LAND (terra). This word has a more comprehensive signification in law than in common parlance; for it comprehends not only land or ground, but also anything that may stand thereon, as a house, a castle, or a barn. It has also an indefinite extent upwards as well as downwards, "Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad cœlum, et deinde usque ad inferos," being the maxim of the law; and therefore no man may erect any building or the like to overhang another's lands, and whatever is in a direct line between the surface of any land and the centre of the earth belongs to the owner of the surface, so that the word "lands" comprehends not only the face of the earth, but everything under it or over it (Co. Litt. 4 a). When, however, the word "land" was used in a declaration of ejectment without any qualifying adjunct, obtained a very restricted sense, and meant arable land (Salk. 256). In such cases, therefore, the particular kind of land should have been stated. Cowp. 346; 11 Rep. 55; Adam's Eject. 31; 2 Ch. Pl. 626, n. (o), 6th ed.

LANDLORD. He of whom lands or tenements are held (Co. Litt.) When the absolute property in, or fee-simple of, the land belongs to a landlord he is then sometimes denominated the ground landlord in contradistinction to such an one as is possessed only of a limited or particular interest in land, and who himself holds under a superior landlord.

LANDLORD AND TENANT. This phrase expresses a familiar legal relation, involving many peculiar rights, duties, and liabilities. The relation is contractual, and is constituted by a letting or agreement to let (as to which, see title LEASE). The landlord is entitled to be paid a stated rent, and may enforce payment thereof either by action, or by distress, or by entry (see these three several titles). The tenant is entitled to the possession and quiet enjoyment of the premises so long as he pays his rent and duly observes and performs the other stipulations contained in his contract (see title COVENANTS). A failure in the performance of any covenant works a forfeiture (see that title), unless the landlord chooses to waive the breach (see title WAIVER). The tenant is also bound to keep and leave the premises in good repair, and will be liable for Dilapidations (see that title); but he is permitted during the term of his lease, but not afterwards, to unfasten and remove all tenants' fixtures so-called which have been affixed to the premises by himself (see title FIXTURES). He is estopped from disputing his landlord's title (see title ESTOPPEL),

LANDLORD AND TENANT-continued. but he may shew that that title has detertermined (see title JUS TERTII).

See also title EJECTMENT.

LAND-TAX. An annual charge levied by the Government upon the subjects of this realm in respect of their real estates, and also in respect of offices and pensions, but not (since 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 11) in respect of their personal estates. The method of raising it is by charging a particular sum upon each county according to a certain valuation, and this sum used to be assessed and raised upon individuals by commissioners duly appointed for that Under purpose (2 Burn's Justice, 61). the stat. 16 & 17 Vict. c. 74, facilities are afforded for the redemption of this tax, which is now generally redeemed.

For origin, see title TAXATION.

LAPSE. This word is used in various senses. (1.) As applied to church livings, it denotes a species of forfeiture by which the right of presentation to a church accrues to the ordinary by the neglect of a patron to present; to the metropolitan by the neglect of the ordinary; and to the king by neglect of the metropolitan. (2.) As applied to a legacy, it denotes the failure of a testamentary gift through the devisee or legatee dying in the testator's lifetime. The mere addition of the words "heirs and assigns," or "executors, administrators, and assigns," or other words of limitation to the name of the predeceasing devisee or legatee in the gift to him will not prevent a lapse of the interest given; and the rule is the same where the devisee or legatee is already dead at the date of the will (Maybank v. Brooks, 1 Bro. C. C. 84). And although the legacy be of a debt, it is liable to lapse in the same manner (Elliott v. Davenport, 1 P. Wms. 83); and although the legacy or devise be contained in a will made in exercise of a power the creation of which was by an instrument (whether deed or will) taking effect before the death of the legatee or devisee, still even in this case the legacy or devise will lapse in case the legatee or devisee predecease the testator who exercises the power. Duke of Marlborough v. Lord Godolphin, 2 Ves. 78; Culsha v. Cheese, 7 Hare, 236.

