have stated. Therefore, I am of opinion that in this case, if the actions in the county court are inquired into, they were properly brought, and the judge of that court was right.

Then, if the next point could be considered by Mr. Justice North, there was nothing to prevent him from giving relief or not, as he might think right according to the merits of the case. Upon the merits of the case he has found that the repairs were not done, and that these premises were all out of repair. With regard to that, we cannot differ from him. I think the evidence shews that the lessees persisted, and, as Mr. Justice North found, obstinately persisted, in doing nothing to these premises until the last moment, when, in order to save themseves from forfeiture, they patched up the repairs which they had so long neglected. I think that was a valid ground, on which Mr. Justice North was entitled to exercise his discretion. On all these grounds, I am of opinion that the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

LINDLEY, L. J.-I am of the same opinion. I think the appellants are wrong, both on the merits and on the procedure. I will deal with the merits first. The case stands in this way. The lessor brought actions in the county court against his tenants to recover possession of this property: and the lessees declined to put themselves in a position to defend those actions. They would have nothing to do with them. Why, I do not know and do not stop to consider. There were means in the practice of the county court by which they might have put themselves in a position technically to defend the actions, if they had chosen to do so, and to have called evidence, which they now say ought to have been produced before the county court judge. But they did nothing whatever. The county court judge therefore decided on the only evidence which was before him, and came to a conclusion on that evidence that this property was in a bad state of repair, and that the plaintiff Pearce was entitled to recover possession from the persons before him as defendants. Then the present applicants, as we may call them, take out a summons the like of which I never saw before. It is what is technically called an originating summons, asking, first, for a declaration that there was no forfeiture in fact, by reason of the breach of covenant to repair the premises. I will pause there to ask if any Chancery practitioner ever heard of such a thing? Obviously not. Their right was to proceed by an action commenced by writ. An originating summons is a process introduced in order to save costs, and is not applicable to such a case as this at all. Then the summons proceeds to ask “in the alternative for an order for relief against the said defendant's right of re-entry and forfeiture upon such terms as "to the Court may seem fit." Whether that relief can be given them depends upon the true construction of the section. Then the summons goes on to ask for an injunction by way of prohibition or otherwise restraining all further proceedings upon the judgments in the actions of ejectment in the county court, on the ground, among other things, of want of jurisdiction in the judge of that court. Who ever heard of such a prayer in an originating summons? For such a purpose an

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originating summons is utterly inappropriate. Whether it is equally inappropriate to obtain relief under sect. 14 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, will have to be considered. Mr. Justice North evidently doubted whether he had jurisdiction to grant relief on an originating summons, and we have reason to believe that he thinks he had not. I quite agree in this, for this reason, that the relief is to be obtained in the mode and at the time prescribed in sect. 14, sub-sect. 2, which says, "where a lessor is proceeding, by action or otherwise, to enforce such "a right of re-entry or forfeiture, the lessee may, in the lessor's "action, if any, or in any action brought by himself, apply to the "Court for relief." The appellants say that an application by originating summons is an application by a summons in an action. In what action? The Court referred to in sect. 14 is the High Court,. and not a county court. Then, again, the Division of the High Court in which the lessee is to bring his action is the Chancery Division;. and a particular application is to be by summons; all of which is consistent with an action in the High Court and in the Chancery Division. In that action you can apply for a summons; but I cannot. read this clause in sect. 14 as authorising an application for relief by an originating summons, which is not a summons in any action. This point is not purely a technical one. In some cases, as in the case of a lessor resident abroad, the inconvenience of proceeding by an originating summons would be far-reaching. Therefore it appears to me that this summons is misconceived.

With respect to the question of forfeiture, there can be no doubt. that there has been a very serious forfeiture. My own conclusion from the affidavits is that the premises were terribly out of repair, but that when the lessor took steps seriously to recover possession efforts were made more or less to put them in repair. I think Mr. Justice North was right when he said that up to a certain point there had been the grossest neglect to keep the property in decent repair; but I think that an effort was made at last to do something to put it in a little better order.

Then, as regards the notices required by sect. 14, sub-sect. 1, the statute requires notice to be given specifying the breach complained of, as the first thing, and, if the breach is capable of remedy, requiring the lessee to remedy it, and "in any case requiring the lessee to make "compensation in money for the breach." Supposing the lessor does. not want compensation, is the notice to be held bad because he does not ask for it? There is no sense in that. The meaning is to be found by looking a little further on. The sub-section begins by saying that the right of re-entry or forfeiture shall not be enforceable unless proper notice is given and the lessee fails within a reasonable time afterwards to remedy the breach and to make reasonable compensation in money to the satisfaction of the lessor. The sense of that is that the lessor must tell the lessee what he wants done. The lessee is entitled to know what his landlord complains of, and, if his landlord is entitled to compensation, whether he wants compensation. Supposing in the case of fire insurance the lessee had discontinued insuring, and no

injury had happened, there would be no damage, and there could be no compensation. In that case there could be no sense in asking for compensation. The true construction of the clause is not that in any case the tenant shall make compensation, but that, as in Skinners' Company v. Knight, the lessor shall give notice what he requires of the lessee. In the present case the notice did tell the tenant that the landlord required certain repairs to be done, and that he wanted certain compensation. It is true that he asked for £2 2s. for the surveyor's fees, and there is a case which decides that he could not recover them; but in fact he told them what compensation he wanted. The notices are as good as any notice could possibly be.

On these grounds I am of opinion that this appeal fails. Upon the merits as well as upon the technicalities, all the points are against the appellants.

KAY, L.J.-I am entirely of the same opinion, and have nothing to add. (L.R. [1893] 2 Ch., p. 271.)

(499.)

THE TOTTENHAM LOCAL BOARD v. WILLIAMSON.

[MARCH 27TH, 1893.]

Local Government-Streets-Recovery of expenses-Paving and sewering -Liability of owner-Owner, who is-Public Health Act, 1875 (38 and 39 Vict., c. 55), sec. 4.

Judgment was given in this case, which decided an important question as to the liability of persons mere agents or not beneficial owners, as owners of houses under the Public Health Act, 1875, for the expenses of paving, sewering, &c., new streets. It was an action by the board against a party mortgagee of houses in Glenwood Road, Tottenham, to recover a sum of £113, as his share, as apportioned by their surveyor, of the expenses of paving and sewering the road. The district is under a Local Act of 1890, but it adopts the definition of owner given in the Public Health Act, and that is in the 4th section:That the owner is the person for the time being receiving the rack"rent of the lands or premises, whether on his own account or as agent or trustee for any other person." In the present case the houses were mortgaged, and Williamson, the person sued, was second mortgagee, and, as he admitted, had at the time in question received the rents of the houses and paid the ground-rent, paying over the rest to the first mortgagee, there being no surplus for himself. He had so received and applied the rents until June, 1892, when the first mortgagee took possession. The expenses were "estimated" while the defendant received the rents, and the action was brought in March, 1892. The question was whether he was chargeable as "owner" under the Act.

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The LORD JUSTICE had taken time to consider his judgment, and delivered it in favour of the board. It appeared to him, he said, that

"

"owner

" of the houses estimated" which were after

the question was whether the defendant was at the time when the expenses were wards apportioned by the surveyor. The Act pointed, in his opinion, to the time when the expenses were estimated, not when the work was completed. (The case of "The Queen v. The Swindon Local Board" (4 Q.B.D., 305) was in this respect different from the present.) Now, the defendant had at the time been in receipt of the rent, and so up to the time of action. The question was whether at that time the defendant was the "owner" of the houses within the meaning of the Act. I think, said the Lord Justice, that he was. It appears to me that the intention of the Legislature was that any person who has received the rents from the occupier should be deemed the " owner." One can conceive of cases where it may be difficult to find the real owner, and therefore it was deemed desirable to make the actual receiver of the rents liable, and I think the Legislature intended to fix the actual receiver, whoever he may be, with the liability. I, therefore, am of opinion that the board are entitled to recover, and must give judgment accordingly.-(T.L.R., Q.B.D., vol. ix., p. 372.)

(500.)

MAYOR, &c., OF FOLKESTONE v. BROOKS.

[MARCH 28TH, 1893.]

Local Government-Streets-Recovery of expenses - Paving and metalling-Liability of "owner"-Objection to prime cost-Public Health Act, 1875 (38 and 39 Vict., c. 55), secs. 150 and 257-Right to arbitration.

Where the "owner" has been served with notice, under the Public Health Act, 1875, of expenses incurred in the paving, &c., of streets, and has objected, not to the apportionment of them, but to the prime cost, the local authority is not bound under the Act to submit the matter to arbitration, but may sue him for the sum apportioned.-(T.L.R., Ch.D., vol. ix., p. 377.)

(501.)

[IN THE COURT OF APPEAL.]

DOUGAL v. McCARTHY.

[APRIL 22ND AND 25TH, 1893.]

Landlord and Tenant-Tenant holding over after Expiration of TermTenancy from Year to Year-Implication of Law.

Premises were let under an agreement in writing for a year from February 1st, 1891, at a rent of £140, payable quarterly in advance on

After the

February 14th, May 14th, August 14th, and November 14th. expiration of the lease, the tenants remaining in possession, the landlord wrote to them on February 25th, 1892, demanding £35 for a quarter's rent due in advance. The tenants did not answer his letter, but remained in possession, and on March 26th, they wrote to him to the effect that it was 66 their intention to discontinue their present tenancy, and that they gave him notice that they would not continue the same beyond the period required under their agreement, but that they would be glad if he could see his way to take up the premises on May 14, or even earlier ":

Held, that, under the circumstances above mentioned, both parties must be taken to have consented to a continuance of the tenancy after the expiration of the lease, and, that being so, the implication was, in the absence of any evidence to rebut it, that there was a tenancy from year to year on the terms of the former lease so far as not inconsistent with such tenancy.-(L.R. [1893] 1 Q.B., p. 736.)

(502.)

THE QUEEN v. TOTTENHAM LOCAL BOARD.

[APRIL 24TH, 1893.]

Local Government-Public Health Act, 1875 (38 and 39 Vict, c. 55), c. 55), secs. 15 and 299-Complaint to Local Government Board-Mandamus-Discretion.

The builder of certain houses at T. applied to the T. Local Board, under section 15 of the Public Health Act, 1875, to make the necessary sewers. In reply the T. Local Board stated that after considering the advice of their engineer on the matter they were of opinion that they had done all that was required by the Act.

Complaint of the alleged default on the part of the Local Board was then made, under section 299, to the Local Government Board. An inquiry was held, and the Local Government Board refused to interfere.

On application for a mandamus to the T. Local Board to make the sewers,

Held, that there had been no refusal on the part of the T. Local Board to exercise their discretion, and the application must be refused. —(T.L.R., C.A., vol. ix., p. 414.)

(503.)

IN RE THE TITHE ACT, 1891.

ROBERTS v. POTTS.

[APRIL 26TH AND MAY 6TH, 1893.]

Tithe Rent-charge-Rating of Owner of Tithe Rent-charge-Tithe Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 8)-Arrears of Rates due before passing of ActDeduction of, from Tithe Rent-charge accruing after act-RepealSaving of existing Rights and Liabilities.

By s. 6 of the Tithe Act, 1891: " Any rate to which tithe rentcharge is subject shall be assessed on, and may be recovered from the

M