Ord. LVIII. r. 15, limiting the time for bring-chambers. Munns and Longden, In re, 50 L. T. ing appeals, does not apply to the time for 536. making motions before a divisional court or a judge in court to discharge an order in chambers; but in the Chancery Division the practice is that no such motion shall be made without special leave after twenty-one days. Dickson V. Harrison, 47 L. J., Ch. 761; 9 Ch. D. 243; 38 L. T. 794; 26 W. R. 730-C. A. In an administration action by next of kin against administratrix, the conduct of which had been given to a creditor, an order was made, on the application of the administratrix, by the judge in chambers, directing the taxation of the costs of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the creditor, and the application of the funds in court in payment of a debt and then pro tanto of the costs when taxed, priority being given to the costs of the defendant. Liberty was also given to any of the parties to apply in chambers as to the getting in of an outstanding asset, and generally-Held, that this was an interlocutory order, and that a notice of motion in court to vary it, given after the expiration of twenty-one days, was too late. Lewis, In re, Lewis v. Williams, 31 Ch. D. 623; 54 L. T. 198; 34 W. R. 410-C. A. Where a motion was made to discharge an order made in chambers more than twenty-one days after such order had been pronounced, the court held that the motion was made too late, and refused it with costs. Hardwidge, In re, 52 L. T. 40. b. In Queen's Bench Division. Order under Law of Libel Amendment Act, 1888.]-An order of a judge at chambers made on an application under s. 8 of the Law of Libel Amendment Act, 1888, is a decision in a "criminal cause or matter," and no appeal lies therefrom to the divisional court. Pulbrook, Er parte, 61 L. J., Q. B. 91; [1892] 1 Q. B. 86; 66 L. T. 159; 40 W. R. 175; 17 Cox, C. C. 464; 56 J. P. 293. Time for Order made during Vacation.]-On an appeal from the decision of a judge at chambers given in vacation, two clear days' notice of motion must be given within five days, and for a day within eight days, after the deci sion, although no divisional court sits within the eight days. Steedman v. Hakim, 58 L. J., Q. B. 57; 22 Q. B. D. 16; 37 W. R. 208-C. A. Affirming, 59 L. T. 607. S. P., Hobbs v. Mead, 53 J. P. 40. Delay in Drawing up Order.]—In appealing from the decision of a judge sitting at chambers it is not necessary to wait until the order has been drawn up by the party succeeding before the judge. If the order is not drawn up within the time limited for appealing and the party desirous of appealing waits until such order is served upon him, and is thereby out of time, the court will not extend the time for serving notice of appeal. Watson v. Hope, 53 J. P. 311. Where a summons, taken out on the 25th March, was heard on the 30th June, when the chief clerk made no order, and on the 23rd Oct. the chief clerk refused an application to adjourn the time within which to serve notice of motion Calculation-Sunday.] — In calculating it into court on the ground of lapse of time; on summons on the 29th Oct. for the opinion of the by way of appeal from an order of a judge at judge upon the chief clerk's refusal to make an chambers, Sundays cannot be excluded; so that order upon the summons of the 25th March:- could be served was a Sunday, and notice of when the last day on which notice of motion Held, that though no time was limited for an adjournment into court by s. 50 of the Judi-held that the notice was out of time. motion was not given until the Monday, it was Chambon v. cature Act, 1873, the court would not hesitate to Heighway, 54 J. P. 520. act by analogy, and the application being in the nature of an appeal from the summons of the 25th March, should have been made within twenty-one days from the hearing of that sumNorwich Equitable Fire Insurance Co., In re, Brasnett's Case, 51 I. T. 620; 33 W. R. 270. mons. Appeal to Court of Appeal from Refusal.] -Where a party moved to discharge a final order made in chambers after the expiration of twentyone days, and the judge refused to hear it because it was too late, quære, whether the motion was made within the terms of the 50th section of the Judicature Act, 1873, so as to give the party a right to appeal. Giles, In re, Real and Personal Advance Co. v. Michell, supra. Further Evidence.]