A mere declaration that the devise or bequest shall not lapse is ineffectual to prevent a lapse in case of the devisee or legatee predeceasing the testator (Pickering v. Stamford, 3 Ves. 493); but such a declaration, if accompanied with the designation of a substitute for the devisee or legatee in case he predeceases the testator, would be valid to prevent a lapse (Toplis v. Baker, 2 Cox, 121); and from the desire

LAPSE continued.

of the Courts to effectuate the intentions of testators, such designation of a substitute, where not expressly made, has been in a manner implied from trifling circumstances, e.g., in Gittings v. M'Dermott (2 My. & K. 69), Lord Brougham, C., in the case of a gift to the children of A. or to their heirs, held that the representatives of predeceasing children were entitled by way of substitution for their parents, the word heirs, although ordinarily a word of limitation, and not of purchase, being in that particular decision, and by reason chiefly of the two words or to which are italicised, construed as a word of purchase and not of limitation.

Again, if the testator makes a gift to two or more persons jointly, there is, of course, no lapse if one or more of the joint tenants survive, as the survivors will take by survivorship; and similarly, if the testator makes a gift to two or more persons in common, and limits over to the survivor or survivors the share of any predeceasing tenant, there is, of course, again no lapse if one or more of the tenants in common survive, as the survivor will take under the limitation over. But it is the rule of law in this latter case that there is no survivorship upon survivorship; and therefore, unless the limitation over is made (as it commonly is made) to extend 66 as well to the accruing as to the original shares," there will be a lapse as to any accrued share of a predeceasing legatee or devisee. Pain v. Benson, 3 Atk. 80.

Again, if a devise or bequest is made to persons of a class in common tenancy, and the class is to be, i.e., can only be, ascertained at the date of the testator's death, the members of the class who are surviving at that date will take the whole among them, notwithstanding that other persons who but for their prior death would have formed members of the class may have predeceased the testator. Viner v. Francis, 2 Bro. C. C. 658.

And with reference to the question, whether lapse shall take place or not, the cases of Willing v. Baine (3 P. Wms. 113), and Humberstone v. Stanton (1 V. & B. 385), should be contrasted.

Where a devise or bequest is made to one person in trust for another, the legal estate will lapse in case the devisee or legatee in trust, i.e., the trustee, should predecease the testator, but the beneficial interest, or interest of the cestui que trust, will not therefore also lapse (Elliott v. Davenport, 2 Vern. 520); and conversely, in the case of a like devise or bequest, the beneficial estate will lapse, and the legal estate will not lapse in case the cestui que trust predecease the testator (Doe d. Shelley

LAPSE continued.

v. Edlin, 4 Ad. & E. 582). It has even been held in Oke v. Heath (1 Ves. 135) that an annuity bequeathed to C. and charged on a bequest to B. did not lapse by reason merely that B. predeceased the testator, whereby the bequest to him lapsed.

Some provisions have been made by the stat. 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, against lapse in certain cases, that is to say:

(1.) By s. 25 of that Act devises and bequests which would otherwise lapse are given to the residuary devisee or legatee (if there is one);

(2.) By s 32 of the same Act the devise of an estate tail to any one (whether child or stranger) does not lapse by reason merely of the devisee in tail predeceasing the testator, but takes effect in him, and descends to the person who is his heir in tail at the testator's death, if he has any such; and

(3.) By s. 33 devises or bequests made to a child or children of the testator who predecease the testator, but leave issue surviving the testator, do not lapse, but take effect in the predeceasing child or children, and devolve in case of the intestacy of the latter upon their next of kin, and in case they have made a will, according to the disposition or dispositions thereof contained in that will (Winter v. Winter, 5 Hare, 306; Johnson v. Johnson, 3 Hare, 157). It has been held, however, that the 33rd section of the Act does not apply to gifts under a limited, i.e., special, power of appointment, where there is a gift over in default of appointment (Griffiths v. Gale, 12 Sim. 327); but it does apply to a general power of appointment, even although there is a gift over in default of appointment. Eccles v. Cheyne, 2 K. & J. 676.

LARCENY. Larceny is the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal goods of any one from his possession, with intent to convert them to the use of the offender without the consent of the true owner. Larceny was formerly divided into grand and petty larceny; the former, including the stealing of goods above the value of 12d.; the latter of that value or under. This distinction was abolished by stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, and now all larcenies are subject to the same incidents as grand larceny. Larceny is sometimes distinguished into simple and compound; the former being larceny of goods only, the latter larceny from the person or habitation of the owner (1 Hale, 510). The law regarding this offence is now consolidated by the statute 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, which renders also many things (both animate and inanimate), the subjects of larceny,

LARCENY-continued. which for various reasons were not so before that Act.

