On an appeal from an order allowing exceptions to a Master's report, those parties only are entitled to be heard who were heard in the court below. Att.-Gen. v. Potter, 1 Ph. 492. On an appeal, none but the parties to it can be heard, but all parties, whether appellants or not, are entitled to be heard on a re-hearing. Hughes v. Turner, 4 L. J., Ch. 141. as her representative, did not admit assets to pay what should be found due from her estate to the husband's estate. On the 28th February, 1885, V. moved for judgment. There was no evidence before the court that Mrs. Y. was indebted to her husband's estate, or that she had been guilty of wilful neglect and default. R., by his counsel, admitted that she was so indebted, and he submitted to a judgment directing an account of Death of Appellant after Appeal set down-personal estate of the husband which she had Order of Revivor.]-A defendant, P., gave notice of appeal from a judgment, and set it down. After this he died, and his executrix obtained an order of course at the Rolls that the appeal might be carried on and prosecuted by her in like manner as it might have been carried on and prosecuted by P. if he had not died :-Held, that the order was sufficient, and that the executrix was entitled to proceed with the appeal. Ranson v. Patton, 17 Ch. D. 767; 44 L. T. 688-C. A. S. P., Chad wick v. Chadwick, 42 L. J., Ch. 805; L. R. 8 Ch. 926; 29 L. T. 284. Leave to Appeal to Person not Party-How Obtained.]-Leave to appeal from an order to a person interested in, but not a party to an action, may be obtained by an ex parte application to the Court of Appeal. Markham, In re, Markham v. Markham, 16 Ch. D. 1; 29 W. R. 228-C. A. Semble, that a person not a party to the record, but who wishes to appeal from a decree pronounced on motion for decree, should first obtain leave to serve a notice of motion to vary the order of the court below. Hodgson v. Smithson, 4 W. R. 699. Leave given on an ex parte application, to set down a petition of appeal where the appellant was not a party to the cause. Parmiter v. Parmiter, 3 De G. F. & J. 461. S. P., Leete v. Jenkins, 14 W. R. 489. Leave to a person not a party to the record to present a petition of appeal, may be granted either upon motion or petition ex parte. Parmiter v. Parmiter, 2 De G. F. & J. 526. received, or but for her wilful neglect or default Order Sanctioning Scheme of Arrangement.] An appeal by a person not a party to the record, but who appears without filing a supplemental bill in order to save expense, was allowed to be set down for hearing. Nickisson v. Cockill,-A person who has not in any way been made a 3 De G. J. & S. 622. An appeal lies at the suit of a tenant in tail in remainder, against a decree affecting his rights, had against a prior tenant in tail; and such remainderman may file a supplemental bill to make himself party in the former suit, for the purpose of appealing. Giffard v. Hort, 1 Sch. & Lef. 386. Person in Contempt.]-An agent being prosecuted for contempt in disobeying an order of which he had no notice, may join in an appeal from that order, though no party to the cause in which the order was made. Stone v. Byrne, 5 Bro. P. C. 213. Creditor's Administration Action.]-D., the residuary legatee of Mrs. Y., brought her action for administration of Mrs. Y.'s estate against R., the surviving executor. Mrs. Y. had been the surviving executrix of her husband. V one of the residuary legatees of the husband, shortly afterwards brought her action against R., as sole defendant, for administration of the husband's estate, alleging breaches of trust by Mrs. Y., and asking administration of her estate if R., party cannot, even if bound or aggrieved by the order, appeal without leave against an order sanctioning a scheme of arrangement under the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act, 1870. Securities Insurance Co., In re, 63 L. J., Ch. 777; [1894] 2 Ch. 410; 7 R. 217; 70 L. T. 609; 42 W. R. 465; 1 Manson, 289—C. A. One of a Class.]-In an action commenced by a bondholder on behalf of himself and all other bondholders, the plaintiff obtained an order for a receiver. One of the bondholders represented by the plaintiff, being dissatisfied with the order, applied for leave to appeal: Held, that the order having been made in favour of the class to which the applicant belonged, and having been obtained by the plaintiff, who represented him in the action, he could not appeal against it. Watson v. Cave, 17 Ch. D. 19; 44 L. T. 40; 29 W. R. 433-C. A. shareholder to pursue was to apply to the court Semble, the proper course for the dissentient below to be made a defendant to the action. Ib. When granted.]