What is not a stranding.

Stoppage of trains.

A ship having struck upon a sunken rock and received damage, was run ashore by direction of the pilot, was repaired and afterwards proceeded on her voyage.1

The striking of a ship on a rock, where she re mained a minute and a half, and was laid on her beam ends.2

A vessel took the ground on two successive days in going into harbour, under direction of a pilot, and being afterwards moored in the usual course, was thrown on her broadside by the receding of the tide."

Taking the ground on the falling of the tide in a tide harbour, in a spot where the ship is properly placed for the purpose of unloading, whereby she was hogged and strained.*

Upon the ebbing of the tide a vessel took the ground in a tide harbour in the place where it was intended she should, but in so doing, struck against some hard substance, by which two holes were made in her bottom.5

In "The Village Belle," causes were excepted which might prevent the loading, "including civil commotion, strikes, riots, stoppage of trains, &c." The port of loading was Bilbao, and that place was at the time threatened by Carlist forces, who cut the railway for some days. But Sir R. Phillimore

1 Burnett v. Kensington, 7 T. R. 210.

2 M'Dougle v. Royal Ex. Ass. Co., 4 M. & S. 503.

Hearn v. Edmunds, 4 Moo. 15.

Magnus v. Buttemer, 21 L. J. C. P. 119.

Kingsford v. Marshall, 8 Bing. 458; Crump on Ins. 289.

30 L. T. 232.

held, that to excuse the charterer for delay in the loading, it was not sufficient to show a general civil disturbance, and a stoppage of the railway for a short period: it must be shown that there was a disturbing cause of such a character as to prevent, and that it actually did prevent, the loading.

The four possibilities under which the accident of Collision. a collision could arise, have been clearly stated by Lord Stowell, thus, "In the first place it may happen without any blame being imputable to either party, as where the loss is occasioned by a storm, or any other vis major and in that case, the misfortune must be borne by the party on whom it happens to light, the other party not being responsible to him in any degree. Secondly, a misfortune of this kind may arise where both parties are to blame; where there has been a want of due diligence or skill on both sides. In such a case, the rule of law is, that the loss must be apportioned among them, as having been occasioned by the fault of both. Thirdly, it may happen by the misconduct of the suffering party only; and then the rule is, that the sufferer must bear his own burden. Lastly, it may have been the fault of the ship which ran the other down; and, in this case, the injured party would be entitled to an entire compensation from the other.”1

The mere happening of a collision, without more, is no evidence of negligence on the part of the ship sued, and in order to fix such ship with the loss, it is necessary for the party suing to give evidence of

1 The Woodrop, 2 Dods. 83.

the absence of reasonable care and maritime skill, on the part of the crew of the ship sued.1

If there has been a departure from any important rule of navigation, and the absence of observance can by any possibility have contributed to a collision, the party in default cannot be excused.2

Where a reasonable doubt exists as to the cause of the collision, the Court will regard it as the result of accident. And if cross actions are brought to recover damage which was occasioned by inevitable accident, both actions will be dismissed.3

Inevitable accident is such as could not have been prevented by the exercise of ordinary care, caution and maritime skill.1

The common carrier by water is, and always has been, exempt by the common law from losses occasioned by the natural accidents peculiar to the sea; therefore, the shipowner will not be responsible for any loss, either to the ship, or cargo, arising from collision where no blame is imputable to his vessel, it being held that such losses come within the exempted clause, "dangers or perils of the sea."5

But a collision arising from the negligence of the crew of the ship in which the goods are carried, is not "a peril of the sea," within the meaning of an exception of "loss arising from perils of the sea.

1 The Mary Stewart, 2 W. Rob. 244; Hammack v. White, 31 L. J. C. P.

129; Scott v. The London Dock Co., 34 L. J. Ex. 220.

The Arklow, L. R. 9 App. Cas. 136.

3 The Shannon, 1 W. Rob. 463; The Ebenezer, 2 W. Rob. 206. The Virgil, 2 W. Rob. 201; The Marpesia, L.R. 4 P.C. 212; The Pladda,

L. R. 2 P. D. 34; The Uhla, 19 L. T. N. S. 89.

Smith v. Scott, 4 Taunt. 125; The Kathleen, L. R. 4 A. & E. 269.

The shipowner will therefore, in such case, be liable to the shipper for loss or damage to his goods resulting from such collision.1

It is now settled that the owner of cargo lost by a collision, is not in eadem conditione with the owner of the vessel, as to his right to recover; for though both ships are to blame, the owner of the cargo not having any control over the blameworthy master and mariners of the vessel upon which his goods are carried, ought not to suffer for the breach of the rule; he is innocent, and the master, who is the guilty party, is not his servant."

The owner of the cargo, in case of loss or injury to his goods by collision, has his remedy by action, where both vessels are in fault, against either one or both; but he cannot recover, if he proceeds. against one only of two delinquent ships, more than a moiety of the damage, because it is impossible in practice to affix to the vessel proceeded against, more than a moiety of the blame, and the owner is therefore left, with respect to the other half of his loss, to his remedy against the other vessel which is equally delinquent.3

The Admiralty Court rule that in cases of collision the damages are to be equally divided where both ships are to blame, does not apply to actions for breach of contract of carriage, brought by owners

1 Grill v. Gen. I. S. Coll. Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 600; L. R. 3 C. P. 476.

2 The Milan, 31 L. J. Ad. 105, approved in The City of Manchester, L. R. 5 P. D. 221.

3 Ookerda Poonsey v. S. S. Savitri, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 409; The Milan, 31 L. J. Ad. 111.

Holidays.

of cargo against the carrying ship, to recover damages for loss of, or injury to, their goods, and hence the plaintiffs in such actions are entitled to recover their full damages from the owners of the carrying ship.1

Where cargo is lost in a collision, and the owners bring a suit to recover its value, the damages must be computed by taking the price paid at the port of shipment, and adding the expense of lading it on board, and of navigating the vessel to the place of collision; with interest on such account from the date of collision.2

Part IX. of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854,3 which limits the liability of the shipowner for damages to an extent beyond the value of his ship, and the freight due, or to grow due, in respect of such ship during the voyage, does not apply to foreign ships; therefore, where a foreign ship is to blame in a case of collision, her owners are responsible to the full extent of the damage done, though exceeding the value of the ship and freight.'

If a local holiday is not observed as a holiday by those who are loading or discharging the ship, it will count as a working day."

Where "holidays" are expressly excepted, and the ship is foreign to the place at which the work is being done, there may be a doubt, as to whether

1 The Bushire, 52 L. T. 740.

2 The Ocean Queen, 2 Asp. M. L. C. 419.

17 & 18 Vict. c. 104.

Cope v. Doherty, 27 L. J. Ch. 600; The Victor, 29 L. J. Ad. 110. · Holman v. Peruvian Nitrate Co., 5 Sc. Sess. Ca. (4) 657,