LATENT AMBIGUITY. This is an ambiguity which arises not upon the words of the will, deed, or other instrument, as looked at in themselves, but upon those words when applied to the object or to the subject which they describe. The term is opposed to the phrase Patent Ambiguity (which see). The rule of law is, that extrinsic or parol evidence is admissible in all cases to remove a latent ambiguity, but in no case to remove a patent one.

See title EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE.

LATHE, LATH, or LETH. Is the designation of a great portion of a county containing three or more hundreds or wapentakes. Les Termes de la Ley.

LATITAT. A writ, which before the Uniformity of Process Act, was the process used for commencing personal actions in the King's Bench against a defendant secking to evade the service of the writ. It recited the bill of Middlesex, and the proceedings thereon, and that it was testified that the defendant " latitat et discurrit," lurks and wanders about, and therefore commanded the sheriff to take him, and have his body in Court on the day of the return.

See now titles SERVICE; SUBSTITUTED
SERVICE.

LAW. This word has various significations. (1.) In the most enlarged sense in which the word can be used, it applies not only to those rules, or systems of rules, which different governments lay down for the internal regulation of their respective communities, but also to those fixed and invariable principles in conformity with which nature carries on her operations. (2.) When, however, we wish to restrict the sense, or to limit the application of the word, we use it ordinarily in conjunction with some other phrase; thus, when we apply it to those rules or principles of morality which our reason enables us to discover, and our conscience commands us to obey, we call it not unfrequently the law of nature; and when the same rules and principles are applied to the regulation of the conduct of nations in their intercourse with each other, it is then termed the Law of Nations or International Law. (3.) The word "Law," however, in a still more limited sense, signifies that body, or system, of rules, which the government of a country has established for its internal regulation, and for ascertaining and defining the rights and duties of the governed, and it is then commonly called Municipal, i.e., Civil Law, and, in popular language,

LAW-continued.

"the law of the land." The Municipal Law of England is composed of written and unwritten laws (jus scriptum and jus non scriptum); or, in other words, of the statutes of the realm, and of the custom of the realm, otherwise termed the "Common Law;" on both of which branches of the law the superior Courts exercise their judgment, giving construction and effect to the former, and by their interpretation declaring what is and what is not the latter. The following extract from an important case furnishes a good illustration of the division of our Municipal Law into the jus non scriptum, or the Common Law, and the jus scriptum or the written, or Statute Law, and of the mode in which the Courts exercise their judgment thereon:

"Two questions of importance were raised in the course of the argument. The first, is, whether at Common Law a foreigner residing abroad. and composing a work, has a copyright in England. The second is, whether such foreign author, or his assignee, has such a right by virtue of the English statutes. . . . We are all of opinion that no such right exists in a foreigner at the Common Law; but that it is the creature of the Municipal Law of each country, and that in England it is altogether governed by the statutes which have been passed to create and regulate it. A foreign author' having, therefore, by the Common Law, no exclusive right in this country, the only remaining question is, whether he has such a right by the Statute Law; and this depends on the construction of the statutes relating to literary copyright which were in force at the time of the transaction in question." See per Pollock, C.B., in Chappel v. Purday, 14 M. & W. 316; also 1 Reeve's Hist. 1.) For an explanation of the different kinds of law, see their particular titles.

The various significations in which the term "Law" has been used in jurisprudence, are thus given by Locke and Austin: I. Locke's divisions of Laws,—

(1.) Divine Law,-being the Law of
God natural and revealed;
(2.) Civil Law-being the Municipal
Law; and

(3.) Law of Reputation, being mora-
lity.

II. Austin's divisions of Laws,-
(1.) Divine Law,-being the revealed
Law of God;

(2.) Positive Human Law, being Mu-
nicipal Law;

(3.) Positive Morality, being morality; and

(4.) Laws metaphorically so called, being the laws of animate and inanimate nature.

LAW OF MARQUE (from the German word march, i.e., a bound or limit). Α sort of law of reprisal, which entitles him who has received any wrong from another, and cannot get ordinary justice, to take the shipping or goods of the wrongdoer when he can find them within his own bounds or precincts, in satisfaction of the wrong (Cowel). The consent of the sovereign is necessary before any subject can thus proceed by his own arm to vindicate a wrong; and such consent, where granted, is expressed in the so-called Letters of Marque.