-Where a summons has been heard by a judge personally in chambers, and he has given his decision upon it, further evidence, which was not before his Lordship in chambers, will not be received without leave upon a motion in court to discharge the order made in chambers. Rouse, In re, Rouse v. Trible, 59 L. T. 887. After a summons has been heard by the judge specially in chambers, and he has given his decision upon it, further evidence, which was not before him in chambers, will not be received upon motion in court to discharge the order made in Ord. LIV. r. 6, for appealing from a decision at When the last of the eight days, limited by chambers expires on a Sunday, the appellant has the following Monday for appealing. Taylor v. Jones, 45 L. J., C. P. 110; 34 L. T. 131. See TIME. Previous Notice.]-Ord. LIV. r. 6 (as amended R. March, 1879, r. 8), which directs that an appeal from a decision at chambers shall be made within eight days, applies to decisions at chambers during the long vacation; and if that period has elapsed without the sitting of a divisional court, the right to appeal is lost, unless the party decided against obtains an extension of time. An order empowering the plaintiff to sign judgment upon a specially indorsed writ, was made by a judge at chambers upon the 29th of August; the time for appealing to a divisional court was on the 2nd of September, extending conditionally upon payment into court of the sum sued for within fourteen days. This condition was never fulfilled, and no divi sional court sat during the long vacation. Upon the first day of Michaelmas sittings, the defendant moved the Exchequer Division to set aside the order made upon the 29th of August :-Held, that as more than eight days had elapsed since the order was made, no appeal could lie. v. Sheffield, 48 L. J., Ex. 385; 4 Ex. D. 150; 40 L. T. 539-C. A. Runt: An order having been made in chambers on the 20th of June, the defendant, on the 24th, gave notice of appeal to a divisional court for Saturday, the 28th. The court sat on the 26th to hear motions, and was sitting on the 28th, but not for the purpose of hearing motions. The defendant brought forward his motion on the 30th, being the next day on which the court sat to hear motions:-Held, that the appeal motion was out of time, since a court to which an application to enlarge the time could be made had been sitting within the eight days. Stirling v. Du Barry, 5 Q. B. D. 65; 28 W. R. 405-C. A. When notice of motion of appeal from a decision in chambers was given on the eighth day after the decision:-Held, that under Ord. LIV. r. 6, it was too late, as the notice must be given so that the motion can be heard within eight days after the decision appealed against. For v. Wallis, 2 C. P. D. 45; 35 L. T. 690; 25 W. R. 287-C. A. By Ord. LIV. r. 6, appeals from chambers "shall be by motion, and shall be made within eight days after the decision appealed against." It is not a sufficient compliance with this rule to give notice of motion within eight days. Deykin v. Coleman, 36 L. T. 195; 25 W. R. 294-C. A. A judge at chambers having made an order on the 29th of August, the party affected by such order moved the divisional court to rescind it during the Michaelmas sittings within eight days from the commencement of such sittings:Held, that the application was too late, inasmuch as by Ord. LIV. r. 6, an appeal from a judge at chambers must be within eight days from the decision appealed against. Crom v. Samuels, 46 L. J., C. P. 1; 2 C. P. D. 21; 35 L. T. 423; 25 W. R. 45. When an appellant from chambers has only the eighth and last day whereon to move, and it happens that no divisional court sits on that day, the right of appeal is not lost, but the appellant must move the next practical court. Forrest v. Davis, 26 W. R. 534. which was allowed by the defendant to expire, and another order at chambers was afterwards made refusing leave to enlarge the time within which the first order might be contested. An appeal was then taken to the divisional