The New London (Consolidation) Building Bill.

Some apparently innocent clauses have issued from the Building Act Committee of the London County Council. These clauses are proposed to be inserted in the new Bill, are lettered (a) to (h), and are printed at the end of this article.*

With the exception that old buildings are now practically brought into the same category as new buildings, I do not see any objection to Clause (a). But under Clause (b), the

never since been paid nor even (save for the two years) been claimed in respect of that land. The defendant's contention, however, was that the plaintiff ought to have appealed to the Land Tax Commissioners, who alone had jurisdiction in the matter, and that he having failed so to appeal, the assessment held good, and the 15s. was legally due and could be levied for, and it followed that this Court had no jurisdiction. That argument rested upon the Statute 38 Geo. III., c. 5, and in particular upon the 8th, 9th, and 23rd sections. Having quoted these sections, His Honour said no witness was called on the part of the defendant, but it might be taken that, apart from the fact that the land tax had been redeemed, and supposing therefore it had not, all formalities, touching the assessment, the warrant, the distress, and the sale were complied with, the question of excessive distress only being raised by the plaintiff. He insisted throughout that the tax had been redeemed and refused to appeal to the Commissioners. For the defendant a number of authorities were cited. Mr. Metcalfe, the learned counsel for plaintiff, cited and relied upon Charleton v. Alway and Hodgson v. Pearson. He (the learned judge) was of opinion the present case came within the authority of Charleton v. Alway, and was governed by it, and therefore the Commissioners had not, whilst this Court had, jurisdiction to deal with the matter, and the plaintiff must succeed. His Honour then quoted from the case (an extract of which has already appeared in these columns), and then the Lord Chief Justice Denman's observations as follows:-" The land tax on the "rectorial tithes had in this case been redeemed; therefore, neither "the Commissioners nor the assessors had any jurisdiction in respect "of such land tax. It was, however, included in the assessment, but "in one undivided sum with the land tax on the vicarial tithes, both "being in the occupation of the plaintiff. This was incorrect at all " events, even if the rectorial tithes had not been redeemed. . . . The "plaintiff did, in fact, pay the land tax on the vicarial tithes,

Council are seeking for power over buildings which may be erected even in a park, because "domestic buildings" are not defined. Of course, blocks of artisans' dwellings, "enclosed "in a courtyard exclusively belonging to them," should be subject to the same control as if they fronted a street, but I much question whether the Council had only in view such dwellings. The "light and air" part of the clause requires very careful consideration.

Clause (c) is distinctly of a confiscatory character. Under it, a rebuilding may be impossible, and the explanatory note

"and the only question is whether the plaintiff ought to have appealed "to the Commissioners. We think that he was not bound to do so. Being assessed in respect of that which was not subject to the land "tax, he had as much right to treat the assessment as a nullity, as if "if it had been in respect of property not in his occupation. See "Governors of Bristol Poor v. Wait. The verdict, therefore, is right. "... The rule must be discharged." His Honour was not aware that this case had ever been in any way impeached; it certainly had not been by any of the cases cited for the present defendant. The very substantial difference between them and Charleton v. Alway was, without going any further into details, that in every one of those there was an unredeemed and so existing land tax or other tax, and, therefore, the question whether the Commissioners had or had not, exclusive of any jurisdiction when the land tax had been redeemed was not, and of course could not be, raised. It followed from what he had said that the defendant Smith was a trespasser and wrong-doer ab initio, and it remained for him to award damages against him. The payment into Court was clearly insufficient. He had no right to make any deductions out of the proceeds of the sale, since he had none to distrain and sell. The auction was peculiar, the plaintiff himself having purchased the cow and calf seized by the defendant. Upon the evidence he could not find that the plaintiff suffered any loss by the mere sale, but he was entitled to be repaid the full proceeds of it, and under the circumstances (there was trespass on plaintiff's premises as well as illegal seizure) to something more. He gave judgment for £15, including the money paid into Court. Mr. Metcalfe asked as to costs. His Honour said the question was about the scale, and he would suggest Scale B, with special allowances. Mr. Ames asked for a copy of the judgment to lay before the Commissioners. His Honour said if he wished to appeal he might say that until Charleton and Alway was reversed his judgment must stand. Mr. Ames said it rested with the Commissioners.-(The Somerset Standard, October 24th, 1891.)

