See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 31, 34 note.
See WILLS, 643, 644 note.
See AGREEMENTS, 341, 347 note.
title to the mortgaged land for the first time in the mortgagee; so that an action, brought within twenty years next after the order of foreclosure, by the mortgagee to recover possession of such land, was held, since the Judica- ture Act, 1873, to be not barred by the Statutes of Limitations (3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27, and 1 Vict. c. 28), although more than twenty years had elapsed since the legal estate in the land had been conveyed to the mort- gagee, and since the last payment of principal or interest secured by the mortgage. Heath v. Pugh.
1. A weaver, a woman subject to the pro- visions of the Factory Acts, was em- ployed at a mill in which amongst the rules were rule 15, that no person shall leave his or her work without giving fourteen days' previous notice, such no- tice to be given on a Saturday, and rule 16, that any person leaving with- cut giving such notice "shall forfeit all wages then due, or earned, or un- paid.' She was paid by the piece, and all work done was booked up at three o'clock on the Wednesday afternoon in cach week, and paid for on the follow- ing Saturday, all work booked after three o'clock on the Wednesday after- noon being carried forward to the fol- lowing week. She left the mill before three o'clock on a Wednesday after- noon without giving the required no- tice, having previously carried in and had booked certain work which she had completed. On the following Sat- urday she applied for the wages due at the time she left and when she had completed her work, but payment was refused on the ground that the same were forfeited by rules 15 and 16. No claim was, however, made for damage sustained by the employer.
The 11th section of the Employers and Workmen Act, 1875, enacts that "in the case of a child, young person, or woman, subject to the provisions of the Factory Acts, any forfeiture on the ground of absence or leaving work shall not be deducted from or set off against a claim for wages or other sum due for work done before such absence or leaving work, except to the amount of the damage, if any, which the em- ployer may have sustained by reason of such absence or leaving work":
Held, that the above facts did not show a weekly hiring at weekly wages, but showed that the price for the work done and booked when the weaver left on the Wednesday was then earned and due, though not then payable, and that the same would have been forfeited by rules 15 and 16, but that as there was no damage and the weaver was a woman subject to the Factory Acts she was protected by the said 11th section, and could not be deprived of what she had so earned. Warburton v. Heyworth.
2. By the Employers and Workmen Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 90), s. 4, “a dis-
pute under this act between an em- ployer and a workman may be heard and determined by a court of summary jurisdiction, and such court, for the pur- poses of this act, shall be deemed to be a court of civil jurisdiction" limited to £10. By s. 10, "In this act the expres sion workman,' means any per-
son who, being a laborer, servant in husbandry, journeyman, artificer, handicraftsman, miner, or otherwise en- gaged in manual labor, . . . has en- tered into or works under a contract with an employer, whether the contract a contract of service or a con- tract personally to execute any work or labor."
The expression "court of summary jurisdiction" means (inter alia) a stipen- diary magistrate:
Held, that a potter's printer, under a contract with his employers to do work in which he was assisted by "trans- ferrers" whom he himself engaged and paid, was a " workman" within the act, and liable in proceedings before a magistrate to pay damages for a breach of his contract with his employers, caused by his transferrers' refusal to do the work, although he was ready and willing to do it. Grainger v. Aynsley.
An action lies against a third person who maliciously induces another to break his contract of exclusive personal service with an employer which there- by would naturally cause, and did in fact cause, an injury to such employer, although the relation of master and servant may not strictly exist between the employer and employed.
So held by Lord Selborne, L.C., and Brett, L.J., affirming the decision of the majority of the judges in Lumley v. Gye (2 E. & B., 216; 22 L. J. (Q.B.), 463), Lord Coleridge, C.J., dissentient.
Where in such an action the employed was also a defendant, but as against him the plaintiff claimed only an injunction and not damages, it was held that dam- ages might, in the discretion of the court, be given under Lord Cairns' Act (21 & 22 Vict. c. 27), and that the jury, therefore, should be directed by the judge, in the event of a verdict for the plaintiff, to find such damages as should be awarded; first, if the court should think it a proper case both for injunction and damages; and secondly, if the court should think it a proper
1. The plaintiff, by mistake, paid to the defendants, who were owners of the tithes of a parish, tithe rent-charge in respect of lands not in his occupation. The plaintiff did not discover the mis- take until the two years limited by 6 & 7 Wm. 4, c. 71, for the recovery of a tithe rent-charge had expired and the defendants had lost their remedy for the arrears against the lands actually chargeable:
Held, that there was no duty cast on the plaintiff in relation to the defend- ants which made his delay in discover- ing the mistake laches on his part; and that he was entitled to recover back the amount paid as money paid under a mistake of fact. Durrant V. Ecclesiastical, etc. 588, 590 note.
See CHATTEL MORTGAGE. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 660.