-Leave will not be given to a person to appeal from an order made in an action to which he is not a party, unless his interest is such that he might have been made a party by service. Crawcour v. Salter, 30 W. R. 329-C. A. Liquidator Leave to Appeal.]-See infra, LEAVE TO APPEAL. Removal of]-A liquidator who has been removed by a judge may appeal against his removal. Charlesworth, Er parte, Adam Eyton, Ld., In re, 57 L. J., Ch. 127; 36 Ch. D. 299; 57 L. T. 899; 36 W. R. 275-C. A. Executor Residuary Legatee.]-A bill had been filed against executors asking for certain inquiries and directions, and the court ultimately ordered that the conduct of the cause should be transferred from the surviving executor to the residuary legatee, that service of all notices or proceedings upon the executor should be dispensed with, and directed certain inquiries, certain other inquiries dependent upon them being directed to stand over. Upon answers being returned to the first-mentioned inquiries a further inquiry was ordered. Against this order the residuary legatee appealed. Upon this appeal the court refused to allow counsel for the executor to be heard. De Mora v. Concha, 29 Ch. D. 268 ; 33 W. R. 846-C. A. Representatives not Served.]-The representatives of a party who was held to be rightly made a party to a suit as legatee of leaseholds, not having been served with a petition of rehearing, on which a decree was made, affecting the party, time was allowed to present a petition of appeal to have the matters re-heard. Hickling v. Boyer, 3 Mac. & G. 635; 21 L. J., Ch. 388; 16 Jur. 137; 1 W. R. 1. In formâ pauperis.]-Where a party who has not sued or defended as a pauper in the court below, applies for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, the court will follow by analogy Ord. XVI. rr. 22, 23, and 24, and not the old practice as to such appeals. A married woman suing without a next friend, her husband not being a party, applied for leave to appeal in formâ pauperis:make the affidavit required by rule 22. Roberts, Held, that her husband as well as herself must In re, Kiff v. Roberts, 33 Ch. D. 265; 35 W. R. 176-C. A. Where a party who has not sued or defended as a pauper in the court below desires to appeal in formâ pauperis, the application for leave should be made ex parte to the Court of Appeal. The court will require the provisions of Ord. XVI. rr. 22-24, to be followed in such a case. Goldberg, Ex parte, 62 L. J., Q. B. 127; [1893] 1 Q. B. 417; 4 R. 232; 68 L. T. 142; 41 W. R. 210C. A. 4. TIME WITHIN WHICH APPEAL MUST BE BROUGHT. a. In what Cases. Time within which Appeals should be brought.] -Observations on the change of opinion in the legislature and the judges as to the period during which orders should be appealable. Curtis v. Sheffield, 51 L. J., Ch. 535; 21 Ch. D. 1; 46 L. T. 177; 30 W. R. 581-C. A. Time Limit does not apply to Notice by Respondent.]-A notice given by the respondent to of court, 1875, need not be given within the time an appeal under r. 6 of Ord. LVIII. of the rules limited by r. 15. Bishop, Ex parte, Fox, In re, 15 Ch. D. 400—C. A. New Trial-Divorce.]-Sect. 1 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1890, which requires. matter in the High Court to be heard by the every motion for a new trial in any cause or Court of Appeal, applies to divorce suits; conse quently, motions for a new trial in divorce suits are now governed by the Rules of the Supreme Court. Wilkins v. Wilkins, 65 L. J., P. 55; a [1896] P. 108; 74 L. T. 62; 44 W. R. 305—C. A. Service of Notice of Appeal on third party.] -An action was brought against a trustee to compel him to make good a loss occasioned by an improper investment. The trustee claimed to be indemnified by a third party whom he served with a third party notice; the defendant was held not liable, and the plaintiff appealed, but did not serve the third party with notice of the appeal :-Held, that the third party was not party directly affected by the appeal within Ord. LVIII. r. 2, and therefore it was not the duty of the plaintiff to serve the third party with notice of the appeal, but that the defendant ought before the hearing of the appeal to have applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to serve the third party with notice. Salmon, In re, Priest v. Uppleby, 42 Ch. D. 351; 61 L. T. 146; 38 W. R. 150-C. A. Test Action-Neglect of Defendant to Appeal -Substitution of other Defendant.]