Held, that Edison's telephone was a
"telegraph" within the meaning of the
Telegraph Act, 1863 and 1869, although
the telephone was not invented or
contemplated in 1869.

2. Held, also, that a conversation through
the telephone was a "message," or at
all events a "communication transmit-
ted by a telegraph," and therefore a
"telegram" within the meaning of those
acts; and that since the company made
a profit out of the rents, conversations
held by subscribers through their tele-
phones were infringements of the ex-
clusive privilege of transmitting tele-
grams granted to the Postmaster-Gen-
eral by the act of 1869, and were not
within the exceptions mentioned in
s. 5. Attorney-General v. Edison, etc.

See AGREEMENTS, 341, 347 note.

TELEPHONE.

See TELEGRAPH.

TENDER.

See PERFORMANCE.

TITLE.

602

1. Goods having been shipped for London
consigned to C. & Co., the shipmas-
ter signed a set of three bills of
lading, marked "First," "Second," and
"Third," respectively, making the
goods deliverable "to C. & Co., or
their assigns, freight payable in Lon-
don, the one of the bills being accom-
plished, the remainder to stand void."
During the voyage, C. & Co. indorsed
the bill of lading marked "First" to
the plaintiffs for valuable consideration.
Upon the arrival of the ship at Lon-
don, C. & Co. entered the goods as con-
signed to them, and they were landed
and placed in the custody of the de-
fendants in their warehouses; the mas-
ter lodging with the defendants notice

under the Merchant Shipping Act,
1862, to detain the cargo until the
freight should be paid. C. & Co. then
produced to and lodged with the de-
fendants, the second part of the set
of bills of lading. The defendants ac-
cordingly entered C. & Co. in their
books as enterers, importers, and pro-
prietors of the goods, and the stop
for freight being afterwards removed,
they delivered the goods to various
persons upon delivery orders signed by
C. & Co.:

Held, by Field, J., that the defend-
ants were liable in an action by the
plaintiffs for the value of the goods,
for without deciding whether the mas-
ter could have been exonerated by a
delivery of the goods to the person first
presenting a bill of lading, the defend-
ants were not by receiving the goods,
subject to the stop for freight, placed in
the same position as the master and
entitled to his rights; and further,
that in delivering the goods upon the
order of C. & Co., they had acted in a
character beyond that of mere ware-
housemen, and were guilty of a conver-
sion. Glyn, etc., v. East, etc.

211

2. Claim. That plaintiffs were holders of
a bill of sale duly registered, comprising
amongst other things all the growing
crops and all the goods, chattels, and
effects which then were or thereafter
should be on or about the farm and
premises of S., farmer, and that defend-
ant wrongfully deprived the plaintiff's
of the use and possession of twelve
quarters of wheat comprised in the bill

of sale.

Defence. That the plaintiffs suffered
S. to have the possession of the goods,
and to hold himself out as having not
only the possession but the property in
them, and that he sold the same to the
defendant, who bought them in the
ordinary course of business, and with-
out any notice that they did not belong
to S. That S. was suffered by the
plaintiffs to carry on his business as a
farmer and dealer in grain at the time
of the sale, and it was the ordinary
course of business of S. in such busi-
ness to make such sales:

Held, that the defence was good, for
the bill of sale by implication conferred
a license on the grantor to carry on his
business and dispose of the goods so as
to give a valid title to purchasers.
National, etc., v. Hampson.

252

3. D. & Co. deposited certain goods with
the plaintiffs as security for an ad-
vance; they afterwards obtained pos-
session of the goods by fraudulently
representing to the plaintiffs that they
had sold them to the defendants, and
would hand over to the plaintiffs the
money to be received in payment. D.
& Co. obtained an advance from the
defendants, and deposited the goods,
with a power of sale, with them:

Held, affirming the judgment of the
Queen's Bench Division, that as the
plaintiffs had parted with their special
property in the goods to D. & Co., they
could not recover them in an action
from the defendants who had obtained
them bona fide and for a good consid-
eration. Babcock v. Lawson. 296,

See SALE, 367.

298 note.

STOCKHOLDERS, 253, 280 note.

TOLLS.

See TURNPIKE, 250.

TORTS.

See TRESPASS, 384.

