Mills W. Barse and others, respondents, and Same, appellants, v. John I. McKinney, and others. Judgments affirmed with costs-In re Judicial settlements of accounts of Lawson A. Long, etc.-Judgment affirmed with costs-Marrion S. Robinson, respondent, v. Andrew H. Frank, appellant.—Judg. ment affirmed with costs-James F. Brooks, respondent, v. New York, Lake Erie and Western Railway Company, appellant.-Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event-Alfred Rose and auother, respondents, v. Caroline A. Strong and others. -Judgment modified as stated in the opinion, without costs-Lawrence J. Callahan and others, respondents, v. George F. Gilman, appellant. -Order affirmed, and judgment absolute ordered for plaintiff, with costs in all courts-Joseph H. Bushby, respondent, v. New York, Lake Erie and Western Railway Company, appellant.-Judgment affirmed with costs -George Streat, appellant, v. Henry Victor Rothschild and others, respondents.-Judgments of General Term and Circuit reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event-Luella S. Root, respondent, v. Harriet E. Wadhams, appellant. Judgment af

firmed with costs, and judgment absolute against appellant ordered in the stipulation-John Ollson, respondent, v. Thomas Walsh and another, appellants. -Judgment affirmed with costs-American Exchange in Europe, appellant, v. William H. Robertson, a collector, respondent.-Judgment affirmed with costs-Stephen Sweet, as survivor, etc., respondent, v. Alex. Taylor, appellant.-Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event-Mary C. Fargis, appellant, v. William T. Walton, respondent. Judgment affirmed with costs-Julius Cutler, Jr., and others, appellants, v. George F. Victor and others, respondents.Judgment affirmed with costs-John Consalus, respondent, v. Isaac McConihe and others, appellants.- -Judgment affirmed with costs-Isaac McConihe, respondent, v. Francis A. Fales and others, appellants.Judgment reversed, uew trial granted, costs to abide event-Joseph M. Berry and others, respondents, v. Andrew Brown, appellant.-Judgment affirmed with costs-Louis J. Simonie, respondent, v. New York, Lake Erie and Western Railway Company, appellant.-Judgment affirmed with costsMerchants' Loan and Trust Company, appellant, v. Henry Clair, respondent.-Judgment affirmed with costs-Henry C. Dart, respondent, v. William E. Laimbeer, appellant.—Judgment and conviction of murder in the first degree affirmed-People, respondent, v. Daniel Driscoll, appellant. Judgment affirmed with costs-Annie Grapp, respondent, v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, appellant. Judgment affirmed with costs-John N. Granville, respondent, v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, appellant.

NOTES.

By the way, it is a curious fact, that with the single exception of the New Jersey Law Journal none of the enterprising gatherers and distributers of legal news seem to have heard of the discontinuance of the Eastern Reporter. The American Law Review still includes the Eastern in its list of legal periodicals. Even the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL has made no allusion to the untimely decease of its neighbor, although we believe it was published at the same office. Common decency it would seem, with a proper regard for the opinions of mankind, would have required the brilliant editor of the ALBANY to drop a public tear in the premises, and we should have expected an epigrammatic obituary with the glowing panegyric depicting

the many virtues and excellencies of the departed.American Digest.

MODESTY." Modesty is a quality which highly adorns a woman." We learned this in our copy-book days, but we never knew how gracefully it bedecked an editor until we read the subjoined paragraph from the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL of the 5th inst.: "Mr. Charles C. Soule, the well-known law-book publisher of Boston, whose shop has the odor of sanctity belonging to the late Freeman Street Chapel, has issued a catalogue of his publications, with portraits of the authors, including Messrs. Wood, Schouler, Stimson, Chamberlayne, B. V. Abbott, Ewell, Jones, Sheldon, Indermaur, Cohen, Henry Austin, and another - a fine array of intellectual beauty, excepting that other." We only know "that other" in the spirit, but from that knowledge have no doubt that those who know him in the flesh will assign to him as his proper place in Mr. Soule's galaxy of worthies the position facile princeps, or at the very least, of primus inter pares.Central Law Journal..

The ALBANY LAW JOURNAL of the 19th has a well considered article on that vexed question, when and how far a judgment against the principal debtor binds his surety. The writer protests against the admission of it in evidence in any case except, as we understand him, unless (1) the surety is really an indemnitor, or (2) the judgment is in the nature of a confession or admission, and the principal is dead, and the circumstances are such that the judgment can be admitted under the familiar rule as to admissions against interest, or (3) the surety expressly or by implication, agreed to abide the event of a suit against the principal. It should not be forgotten that there is a class of cases in which the very object of requiring a surety is to give assurance that the supposed debtor will not take advantage of some personal defense, as alleged ground of exoneration. Covenants in such cases should be so drawn as to make the intent clear.-N. Y. Daily Register.

