to be taken into account in reduction of the damages recoverable from the defendants. Held, further, that the fire only absolved the defendants from payment of the freight, which would have been payable on the goods destroyed by fire according to the bills of lading, and that after the fire, the total amount of freight, for which the defendants were liable, was 5,6007; less 17. 58. per ton, on the 1,000 tons destroyed by fire, not 5,6007; less the charter freight of 17. 17s. 6d. per ton, on such 1,000 tons.1 The proximate cause of heat cannot be brought within the legal import of the exception of dangers of the seas.2 Aitken v. Ernsthausen, L. R. (1894) 1 Q. B. 773. The Freedom, L. R. 3. P. C. 594, |