"situate. . . : Provided that it shall be lawful for the vestry or district "board to charge the owners of land in a less proportion than the owners "of house property":

By s. 4, s. 250 of the Metropolis Management Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), which enacts that "the word 'street' shall include any road and a part of any road" is to apply to the provisions of the Act of 1890:

Held, that, under s. 1, subject to the proviso, the expense of flagging is to be borne by the owners of the houses and the owners of the land on both sides of the road or street, or on both sides of the section of the road or street, in which the footway is situate.-(L. R. [1894] 1Q. B., p. 633.)

(581.)

LOVEGROVE v. KIRK AND RANDALL.

WORSHIP STREET POLICE COURT, MR. H. J. BUSHBY, MAGISTRATE.

[DECEMBER 11TH, 1893.]

Metropolitan Building Act, 1855-Exemptions, s. 6.

The real defendants in this case were the Directors of the London and North Western Railway, who instructed the Contractors not to give notice to the plaintiff, the District Surveyor of South Islington, Shoreditch and Norton Folgate.

The building was erected on a site in Maria Street, Shoreditch, adjoining the North London Railway, to be used as a fodder and harness store by Messrs. Allsopp and Co., Limited, and the summons was taken out to recover the fee under the Building Act.

The D.S. conducted his own case. The Railway Company, claimed that the building in question was built by the railway, and could be used for their own purposes, also that the beer was conveyed to the adjoining stores by the railway.

Mr. Bushby stated that, having carefully considered the case, he decided that the District Surveyor was right, as the building was used by tenants, and not by the defendant company, and allowed one guinea costs.

A similar case of an adjacent building in Harwar Street, was treated in a similar way.

The defendants asked for a case, but eventually gave notice to the plaintiff that they would not proceed.

The decision that buildings, erected by the railway companies for the purpose of letting, are not exempt, therefore stands.

(582.)

NIND v. NINETEENTH CENTURY BUILDING SOCIETY.

(JANUARY 13TH, 1894.]

Landlord and Tenant-Underlease-Breach of covenant to repair in head lease-Solicitor's and surveyor's charges for preparing notice under Conveyancing Act-Liability of under lessee-Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 41), s. 14-Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 13), ss. 2 and 4.

The effect of sub-sect. 3 of sect. 14 of the Conveyancing Act 1881 is to confer the benefits of sub-sec. 1 on an under-lessee for a part of the term, though it has no application to an under-lessee of a part of the estate. An action can therefore be brought under sect. 2 of the Conveyancing Act 1892 by a lessor against an under-lessee of part of the term to recover as a debt the costs and expenses incurred in the employment of a solicitor or surveyor in preparing the notice of the breaches of the covenant in the head lease for which re-entry has been threatened. When the breaches complained of have in fact been remedied by the under-lessee immediately on receipt of the notice, the under-lessee has obtained relief by his own conduct and the operation of the Act of 1881, and is within the liability of sect. 2 of the Act of 1892, without any written waiver of the breach being given by the lessor. (L.T., Q.B.D., vol. lxx., N.S., p. 316.)

(583.)

GOZZETT, APPELLANT, V. THE MALDEN URBAN SANITARY AUTHORITY, RESPONDENTS.

[JANUARY 15TH, 1894.]

Public health--Width of street-Laying out "new street" as carriage road -Right of way-Bye-laws of local authority– Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict c. 55), s. 157.

Sect. 157 of the Public Health Act 1875 provides that every urban authority may make bye-laws with respect to the level, width, and construction of new streets. Two bye-laws made, arising out of the above section, provided that every person who shall lay out a new street exceeding 100 feet in length, as a carriage road, shall lay out such street of a width of not less than thirty-six feet, and shall lay out on each side of such new street a footway, &c.

The appellant became lessee of a piece of land on which he commenced to build two houses; with this piece of land he also obtained a right of way fifteen feet wide over a road more than 100 feet in length, which led past the piece of ground on which he had commenced to build. The appellant, after commencing to build, did not widen this

right of way over the adjoining road to the width of thirty-six feet. The appellant was summoned by the respondents for laying out a new street of a width of less than thirty-six feet.

The magistrates, finding that commencing to build two houses, and other facts, constituted a laying out of a new street as a carriage road of a less width than thirty-six feet in contravention of the respondents' bye-laws, convicted the appellant.

Held, that what the appellant had done did not amount to laying out a new street contrary to the respondents' bye-laws, and the conviction ought to be quashed.-(L.T., Q.B.D., vol. lxx., N.S., p. 414.)

(584.)

ECCLESIASTICAL COMMISSIONERS OF ENGLAND v. PARR AND OTHERS.

[JANUARY 22ND, 23RD, AND 29TH, 1894.]

Copyhold-Admittance of tenants not required-Lapse of time--Implied admittance-Statute of Limitations (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27).

The lords of a manor received the quit rents due in respect of certain copyhold lands and premises from the heir of the last tenant upon the court-rolls, and other quit rents from the devisees of other lands forming part of the manor, for more than twenty years. It could not be shown that the heir or devisees of the lands had been admitted as tenants. Upon their refusal to be now admitted, and to pay the fines demanded, the lords of the manor seized quousque.