court against the second order, when that court desired that the notice of motion should be considered as amended so as to include the first order :Held, that the two orders were thus brought fully before the court, and the judgment then given must be taken as applicable to both of them. Wallingford v. Mutual Society, 50 L. J., Q. B. 49; 5 App. Cas. 685; 43 L. T. 258; 29 W. R. 81-H. L. (E.) For the same reason, in an appeal against that judgment, the Court of Appeal must be considered to have had both the orders brought under its revision, and on an appeal to the House of Lords both the orders and both the judgments were brought into discussion. Ib. Fresh Affidavit.]-The divisional court on an appeal from chambers will, as a matter of convenience, allow a new affidavit made since the date of the order at chambers to be read. Robinson v. Bradshaw, 32 W. R. 95. Costs.]-Costs follow a reversal of a decision of a judge at chambers. Friend v. L. C. & D. Ry., 25 W. R. 735—C. A. c. In Probate and Admiralty Division. Order of Registrar Reviewed by Judge in Chambers.]-An order made by a registrar sitting as judge under Ord. LIV. is not, for the purposes of the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 50, an order made by a judge in chambers, and hence, where such an order has been reviewed by a judge in court, an appeal from the judge's decision will lie without special leave. The Vivar, 2 P. D. 29; 35 L. T. 782; 25 W. R. 453—C. A. Leave to Appeal to Court of Appeal.]-The practice with reference to appealing from orders in chambers in the Probate Division is the same as that which is followed in the Chancery Division-namely, that special leave must be obtained from the judge, which leave is signified by a certificate from the judge that he does. not require to hear any further argument in the case. Smith, In re, Rigg v. Hughes, 53 L. J., P. 62; 9 P. D. 68; 50 L. T. 293; 32 W. R. 355— C. A. Extension of Time.]-By one of the general orders of the Judicature Act, 1875, eight days only are given for an appeal to the divisional court against an order made by a judge at chambers-Held, that that limitation of time does not affect the right to appeal against an order made in vacation at chambers, when no divisional court would be sitting within the eight days. The time for appealing against such an VI. TO JUDGE AT CHAMBERS. order ought, almost as a matter of course, to be enlarged. Wallingford v. Mutual Society, 50 From Official Referee-Interlocutory Matter.] L. J., Q. B. 49; 5 App. Cas. 685; 43 L. T. 258;-An official referee, to whom an action is re29 W. R. 81-H. L. (E.) Where an order had been made at chambers, and the eight days had, under such circumstances, expired without an appeal to the divisional court, the fact that an execution had in the meantime issued, makes no difference in the matter. Ib. Under Ord. VII. r. 6, the court or a judge has power to enlarge the time for appealing against an order in chambers, notwithstanding that the time for appealing has elapsed, and that the action stands dismissed under the order. Carter v. Stubbs, 50 L. J., Q. B. 161; 6 Q. B. D. 116; 43 L. T. 746; 29 W. R. 132—C. A. What Orders are before Court of Appeal.]-An order at chambers was made refusing leave to defend, except on terms, the time for performing ferred for trial, has jurisdiction to make an order granting a commission to examine witnesses. abroad, and a judge at chambers has jurisdiction to review the decision of an official referee granting or refusing such an order. Hayward v. Mutual Reserve Association, [1891] 2 Q. B. 236; 65 L. T. 491; 39 W. R. 624. Sheriffs' Costs-Taxation-Review of.]