MANOR-continued. (18 Edw. 1, c. 1), a manor cannot be made, because the process of subinfeudation has been abolished, and a Court Baron cannot now be made, and a manor cannot exist without a Court Baron, and suitors and freeholders to the amount of two at the least; for if all the freeholds except one escheat to the lord, or if he purchase all except one, his manor is at once gone and dead. A manor by reputation, however, but which has ceased to be a legal manor, by defect of suitors to the Court, may yet retain some of its privileges, as a preserve for game, and the lord may still appoint a gamekeeper thereto. Les Termes de la Ley; Watkins on Copyholds. With reference to the legal content of the word manor, it seems that without the addition of the word "appurtenances," it will pass the following properties, viz:— (1.) The demesnes, i.e., the lands of which the lord is seized within the manor ;* (2.) The freehold of all the lands held by copyhold or other customary tenants; (3.) The wastes; (4.) Fealty, suit of Court, rents, and generally all the services; (5.) Courts Baron with fines and perquisites annexed thereto; (6.) Courts Leet, with the like fines and perquisites; (7.) Franchises; and (8.) Advowsons appendant. Many manors which have been destroyed are still reputed manors, and will pass in a deed by the description of manor. MANSLAUGHTER. Is a criminal offence; it is defined as homicide felonious, but without premeditation; and it may be either (a) involuntary, as where a man doing an unlawful act not amounting to felony by accident kills another, or where by culpable neglect of duty he occasions another's death; or (b) voluntary, as when upon a sudden quarrel, two persons fight, and one of them kills the other, or where a man greatly provokes another by some personal violence and the other immediately kills him. MANUMISSION (manumissio). The making a bondman free, which in the feodal ages was a frequent occurrence. Manumission was either express or implied. Manumission express was done by the lord granting to his villein a deed of enfranchisement. Manumission implied, * But demesnes previously granted in fee do not, on a repurchase of them by the lord, become part of the manor again, as they would do upon an escheat, Delacherois v. Delachervis, 11 H. L. C. 62. MANUMISSION-continued. was done by the lord entering into an obligation with his villein to pay him money at a certain day, or granting him an annuity, or leasing lands to him by deed for a term of years, or doing any other similar act which would imply that he treated with his villein upon the footing of a freeman (Les Termes de le Ley). Similar modes of dealing with a servus had in Roman Law the like effect of an implied manumission; and in particular the mere circumstance of the master describing his slave in a written document as his son (filius) had the effect of rendering him a freeman, although not a son. Just. Inst. i. 11, 12. MARKET. In its legal signification may be defined to be the liberty or privilege by which a town or lord is enabled to keep a market (Old Nat. Brev. 149. See also title FRANCHISE). The Market and Fairs Clauses Act (10 & 11 Vict. c. 114) consolidates in one Act the provisions usually contained in special Acts for constructing and regulating fairs and markets; and under the stat. 31 & 32 Vict. c. 51, the usual days for holding fairs, if inconvenient, may on representation to the Home Secretary be altered, a notice of the alteration being published in the Gazette. The fairs of the metropolis are regulated by the stats. 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, and 31 & 32 Vict. c. 106. No one may place a stall in a market without leave from the owner of the soil (Northampton (Mayor) v. Ward, 1 Wils. 107), and trespass will lie for so doing. Norwich (Mayor) v. Swan, 2 W. Bl. 1116. See also next title. MARKET OVERT (open market). Selling goods in market overt means selling them in an open market, as opposed to selling them privately or in a covert place; the former kind of sale effects a change in the property of the things so sold, even as against the true owner, e.g., in the case of stolen goods; but a sale out of market overt does not. In the country, the market-place or spot of ground set apart by custom for the sale of goods and MARKET OVERT-continued. wares, &c., is, in general, the only market overt. In London, however, a sale in an open shop of proper goods, is equivalent to a sale in market overt; for every day, except Sunday, is a market there. So it would appear is the case in Bristol, or elsewhere, when warranted by custom. Dub. Mo. 625; 5 Co. 83 c; cited in Com. Dig. tit. Market (E). And see generally the Case of Market Overt, Tud. L. C. Mer. Law, 713. MARKSMAN. A deponent in an affidavit who cannot write his name, but makes his mark or cross instead, is so termed (2 Q. B. 520, n. (a); 4 Dowl. P. C. 765). The proof of such a signature by comparison of handwriting is excluded a mark not presenting sufficient data of comparison. OF. MARQUE AND REPRISAL, LETTERS These words" marque and reprisal," are frequently used as synonymous; but taken in their strict etymological sense, the latter signifies a taking in return; the former, the passing the frontiers (marches) in order to such taking. Letters of marque and reprisal are grantable by the law of nations, whenever the subjects of one state are oppressed and injured by those of another, and justice is denied by that state to which the oppressor belongs; and the party to whom these letters are granted may then seize the bodies or the goods of the subjects of the state to which the offender belongs, until satisfaction be made, wherever they happen to be found. Reprisals are to be granted only in case of a clear and open denial of justice. They are regulated in England by the stat. 4 Hen. 5, c. 7. They are of course granted only in times of peace, and for a cause which is not sufficient to provoke an actual war between