The following, which we find in the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL of Nov. 5, contains so much of truth, and is so well said in short, pithy sentences, sparkling all through with evidence of the earnestness and conviction of the writer, that we cannot resist the impulse to publish it. It will certainly interest our readers, very few of whom, we venture to say, have a friendly interest in the "Personal Liberty movement, and it should interest every sympathizer with that movement to know what a conservative law journal of national repute has to say regarding the movement.-Marshall (Mich.) Stateman.

"The custom of advocates to render their services quiddam honorarium does not exist in this country. We doubt very much if counsel for appellant, who discourse with such evident admiration upon this practice as it existed centuries ago in Rome, in France, and in England, would be willing to see it established in Colorado. The advocate or counselor who should here to-day imitate Cicero, and give his services gratuitously, relying solely upon the gift which, in the language of Sir John Davy, 'guieth honor as well to the taken as the guier,' would soon find the wolf at his door, unless, like Cicero, he had other sources of revenue. It may, from counsel's standpoint, be a humiliating fact, but it is a fact nevertheless, that in this respect the legal profession occupies the status with us of other employment followed for a livelihood. The attorney is considered worthy of his hire, and is not in danger of disbarment if he contract in advance for his fees, and collect them by suit, when necessary, after the service is rendered." Helm, J., in Fillmore v. Wells, Colo. Sup. Ct., Oct. 18, 1887.

of the newspaper is muddled by the Sharp decision. The "learned jurist" of the Tribune has stubbed his mental toes over a mare's nest, and makes a

two-column present of it to that newspaper. It is a pity that he hides under the signature of "E. B. R.," because we do not know any "learned jurist of those initials, and it would be a great boon to us and to the profession to know who he is, so that we could "put him on the list" for an appointment to the bench- unless he is already there. We hope he is not merely some sore-headed gentleman who has lost a case in the Court of Appeals, or lost money on Mr. Nicoll's non-election. This learned pundit obligingly informs us what the law is and is not, and indulges in many keen sarcasms and much pointed ridicule at the expense of those unlearned persons who constitute the Court of Appeals. It is probably not worth while to notice these, because the chances are that one of these days having waked up to the consciousness that he has made himself an object of derision like the late irascible and half-cocked Mr. O'Conor, he will, like that dis

tinguished gentleman, don the sackcloth of repentance and invite these same judicial rascals to dinner, that is, always provided he has money enough left from election to square the bills. We will now seriously proceed briefly to take the conceit out of Elaborately Blundering Recalcitrant, if that is his, name, and make the Tribune ashamed of its editorial hullaballoo. We shall not waste much time upon the Tweed decision. "E. B. R." evidently does not understand what that decision was, for he says it was "that a man who has been charged with several crimes in several counts of an indictment should" "not be punished for each crime of which he was adjudged guilty," and contends that such a decision was wrong! According to this learned gentleman's misstatement of the case, a man could be lawfully punished for murder, rape, arson, bigamy and a misdemeanor all under one indictment! And he calls this a "just and common-sense proposition!" Until this learned person can exercise self-control enough to say what he means, and exhibit knowledge enough to fit out a six months' law-student, we shall not waste any powder against his criticism of the Tweed decision. But now to the case in hand. "E. B. R." cites the constitutional amendment of 1874, which enacts in substance that any successful bribe-giver shall be "liable to punishment" for felony, unless he turns State's evidence on a prosecution of the taker, and argues that consequently Sharp must have been convicted unless he turned State's evidence. To be

VOL. 36 No. 24.

sure that is so, if there was legal evidence upon which to convict him; surely not otherwise. You cannot convict a man of bribe-giving upon a mere allegation in an indictment. You must prove him guilty by competent evidence. You may not compel him to testify against himself,- the same Constitution provides that: "liable to punishment" does not mean punishment without competent or upon incompetent evidence. Then section 79 of the Penal

Code came in and provided that the bribe-giver

upon a prosecution or investigation might be compelled to testify against the bribe-taker, but that his testimony must not be used in any prosecution or And the court decided investigation against him. that Sharp's testimony before the legislative committee was compulsorily procured upon such an "investigation," and therefore could not be used against him on his trial. In a word: Sharp was turned State's evidence against the others, provided himself "liable to punishment," unless he had you could prove that he had offered the bribe, and you could not prove this by his own extorted testimony. Any thing very mysterious about this? But "E. B. R." complains that the court did not pay any attention in the opinions to this argument. We have not seen the opinions, but granting the correctness of this assertion, we do not wonder that