-A taxation of sheriffs' costs and charges by a master of the Supreme Court or district registrar of the High Court, under the general order as to fees of the 31st of August, 1888, made in pursuance of the Sheriffs Act, 1887, is not the subject of review under the provision of Ord. LXV. r. 27 (39-41) of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Such taxation is a mere calculation of amount, and, per se, fixes no liability on the person assessed. Townend v. Yorkshire (Sheriff), 59 | v. Watts, 52 L. J., Ch. 209; 22 Ch. D. 1; 48 L. J., Q. B. 156: 24 Q. B. D. 621; 62 L. T. 402; L. T. 167; 31 W. R. 262—C. A. 38 W. R. 381; 54 J. P. 598. Interpleader-Summary Decision-Leave.]An appeal lies to a judge at chambers from the summary decision by a Master disposing of the merits of the claims in an interpleader where special leave to appeal has been given by such Master. Webb v. Shaw, 55 L. J., Q. B. 249; 16 Q. B. D. 658; 54 L. T. 216; 34 W. R. 415. Quære whether an appeal does not lie without leave to a judge at chambers, under Ord. LIV. r. 21, from every order or decision of a Master at chambers, including a decision in an interpleader proceeding by a Master in a summary way under Ord. LVII. r. 8. Bryant v. Reading, 55 L. J., Q. B. 253; 17 Q. B. D. 128; 54 L. T. 524; 34 W. R. 496-C. A. Upon the true construction of Ord. LIV. rr. 12 and 21, and Ord. LVII. rr. 8 and 11, an appeal lies from a summary decision of a Master in an interpleader proceeding to a judge at chambers. Clench v. Dooley, 56 L. T. 122. Appeal for Costs.]-The enactment in s. 49 of the Judicature Act, 1873, that no order by the High Court, or any judge thereof, as to costs only which by law are left to the discretion of the court, shall be subject to any appeal, does not apply to the order of a Master or district registrar, and therefore a judge of such court has power to vary as to costs an order of a district registrar dismissing the action without costs. Foster v. Edwards, 48 L. J., Q. B. 767. Time for Appealing.]-In order that an appeal from a Master to a judge at chambers may be in time, according to Ord. LIV. r. 4, it is not sufficient that the appeal summons should be taken out within four days from the Master's decision, but it must be heard or adjourned within the four days. Bell v. North Staffordshire Ry., 48 L. J., Q. B. 518; 4 Q. B. D. 205; 27 W. R. 263. Extension of Time for Appeal.]-Within four days from the decision of a Master at chambers, an appeal summons was taken out and made returnable at a date after the expiration of the four days, but on the first day when any judge would sit at chambers:-The court held, that, under the circumstances, the time might be enlarged under Ord. LVII. r. 6, and that no summons for that purpose was necessary under Ord. LIV. r. 1. Gibbons v. London Financial Association, 48 L. J., C. P. 514; 4 C. P. D. 263; 27 W. R. 619. On the 2nd November an order was made dismissing an action unless a statement of claim was delivered within seven days, and on the 9th November this time was extended by three days. On the 14th November the plaintiff delivered his statement of claim, and on the following day the defendant drew up and served the order of the 2nd November. On the 17th November the Master, and subsequently a judge, made an order that the statement of claim do stand:-Held, that the time of appealing from the order of the 2nd November should be extended. Metcalf v. British Tea Association, 46 L. T. 31. VII. FROM CHIEF CLERK TO JUDGE. Adjournment to Judge.]-An adjournment from the chief clerk to the judge in person is not in the nature of an appeal. Watts, In re, Smith In what Cases.]-A disallowance by the Master of a claim made under the Winding-up Acts is the subject matter of an appeal. Ernest v. Nicholls, 6 H. L. Cas. 401. The Lord Chancellor would not, in causes depending in the courts of the vice-chancellors. hear motions by way of appeal from orders of the Master giving or refusing leave to amend. Coombes v. Warwick, 1 Coop. C. C. 282. The appeal from an order, made by one of the Masters under the statute 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 94, s. 13, in a cause set down at the Rolls, is not to the Lord Chancellor, but to the Master of the Rolls. Hill v. Gomme, 3 Myl. & C. 503; 8 L. J., Ch. 101; 2 Jur. 1057. The Master, upon an application to him under s. 13 of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 94, had made an order for enlarging application in a suit :-Held, that upon the language of the statute the court could not, upon an appeal by motion from that order, receive in evidence affidavits which had not been used before the Master. Parkyn v. Cape, 18 L. J., Ch. 392; 13 Jur. 690. stated certain facts, but reserved the point to done. Stott v. Meanock, 31 L. J., Ch. 746; 6 APPEARANCE. APPOINTMENT. See POWERS. Of Trustees. See CHARITY-TRUST. APPORTIONMENT. WHAT RIGHTS APPORTIONABLE. 