the default of the vendor, and the purchaser brought an action to recover the deposit from the solicitor :

Held, that the payment of the deposit to the solicitor was equivalent to payment to the vendor, and that the action could not be maintained. (L. R. [1893] 1 Q. B., p. 350.)

(491.)

ELLIS v. PLUMSTEAD BOARD OF WORKS.

[FEBRUARY 2ND, 1893.]

Metropolis management-New street-Building within 50 feet of the highway-Beyond general line of buildings-Building structure or erection Garden wall or fence-Metropolis Management Act 1862 (25 and 26 Vict. c. 102), secs. 75, 98-41 and 42 Vict. c. 32, sec. 6.

The appellant erected upon his land in a new street in the metropolis a wall in advance of and at right angles to the general line of buildings without the consent in writing of the London County Council. The said wall extended 20 feet towards the centre of the roadway from the front of the appellant's house which was in the general line of buildings, and within 50 feet of the highway. The wall was 9 inches thick, and from 7 feet to 7 feet 8 inches high above the level of the pavement, and 14 inches thick and 8 feet deep below the said level.

Held, that the wall was a "building, structure, or erection" within the meaning of sect. 75 of the Metropolis Management Act 1862, and therefore could not be erected within 50 feet of the highway, and in advance of the general line of buildings in the street, without the consent in writing of the London County Council.-(L.T., Q.B.D. vol. lxviii., N.S., p. 291.)

(492.)

PEARSON, APPELLANT v. THE ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE OF THE HOLBORN UNION, RESPONDENTS.

[FEBRUARY 9TH, 1893.]

Poor-rate--Exemptions-Crown Property-Volunteer

Corps-Store

house-Volunteer Act, 1863 (26 & 27 ict. c. 65), sec. 26.

Premises occupied by a volunteer corps for the purpose of the service of the corps, and being reasonably necessary for such service, are occupied by servants of the Crown for the purposes of the Crown, and, therefore, are exempt from rates.

Therefore, premises occupied by the teer corps for the purpose of the se reasonably necessary for such service, a

manding officer of a volunce of the corps, and being \empt from rates, including

both such part of the premises as is a storehouse for the depositing and safe keeping of arms, ammunition, and stores, within the meaning of sec. 26 of the Volunteer Act, 1863, and, therefore, exempted from rates by that section, and all such other parts of the premises as are reasonably necessary for the service of the corps.—(L.R. [1893] 1 Q.B., p. 389.)

(493.)

ROBSON v. EDWARDS.

[FEBRUARY 10TH, 1893.]

Easement-Light-Prescription-Lease-Prescription Act, 1832 (2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71), s. 3.

Two tenements were held under leases from the same landlord. The lessee of the first enjoyed access of light to his windows over the second tenement for more than twenty years prior to the expiration of his lease. He continued to hold under an agreement for a lease for a term still running. The lease of the second tenement was subsequently surrendered; the landlord granted a lease to a new tenant:

Held, that the tenant of the first tenement had a right to access of light over the second tenement.

This was a motion for an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendant from erecting the back wall of a theatre he was building so as to obstruct the access of light to windows of three houses 31, 32, and 33, Lisle Street, of which the plaintiff was lessee. A question arose on the motion whether the plaintiff had a prescriptive right to the access of light to two of his houses, 32 and 33, Lisle Street, over premises No. 18, Rider Court, Cranbourne Street, which formed part of the site of the defendant's theatre. Lord Salisbury was the landlord of both the plaintiff's and the defendant's premises. In December, 1882, the plaintiff occupied Nos. 32 and 33, Lisle Street, under a lease for twentyone years, expiring on the 25th of December, 1882. He and his predecessors in title had enjoyed access of light to the premises through the same windows on the south side of his houses over No. 18, Ryder Court, for a period of more than twenty years. On the 22nd of December, 1882, the Marquis of Salisbury agreed to grant him a fresh lease of those two houses for a term of twelve years from the 25th of December, 1882, and he continued after the expiration of his lease to occupy and pay rent under the agreement. In December, 1882, No. 18, Ryder Court was held by one William Thompson of the Marquis of Salisbury, under a lease for twenty-one years, which would have expired on the 24th of June, 1888. That lease was surrendered to the Marquis of Salisbury in 1887, and he granted a fresh lease of 18, Ryder Court, for ten years from the 24th of June, 1887, to one August Neuendorff. The

defendant was assignee from Neuendorff. The premises No. 18, Ryder Court were also subject to an agreement for the building of a theatre on a site including the site of that house. This building agreement, to which the Marquis of Salisbury was party, was vested in the defendant.

JUDGMENT.

NORTH, J.-As regards the legal aspect of the case, I think the matter is entirely free from doubt.

The plaintiff's father became lessee of what I will call the plaintiff's houses, Nos. 32 and 33, in the year 1862, for a term of twenty-one years expiring at Christmas, 1882. In the year 1880 the plaintiff succeeded his father, and entered into possession of the property, and the lease was assigned to him, and he became tenant of the property. At the end of that time he did not go out, because, a few days before, an arrangement had been made by written agreement, under which he was to have a renewal of the lease for a term which will expire at Christmas, 1894-that is to say, nearly two years of that have yet to run. The parties have allowed it to rest in agreement. No actual lease has been prepared, but the rent has been paid on the footing of the agreement, and the mere fact that a formal parchment-deed has not taken the place of the agreement for a lease is, in my opinion, immaterial.