-Where by an order of the court all the defendants in several actions are bound by the result of a selected action, and the defendant in the selected action refuses to appeal against the judgment, the court has power to substitute another of the defendants for the purpose of prosecuting an appeal. Briton Medical and General Life Assurance v. Jones, 60 L. T. 637. But see Thomas v. Winter, 17 L. T. 148; 16 W. R. 82. Next Friend.]-Leave was given to a married woman to appeal by a next friend, who was a codefendant and respondent. Elliot v. Ince, 7 De G. M. & G. 475. "Final" Order-What is.]-An order is "final" only where it is made upon an application or proceeding which must in any event, whether it succeed or fail, finally determine the rights of the parties. Salaman v. Warner, 60 L. J., Q. B. 624; [1891] 1 Q. B. 734; 39 W. R. 547-C. A. Interlocutory or Final-Demurrer.]—An order overruling a demurrer which goes to the whole cause of action is not an interlocutory order within Ord. LVIII. r. 15. Trowell v. Shenton, 47 L. J., Ch. 738; 8 Ch. D. 318; 38 L. T. 369; 26 W. R. 837-C. A. Interlocutory Application.]—The time for appealing from an order which is final, though made on an interlocutory application, is one year. Att.-Gen. v. G. E. Ry., 48 L. J., Ch. 429; 40 L. T. 65; 27 W. R. 759—C. A. Judgment under Order XIV.]—An order empowering a plaintiff to sign judgment upon a specially indorsed writ is an interlocutory, and not a final proceeding, for it does not become effectual against the defendant until it has been | twenty-one days from the date thereof, under perfected by the further step of signing the judg- Ord. LVIII. r. 15. Highton v. Treherne, 48 L. J., ment; and, therefore, an appeal upon an order of Ex. 167; 39 L. T. 411; 27 W. R. 245—C. A. this kind made by one of the divisions of the High Court. must be brought before the expiration of twenty-one days. Standard Discount Co. v. La Grange, 47 L. J., C. P. 3; 3 C. P. D. 67; 37 L. T. 372; 26 W. R. 25—C. A. Interpleader Issue.]-Two actions having been brought relating to a cargo, an interpleader issue was directed to try the question to whom it belonged. It was tried by the Master of the Rolls, who made an order finding in favour of the defendants, and declaring them to be entitled to the cargo. Subsequently an order was made in the actions directing the proceeds of the cargo, which were in court, to be paid to the defendants-Held, that the former order was an interlocutory order from which an appeal could not be brought after twenty-one days. McAndrew v. Barker, 47 L. J., Ch. 340; 7 Ch. D. 701; 37 L. T. 810; 26 W. R. 317—C. A. An appeal from the decision of a judge on an interpleader issue tried by him without a jury must, under Ord. LVIII. r. 15, be brought within twenty-one days. McNair v. Audenshaw Paint Co., 60 L. J., Q. B. 770; [1891] 2 Q. B. 502; 65 L. T. 292; 40 W. R. 36-C. A. The judgment of the divisional court, affirming the judgment of a county court judge in an interpleader issue transferred to the county court under s. 17 of the Judicature Act, 1884, is a "final_order" within Ord. LVIII. r. 3. Hughes v. Little, 56 L. J., Q. B. 96; 18 Q. B. D. 32; 55 L. T. 476; 35 W. R. 36—C. A. Trial without Jury-Facts separate from Judgment.]-In an action in the Chancery Division, tried by a judge without a jury, if the judge takes upon himself the trial of specific questions of fact and finds his verdict upon them as a matter separate from the judgment which he gives upon that verdict, the judge's verdict upon the questions of fact is an interlocutory order and cannot be appealed from after the expiration of twenty-one days. Krehl v. Burrell, 48 L. J., Ch. 383; 10 Ch. D. 420; 39 L. T. 461; 27 W. R. 234-C. A. See cases ante, col. 391. An action in the Chancery Division to restrain the obstruction of a right of way claimed by the plaintiff over land belonging to the defendant,! was tried by a judge of the Chancery Division without a jury on the 4th and 6th December, and the judge having stated that he would first try the issue of fact whether the plaintiff was entitled to the alleged right of way, found that the plaintiff was entitled to the alleged right of way, and reserved his judgment on the finding to a future day. On the 28th January, upon motion for judgment by the plaintiff, the judge gave judgment in his favour, granting a mandatory injunction. In April the defendant gave notice of appeal from the order, which embodied both the finding of fact and the judgment: Held, that the appeal from the finding of fact ought to have been brought within twenty-one days from the 6th of December, and that the appeal could only proceed upon the footing that the plaintiff was entitled to the right of way. Ib. Rule Absolute for New Trial.]