1. In General, 477. 2. Annuities and Rent-charges, 479. 5. Of Costs.-See COSTS. 6. Of Compensation.-See LANDS CLAUSES Аст. 7. Of Rent on Sale of Leaseholds. - See VENDOR AND PURCHASER. 8. Of Mortgages and other Charges.-See MORTGAGE. 9. Of Purchase Money.-See VENDOR AND PURCHASER. 10. Of Charitable Gifts to Parishes.-See that the award was an instrument under which ECCLESIASTICAL LAW. the rent-charge was payable" within s. 2 of 4 & 11. Tenant for Life and Remainderman.- 5 Will. 4, c. 22, and therefore the rent-charge was See ESTATE. WHAT RIGHTS APPORTIONABLE. 1. IN GENERAL. Under 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 22.]—Where it can be predicated that the interest mentioned in s. 2 of 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 22, has been determined, the rents and other payments there mentioned shall be apportioned; but where this cannot be predicated there shall be no apportionment. Clulow, In re, 3 Kay & J. 689; 26 L. J., Ch. 513; 5 W. R. 544. The instrument referred to in the Apportionment Act is not the instrument creating the periodical payments, but that creating a life interest therein. Knight v. Broughton, 12 Beav. 312; 19 L. J., Ch. 66. The statute 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 22, requires, in order to exclude apportionment, either an express direction that there shall be none, or language so express in the terms of gift, that apportionment is clearly impossible, consistently with it. Inference from the whole will is not sufficient to exclude the operation of the statute. Tyrrell v. Clark, 2 Drew. 86; Eq. R. 333; 23 L. J., Ch. 283; 18 Jur. 323; 2 W. R. 152. This statute applies to cases in which the interest of the person is terminated by his death, or by the death of another person; but does not apply to a tenant in fee, or provide for apportionment of rent between the real and personal representative where the interest does not terminate at death. Browne v. Amyot, 3 Hare, 173; 13 L. J., Ch. 232. S. P., Beer v. Beer, 12 C. B. 60; 21 L. J., C. P. 124; 16 Jur. 223. Salary.]-Where A. was appointed auditor and manager of B.'s estates at a salary payable halfyearly, and B. revoked the appointment in the middle of a current year-Held, that 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 22, s. 2, did not enable A. to recover a proportionate part of the salary. Lowndes v. Stamford and Warrington (Earl), 18 Q. B. 425; 21 L. J., Q. B. 371; 16 Jur. 903. The statute does not include a payment under a contract between employer and employed, for services performed. Ib. The clerk of the crown resigned in the middle of the half year :-Held, entitled to recover from his successor, as money had and received, an apportioned part of that half-year's salary. Treacy v. Corcoran, Ir. R. 8 C. L. 40. Taxes.]-Land-tax, quit rents, &c., are not apportioned as between tenant for life and the remainderman. Sutton v. Chaplin, 10 Ves. 66. Tithes.]-Composition for tithes, received after the death of the incumbent by the successor, apportioned. Aynsley v. Wordsworth, 2 Ves. & B. 331. Where the rector died in January :-Held, that the representative of the deceased rector was entitled to recover an apportionment of the composition of the year's tithe up to his death. Oldham v. Hubbard, 2 Y. & Coll. C. C. 200. Upon the death of a tenant for life of tithes which were commuted for a rent-charge :-Held, apportionable. Heasman v. Pearse, L. R. 8 Eq. 599. Right of Turbary under a Demise.]-A., by deed, demised lands to B. and C., and convenanted that B. and C., "their executors, administrators and assigns, should and might from time to time, and at all times during the grant, raise and carry away from off certain sufficient to be expended on the premises." B. lands" (not included in the lease), "turf and C. partitioned the lands, and the court granted B.'s moiety to D., with the appurtenances :-Held, that the right of turbary was apportionable, and that D. was entitled to a Ir. C. L. R. 368. share. Hargrove v. Congleton (Lord), 12 Under Apportionment Act, 1870.]