troops (Art. XX); and south of the line Eastern Roumelia was to remain under the direct political and military authority of the Sultan, with a Christian Governor-General, though under eonditions of administrative autonomy (Art. XIII). In short, the treaty left the powers as far as ever from any agreement on the question of partition and with a good defensible frontier still in Turkey's hands.

By 1878 the situation had been reached which can best be described as a stalemate. No general manoeuvring for an agreement, no sudden move presenting a fait accompli, had so far been effective in producing an acceptable solution of the fate of Turkey, and no alternative presented itself except an upsetting of the board and the certainty of European war. The mutual jealousies and suspicions of the powers which prevented agreement on any general scheme of partition appear of course in other quarters, but they are particularly well illustrated in the history of Turkey. By 1878 the preservation of the status quo in the Near East had become inextricably bound up with the existing form of the European states system, and could only be threatened by a threat to the system itself. The unification of Bulgaria, the Armenian atrocities, the question of Crete, Ferdinand of Coburg's defiance of the powers, all show the helplessness of the powers for a generation after 1878; and when Austria proceeded to disturb the status quo the result was a threat of war in 1908 and a European war in 1914. An additional factor was the strength of national feeling in the peninsula. By the treaty of 1881 between Austria, Russia, and Germany, the union of the two Bulgarias was to be Russia's compensation for the eventual annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the strong national feeling against Russia, which appeared in Bulgaria shortly after the treaty was signed, made it obvious that the union would no longer be regarded by Russia as adequate compensation. All schemes for an agreed settlement of the Eastern question involved a partition of Turkish territory among the European powers; and violent expressions of local nationalism threatened both an unexpected element of opposition to these schemes and the possibility that some powers might make local disturbances an excuse for occupation.

Nevertheless, Europe was slow in realising the importance of Bulgarian nationalism. Even the spectacular horrors of the 1876 atrocities produced no ready recognition of a new factor in Balkan affairs, and the first utterances of European statesmen between 1876 and 1878 seem to anticipate no very serious assertion of the national principle in that quarter. The belief that an autonomous Bulgaria could be dominated by Russia or partitioned to suit the Turks was made the basis of the Berlin Treaty, and Europe had to suffer a generation of diplomatic alarums in consequence.

It is interesting to examine these aspects of the Berlin settlement in the light of some discussions of the Eastern question which have appeared in recent years. There is a tendency to attribute to several of the great powers lines of policy which the difficulties of the Eastern question in the 'eighties and 'nineties would scarcely have warranted, and in any case are difficult to support with any positive evidence. Although there is still much to be known about this period no evidence that has as yet come to light seems to support the view that the powers could do anything except more or less helplessly await events.

The intensity of Gladstone's denunciation of the Turks from the 'seventies onward, and certain anti-Turkish speeches of Salisbury and others have suggested the abandonment by England of the old pro-Turkish policy, and a declaration in favour of partition as opposed to reform. Dr Hazen, for example, in his volume on Europe since 1815' (p. 570), suggests that as early as 1876 Gladstone was an advocate of the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, 'bag and baggage'; that, in other words, he had publicly renounced the Palmerstonian policy of maintaining Turkish integrity. This is a complete misunderstanding of Gladstone's intentions. In the atrocity agitation of 1876 he carefully limited himself, as in his pamphlet on 'Bulgarian Horrors,' to a demand for the 'extinction of the Turkish executive power in Bulgaria.' A few days after the publication of this pamphlet a similar statement occurred in the Blackheath speech of Sept. 10; in this he declared himself willing to say to the Turk, 'You shall receive a reasonable tribute; you shall retain your titular

sovereignty; your empire shall not be invaded.' He had, in fact, in order to remove any misapprehensions as to the meaning of his pamphlet proposals, explained in the Times,' of Sept. 9, that his desire that the Turks should 'carry themselves off' was 'strictly limited to military and official Turks.' As the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 established an autonomous, though limited, Bulgaria, the Conservative Government practically accepted the bag and baggage' policy; and in the Midlothian speeches the policy of maintaining Turkish integrity was not under discussion, criticism being limited to the bellicose and 'wild-cat' elements that Beaconsfield was accused of having introduced into his conduct of foreign affairs. Much political passion had been generated by the personal rivalry of Gladstone and Disraeli, and in spite of differences in application both English parties remained pledged to the treaty settlement of 1878 as embodying the two fundamentals of the maintenance of Turks in Constantinople and the amelioration of the condition of the subject Christian races.