—An order absolute for a new trial is an interlocutory order, an appeal from which must be brought within Application Partly Refused and Partly Granted.]-On appeal by the plaintiff from an order made upon an application to unseal certain books and documents which was partly refused and partly granted, the defendants objected that, although the appeal was brought within twenty-one days of the drawing up of the order embodying the decision appealed from, it was not within twenty-one days from the date of the decision itself, and therefore the appeal was out of time :-Held, that, as the matters decided were not clearly severable, the objection failed. Jones v. Andrews, 58 L. T. 601-C. A. Order Partly Final and Partly Interlocutory.]-When an order on an interlocutory application and an order on further consideration are made at the same time and are included in one order, an appeal from the order on the interwithin twenty-one days, although such order in locutory application must nevertheless be brought effect determines the issue in the cause. mins v. Herron, 46 L. J., Ch. 423; 4 Ch. D. 787; 36 L. T. 41 ; 25 W. R. 325—C. A. Cum Special Case stated by ArbitratorOpinion of Court on.]-An action having been referred, with power for the arbitrator to state a special case, he stated a case for the opinion of the court on a point of law. The case was to be sent back to the arbitrator if the court was in favour of the plaintiff, and judgment was to be entered for the defendant if the court decided in favour of the latter. The court decided in favour of the plaintiff, and referred the matter back to the arbitrator:-Held, that it was a final and not an interlocutory order. Shubrook v. Tufnell, 9 Q. B. D. 621; 46 L. T. 749; 30 W. R. 740— C. A. An arbitrator to whom an action had been referred stated a case for the opinion of the court, asking for its decision upon certain points; the case was to go back to the arbitrator whichever way the court decided; on an appeal from the decision of the court :-Held, to be an interlocutory order within the meaning of Ord. LVIII. r. 15, and that it must be brought within twentyone days. Collins v. Paddington Vestry, 49 L. J., Q. B. 264, 612; 5 Q. B. D. 368; 42 L. T. 573; 28 W. R. 588-C. A. Case Stated by Sessions.]—A judgment given. by the Queen's Bench Division on a case stated by quarter sessions under 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45,. s. 11, is an interlocutory and not a final order. Peterborough Corporation v. Wilsthorpe Overseers, 53 L. J., M. C. 33; 12 Q. B. D. 1; 50 L. T. 189; 32 W. R. 458; 48 J. P. 373-C. A. Order in Administration Action.]—Although an order made on a summons by a creditor in an administration action is considered as interlocutory for the purpose of determining the time within which an appeal must be brought, for other purposes it is a final order, and therefore fresh evidence cannot be given on the appeal without the special leave of the court. Compton, In re, Norton v. Compton, 27 Ch. D. 392; 51 L. T. 277; 33 W. R. 160-C. A. In the course of an action to administer the estate of a deceased testatrix, in which further consideration had been adjourned, the plaintiffs, the executors and trustees of the will, took out a summons asking that they might be at liberty to make certain payments, out of moneys in their hands, to one of the annuitants, on account of his interest under the will. North, J., acceded to the application. Held, that the order of North, J., was interlocutory and not final; and that, therefore, an appeal from it, not being brought within fourteen days, was too late, and must be dismissed with costs. Gardner, In re, Long v. Gardner, 71 L. T. 412-C. A. After an action had been brought for the administration of a testator's estate the executrix carried on the testator's trade with his assets, and incurred a trade debt for which the creditor brought an action and obtained judgment and execution, under which he seized some of the testator's assets. The sheriff interpleaded, and the proceeds of the sale were paid into court in the administration action. The creditor took out a summons in the administration action claiming the proceeds of the sale, but his claim was refused-Held, that the order, although finally determining the rights of the parties, was an interlocutory order under the Rules of Court, 1875, Ord. LVIII. r. 15, and that an appeal must be brought within twenty-one days. Pheysey v. Pheysey, 12 Ch. D. 305; 41 L. T. 607-C. A. Order Depriving of Costs.]