-The 33 & 34 Vict. c. 35, is retrospective and makes every species of income, from whatever source derived, apportionable as between tenant for life and remainderman, where the tenant for life dies after the passing of that act. Thatcher's Trust, In re, 28 L. T. 56; 21 W. R. 285. The Apportionment Act, 1870, applies to every will executed before, and confirmed by a codicil executed after, its passing; and, semble, also to every will coming into operation after its passing. Constable v. Constable, 48 L. J., Ch. 621; 11 Ch. D. 681; 40 L. T. 516. The Apportionment Act, 1870, applies as between the real and personal representatives, where a will has been made before and the testator has died after the passing of the act. Hasluck v. Pedley, 44 L. J., Ch. 143; L. R. 19 Eq. 271; 23 W. R. 155. Personalty Specifically Bequeathed.]The income arising from personalty specifically bequeathed is not apportionable under the Apportionment Act, 1870, as betwen the specific legatee and the estate of the testator. Whitehead v. Whitehead, L. R. 16 Eq. 528; 29 L. T. 289. Death of Tenant for Life after Act-Will.] -A testator who died before the Apportionment Act, 1870, came into operation, gave the income of his residuary estate to his wife for life. The widow under the old law received the entire dividends upon the railway stock which became receivable after the testator's death. On the death of the widow:-Held, that the executors of the widow were entitled, under the new law, to an apportioned part of the dividends up to her death. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 53 L. J., Ch. 982; 26 Ch. D. 795; 50 L. T. 715; 32 W. R. 791. Dividends.]-A testator, after the Apportionment Act, 1870, bequeathed -. to trustees, such sum to carry interest at 4 per cent. until paid or appropriated, upon trust, to invest in certain specified securities, and to pay the annual income of the legacy and the investments thereof, to his wife for life, with remainders over. Interest was paid to the widow until the bequeathed sum was invested in stocks on some of which five months' dividend had accrued:- Held that the Apportionment Acts did not apply, and that the widow was entitled to the whole of the dividends upon the purchased stocks. Clarke, In re, A testator, bequeathed all his "moneys due on mortgage, securities for money, and ready money," upon trust for his children. Part of the property consisted of the proportion of dividend on consols to the date of the testator's death Held, that this did not pass, as the Apportionment Act, 1870, applied. Beaven, In re, Beaven v. Beaven, 53 L. T. 245. Covenant-Tenant for Life.]-A. covenanted on his marriage to pay an annuity to his wife during her life. By his will he confirmed the annuity, and devised his residuary real and personal estate to his wife for life :-Held, that the payments were apportionable between the value of the life estate and of the reversion. Yates v. Yates, 6 Jur. (N.s.) 1023. Death of Tenant for Life-Purchase of Life Interest.]-A. had an interest in S. S. annuities for life, and died before the Christmas dividend. The purchaser of his life-interest is not entitled to the accruing dividend. Pearly v. Smith, 3 Atk. 260. nature of annuity not apportioned in favour of Rights of Executor.]-Interest by will in the Shares Settled on Marriage.]-A grandfather bequeathed his residuary personal estate for his two granddaughters at twenty-one or marriage, and directed that in case either of them should marry under twenty-one, their shares should be settled in the usual form. The granddaughters married under twenty-one, one in 1867, and the other after the passing of 33 & 34 the executor of the tenant for life. Franks v. Vict. c. 35-Held, that in both cases the income-oble, 12 Ves. 484. of the trust funds was apportionable down to the date of the respective marriages. Clive v. Clive, 41 L. J., Ch. 386; L. R. 7 Ch. 433; 26 L. T. 409; 20 W. R. 477. to be invested in bank annuities, charged it Testator, after directing the rents of his estates with the payment of 150l. a year to his wife during her life :-Held, that the executors of the wife were entitled to a proportionate part of the 150l. for the interval between the death of the wife and the last preceding payment. Carter v. Taggart, 16 Sim. 447. Payment ordered by Court.]