1. A structure within the metropolis hav- ing been surveyed by the Board of Works under 18 & 19 Vict. c. 122, ss. 69, 73, an order was made by a magistrate for the owner to take down or otherwise secure the party walls. Upon his default the board themselves executed the works and took out a summons against the owner for the ex- penses incurred:
Held, first, that upon the hearing of such summons the owner could not ob- ject to his being made liable for ex- penses actually incurred, by merely showing that they included items which were in excess of the market price of labor and materials at the date of the execution of the works. Sec- ondly, that he could not require that the other owners of the party walls should be summoned in order that the expenses might be distributed among them. Debenham v. Metropolitan, etc.
The chief constable of a borough hav- ing, by the direction of borough magis- trates, laid an information against a person for conspiracy, an action for malicious prosecution was brought by such person against him and a verdict recovered for £200 :
Held, that it was not competent to the town council to order payment of the chief constable's costs out of the borough fund or rate under 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 76, s. 82. Queen v. Mayor, etc. 526, 529 note.
3. The defendant was possessed of a trac- tion engine, which was propelled by steam power. Whilst it was being driven by the defendant's servants along a highway, some sparks escap- ing from it set fire to a stack of hay of the plaintiffs standing on a neighbor- ing farm. The engine was constructed in conformity with the Locomotive Acts, 1861, 1865; at the time of the accident it was being driven at a proper pace, and the defendant's ser- vants were guilty of no negligence in the management of it:
Held, that the defendant was liable to compensate the plaintiffs for the in- jury done to the stack, upon the ground, that the engine being a dangerous ma- chine, an action was maintainable at common law, and the Locomotive Acts did not restrict the liability of the de- fendant. Powell v. Fall.
4. The plaintiff hired from the defendant, a job-master, for a specified journey, a carriage, a pair of horses, and a driver. During the journey a bolt in the un- der part of the carriage broke, the splinter-bar became displaced, the horses started off, the carriage was up- set, and the plaintiff injured. In an action against the defendant for neg- ligence, the jury were directed that, if in their opinion the defendant took all reasonable care to provide a fit and proper carriage, their verdict ought to
be for him. The jury found a verdict for the defendant, and in particular that the carriage was reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was hired, and that the defect in the bolt could not have been discovered by the defendant by ordinary care and attention:
Held, that the direction was wrong, for that it was the duty of the defend- ant to supply a carriage as fit for the purpose for which it was hired as care and skill could render it, and the evi- dence was not such as to show that the breakage of the bolt was, in the proper sense of the word, an accident not pre- ventible by any care or skill, or to warrant the finding of the jury that the carriage was reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was hired. Hy- man v. Nye.
CRIMINAL LAW, 503, 506 note. LANDLORD AND TENANT, 480, 487 note. WATER AND WATERCOURSES, 645.
1. The 116th and 117th sections of the Public Health Act, 1875, give power to a medical officer of health or in- spector of nuisances, to seize meat, &c., exposed for sale or deposited in any place for the purpose of sale, or of pre- paration for sale, and intended for the food of man, which may appear to him to be diseased or unsound, and carry it before a justice, who, if it appears to him to be diseased or unsound, is to condemn the same and order it to be destroyed. The person to whom such meat, &c., belongs, is also rendered by section 117 liable to a penalty:
Held, that meat might be taken be- fore a justice under the above sections, and condemned without any summons or notice to the person to whom it belonged, and that such person hav- ing been subsequently to the destruc- tion of the meat summoned and con- victed of an offence under the above
may have failed to apply to the guardians under s. 10, to pay the fees, and refused to obtain a remission of them under 33 & 34 Vict. c. 75, s. 17. Richardson v. Saunders. 645
1. An information was laid against the respondent for using a cart on the highway without having his name painted thereon, as required by 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 50, s. 76. The cart was a light spring cart with two wheels used by the respondent in his business as an agricultural implement maker, in which he frequently carried agricultural im- plements to market, and drove his family about from place to place, and for which he paid duty under 32 & 33 Vict. c. 14, s. 18. The magistrates dismissed the information:
2. The plaintiffs lent money to S. upon his bond, under which the principal was to be paid in five years by instal- ments, in case the debtor should so long live; the instalments being calcu- lated so as to cover the principal of the loan; interest thereon; the ex- penses of negotiating it, and a margin representing a premium for the in- surance of the debtor's life. The con- dition of the bond made it void; first, if the instalments were regularly paid till the expiration of the five years or till the death of the debtor, whichever should first happen; secondly, if all the instalments which would have be- come payable at the expiration of the five years, if the debtor lived so long, were at any time paid up, the balance of instalments being at once payable on the failure of any single instalment.
The defendant as surety executed the bond, and default having been made in payment of one instalment, the plain- tiffs brought an action claiming the entire balance of unpaid instalments:
Held, by Bowen, J., that the amount claimed was a penalty, and could not be recovered; and that the defendant
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