The

they passed by so baseless and trifling an argument, We recollect that Mr. Nicoll made some parade of and devoted themselves to those of serious weight. this argument, but if we recollect right, the point had not been pressed below. The only question was court held that the proceeding before the legislative the meaning of the word "investigation." committee was a "judicial investigation," and that was the end of the case the admission of Sharp's After this "E. B. testimony before it was error. R." becomes so devious and "erratic" that we cannot follow him. His expressions are of a wandering class, as Mrs. Lirriper would say. He argues that if all the "Broadway grabbers" had marched before the committee "and sworn to the giving of a bribe which had been accepted," they would all have gone scot free! Now this passes legal comprehension. There never has been any claim that Sharp's evidence before the committee cleared him. That was not the point. The point was that it could not be used against him. If you could not convict him without it, why he simply could not practically be punished, although he was "liable to B. R." you are all wrong -- crazy, so to speak. punishment" on proper conviction. No, no, "E. Better think it over, apply cooling lotions to your heated brow, take it all back, and invite the judges to dinner. will exhibit a grain of common sense and legal sense Of course they will not accept, but it on your part, and convince the bar that if you a donkey, you are a good-natured one.

agree with him.

On the first point recommendation to cut off appeals from certain orders-we readily fall into line with him. But we have been known of old to be strenuously opposed to limiting appeals. It is superfluous to repeat the arguments against it. We content ourselves with saying now that the people have a right to indulge in litigation, and to provide for its dispatch, and having done so, to avail themselves of all the means and remedies provided. The problem how to dispatch legal business is not solved by recipes how not to do it. If a physician is crowded with patients he does not kill some of them off to make things easy. Seriously objectionable also is Mr. Milburn's recommendation to allow the chief judge to summon up Supreme Court judges now and then, in his discretion, to put their shoulders to the wheel. We want no such thing. The sitting of the Supreme Court judges by turn in the Court of Appeals was one of the worst features of the old system, and was abolished by the new Constitution. To allow the chief judge to accomplish the same thing at intervals at his pleasure would be worse. The people are entitled to have a uniform and known court, selected for this particular station, fitted for it by training and experience, continually removed from local and popular influences. The suitor has the right to know beforehand who his judges are to be. But worst of all is Mr. Milburn's suggestion to allow appeals in cases involving less than one thousand dollars, only at the discretion of the General Term. No court can safely be trusted with such a discretion. There are many complaints against the existing exercise of it. Does anybody suppose, for example, that the General Term of the First Department would have allowed Jacob Sharp to appeal if his right had depended on their will? So in civil cases there must frequently be a bias and a conceit, unconscious, perhaps, which would deny suitors just privileges. It is not for the courts to say whether the suitor shall or shall not have the privilege of litigation. The simple - the only. remedy for the grievance in question is to supply judges enough to sit all the time, and let them take turns as they do in Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio and other States. Security may be exacted on stay of execution, and penalties imposed for frivolous appeals.

British spy, and received a letter from the British commander threatening that if the spy were executed he would retaliate on American prisoners in his hands. To which Putnam replied: "So-and-so has been apprehended as a spy, tried as a spy, convicted as a spy, and will be hanged as a spy. P. S. He has been executed accordingly." We did not know that the Legal Adviser had any "views" except advertisements. It is noteworthy, also, that so far as we have observed the Chicago Legal Journal has not had a word to say on this subject. We are informed by a prominent Chicago lawyer that all the “panic” existed outside of Chicago, and was probably news. paper stock in trade.

There is considerable interest in the "Report of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Missouri Bar Association," in July last. A paper on the Relation of Attorney and client well worn topic — by Hon. John W. Henry, is very readable. It contains a great deal of plain and sensible talk. The essayist denounces the extravagance and pomp of modern religion, the precociousness of modern children, the imperfect education of men for professions. Was he not a little satirical when he said: "The model husband, but you know what that is. Each of you married men can see one by looking into his mirror. He is not a member of a club, does not spend his evenings from home, at a meeting of some secret society or convivial club, has a higher regard for his own wife than for any other woman, and prefers her company to that of the wife of some other men. The model wife,— but each of you married men has one at home." It is interesting to learn that Mr. Justice Miller was originally a physician. We agree with the learned writer in the following: "For the young lawyer there is no more direct road to perdition than that travelled by the politician. Leave politics to men advanced in years, but as for yourselves shun it as you would a pestilence, for all along the highway of political life, at every step, are devil's stations to drag you down to hell." And we commend this to certain young lawyers of this city, whose mouths are just now full of the ashes of the apples of Sodom. The annual address by Prof. C. G. Tiedeman, author of a very interesting work on the Police Power of the government, was entitled "The Doctrine of Natural Rights in its bearing upon American Constitutional Law." Two debates close the proceedings: "Is it advisable to abolish the disabilities of coverture of married women in this State?" the affirmative sustained by Mr. E. S. Scarvitt, the negative by Mr. J. A. Harrison; and "Is it advisable to abolish the elective and substitute the appointive system of selecting the judiciary?" the negative sustained by Mr. N. M. Givan, the affirmative not given. There was one peculiar resolution adopted, namely, that each member of the association be permitted to bring a lady to the "banquet." This is commendable, and if generally adopted would result in a moderation of imbibing and utterance.