Held, that the right of the lords of the manor to seize quousque was barred, because in the circumstances an admittance of the heir and devisees of the lands ought to be implied; and further, that such a right was barred by the Statute of Limitations.-(L. T., Q. B. D., vol. lxx., N. S., p. 170.)

(585.)

THE ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE OF THE REIGATE UNION AND THE CHURCHWARDENS AND OVERSEERS OF BETCHWORTH v. THE SOUTH-EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

[JANUARY 23RD, 1894.]

Poor-rate-Appeal-Valuation List-Approval of by Committee before expiration of Statutory Period-Union Assessment Committee Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 103), s. 18-Union Assessment Committee Amendment Act, 1864 (27 & 28 Vict. c. 39), s. 1.

The effect of s. 18 of the Union Assessment Committee Act, 1862, is to render void any valuation list which has been approved by the

assessment committee before the expiration of twenty-eight days after public notice of the deposit of such list by the overseers, and also any rate made in conformity with such list, and that effect is not taken away by s. 1 of the Union Assessment Committee Amendment Act, 1864.-(L.R. [1894] 1 Q.B., p. 411.)

(586.)

[IN THE COURT OF APPEAL.]

STROUD v. WANDSWORTH DISTRICT BOARD OF WORKS. [JANUARY 29TH, 1894.]

Repairs of Carriage Road-" Necessary Works of Repair"-Apportionment and Recovery of Expenses-Necessity of Works-Metropolis Management Amendment Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 66), s. 3.

(For a previous stage of this Case, see p. 383, ante.)

Under s. 3 of the Metropolis Management Amendment Act, 1890, which empowers vestries or district boards to execute any "necessary works of repair" upon carriage roads, and to apportion and recover the expenses, it is for the vestry or district board to decide as to the necessity of the works, and they are not bound to prove such necessity to the satisfaction of the tribunal before which they seek to recover the expenses.

Decision of Divisional Court (Charles and Wright, JJ.) affirmed.— (L. R. [1894] 2 Q. B., p. 1.)

(587.)

RE AN ARBITRATION BETWEEN GREGSON AND ARMSTRONG.

[FEBRUARY 3RD, 1894.]

Arbitration-Legal misconduct of arbitrators-Information taken from one side in the absence of the other-Award set aside.

By agreement between the landlord of a farm and his outgoing tenant certain matters in dispute between them were referred to arbitration, the Arbitration Act 1889 and first schedule thereto being incorporated in the agreement. All the evidence on both sides having been heard, the arbitrators, on a subsequent day before making their award, held a meeting on the farm at which the outgoing tenant was present, but without the knowledge and in the absence of the landlord.

Held, that the award must be set aside, it being improper to take information from one side in the absence of the other.

This was a motion to set aside the award of an umpire on the ground that the arbitrators and umpire had misconducted the arbitration, and that the award was improperly procured.

The following facts appeared from the affidavits:

By an agreement of reference dated the 5th Oct., 1893, between Lancelot Allgood Gregson, the landlord of the Seaton Moor Farm, in the county of Durham, and Richard Armstrong, the outgoing tenant, it was agreed that certain matters in dispute between them relating to the said farm should be referred to the award and determination of two arbitrators, and that the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1889, and the first schedule thereto, should be incorporated with the agreement. The arbitrators appointed one Marriott to be the umpire. It was agreed that the umpire should sit with the arbitrators to save expense. The hearing of the arbitration took place before the arbitrators and the umpire on the 22nd Oct., when both parties attended with their solicitors and witnesses. At the conclusion of the proceedings on that day the arbitrators and umpire intimated that if they required a view they would inform the parties. On the 5th Dec. the umpire made and published his award, the arbitrators having disagreed. Meanwhile on the 15th Nov. the arbitrators and the umpire met upon the farm for the purpose of viewing it, and held a conference which lasted two hours, at which Armstrong was present. No notice of this meeting was given to Gregson, who therefore was not present. A notice of the meeting had however been sent to one Weightman, a person who had given evidence on behalf of Gregson, at the hearing of the arbitration, and whom the umpire stated upon affidavit that he understood to be acting on Gregson's behalf, and with his authority. The notice to Weightman was only received by him on the morning of the day on which the conference took place, and he consequently only arrived on the scene when the conference was nearly over. He had no authority to act on behalf of Gregson. On the 15th Dec., Gregson having discovered the fact of this conference having been held in his absence, gave notice to the other side of his intention to move to set aside the award.

MATHEW, J.-I think this application must be granted, and the award set aside. Arbitrators are not merely valuers; they have judicial functions to perform. Though intending no injustice they must observe the fundamental rules which govern judicial proceedings. In this case they received information from one party to the arbitration in the absence of the other party. After the evidence had all been heard the arbitrators agreed that a view should take place, and notice be given to the parties. No notice was given to Col. Gregson, but notice was given to a principal witness who had appeared on his behalf at the hearing. That was the mistake which the arbitrators made. But even that witness did not attend the meeting for a considerable time after its commencement. Meanwhile the arbitrators had before them the other party to the dispute, and held conference with him for some time. That being so, the arbitrators have undoubtedly taken information from one side in the absence of the other. I do not feel sure that the landlord had not some inkling that the meeting was going to take place. The tenant, however, is in no way to blame. The result is, that the award must be set aside, but without costs.

COLLINS, J. concurred.-(L. T., Q. B. D., vol. lxx., N.S., p. 106.)