prevent his cattle from straying from
the land. Corry v. Great Western, etc.

595

10. The Railway Commissioners, to whom
has been transferred the jurisdiction of
the Court of Common Pleas under the
Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854
(17 & 18 Vict. c. 31), have under that
act jurisdiction to hear and determine
a complaint against a railway company
of not, according to its powers, afford-
ing all reasonable facilities for receiv-
ing, forwarding, and delivering passen-
gers and other traffic at and from any
of its stations which are used by the
company for such passengers or other
traffic; and although the commission-
ers have no jurisdiction to order the
company to make a new railway sta-
tion, or to order any particular works,
or otherwise to interfere with the dis-
cretion of the company in the mode of
performing its obligation to afford such
facilities, according to its powers, for
the receiving, forwarding, and deliver-
ing of the traffic, yet they have juris-
diction to order such facilities, even
if their doing so would necessitate the
making by the company of some struc-
tural alteration of such station.

If the Railway Commissioners act
beyond their powers, prohibition will
lie, notwithstanding the power of the
Court of Common Pleas over railways
under 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31, was trans-
ferred to such commissioners by 36 &
37 Vict. c. 48.

In a declaration in prohibition by a
railway company against the Railway
Commissioners it appeared that a com-
plaint, under the Railway and Canal
Traffic Act, 1854, had been made to the
commissioners against the company,
and that the commissioners proposed to
order certain things to be done by the
company in respect of such complaint,
and that the company denied the juris-
diction of the commissioners to hear
and determine the complaint or any
part of it, and prayed for a writ to
prohibit the commissioners "from fur-
ther proceeding in any way touching
the premises before them."

The court, being of opinion that
the commissioners had jurisdiction over
the general matter of the complaint,
and that they had jurisdiction to or-
der some of the things they proposed
ordering, though not to order the
others:

Held (Brett, L.J., dissenting), that a

1. By agreement between the plaintiffs
and the defendants, the plaintiffs, who
were merchants at Bilbao, undertook
to supply the defendants at Working-
ton, Cumberland, with about 30,000
tons of Sommorostro ore at the price
of 25s. 6d. per ton, cost freight and in-
surance, payment to be made by cash
on delivery of each shipment, "Deliv
eries to be made at the rate of from
800 to 1,300 tons per month, provided
we (plaintiffs) are able to procure ton-
nage at or under the rate of 16s. 6d.
per ton. No responsibility to attach
to us should we be prevented from de-
livering all or any portion of the ore,
through any dangers and accidents of
the mines, railway shoots, rivers, seas,
and navigation of whatever nature or
kind, or through any circumstances be-
yond our own control:"

Held, first, that the plaintiffs were
entitled to deliver quantities of the ore
which they had previously withheld
while freights were above the limit,
provided such deliveries were made
within a reasonable time, having re-
gard to the contemplated duration of
the contract, the means which they had
to make up arrears, &c.; secondly, that
they were not entitled to deliver quan-
tities which they had previously been
prevented from delivering from dan-
gers and accidents of the mines, &c.,

2. The plaintiff gave the defendant a bill
of sale on his goods as security for
money advanced. The loan was to be

sale authorized the defendant at any
time after the execution thereof to take
and retain possession of all the goods
comprised in it until all the money pay-
able under it should have been satis-
fied. It also contained a power of sale.
The plaintiff, having paid thirteen in-
stalments, on the day when the four-
teenth became due called upon the de-
fendant and asked for time; the defend-
ant replied that he would wait for a
week, but he seized the goods upon the
third day and sold them before any
further default had been committed
by the plaintiff. An action having
been brought to recover damages for
the seizure and sale, at the trial the
judge asked the jury whether the de-
fendant had so acted as to induce the
plaintiff to believe that the defendant
would hold his hand; the jury an-
swered this question in favor of the
plaintiff:

Held, that there was no evidence of
a waiver by the defendant, and that
there must be a new trial,
V. Stern.

See PERFORMANCE, 40.

Williams

SECURITY FOR COSTS.

367

SENTENCE.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 408, 432 note.

SET-OFF.

1. There is a distinction between cases
where an agent in effecting a contract
for the purchase of goods does not dis-
close the existence of a principal at aii
and cases where he discloses that he
has a principal but does not give his
name. Whereas in the former class of
cases it is settled law that the seller,
upon discovery of the principal, can-
not have recourse to him if in the
meanwhile the principal has bona fide
paid the agent:

2.

Held, by Bowen, J., on further con-
sideration, that in the latter class of
cases the seller may have recourse to
the principal though he has bona fide
paid the agent for the goods, unless
there have been such conduct on the
seller's part, e.g., delay in applying to
the principal, as might justify the prin-
cipal in concluding that the seller was
not looking to his credit but to that of
the agent. Irvine v. Watson. 186,
192 note.

