"any dwelling-house, workshop, or other building shall have been "actually enjoyed therewith for the full period of twenty years without "interruption, the right thereto shall be deemed absolute and inde46 feasible, unless it shall appear that the same was enjoyed by "some consent or agreement expressly made or given for that purpose "by deed or writing." There is no evidence whatever in this case of anything which brings it within the exception. There is no evidence that it was enjoyed by any consent or by any agreement, either expressly or otherwise, made relating to it by deed or writing. Therefore, the right at the end of twenty years became absolute and indefeasible.

The lease granted on the 8th of December, 1862, expired on the 25th of December, 1882. At that time, therefore, when that lease expired, the twenty years had run, and the right had become absolute and indefeasible appurtenant to that house, as it was then occupied by the plaintiff. What difference does it make that, that lease coming to an end, the ground landlord renewed the lease, or agreed to renew the lease, to the same tenant? In my opinion, it does not make any difference. The contention is that it put an end to the right to light acquired by the twenty years which had expired before Christmas, 1882, and it is said that because that lease ended and a new one was granted no time had run, and you must begin to count the twenty years afresh. In my opinion, that is not the law. When twenty years had run, the right was acquired absolute and indefeasible in respect of the access of light to that house; and when the house was leased afterwards, the right given by law passed with it, not by reason of the lease, though, no doubt, the person who became tenant went in under the lease; but he did not get the grant to the light by the lease in any He got the house by the lease, and the law gave the tenant, the occupier of the house, the right to the enjoyment of that light at that time.

sense.

Then it is said that by reason of the lease of 1887 to the defendant or to the defendant's predecessor something was done which interfered with that. I cannot follow that in the least, because I cannot see how the making of the lease in 1887 could have any effect upon a prior demise by the same landlord as far back as the year 1882; for, as I have said, the agreement to lease, coupled with the possession and the payment of rent under it, come to exactly the same thing as if a formal parchment lease had actually been signed.

The plaintiff therefore is, in my opinion, clearly right on the question of law.

[His Lordship considered the evidence as to obstruction and granted an injunction to meet the circumstances.] —(L. R. [1893] 2 Ch., p. 146.)

(494.)

BROMLEY LOCAL BOARD v. LLOYD.

[FEBRUARY 23RD, 1893.]

Local Government-Local Board-Bye-Laws New Street"— Width of Entrance.

For a previous stage of this case, see Professional Notes," Vol. V., p. 384.)

The plaintiffs in this action claimed an injunction to restrain the defendant from constructing a new street, the plans for which they contended did not comply with the requirements of the bye-laws of the Local Board in force in the district. The bye-laws in question are as follows:

"4. Every person who shall lay out a new street which shall be "intended for use as a carriage road shall so lay out such street that "the width thereof shall be forty feet at the least."

"(8) Every person who shall construct a new street shall provide "at one end at least of such street an entrance of a width equal to "the width of such street and open from the ground upwards." In September, 1891, the defendant submitted to the plaintiffs a plan of a new street which he proposed to make, the only access to which was to be by a narrow cul-de-sac called the White Hart Lane. That plan was disapproved of and the defendant submitted a reamended plan, by which the new street was to be forty feet wide throughout, and the White Hart Lane to be forty feet wide at the part immediately adjacent to the new street. This was to be effected by throwing in a strip of defendant's own land. The remainder of the White Hart Lane, for a distance of 120 feet from the defendant's land in the Market Square, Bromley, was to remain as before, only ten feet wide. This plan was disapproved of. The defendant thereupon gave notice that he intended to lay out the street according to the reamended plan, and the plaintiffs issued the writ in this action and moved the Court of Chancery for an interim injunction. The motion was heard before Mr. Justice Kekewich, who gave judgment on March 25, 1892, granting the plaintiffs an interim injunction. The action was then transferred to the Queen's Bench Division, and came before his Lordship for trial.

Mr. Justice WILLS, in giving judgment for the defendant, held that the entrance meant a practicable way into the street; that the language of the report in the case of Hendon Local Board v. Pounce did not sufficiently indicate what it was Mr. Justice North did decide; that from the evidence showing the repairs by the parish and Local Board, and the user by the public of the White Hart Lane, he con cluded it was a public highway; and that the defendant's plan ought to have been sufficient to satisfy the Local Board.

Judgment was given for the defendant, with costs. The interim injunction to be dissolved.-(T. L. R., Q. B. D., vol. ix., p. 306.)

(495.)

MACALPINE & CO. v. CALDER & CO.

[FEBRUARY 28TH, 1893.]

(For a previous stage of this case, see p. 72, ante.) Arbitration-Reference of all Matters-Inspection of Premises-Jurisdiction to Order-Arbitration Act, 1889, Sched. 1 (ƒ)—O. 36, r. 50.

Decision of Divisional Court affirmed, but on different grounds. In an action for work and labour done and materials supplied to certain premises belonging to the defendants, an order was made by consent referring "all matters in dispute in the action" to an arbitrator.

On the plaintiffs' application an order for inspection of the premises was subsequently made by the Judge in Chambers.

Held, that he had jurisdiction to make such order, but that, as by O. 36, r. 50, the arbitrator had concurrent jurisdiction, the application should have been made first to him.-(T. L. R., C. A., vol. ix.,

p. 311.)

(496.)

[IN THE COURT OF APPEAL.]

HORNSEY LOCAL BOARD v. DAVIS.

[MARCH 8TH, 1893.]

Local Government-Sewers-Vesting in Local Authority-Private Street, Sewer in-Acceptance by Local Authority of incomplete SewerPublic Health Act, 1875 (38 and 39 l'ict. c. 55), secs. 13, 15, 150.

The owners of a building estate, who were the predecessors in title of the defendant, deposited plans, which were approved by the local authority, shewing a road running down the slope of a hill and crossing the New River at the foot, with a sewer running the whole length of the road and crossing the New River to join another sewer on the farther side. An agreement was made by the New River Company with the estate owners to divert the New River so as to enable the sewer to be laid across the old bed of the stream. In 1885 the sewer was made as far as the New River, where it stopped, the river not having then been diverted; it had no outfall, and was never, in fact, used as a sewer; but the work was from time to time inspected by a servant of the local authority, who authorised the covering in of the various sections, and made reports to the local authority, who never expressed dissatisfaction with the work. Nothing more was done to the sewer, which became out of repair and ruinous; and in 1890 the local authority gave to the frontagers in the road notice, under section 150 of the Public Health

Act, 1875, to sewer the road down to the New River; on their default the local authority themselves constructed a new sewer, which they carried across the bed of the New River and connected with the sewer on the other side, the diversion of the river having been completed during the execution of the works by the local authority. The local authority having sought to charge the frontagers with the expenses of making the new sewer, the question of the amount to be paid by the defendant was referred to arbitration, and in an action on the award the jury found that the local authority had accepted the old sewer as a satisfactory sewer :—

Held, that the local authority had power to accept the orignal sewer, although it had no outfall, and was at the time of acceptance incapable of being used as a sewer; and that, the road having once been sewered to the satisfaction of the local authority, the expenses of constructing the new sewer were not chargeable on the frontagers.-(L.R. [1893] 1 Q.B., p. 756.)

(497.)

IN RE A CONTRACT BETWEEN PECK AND THE SCHOOL BOARD FOR LONDON.

[MARCH 16TH, 17тH, 21ST, AND 22ND, 1893.]

Vendor and Purchaser-Form of Conveyance-General Words-Easement-Right of Way-"Reputed to appertain or enjoyed"-Exception from Conveyance--Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881 (44 d 45 Vict. c. 41), s. 6, sub-ss. 1, 2, 4.

Under a contract for the sale of land "with the appurtenances," the purchaser is only entitled to have such general words in his conveyance as he would have been entitled to before the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, came into operation; and if the general words implied by sect. 6 of that Act are more extensive than the contract, the vendor is entitled to have them limited accordingly.— (L.R. [1893] 2 Ch., p. 315.)

(498.)

LOCK v. PEARCE,

[MARCH 21ST, 1893.]

66

(For a previous stage of this case, see Professional Notes," Vol. V., p. 481.)

Lease-Forfeiture-Breach of Covenant-Notice-Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 41), s. 14, sub.-s. 1, 2.

A notice under sect. 14, sub-sect. 1, of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, requiring the lessee to remedy a breach of

covenant, may be good, though it does not require payment of compensation in money.

North London Land Company v. Jacques disapproved.

An application by a lessee under sect. 14, sub-sect. 2, of the same Act must be made in an action commenced by writ, and cannot be made by originating summons.

The decision of North, J., affirmed.

This was an appeal from a decision of Mr. Justice North.

The facts are fully given in the previous report. The following short statement will be sufficient for the purpose of the present report.

The plaintiffs were the owners as mortgagor and mortagee of seven leasehold houses in South Tottenham let to weekly tenants. The defendant, Arthur Pearce, was the lessor of the premises.

66

On the 2nd of June, 1891, the defendant, by his solicitors, served written notices on the plaintiffs, by leaving them at the several houses, that they had not sufficiently repaired the houses in pursuance of the covenants contained in the leases thereof, and requiring them to remedy the breaches of covenants by doing the works specified in the schedule annexed to the notices. The notices concluded as follows: "And as such solicitors and agents as aforesaid, we also require you "to forthwith pay to the said Arthur Pearce the sum of £2 2s. for the expenses which have been incurred by the said Arthur Pearce for surveyor's fees and solicitor's charges by reason of such breaches of "covenants as aforesaid; and we hereby give you further notice that "if you make default in remedying such breaches of covenants in "manner above mentioned, or in making the compensation hereby "required, the said A. Pearce will enter and take possession of the "said messuage dwelling-house and premises, but without prejudice "to any other remedies which he may have by reason of such default." A schedule of work to be done was appended to the notices.

66

After the expiration of three months from the date of the notices, the defendant commenced actions in the Edmonton County Court against the tenants in occupation for the recovery of the houses, to which the present plaintiffs were not made parties, although an opportunity was offered to them of being added as defendants; and on the 25th of November, 1891, the county court judge made orders on the tenants for the delivery of possession to the defendant. On the same day, the plaintiffs took out an originating summons in the Chancery Division asking a declaration that no forfeiture had taken place: or, in the alternative, relief against the defendant's right of re-entry and forfeiture upon such terms as the Court should think fit; and an injunction to restrain the defendant from proceeding on the judgments in the county court to take possession. The summons was returnable on the 10th of December, 1891. On the 9th of December, the defendant obtained possession of the houses under the county court judgments.

Mr. Justice NORTH held that the notices on which the proceedings in the county court were carried on were good notices under sect. 14, sub.-sect. 1, of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, and