-The plaintiffs after a trial with a jury recovered 57., and the judge at the trial ordered judgment for that sum, but without costs. The divisional court reversed this judgment as to costs :-Held, that the appeal from the order of the divisional court was not an appeal from an interlocutory order. Marsden v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry., 50 L. J., Q. B. 318; 7 Q. B. D. 641; 44 L. T. 239; 29 W. R. 580-C. A. Originating Summons.]—An originating summons taken out under Ord. XV. r. 3, is a civil proceeding commenced otherwise than by writ in manner prescribed by a rule of court, and is consequently an action within the definition of that word in s. 100 of the Judicature Act, 1873. Therefore an order made upon such a summons is appealable at any time within one year from its date. Fawsitt, In re, Galland v. Burton, 54 L. J., Ch. 1131; 55 L. J., Ch. 568; 30 Ch. D. 231; 53 L. T. 271; 34 W. R. 26-C. A. An originating summons under Ord. LV. r. 3, is an action within the meaning of the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 100, and therefore it is not a "matter not being an action" within Ord. LVIII. r. 15. An appeal, therefore, can be brought from an order made on such a summons within a year from the date of the order. Vardon's Trusts, In re, 55 L. J., Ch. 259—C. A. Order on Further Consideration and on Summons to Vary Certificate.]-Where an order was made on further consideration and another order separate in form was made the same day dismissing a summons to vary the certificate on which the order on further consideration was made, and the two orders were separately drawn up on consecutive days :-Held, that there was in substance only one order, and consequently that Ord. LVIII. r. 15 (a), applied, and that the time for appealing would be the same as the time for appealing against the order on further consideration. The object of that rule was to get rid of the anomaly of having two different periods of time for appealing where a summons to vary and further consideration were heard together. Marsland v. Hole, 40 Ch. D. 110; 59 L. T. 593; 37 W. R. 81—C. A. Goods seized in execution were claimed by the trustees of a settlement made by the debtor. A decree was made in an interpleader suit directing an inquiry whether the settlement was a valid settlement of the goods, and who were entitled to them. The chief clerk certified that the settlement was invalid, and the judgment creditor entitled. By an order made on further consideration and on adjourned summons to vary the certificate, the court declared the settlement valid, and ordered the certificate to be varied Addition as to costs made to Decree.] accordingly, and directed the proceeds of the An addition made to a decree upon motion giving goods to be paid to the trustees :-Held, that the directions as to costs as to which the decree itself substantial part of this order was an order to was silent, is a portion of the decree, and there- vary the certificate, which was an interlocutory fore can be examined in an appeal from the order, and that an appeal brought after 21 days decree, and is not an interlocutory order within was too late. White v. Witt, 46 L. J., Ch. 560; the meaning of Ord. LVIII. r. 15. The City of 5 Ch. D. 589; 37 L. T. 110; 25 W. R. 435— Manchester, 49 L. J., P. 81; 5 P. D. 221; 42 | C. A. L. T. 521-C. A. - Review of Taxation.]—An appeal from an order directing a review of taxation must be brought within 21 days. Phillips, Ex parte, Watson, In re, 56 L. J., Q. B. 619; 19 Q. B. D. 234; 57 L. T. 215—C. A. Foreclosure Judgment.]-Under Ord. LVIII. r. 15, an order in the ordinary form of a foreclosure judgment, made under Ord. XV., is, for the purpose of an appeal from it, to be treated as a final order, and it can be appealed from at any time within a year, and the appeal can be heard though, since the notice was served, the foreclosure has been made absolute. Smith v. Davies, 55 L. J., Ch. 596; 31 Ch. D. 595; 54 L. T. 478-C. A. Striking out Statement of Claim.]—An order striking out a statement of claim on the ground that it discloses no cause of action is an interlocutory, not a final order; and consequently it must be appealed from within 21 days. Jones v. Insole, 64 L. T. 703; 39 W. R. 629-C. A. Law.-An order made under Ord. XXV. rr. 2 Order Dismissing Action upon Point of and 3, of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, dismissing an action upon a hearing before trial of a point of law raised by the pleadings, is not a "final" order within Ord. LVIII. r. 3. Salaman v. Warner, 60 L. J., Q. B. 624; [1891] 1 Q. B. 734; 39 W. R. 547—C. A. Order made after Judgment.]