Action on a covenant to pay all liabili-
ties which the plaintiff might incur
under a deed of assignment made be-
tween the plaintiff and other parties.
The defendant pleaded that the cove-
nant was the joint and several cove-
nant of himself and one Wilson, and
that before action the plaintiff was
indebted to Wilson in an amount ex-
ceeding the plaintiff's claim against the
defendant; and that Wilson had as-
signed the plaintiff's debt to himself
and the defendant in equal shares as
tenants in cominon. As to one half of
the plaintiff's claim the defendant

claimed to set off one half of the debt
so assigned, and as to the other half,
the defendant said that he was entitled
to be exonerated by his co-surety Wil-
son, and to call upon him to contribute
in equal shares to the payment of the
plaintiff's claim, and was entitled to
set off the share remaining vested in
Wilson against this part of the plain-
tiff's claim:

Held, by Watkin Williams and Ma-
thew, JJ., that the defence was no an-
swer to the plaintiff's claim. Bowyear
v. Pawson.
704, 708 note.

See ATTORNEYS, 727, 730 note.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 399.

SHERIFF.

See ATTORNEYS, 548, 553 note..

SLANDER.

1. To an action of slander defendant
pleaded that the statements complained
of were part of the evidence given by
him in the character of a witness be-
fore a select committee of the House of
Commons:

Held, that the statements so made
were privileged, and that the action
would not lie. Goffin v. Donnelly.
640, 642 note.

See PLEADINGS, 310, 313 note.

SLEEPING CARS.
See RAILWAYS, 572.

STATUTES.

1. In ss. 1, 15 of the Pharmacy Act, 1868
-which prohibit under a penalty any
person, not being a duly registered
pharmaceutical chemist, from keeping
open shop for the sale of poisons or
using the name of chemist or druggist
-the word "person" does not include

1. C. owned stock in a company incorpo-
rated under the Companies Act, 1862.
His clerk, P., contracted to sell stock
in the company to S., who was the
nominee of B. In order to carry out
the contract, P. forged a transfer from
C. to S., which was left by S. at the
office of the company for registration.
The company sent a letter to C. inquir-
ing whether the transfer was correct:
as they received no answer from him,
they registered the transfer. B. bor-
rowed money from a bank, and by way
of security for the loan the stock was
transferred by S. at the request of B.
to I. as trustee for the bank, and the
company registered I. as owner and
issued a certificate accordingly. The
money borrowed by B. was afterwards
repaid by him to the bank, and the
stock was held by I. as a bare trustee
for B. The forgery was discovered,
and the company then refused to ac-
knowledge 1. as the holder of the
stock. In an action brought by B. and
I. to compel the company to recognize
their title:

Held, that although I., as trustee for
the bank, might have acquired a good
title by estoppel against the company,
yet that title ceased when the loan by
the bank was paid off, and that no es-
toppel existed in favor of B. against
the company; for B. in contracting,
through S., to buy the stock belonging
to C. had acted on the faith of the
forged transfer, and had not relied
upon any act of the company, and by
sending the forged transfer to the com-
pany had induced them to recognize
his nominee as the holder, and that the
action would not lie. Anglo, etc., v.
Spurling.
253, 280 note.

1. To a statement of claim for working
mines under the plaintiff's land with-
out leaving a sufficient support for the
surface, the defendant pleaded in his
statement of defence that he was the
lessee of the mines from the lord of
the manor; that the plaintiff's land
had, previously to the passing of an In-
closure Act under which the waste of
the manor was inclosed and allotted,
formed part of such waste; that the
lord of the manor from time immemo-
rial had been accustomed to work the
mines under the waste without leaving
sufficient support for the surface, and
without making any compensation for
injury so caused; that by the Inclosure
Act it was provided that the lord of the
manor, his successors or assigns, might
hold all mines and quarries lying under
the waste together with liberty of
searching for, winning, and working
the same as fully and freely as he or
they might have had and enjoyed the
same in case the act had not been
passed, and that without making or
paying any satisfaction for so doing;
and that it was further provided by
the act that compensation for damage
caused to any person's allotment by
such working of the mines should be
assessed by a justice of the peace, and
should, when so assessed, be paid by the
occupiers of the other allotments in the
same township:

Held, that the statement of defence
was good, on the ground that, whether
any valid custom such as alleged in the
statement of defence existed previously
to the act or not, the act expressly gave
to the lord of the manor and his assigns
the right to let down the surface by
mining without making any compensa-
tion. Gill v. Dickinson. 242, 245 note.

SURVIVORSHIP.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 660, 664 note.

T.

TAXATION.

1. A society, the primary object of which
is the acquisition and advancement of
scientific knowledge for the purposes
and in the interests of a particular pro-
fession, such as that of civil engineers,
is not a society instituted for purposes
of science exclusively, within the 1st
section of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 36, and conse-
quently is not entitled to exemption
from rating under that statute.
v. Institution, etc.

1.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 63.

TELEGRAPH.

Queen

174

Edison's telephone, for which patents
were granted in 1877 and 1878, con-
sists of a transmitter, a wire, and a re-
ceiver. When sounds are spoken into
the transmitter, electric currents of
varying intensity pass along the wire,
so that corresponding or equivalent
sounds are heard at the receiver, and
two persons at a distance can thus con-
verse with one another. A company
leased these telephones to subscribers
at yearly rents which produced a profit
to the company, and arranged the
wires so that subscribers could con-
verse with one another when put into
communication by a servant of the
company: