Ice, Frost.

Where a vessel was frozen into the port during the loading, and could not sail, owing to the ice, for some time after the loading was finished, it was held, that the charterer was not liable to pay for that delay.1

The charter-party in Kay v. Field2 stipulated that the plaintiff's ship should proceed to Cardiff East Bute Dock, and there load a full and complete cargo of rails: detention of frost, floods, &c., not to be reckoned as lay-days. There are two docks at Cardiff-the East and West Bute Docks which are connected by a short canal, and also by a railway which runs along the quays round both of the docks. The West, but not the East, Bute Dock was connected by a junction canal with another canal-the G. canal. There are five or six manufacturers of rail iron at Cardiff, all of whom, with the exception of the charterer's agents had wharves either in the East or West Bute Docks; and who were accustomed to load vessels in the East Bute Dock either from the quays or from lighters alongside the vessels. The charterer's agents had their wharf for the deposit of iron on the G. canal, and, in order to load a vessel in the East Bute Dock, were accustomed to bring their iron in lighters from their wharf on the G. canal, along the junction canal into the West Bute Dock, thence along the short canal into the East Bute Dock, where the vessel to be loaded was berth

1 Pringle v. Mollett, 6 M. & W. 80.

2 L. R. 10 Q. B. D. 241; 52 L. J. Q. B. 17; Grant v. Coverdale, L. R. 9 App. Cas. 470; 53 L. J. Q. B. 462.

ed. The whole cargo of iron was deposited at the agent's wharf in anticipation of the arrival of the plaintiff's ship which, on arrival, was berthed in the East Bute Dock, but the loading by means of lighters was interrupted for fifteen days by a frost, which covered with ice the junction canal leading from the agent's wharf to the West Bute Dock. In an action by the shipowners for demurrage, Brett, L. J., in delivering judgment for the plaintiffs, said: "The charter-party in this case is made not with freighter's agents, nor by one of the five or six manufacturers of iron rail, but it is made by an ordinary charterer. Under the terms of that charter the ship is to proceed not to Cardiff, but to Cardiff East Bute Dock, and there to load, in the customary manner, a full and complete cargo of iron. The shipowner here has no means of knowing from which of these many manufacturers the railway iron will come; he cannot tell whether it is deposited in the East Bute Dock, or in the West Bute Dock, or at the wharf belonging to freighter's agents. The duty of the shipowner, under this charter-party, is to take the ship to Cardiff East Bute Dock, and when he has done that, and put her in a berth ready to be loaded, his duty is over. It then becomes the duty of the charterer, immediately the ship is in her berth ready to load, to begin to load her cargo, or else to pay demurrage for the delay. The first question in this case is whether this charter-party ought to be construed with relation to the

circumstances as if the East Bute Dock were the only harbour at Cardiff. It is clear from the charter-party itself that it relates to the loading of cargo in the East Bute Dock only, and that it ought not to be construed with regard to anything which may have happened in the West Bute Dock or in the town of Cardiff. When may that loading be said to commence? Unless there is something peculiar, all the stipulations in the charter-party with regard to the loading apply to the place where such loading is to be done. The conveyance of the goods to the place of loading is no part of the loading; but the loading begins in and at the place named in the charterparty, and is not confined to the actual lifting of the goods on board the ship. That was decided in Hudson v. Ede,' where it was held, that prima facie the interpretation of such a charter-party as this that the loading commences at the place where it is said that the loading is to be done, which here is the East Bute Dock. The stipulation of excuse for not loading is confined to the same place as that to which the stipulation for loading applies. The exception is limited in the same way as the obligation, and the detention here is a detention of the ship by reason of the charterer being prevented from loading by frost. The obligation is to load in the East Bute Dock, and therefore the prevention from loading must prima facie be a prevention by frost from loading in that dock. It was said that this matter would be altered, even without the circumstances to which we must here1 L. R. 3 Q. B. 412; 37 L. J. Q. B. 166.

after refer, by the words 'and there load in the customary manner;' but these words refer to the customary manner of loading in the East Bute Dock, which is the dock named in the charter-party, so that everything must happen in the East Bute Dock. It was further said, that under the circumstances of this case the loading commenced before the arrival of the iron at the East Bute Dock namely, when the iron was conveyed from the wharf belonging to freighter's agent, which was half a mile from the East Bute Dock. The question arises, under what circumstances can one go beyond the limits of the port or dock if named. There are circumstances under which the loading can be said to have commenced beyond the limits of the port which is named. That was decided in the case of Hudson v. Ede,' the circumstances in which it is admitted, were exceptional. There the obligation on the part of the shipowner was to take his ship to the port of Sulina and load a cargo of grain. Prima facie the loading was to be done in the port of Sulina, and it was declared that unless there were peculiar circumstances the loading would commence in the port of Sulina, as, by way of example, by taking goods from the shore out to the ship. It was, however, proved, not that some, but that all of the shippers who shipped grain at Sulina brought it down in lighters from Galatz, a port above a hundred miles up the river Danube, and taking it alongside the ship, there

'L. R. 3 Q. B. 412; Kearon v. Pearson, 31 L. J. Ex. 1; Ashcroft v. The Crow Orchard Col. Co., L. R. 9 Q. B. 540.

loaded the grain. The Court also relied on the fact that every shipper shipped grain in this way at the port of Sulina; and consequently, when an exception is found in the charter-party which relieves the shipper in the case of frost, it must be taken to have been known by the parties that the grain would come from Galatz; that there was only one way of loading the ship; and that the exception applied to the whole of the distance from Galatz, although that place was not in the port of Sulina. It is obvious from the observations made in that case by Mr. Justice Blackburn, together with the addition made by Chief Baron Kelly at the instigation of Mr. Justice Willes, that the foundation of the judg ment is that every shipper must be taken to have shipped grain in the manner stated. The present case comes within the general rules applicable to the interpretation of an ordinary charter-party, but it does not come within the exception in Hudson v. Ede. If it is to be taken that this case was decided on the words and there load in customary manner,' I am also unable to agree with the decision, for that stipulation has no application here."

Where a vessel was chartered to load a full and complete cargo of coals in a dock which was on a canal, by which coals were brought from the colliery in flats alongside the vessel to be loaded. In consequence of a sudden frost, the loading of the vessel was delayed for a considerable period. It was held, that the circumstance of the canal having been

L. R. 3 Q. B. 412.