-An appeal by a plaintiff from a judgment dismissing his action having been dismissed with costs, the plaintiff | was made in the winding-up and in the action moved for liberty to set off against the costs sanctioning the arrangement and declaring that payable to the defendant L. under that order certain costs payable to the plaintiff by L., partly in that action and partly in another action between the same parties. G. claimed a lien upon those costs for his costs as L.'s solicitor in the first-mentioned action. The court made an order allowing the set-off, but as regards the costs in the secondly mentioned action subject to any lien G. could make out before the taxingmaster for his costs in the firstly mentioned action. G. appealed-Held, that as regards time for appealing, the order was interlocutory and not final, being only an order for working out the rights given by a final judgment. Blakey v. Latham, 43 Ch. D. 23; 38 W. R. 193—C. A. Case Stated by Revenue Commissioners.]The decision of a divisional court upon a case stated by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue under s. 19 of the Stamp Act, 1870, is an "order," and not a "judgment," and an appeal from such decision to the Court of Appeal must be brought within twenty-one days. Onslow v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, 59 L. J., Q. B. 556; 25 Q. B. D. 465; 63 L. T. 513; 38 W. R. 728C. A. Petition under Lands Clauses Act.]-A petition having been presented for payment out of court of a fund paid in under the Lands Clauses Act as the purchase-money of a devised estate, the court, on the 18th of June, made an order declaring the construction of the will and directing inquiries as to the persons interested. An application was made on behalf of some of the parties who were resident in America to extend the time for appealing to four weeks from the 8th of July, in order to allow time for the persons acting for them under a power of attorney to consult them as to appealing: Held, that the order was a final one. Jacques, In re, Carlisle Corporation, Ex parte, 18 Ch. D. 392; 45 L. T. 297; 30 W. R. 394-C. A. Order under Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874.-The time within which an appeal can be brought from an order under the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, s. 9, is twenty-one days. Blyth and Young. In re, 13 Ch. D. 416; 41 L. T. 746; 28 W. R. 266-C. A. Order under Trustee Relief Act.]-Under Ord. LVIII. rr. 9, 15, an appeal from an order made upon a petition under the Trustee Relief Act must be brought within twenty-one days. Baillie's Trusts, In re, 46 L. J., Ch. 330; 4 Ch. D. 785; 35 L. T. 917; 25 W. R. 310-C. A. Winding-up Order.]—A winding-up order is not an interlocutory order; and that the proper notice of appeal is a fourteen days' notice; but a four days' notice having been given, the court allowed it to be amended. Stockton Iron Furnace Co., In re, 48 L. J., Ch. 417; 10 Ch. D. 335; 27 W. R. 433; 40 L. T. 19. Order in Winding-up and in an Action.] -An action was brought by a debenture holder of a company on behalf of himself and the other debenture holders to enforce their securities. After this an order was made for winding-up the company. An arrangement was proposed for the making over the undertaking to the Secretary of State for India on certain terms, and an order no moneys payable by the Secretary of State to the stockholders and debenture holders of the company under the arrangement should be treated as assets of the company. An unsecured creditor of the company, who did not know of this order at the time when it was made, applied after a lapse of more than twenty-one days from his receiving a copy of the order, but within the time for appealing from a final order in an action, for leave to appeal against it :-Held, that as the applicant had no such interest that he could have been a party to the action the order must, as regarded him, be treated as an order made only in the winding-up, that Ord. LVIII. r. 9, applied, and that he was out of time. Madras Irrigation and Canal Co., In re, Wood v. Madras Irrigation and Canal Co., 23 Ch. D. 248; 49 L. T. 228-C. A. From Refusal of Application.]-When an interlocutory motion is refused, and the court at the same time makes an order as to the costs of the motion, this addition does not enlarge the time. for appealing, which still begins to run from the time of the refusal of the order, and not from the time of its being perfected by entry. Swindell v. Birmingham Syndicate, 45 L. J., Ch. 756; 3 Ch. D. 127; 35 L. T. 111; 24 W. R. 911—C. A.. |