See also title REPRISALS.

LAW MERCHANT (lex mercatoria). One of the branches of the unwritten or Common Law, consists of particular customs, or Jaws which affect only the inhabitants of particular districts, under which head may be referred the law or custom of merchants (lex mercatoria), which is a particular system of customs used only among one set of the king's subjects, which, however different from the general rules of the Common Law, is yet engrafted into it, and made a part of it; being allowed for the benefit of trade to be of the utmost validity in all commercial transactions, for it is a maxim of law, that "cuilibet in sua arte credendum est." This law of merchants comprehends the laws relating to bills of exchange, mercantile contracts, sale, purchase and barter of goods, freight, insurance, &c. 1 Chitty's Bl. 76, n. (q).

LAW OF NATIONS. The Law of Nations consists of a system of rules or principles deduced from the law of nature, intended for the regulation of the mutual intercourse of nations. The law is founded on the principle, that the different nations ought to do to each other in time of peace as much good, and in time of war as little harm, as may be possible without injuring their own proper interests; and this law comprehends the principles of national independence, the intercourse of nations in peace, the privileges of ambassadors, consuls, and inferior ministers; the commerce of the subjects of each state with those of the others in times of war and of peace, or of neutrality; the grounds of just war, and the mode of conducting it; the mutual duties of belligerent and neutral powers; the limit of lawful hostility; the rights of conquest; the faith to be observed in warfare; the force of armistice, of safe conducts and passports; the nature and obligations of alliances; the means of negotiation, and the authority and interpretation of treaties. 1 Chitty's Commercial Law, 25, 26; Puffendorf.

See also title INTERNATIONAL LAW. LAW OF NATURE: See title LAW.

LAW-WORTHY. Being entitled to, or having the benefit and protection of the law. Brady on Boroughs, 16, fo. ed.

LAY, TO. Signifies to allege, to state, &c., e. g.: "No inconvenience can arise to the defendant from either mode of laying the assault." Per Curiam, 2 Bos. & Pul. 427; 6 Mod. 38. "If you lay (ie., allege, or state) an ouster in your declaration, you must lay a re-entry." Per Holt, C J. So "laying the venue" signifies the stating, naming, or placing in the margin of a declaration any given county as the county in which the plaintiff proposes that the trial shall take place.

LEADING A USE. When lands were conveyed by that species of conveyance termed a 66 fine and recovery," the legal seisin and estate became thereby vested in the cognisee or recoveror, i.e., in the person who was the object of that conveyance. But if the owner of the estate declared his intention that such fine or recovery should enure or operate to the use of a third person, a use immediately arose to such third person out of the seisin of the cognisee or recoveror; and the Statute of Uses transferred the actual possession to such use, without any entry on the part of such third person. The ded by which the owners of estates so declared their intention with regard to the lands thus conveyed was termed either a deed to lead the uses, or a deed to declare the uses; when executed prior to the levying the fine, or suffering the recovery, it bore the former appellation; when executed subsequently thereto, it bore the latter. 1 Cru. Dig. 396.

See also titles CONVEYANCES; USES.

LEADING CASE. Amongst the various cases that are argued and determined in the Courts, some, from their important character, have demanded more than usual attention from the judges, and from this circumstance are frequently looked upon as having settled or determined the law upon all points involved in such cases, and from the importance they thus acquire are familiarly termed "leading cases.' Such, for instance, are those cases collected in the valuable work of the late Mr. J. W. Smith, so well known to the profession under the title of "Smith's Leading Cases;" and similar collections have been made of the leading cases in Conveyancing Law (Tudor's), and in Equity Law (White & Tudor's), and in Mercantile Law (Tudor's).

LEADING QUESTION—continued.

a proposition as though he believed it to be true, with a view of leading the witness into the admission of it. Such questions may be asked upon cross-examination, but not upon examination in chief. They may also be asked with a view to discrediting one's own witness where he unexpectedly proves adverse.

See also title WITNESSES.