-A testator gave Deficiency of Assets-Capital and Income.] -A testator bequeathed 20,000l. with interest from his death at 4 per cent. upon trust to pay the income to one for life, and after her death for other persons. The estate was insufficient for payment of his legacies, and the realisation an annuity to A. for life, no period of payment being mentioned. The court ordered the first of his assets occupied several years :-Held, that moneys received by the trustees and applicable payment to be made one year after the testator's to the legacy were divisible rateably between Held, that the annuity must be apportioned. death. The annuitant died eight days before:capital and income, so as to attribute to income Trimmer v. Danby, 23 L. J., Ch. 979; 2 W. R. 380. 47. per. cent. from the testator's death on the amount attributed to capital. Tinkler's Estate, In re, L. R. 20 Eq. 456. 2. ANNUITIES AND RENT-CHARGES. Terminable Annuity.]-A terminable annuity is apportionable under 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 22. Sutton v. Ennis, Ir. R. 4 Eq. 325; 18 W. R. 882. Tenant for Life-Rent-Charge.]—A tenant for life granted a rent-charge, chargeable on lands, for the life of the grantor, with an apportionment clause in the event of the death of the grantee between two days of payment. The grantor died between the days of payment:-Held, first, that independently of the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 22, there could be no apportionment. Held, secondly, that the court could not imply an apportionment on the death of the grantor. Annuities, independently of the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 22, are not apportionable, unless granted for the maintenance of infants, or married women living separate from their husbands. Leathley v. French, 8 Ir. Ch. R. 401. By an order of the court, an annuity of 1007. was directed to be paid to W. during her life :— Held, that the annuity was apportionable to the day of her death. Thacker's Trusts, In re, 28 L. T. 56; 21 W. R. 285. Payable Half-Yearly.]-Where an annuity is payable half-yearly, viz., at Lady-day and Michaelmas, and the annuitant dies at Michaelmas-day, after sunset, his executors shall have the half-year's interest. Rokingham v. Penrice, 1 P. Wms. 179; Salk. 578. Where an annuity was granted to A. during the joint lives of B. and C., payable on the 1st of May and 1st of November in each year, to pay the same to B. during the joint lives of B. and C., and then to C. if she survived:-Held, that C. having survived B., and died on the morning of the 1st of May, A. was entitled to the entire 2 Ir. C. L. R. 370. sum due upon that day. Robinson v. Robinson, of a fund in court, half-yearly at Midsummer and Annuity payable quarterly ordered to be paid out Christmas; the annuitant having died between Lady-day and Midsummer, her representative is entitled to a quarter to Lady-day. Webb v. Maintenance.]-An annuity given for main-Shaftesbury (Lord), 11 Ves. 361. tenance, and charged upon land for a certain Testator gave an annuity, payable half-yearly, time, which ceased before the time at which to his son for his maintenance until twenty-one, the annuity was payable, the annuitant was held entitled to an apportionment of the annuity for the time between the last payment and the cessation of the charge. Sheppard v. Wilson, 4 Hare, 395; 9 Jur. 920. And see preceding case. Married Woman.]-An annuity bequeathed to a married woman, for her sole and separate use, is not apportionable. Secus, if it has been given as a separate maintenance. Semble, Anderson v. Dwyer, 1 Sch. & Lef. 301. and another annuity, payable in like manner, to his daughter during the son's minority-Held, that as the son was entitled to a proportional part of his annuity up to his attaining twentyone, the daughter was entitled to a like proportion. Weigal v. Brome, 6 Sim. 99. Payable Quarterly.]-A testator gave an annuity for life, and an annuity for twenty-one years from his death, both payable by four equal quarterly payments on the usual quarter-days:— Held, that a proportional part only of each |