'The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy' does not throw much light on the situation after 1878, but there are many indications of the failure of British statesmen to discover alternative solutions to the question. The union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia in 1885 undid one part of the Berlin Treaty, and Lord Salisbury in approving the union apparently reversed his previous policy. But the reversal was more apparent than real, for the anti-Russian motive in British policy was expressed as strongly as ever; his first action on hearing of the union was to announce his disapproval, and it was only when Russia, alienated by the Russophobism of the Bulgarian Government, decided to oppose the union, that he gave it support. His policy, as in 1878, was primarily anti-Russian, and neither pro-Bulgarian nor pro-Turkish in sympathy, though considerable personal sympathy for Prince Alexander was felt in court and political circles in England. Lord Rosebery remarked that Alexander was too fine a man for such a beastly country,' and the recently published volume of Queen Victoria's Letters shows how her interest in the prince, active from their first meeting in 1879, was intensified by the crises of 1885. This sympathy was

quite in keeping with the previous development of British foreign policy, and pointed to support of an independent Bulgaria as an additional barrier to Russian advance; and behind the barrier Turkey could continue her shaky existence. Beaconsfield and Salisbury before 1880, Salisbury and Lord Rosebery in the 'eighties and 'nineties, examined schemes for the partition of Turkey and weighed the possibilities of alternative governments. As time went on the gradual disappearance of Turcophil feeling in England allowed politicians to express, in public, condemnation which had previously been voiced in private correspondence and behind closed doors. But the Armenian question in the 'nineties showed once more the powerlessness of the powers, and indicated that the stalemate was to continue; and though Salisbury in 1897 could lament in the Lords that support of Turkey had been a backing of the wrong horse, he was compelled to add the observation that it might be 'in the experience of those who have done the same thing that it is not very easy to withdraw from a step of that kind when it has once been taken'; in fact, that you are practically bound to go on.'

·

Though Russia could hope for no modification of British policy her aims in the Near East might still be secured through an agreement with the Central Powers which would present Britain with a continental combination too strong to be opposed. Bismarck seems to have visualised a scheme of partition which would satisfy the ambitions and occupy the energies of all the great powers, with North African territories to keep Britain, France, and Italy quiet, and with a partition of the Balkan Peninsula into spheres of influence as a basis of understanding for the Alliance of the Three Emperors. This solution is clearly expressed in the various agreements negotiated between Russia and Austria, with Bismarck's mediation, up to 1885. As far back as December 1875 he had urged the Russian Chancellor to co-operate with Austria-Hungary, adding that Germany would approve any decision arrived at. Early in 1876 Bismarck suggested to the Russian ambassador in Berlin simultaneous advances of Russia into Bessarabia and of Austria into Bosnia and Herzegovina; and this idea formed the basis of the Reichstadt Agreement of

July. In 1878 the Russian Government received no support from Germany in its fight for a big Bulgaria which, stretching far south of the Balkan mountains, appeared to give Russia an overwhelming preponderance in the peninsula; nevertheless, Russia received Bessarabia, and the violent denunciations of Germany that appeared in the Russian press after the Congress are explicable only on the erroneous assumption that Bismarck had promised to favour Russian ambitions at the expense of Russia's opponents. There is no evidence to support belief in such a betrayal; and though Bismarck, in the autumn of 1879, formed the Dual Alliance with Austria for joint opposition to an attack on either of the Central Powers by Russia, he showed anxiety to return to friendly relations with Russia, and succeeded in restoring the three powers to the amicable relationship of 1876. In the Alliance of the Three Emperors of 1881 it was recognised in principle (Art. II) that Austria reserved the right to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina at whatever moment she might deem opportune, and that the three powers would not oppose the eventual reunion of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia if that question should come up by force of circumstances. In 1884 the Alliance of the Three Emperors was renewed and the friendly conversations of the Emperors of Austria-Hungary and Russia at Kremsier, in August 1885, provided further evidence of Bismarck's skill in reconstituting the understanding between the three empires which had seemed hopelessly shattered after the Congress of Berlin. He pressed the idea of a division into spheres of influence at each successive crisis or discussion over Balkan affairs, and in the Reinsurance Treaty of June 18, 1887, promised not only to recognise the legitimacy of Russia's influence in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, but also to accord benevolent neutrality and moral and diplomatic support if the Tsar should find himself under the necessity of assuming the task of defending the entrance of the Black Sea. All these agreements are consistent in their approval of Russia's movement towards Constantinople, and his policy would present no difficulties but for the fact that numerous agreements exist which appear to commit Germany to equally definite opposition to all Russia's Balkan ambitions. When the disturbances in