LEASE. A lease is a conveyance of lands or tenements to a person for life, for a term of years or at will, in consideration of a return of rent or some other recompense. The person who so conveys such lands or tenements is termed the lessor; and the person to whom they are conveyed the lessee; and when a lessor so conveys lands or tenements to a lessee, he is said to lease, demise, or let them. 4 Cruise, 58.

See also titles ASSIGNMENT; CONVEY-
ANCES; FORFEITURE; FRAUDS, STA-
TUTE OF; LANDLORD AND TENANT;
TENANCIES; UNDERLEASE.

LEASE AND RELEASE. A species of conveyance commonly in use for conveying the fee simple or absolute property in lands or tenements from one person to another. In the reigns of Henry VI. and Edward IV. it was not unusual to transfer freehold estates in the following manner: A deed of lease was made to the intended purchaser for three or four years; and after he had entered into possession, a deed of release of the inheritance was executed to him, which operated by enlarging his estate into a fee simple. When it was found that the Statute of Uses transferred the actual possession without entry, the idea of a lease and release was adopted. This kind of conveyance was thus contrived-A lease, or rather bargain and sale upon some pecuniary consideration for one year was made by the tenant of the freehold to the lessee or bargainee, i.e., to the person to whom the lands were to be conveyed; now this made the vendor stand seised to the use of the lessee or bargainee, and vested in the latter the use of the term for a year, to which the Statute of Uses immediately transferred the possession. Thus the bargainee, by being in possession, became immediately capable of accepting a release of the freehold and reversion (which must be made to a tenant in possession), and accordingly a release was made to him, dated the day next after the day of the date of the lease for a year, which at once transferred to him the freehold.

See also titles CONVEYANCES; USES. LEGACIES. These are bequests (ie., gifts by will) of personal property; they are of three kinds, namely:

LEGACIES-continued.

(1.) General, called also pecuniary, legacies, being a gift of money or other fungible substance in quantity:

(2.) Specific legacies, being a gift of earmarked money, or of other car-marked fungible substance, in mass, or of any nonfungible substance by description; and,

(3.) Demonstrative legacies, being a gift of money or other fungible substance in quantity, expressed to be made payable out of a specified sum of money or other specified fungible substance; but such legacies become, upon any destruction of the specified source of payment, merely general legacies.

The following are examples of these three kinds of legacies, namely:

(1.) General legacies: £500 in cash (Richards v. Richards, 9 Price, 226); £50 annuity payable out of, or charged upon, the personal estate (Alton v. Medlicott, 2 Ves. 417); £20 to buy a ring (Apreece v. Apreece, 1 V. & B. 364); my stock (Goodlad v. Burnett, 1 K. & J. 341); and, ordinarily, residuary gifts.

(2.) Specific legacies: sum of money in such a bag (Lawson v. Stitch, 1 Atk. 508); sum of money in the hands of A. (Hinton v. Pinke, 1 P. Wmns. 540); A.'s debt (Fryer v. Morris, 9 Ves. 300); A.'s bond (Davies v. Morgan, 1 Beav. 405); my East India Bonds (Sleech v. Thorington, 2 Ves. 562); gift of one part of debt to A., and of residue thereof to B. (Ford v. Fleming, 2 P. Wms. 469); gift of debt to A. for life, remainder to B. (Ashburner v. Macguire, 2 Bro. C. C. 108); a lease of lands (Long v. Short, 1 P. Wms. 403); and occasionally residuary gifts. Page v. Leapingwell, 18 Ves. 463.

(3.) Demonstrative legacies: £1000 out of my Reduced Stock (Kirby v. Potter, 4 Ves. 748): £12,000 out of my funded property (Lambert v. Lambert, 11 Ves. 607); £500 annuity or legacy payable out of, or charged on, lands. Savile v. Blacket, 1 P. Wms. 778. These distinctions between legacies lead to the following consequences :

I. With reference to the Ademption of legacies:

(1.) General legacies are not, as a general rule, liable to ademption; so that although locally described, the alteration of locality by removal does not adeem the legacy (Norris v. Norris, 2 Coll. 719); but a general legacy to a child would be adeemed in whole, or pro tanto, by a subsequent portion given to that child (see title SATISFACTION OF LEGACY BY PORTION, infra).

(2.) Specific legacies are invariably liable to ademption, e.g., by the specific thing ceasing to belong to the testator and not becoming his again at or before his death (Stanley v. Potter, 2 Cox, 182), and without