that upon the true construction of the Act the lord of the manor was not deprived of his rights as owner of the soil in the turf common, but was entitled to so much of the purchase-money as represented the value of those rights.-(L.R. [1893] A.C., p. 1.)

Local Government—By-laws — New Building-Deposit of Plan— Deviation from Plan.

By one of the by-laws of an urban sanitary authority, made under s. 157 of the Public Health Act, 1875, every person intending to erect a building was required to give to the sanitary authority notice in writing of such intention, and at the same time to deliver or send to the clerk or surveyor complete plans and sections of every floor of the intended building, shewing the position, form, and dimensions of the several parts of the building. Another by-law empowered the sanitary authority to remove, alter, or pull down work done in contravention of any by-law relating to new buildings; but there was no by-law directed against persons building contrary to deposited plans.

The respondent gave notice to the urban sanitary authority of his intention to build a house, and sent in plans, which were approved. During the progress of the building he made substantial alterations or deviations from the plans, which chiefly consisted in diminishing the height of certain of the floors; but such alterations did not contravene any of the by-laws, there being no by-law regulating the height of rooms in new buildings. The respondent was summoned on a charge of erecting a building without sending in complete plans and sections of every floor as required by the by-laws. The justices dismissed the

summons:

Held, that as the erection of the building was no longer proceeding in accordance with the deposited plans, the respondent was bound to send in fresh plans in accordance with the change in his intention, and, having omitted to do so, was liable to be convicted.-(L. R. [1893] 1 Q. B., p. 355.)

(484.)

GOVERNORS OF BRIDEWELL HOSPITAL AND OTHERS v. WARD, LOCK, BOWDEN, AND CO.

[DECEMBER 20TH, 1892.]

Ancient lights-User for more than nineteen and less than twenty years— Inchoate right-Injunction—Prescription Act (2 and 3 Will. 4, c. 71), sect. 3.

The plaintiffs were owners and lessees of buildings having windows the access of light to which over adjoining land was claimed to have

been enjoyed for more than nineteen and less than twenty years. The defendants, the owners of the adjoining land, were proceeding to erect thereon buildings of a permanent character, which, if completeȧ, would obstruct the plaintiffs' light.

The plaintiffs brought this action, and now moved to restrain the further erection of the defendants' building. They contended that they were entitled to an injunction by way of protection to their inchoate right, which in a few months would under sect. 3 of the Prescription Act ripen into an absolute and indefeasible right.

Held, that there being no precedent for granting such an injunction, and the case not being one in which the property would be destroyed if an injunction was not granted, the motion must be refused.

Held, that, if the defendants ran up their buildings, these at the end of twenty years would constitute an interference with the plaintiffs' ancient lights, and would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the court, but the court would not intervene to protect this inchoate right.

The plaintiffs in this action were the Corporation of London, as governors of Bridewell Hospital, the owners, and William Collins, Sons, and Co., the lessees, of Nos. 4 and 5, Bridewell Place, Blackfriars.

On the 25th April 1873 the land was let to Messrs. Collins and Co. on a building agreement; the houses were finished in November 1873, the windows being put in in the summer.

The plaintiffs claimed the access of light to their windows for more than nineteen and less than twenty years over the adjoining land to the west of their premises.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, Messrs. Ward, Lock, Bowden, and Co., the owners of the said adjoining land, had pulled down the old buildings and wall standing on the land to the west of plaintiffs' premises, and were proceeding to erect thereon buildings of a permanent character, which, if completed, would obstruct the plaintiffs' light.

The plaintiffs brought this action, and now moved to restrain the defendants from building on land adjoining, and to the west of the premises, Nos. 4 and 5, Bridewell Place, Blackfriars, so as to darken, injure, or obstruct the light or air coming to the windows in the said premises, as the same was enjoyed previously to the taking down of the buildings and wall lately standing on the said adjoining land to the west of the said premises.

Sect. of the Prescription Act 1832 provides as follows:

"When the access and use of light to and for any dwelling-house, workshop, or other building, shall have been actually enjoyed therewith for the full period of twenty years without interruption, the right thereto shall be deemed absolute and indefeasible, any local usage or custom to the contrary notwithstanding, unless it shall appear that the same was enjoyed by some consent or agreement, expressly made or given for that purpose by deed or writing."

KEKEWICH, J.—It is conceded that there is no precedent for such an injunction as I am asked to grant, and I am not disposed to create There are cases in the books in which it has been held that where

one.

à person has no actual legal claim to the interference of the court at the present moment, but in the ordinary course of things will have a legal claim after the lapse of a year or more, and the property in respect of which the claim will arise is in the meantime likely to disappear, he can invoke the interference of the court to prevent its disappearance. As for example, where there is a statutory power of sale at the end of three years, the court has interfered to restrain the property which will be saleable at the end of three years from being made away with in the meantime. The argument on behalf of the plaintiffs, as I regard the case, tells the other way. The plaintiffs say, if no injunction is granted, the building will be run up, and at the end of a few months will be a building interfering with their ancient lights. But if so, the building will be amenable to the jurisdiction of the court, and I can grant exemplary damages or a mandatory injunction. If there is any inconvenience, it is due to the fact that the plaintiff has no right at present. At the end of the time he will be just as well off as if an injunction were granted now, except that he will have to prove his case. I do not think I ought to start a new series of cases, and grant an injunction to prevent the defendant from doing that which, so far as it goes, he is entitled to do now, however wrong it may be at the end of the time. The motion must be refused without costs.-(L.T., Ch. D., vol. lxviii., N.S., p. 212.)

(485.)

[PRIVY COUNCIL.]

JAMES, DEFENDANT; STEVENSON AND OTHERS, PLAINTIFFS.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA.

[NOVEMBER 24TH AND 25TH, 1892, AND FEBRUARY 11TH, 1893.] Victoria Transfer of Land Statute-Certificate-Easement-Evidence to shew Abandonment.

In an action by the respondents to assert a right of way which had been granted by the appellant's predecessor by deed in 1839 over his land, and along the boundary which divided land retained by him from land conveyed to the respondents' predecessor, the appellant pleaded that it had been abandoned :

:

Held, that abandonment being a question of intention, non-user by the respondents, coupled with user by the appellant for farm purposes, of portions of land, subject to the easement, when the easement was not required, could not prove an abandonment of the entire right, and were inconclusive to prove an abandonment of portions thereof :

Held, that the omission in the appellant's and respondents' certificate of title to their respective lands under the Transfer of Land Statute to record the easement, did not bar the respondents' claim or relieve the servient tenement of its liability.-(L.R. [1893] A.C., p. 162.)

(486.)

NATIONAL TELEPHONE COMPANY v. BAKER. [DECEMBER 13TH, 14TH, AND 15TH, 1892; AND JANUARY 12TH, 13TH, AND 17TH, AND FEBRUARY 4TH, 1893.]

Nuisance-Electricity-Damage-Telephone Company-Tramway Com

pany.

A man who creates on his land an electric current for his own purposes, and discharges it into the earth beyond his control, is on the principle of Fletcher v. Rylands as responsible for damage caused by that current as he would have been if, instead, he had discharged a stream of water. Where the act is done in pursuance of a provisional order of the Board of Trade, it is protected to the same extent as other nuisances under statutory authority.

A tramway company, acting under a provisional order and using the best known system of electrical traction, caused electrical disturbance in the wires of a telephone company acting under license from the Postmaster-General :

Held, that the tramway company are protected from liability for nuisance. (L. R. [1893] 2 Ch., p. 186.)

(487.)

[IN THE COURT OF APPEAL.]

RAMSEY v. CRUDDAS AND OTHERS.

[DECEMBER 17TH, 1892.]

Common-Copyhold—Custom for Lord to make Grants of WasteConsent of Homage-Enfranchisement-Statutory Reservation of Right of Common-Copyhold Act, 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 51), s. 45. Where a custom existed in a manor for the lord, with the consent of the homage, to make grants of portions of the waste, to be held on copyhold tenure, although a sufficiency of common was not left:

Held, that such a grant might be made by the lord, with the consent of the homage, as against a commoner, although his tenement had been enfranchised under the Copyhold Act, 1852, and he could therefore no longer attend the manor court.-(L. R. [1893] 1 Q. B., p. 228.)

(488.)

THE QUEEN v. KENNEDY.

JANUARY 18TH AND FEBRUARY 8TH, 1893.]

Lands Clauses Acts-Compensation-Procedure-Notice to Treat-Determination of Amount of Compensation by Justices.

On May 14th, 1891, a railway company, empowered by statute to make compulsory purchase of certain lands, served the lessee of part

L

of such lands with notice to treat. At that time the lessee held under a thirty years' lease, which was terminable by the lessor under certain conditions by three months' notice. No further steps were taken by either party under the notice to treat; and on June 30th, 1892, the lessor gave the lessee notice to terminate the tenancy at the expiration of three months. On July 20th the railway company required and took possession of the land under section 85 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, and took out a summons, to determine the amount of compensation due to the lessee, before a metropolitan magistrate under section 121 of that Act, which enables justices to determine the amount of compensation when the land required is in the possession of any person "having no greater interest therein than as a tenant for a year or from year to year." The magistrate considered that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter on the ground that the value of the interest of the lessee in the land must be considered at the date of the notice to treat, and not at the date at which the land was actually required and taken :

Held, that since no proceedings had been taken under the notice to treat, the fact that it had been given was immaterial, and that the magistrate had therefore jurisdiction under section 121 to determine the amount of compensation.-[L.R. [1893] 1 Q.B., p. 533.]

(489.)

AITKEN v. BATCHELOR.

[JANUARY 30TH, 1893.]

Agreement to refer to Arbitration-Indorsement on Briefs by CounselArbitration Act 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 49), s. 27-Agreement in Writing.

An agreement having been come to to refer to arbitration certain claims, being part of a counterclaim in an action, the terms of the reference were indorsed by counsel representing the parties on their briefs.

Held, that such indorsement constituted an agreement to refer the claims in question to arbitration, and that it amounted to a submission within sect. 27 of the Arbitration Act 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 49), which requires that the submission should be "a written agreement."(L.T., Q.B.D., vol. lxviii., N.S., p. 530.)

(490.)

[IN THE COURT OF APPEAL.]

ELLIS v. GOULTON AND ANOTHER.

[JANUARY 31ST, 1893.]

Principal and Agent-Sale of Real Property-Payment of Deposit to Solicitor as Agent-Action to recover Deposit from Agent.

On the sale of premises by auction the purchaser paid a deposit to the vendor's solicitor as agent for the vendor. The sale went off through