the two countries. But at the present day, in consequence partly of treaties and partly of the practice of nations, the making of reprisals is confined to the seizure of commercial property on the high seas, by public cruisers, or by private cruisers specially authorized thereto. See also title PRIVATEERING. MARRIAGE. The law of marriage depends partly on statute and partly on the Common Law. The most important statute upon the subject was the 26 Geo. 2, c. 33 (Lord Hardwicke's Act), by which the publication of banns, and the solemnization in one of the churches where they had been published, were required; and that statute also enacted that two witnesses besides the minister should be present, and that the register should be signed by the minister, parties, and witnesses. This statute, referring only to the formalities of the mar MARRIAGE-continued. riage, was strictly territorial or local (see title LEX LOCI ACTUS), whence Gretna Green marriages were valid (Brook v. Brook, 9 H. L. C. 193). The stat. 3 Geo. 4, c. 75, declared marriages of infants by licence, without consent, valid. The stat. 6 Geo. 4, c. 92, and other subsequent statutes, provide for the validity of marriages celebrated in churches and chapels in which banns have not been usually published. And under other statutes, commencing with the stat. 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 85, marriages by or without licences may be solemnised by virtue of the superintendent registrar's certificate. By the Common Law of England the requisites to the validity of marriage, are the following: (1.) The presence of a priest in holy (2.) The presence of witnesses (Beamish (5.) The essentials of marriage, as de- (6.) The parties must not be within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity or of affinity; and for that purpose illegitimate relationship counts; but (7.) The consent of the parents is not necessary (Rex v. Birmingham, 2 M. & R. 230). See also title HUSBAND AND WIFE. MARRIAGE, BREACH OF PROMISE OF. The promise, to support an action, must have been made to the plaintiff (Cole v. Cottingham, 8 C. & P. 75.) Moreover, it must appear not only that the defendant proposed or even promised to marry the plaintiff, but also that she promised to marry him; for in this as in all other cases of contract mutuality is an essential requisite (see title CONTRACT) (Veneall v. Veness, 4 F. & F. 344). The C. L. P. Act, 1852, Sch. B, provides simple counts for this action, suitable to the circumstances of the generality of cases. With reference to the evidence of the promise, the parties themselves, although formerly incompetent as witnesses (14 & 15 Vict. c. MARRIAGE, BREACH OF PROMISE OF-continued. 99, s. 4), were made competent by the stat. 32 & 33 Vict. c. 68. Various defences may be raised to the action, e.g., (1.) General bodily infirmity arising subsequently to the contract (Atchinson v. Baker, Peake's Add. Ca. 103), not being, semble, mere infirmity arising from disease (Hall v. Wright, El. Bl. & El. 746); (2.) Prior unchastity of the female, not discovered until after the contract (Wharton v. Lewis, 1 C. & P. 529); and (3.) Mutual releases Davis v. Bomford, 6 H. & N. 245. MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS. These are settlements made on marriage, either by the parties themselves to the marriage contract or one of them, or by some parent or other relation of the parties, or of one of them on their behalf. Such settlements if made before marriage are called ante-nuptial, if made after the marriage, are called post-nuptial: and there is this broad distinction between ante-nuptial and postnuptial settlements, that the former are equivalent to purchases for value, while the latter are considered as voluntary conveyances only, and the respective natural effects of that distinction attach to the respective settlements. Consequently, an ante-nuptial settlement receives the like favour in Equity and also at Law which a purchase for value receives, while a postnuptial settlement is subject to the like liabilities to be defeated both in Equity and at Law which every voluntary settlement is subject to (see titles VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENTS; VALUE, PURCHASE FOR). Two rules, however, have been established, which partially favour post-nuptial settlements above purely voluntary settlements, namely: (1.) If the slightest addition of value, not notoriously colourable, is added to the meritorious consideration of blood or natural affection, which already underlies the settlement, then the post-nuptial settlement is taken out of the category of voluntary settlements altogether, and is placed in the category of settlements for value, with all the corresponding incidents of advantage attaching to the latter (Hewison v. Negus, 16 Beav. 594); and (2.) If the post-nuptial settlement has been preceded by marriage articles entered into previously to the marriage, then the post-nuptial settlement relates back to the date of the articles, and becomes practically ante-nuptial, or equivalent to a settlement for value; and it does not matter whether the articles are in writing or rest in parol merely (Dundas v. Dutens, 2 Cox, 235; Warden v. Jones, 2 De G. & J., 76); the subsequent settlement in writing sup MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS_contd. plying in the latter case, before any action has arisen, the original defect of writing. Bailey v. Sweeting, 9 C. B. (N.S.) 843; Bill v. Bament, 9 M. & W. 40. Also, by the Bankruptcy Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 71), s. 91, the following provisions have been made with reference to post nuptial settlements by traders: I. With reference to the husband's property in his own right,— (1.) Any post-nuptial settlement made within two years of the subsequent bankruptcy of the trader is ipso facto void upon the bankruptcy; and (2) Any post-nuptial settlement made within ten years of the subsequent