The defendant is the owner of opposite property, with certain intervening property belonging to other persons, coming between the two; and 18, Ryder Court, which is the site of part of the theatre which the defendant is erecting, was made the subject of a lease by the landlord of the property to one Neuendorff in the year 1887, and in 1891 that lease was assigned to the defendant. These leases that I have mentioned (it is clearly proved as to the defendant's lease) have been leases succeeding previous leases by the landowner, and no doubt the plaintiff's father's lease had been so too, because the houses are old houses. The houses comprised in both leases are old houses, built a good many years ago - far more than twenty years since. The sites of both belong to Lord Salisbury, and are part of the Salisbury estate in London.

The question is, What are the legal rights of these parties? Assuming there was no legal right, either actual or inchoate, in 1862because that is the point at which I must begin, as I cannot fix any definite time earlier at which these houses were existing-assuming that there was no right to light in 1862, at any rate when the plaintiff's father went into occupation the time for the acquisition of a right by statute to have the light coming to 32 and 33 and 34 at the back over the adjoining lands began to run, and at the end of twenty years from that time that right became absolute and indefeasible under the 3rd section of the Prescription Act. The fact that the premises have not been in the occupation of the same person all along is clearly immaterial. It does not matter what the number of tenants may have been, because the Act says: "When the access and use of light to and for

44

any dwelling-house, workshop, or other building shall have been "actually enjoyed therewith for the full period of twenty years without interruption, the right thereto shall be deemed absolute and inde44 feasible, unless it shall appear that the same was enjoyed by some consent or agreement expressly made or given for that purpose by deed or writing." There is no evidence whatever in this case of anything which brings it within the exception. There is no evidence that it was enjoyed by any consent or by any agreement, either expressly or otherwise, made relating to it by deed or writing. Therefore, the right at the end of twenty years became absolute and indefeasible.

The lease granted on the 8th of December, 1862, expired on the 25th of December, 1882. At that time, therefore, when that lease expired, the twenty years had run, and the right had become absolute and indefeasible appurtenant to that house, as it was then occupied by the plaintiff. What difference does it make that, that lease coming to an end, the ground landlord renewed the lease, or agreed to renew the lease, to the same tenant? In my opinion, it does not make any difference. The contention is that it put an end to the right to light acquired by the twenty years which had expired before Christmas, 1882, and it is said that because that lease ended and a new one was granted no time had run, and you must begin to count the twenty years afresh. In my opinion, that is not the law. When twenty years had run, the right was acquired absolute and indefeasible in respect of the access of light to that house; and when the house was leased afterwards, the right given by law passed with it, not by reason of the lease, though, no doubt, the person who became tenant went in under the lease; but he did not get the grant to the light by the lease in any sense. He got the house by the lease, and the law gave the tenant, the occupier of the house, the right to the enjoyment of that light at that time.

Then it is said that by reason of the lease of 1887 to the defendant or to the defendant's predecessor something was done which interfered with that. I cannot follow that in the least, because I cannot see how the making of the lease in 1887 could have any effect upon a prior demise by the same landlord as far back as the year 1882; for, as I have said, the agreement to lease, coupled with the possession and the payment of rent under it, come to exactly the same thing as if a formal parchment lease had actually been signed.

The plaintiff therefore is, in my opinion, clearly right on the question of law.

[His Lordship considered the evidence as to obstruction and granted an injunction to meet the circumstances.)-(L. R. [1893] 2 Ch., p. 146.)

(494.)

BROMLEY LOCAL BOARD v. LLOYD.

[FEBRUARY 23RD, 1893.]

Local Government—Local Board—Bye-Laws—“ New Street”—Width of Entrance.

For a previous stage of this case, see Professional Notes," Vol. V., p. 384.)

The plaintiffs in this action claimed an injunction to restrain the defendant from constructing a new street, the plans for which they contended did not comply with the requirements of the bye-laws of the Local Board in force in the district. The bye-laws in question are as follows:

"4. Every person who shall lay out a new street which shall be "intended for use as a carriage road shall so lay out such street that "the width thereof shall be forty feet at the least."

(8) Every person who shall construct a new street shall provide "at one end at least of such street an entrance of a width equal to "the width of such street and open from the ground upwards." In September, 1891, the defendant submitted to the plaintiffs a plan of a new street which he proposed to make, the only access to which was to be by a narrow cul-de-sac called the White Hart Lane. That plan was disapproved of and the defendant submitted a reamended plan, by which the new street was to be forty feet wide throughout, and the White Hart Lane to be forty feet wide at the part immediately adjacent to the new street. This was to be effected by throwing in a strip of defendant's own land. The remainder of the White Hart Lane, for a distance of 120 feet from the defendant's land in the Market Square, Bromley, was to remain as before, only ten feet wide. This plan was disapproved of. The defendant thereupon gave notice that he intended to lay out the street according to the reamended plan, and the plaintiffs issued the writ in this action and moved the Court of Chancery for an interim injunction. The motion was heard before Mr. Justice Kekewich, who gave judgment on March 25, 1892, granting the plaintiffs an interim injunction. The action was then transferred to the Queen's Bench Division, and came before his Lordship for trial.

Mr. Justice WILLS, in giving judgment for the defendant, held that the entrance meant a practicable way into the street; that the language of the report in the case of Hendon Local Board v. Pounce did not sufficiently indicate what it was Mr. Justice North did decide; that from the evidence showing the repairs by the parish and Local Board, and the user by the public of the White Hart Lane, he con cluded it was a public highway; and that the defendant's plan ought to have been sufficient to satisfy the Local Board.

Judgment was given for the defendant, with costs. The interim injunction to be dissolved.-(T. L. R., Q. B. D., vol. ix., p. 306.)