TRESPASS.

1. By the Kidnapping Act, 1872, s. 3,
vessels carrying native laborers of the
South Sea Islands, not being part of
the crew, must have a license; by s. 6,
vessels carrying native laborers without
a license are subject to the provisions
of s. 16; by s. 9, to detain or confine a
native for the purpose of removing him
from one place to another is declared
to be felony; by s. 16, any vessel sus-
pected upon reasonable grounds of
committing an offence against the 9th
section may be detained; by s. 20, no
damages shall be payable and no officer
shall be responsible for the detention
or seizure of a vessel in pursuance of
the act.

Before the passing of the Kidnapping
Act, 1872, the plaintiff's vessel sailed

TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES.

1. G. had purchased certain calico print-
ing works for the sum of £15,000. G.
and S. associated themselves together
as promotors of a company formed for
the purchase of the works from G., and
for the purposes of the negotiations for
such purchase a contract, which the
jury found to be a sham contract, was
entered into between them for the pre-
tended sale of the works by G. to S.
for £20,000. The company was ulti-
mately formed, its directors being
nominees of G. and S., and the works
were conveyed by G. and S. to the
company for £20,000. It was agreed
between G. and S. that G. should pay
the sum of £3,000 out of the purchase-
money to S., but this agreement was
not communicated to the directors of
the company when the sale to the com-
pany was effected:

Held, by Bowen, J., on further con-
sideration, that S., as a promoter of
the company, was not entitled to secure
any profit to himself out of the forma-
tion of the company without the knowl-
edge of the directors, and that such
being the case the company were enti-
tled to treat the agreement made
between G. and S. as made by S. on
their behalf, and to enforce it against
G., and that consequently they could
recover from G. so much of the £3,000
which he had agreed to pay to S. as

1. A Local Turnpike Act, 3 Wm. 4, c. lv,
imposed the following tolls:

For every horse, mule, or other beast
drawing any coach, sociable, chariot,
berlin, landau, vis-à-vis, phaton, cur-
ricle, &c., 6d.

For every carriage of whatever de-

WAR.

See INSURANCE, MARINE, 21.

WAREHOUSEMEN.

which shall be drawn or impelled, or
set or kept in motion by steam or
other power or agency, than being
drawn by any horse or horses, or
other beast or beasts of draught, 5s.:

Wil-

Held, that a bicycle was not a car-
riage liable to toll under the act.
liams v. Ellis.

See EMINENT DOMAIN, 15.

250

U.
USAGE.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 371.

WARRANTY.

See NEGLIGENCE, 769, 775 note.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 348, 351 note.

WASTE.

1. A devise of premises for life provided
that the tenant for life should keep
the premises in repair. The tenant for
life entered upon and enjoyed the prem-
ises during her lifetime, but left them
at her death out of repair. The re-
mainderman in fee brought an action
against the executor of the tenant for
life in respect of the non-repair of the
premises within the period of limita-
tion prescribed by 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 42,
8. 2, which gives a right of action
against the executor of a person de-
ceased in respect of wrongs committed
by the testator to another in respect
of his property:

Held, that an action of tort in respect
of the permissive waste by non-repair
of the premises would have lain at
common law against the tenant for
life in her lifetime, and consequently
lay under the above-mentioned statute

845

WATER AND WATERCOURSES.

1. The plaintiffs occupied premises be-
neath the offices of the defendants who
were solicitors. One of the defendants
had a room of the offices, and in it was
a lavatory for his own use exclusively,
and his orders to his clerks were that
no clerk should come into his room
after he had left. A clerk went into
the room to wash his hands at the lava-
tory after his employer had left, turned
the water tap, and negligently left it
so that water flowed from it into the
plaintiffs' premises and damaged them.
In an action for negligence:
Held, that the act of the clerk was
not within the scope of his authority,
or incident to the ordinary duties of his
employment, and that there was no
evidence of negligence for which the
defendants were liable. Stevens v.
Woodward.

645

See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 480, 487 note.

246

317

602

602

WRITING.

WILLS.

1. Under the Wills Act (1 Vict. c. 26),
s. 15, the marriage, after attestation of

WRONGDOERS.

See CARRIERS, 671, 700 note.