First, the Council

of the Council does not relieve matters. says that "setting back should be compulsory," and then, that "there was no sufficient reason why the public should not

pay a fair price for what it required." A "fair price "— who is to determine it? Not a word as to this; but if it is left to the Council to determine, an owner would probably get an inadequate price per foot superficial for the land required for the "setting back," and not a shilling in respect of a building site which was thereby rendered absolutely useless as such.

Clause (d), again, may render useless land which is at present of value, and it is extremely generous on the part of the Council to say that "in their case the owner shall not "be compelled to give up to the public way the land so left "free from buildings." But the Council does not say what is to become of the land "so left free." Nor does it condescend to a "fair price," as for Clause (c). The site may be rendered valueless, the owner may perambulate it as an open space, and may even grow cabbages on it; but what owner could say "nay" when the Council politely tells him that the land taken from him (so far as building upon it goes) "is not to "be given up to the public way, only the open space is"?

Clause (e), on the face of it, is harmless, but who is to determine what is an "adequate" internal area? Some members of the London County Council would, perhaps, leave a fourth of the site as that to be covered with bricks and mortar.

Clause (f) is designed to heal the wounds caused by certain rebuffs which the Council has received on their interposition in the laying-out of new streets. It will be seen that, by this clause, no new street can be laid out without the sanction of the Council in writing, and the man who has acquired an area of land in London, and cannot form a street through it without the consent above stated, has my commiseration. In my opinion, the present Council cares not

a straw what property they take away from any groundlandlord, and thus suspicion attaches to every line of new law they desire to impose. Surely some power of appeal against unwarrantable delay on the part of the Council in passing plans, and unreasonable demands upon an owner's land, should be provided, otherwise, an owner would be almost forced to agree to the Council's requirements, however unjust they may be.

Clause (g), however, is fairly startling. (Clause (h) is unobjectionable.) The removal of gates and bars, without any compensation for loss of quietude-for which quietude lessees pay heavily-was sufficiently bold, but the success of that step has encouraged the Council to further inroads upon private property, which may end no one knows where. The Council is to have power, "under proper safe

guards," (whatever that may mean) to “close or divert use"less roads, paths, or rights of way." I cannot help the use of italics for these words: the proposal amounts to a most unjustifiable attempt to step in and take away valuable property. Just think, for one moment, of the hundreds of roads, paths, and rights of way in London, which are clearly and distinctly the property of private individuals. The Council, some fine day, declares these are

useless," and proceeds to "close" them-and by so doing, they close access to valuable estate, and leave the land to take care of itself—or they "divert" them. Upon whose land do they "divert" them? It must be upon someone's! So they kill two birds with one stone. They "close" a road or a path on one owner's land, and "divert" it across another owner's land, and not a word about compensation appears in the clause. This clause demands the most strenuous and uncompromising opposition on the part of every landowner in London. I see in it powers of confiscation of the largest character, and these are doubly magnified when I remember

the views from time to time expressed by individual members

of the London County Council.

WM. WOODWARD, Fellow.

PROPOSED CLAUSES.

(a) That existing buildings should not be raised or extended so as

"to contravene the provisions of the Bill as to height and

open space in front which are applicable to new buildings, "or where they already contravene such provisions they "should not be raised or extended so as to make matters "worse.

"(b) That domestic buildings not abutting upon any streets shall "be subject to restrictions as to height and open space "about them similar mutatis mutandis to those to which buildings abutting on streets are subject, and that it be "unlawful to erect buildings other than domestic buildings "of such height or in such position in relation to domestic buildings existing previously to the year 1890, as to deprive "the latter of the amount of light and air provided for by "other clauses of the Bill.

"(c) That buildings erected anew upon old foundations shall, unless "the Council otherwise allow, be subject to the same restric"tions of height as new buildings erected upon new sites. "(d) That buildings erected anew upon old foundations, or erected "in old streets shall, unless the Council otherwise allow, "be set back at the same distance from the centre of the "road as applies to new buildings erected on vacant land, "but that in their case the owner shall not be compelled to give up to the public way the land so left free from buildings.

(e) That provision be made for the adequate ventilation of internal areas or shafts, constructed with a view to providing light "and air to rooms in domestic buildings, and for regulating "the dimensions of the same.

“(ƒ) That it should be an offence to lay out any new street without "the sanction of the Council in writing.

(g) That in cases arising in the administration of the Building Act, the Council shall have power, under proper safe"guards, to close or divert useless roads, paths, or rights-of

way.

(h) That the Council be empowered to frame by-laws to regulate

lamps, signs, or other structures overhanging the public way, such by-laws to be enforced by the vestries."