bankruptcy of the trader, and outside of the first two years thereof, is also void upon the bankruptcy, until proof of bona fides. II. With reference to the husband's property in right of his wife, (3.) Any post-nuptial settlement by a trader on his wife and children is good, notwithstanding the bankruptcy, if the property have accrued during the coverture. Also, by the same Act, and the same section thereof, it is provided, that, with reference to covenants and contracts made before marriage by a trader to settle future property, yet to acquire, all such covenants and contracts shall be void upon the trader's bankruptcy, unless prior to such bankruptcy the property referred to has been both acquired and settled pursuant to the covenant or contract. Ex parte Bishop, In re Tönnies, W. N. 1873, pp. 81, 125. Assuming that a marriage-settlement is ante-nuptial, or (although post-nuptial,) is for any one or more of the foregoing reasons, valid, the following question arises upon it, namely, what is the extent of the marriage consideration. The general rule is, that the consideration of marriage supports only limitations to the intended husband and wife and the expected issue, and not limitations to any other persons (Johnson v. Legard, 6 M. & S. 60); but to this rule there are two exceptions, namely,— (a.) Settlements made previously to and in contemplation of a second marriage, upon the issue of a former marriage (Clarke v. Wright, 6 H. & N. 849); and (b.) Settlements made previously to, and in contemplation of, a first marriage upon the issue of either of the marrying parties by a future marriage. Jenkins v. Keymis, 1 Lev. 150; Clayton v. Wilton, 3 Mad. 302. There is also, speaking with a rough accuracy only, a third exception, namely,— (c.) Settlements made upon collaterals, MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS-cont. if there is any person purchasing on their behalf; but the validity of such limitations to collaterals clearly depends upon the money consideration and not on the marriage consideration alone. Heap v. Tonge, 9 Hare, 90. The peculiarity which attaches to marriage as a consideration is this, that, unlike other considerations, when the marriage consideration has once had effect, the parties cannot be remitted to their original positions, the consideration not admitting, like a money sum, of being repaid or returned. The law regards the consideration of marriage in a sacred light. Where, therefore, the sacredness of marriage is made a mere pretext for committing a fraud, as where a trader who has been already living in concubinage with a woman marries her on the eve of his bankruptcy, and previously to such marriage settles all or a material part of his property on her, and his expected issue by her, the marriage consideration being clearly fictitious will be disregarded by the Court, and the settlement, although it is ante-nuptial, will be set aside upon the trader's bankruptcy, or as against his creditors (Columbine v. Penhall, 1 Sm. & Giff. 228; Bulmer v. Hunter, L. R. 8 Eq. 46), the wife being in such cases presumed to have notice of the husband's embarrassment, a presumption which perhaps, would hardly be rebuttable by evidence. MARSHAL. There are, or used to be, several officers of this name, but those which are more particularly connected with law are, (1.) The marshal of the king's house or knight marshal, whose special authority is in the king's palace, to hear and determine all pleas of the Crown, and to punish all faults committed within the verge, and to hear and judge of suits between those of the king's household; (2.) The Marshal of the Queen's Prison, who, previously to the stat. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 22, was called the Marshal of the King's Bench Prison, and had the custody of the King's Bench Prison; (3.) The Marshal of the Exchequer, to whose custody that Court committed the king's debtors for securing payment of their debts, and who also assigned sheriffs, escheators, customers, and collectors their auditors, before whom they had to account. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 4, 5; Cowel. MARSHALLING OF ASSETS-contd. the creditors in general; it has been long a general principle of Equity that if a claimant has two or more funds to which he may resort, a person having an interest in one only of such funds has a right to compel the former to resort to the other or others of them, if that is necessary for the satisfaction of both. This principle is not confined to the administration of the estate of a person deceased, but applies wherever the election of a party having two funds will disappoint the claimant having the single fund. Thus, where A., a creditor, can resort to more than one fund of the deceased, and B., another creditor, can resort to only one, then in such case A. shall resort to that fund on which B. has no claim, and thus both will be satisfied; and this is termed marshalling of assets. The question who are entitled to marshal, and against whom, is one of very considerable complexity, but may be conveniently explained in the following manner : Upon referring to the title ADMINISTRATION OF ASSETS, it will be seen that there is an order usually observed in applying the properties which are applicable in payment of debts; now, by substituting in the same order the various persons to whom these various properties would go if there were no debts to pay, and to whom they do go so far as they are not exhausted by that payment, we obtain the following list of persons entitled to participate in the property of the deceased, viz.: (1.) Next of kin ; (2.) Heir-at-law; (3.) Heir-at-law; (4.) Charged devisees and charged lega tees; (5.) Uncharged pecuniary legatees, and uncharged residuary devisees; (6.) Uncharged specific devisees, and uncharged specific legatees; and (7.) Appointees. Now the general rule of marshalling is this, That if any person in the above list is disappointed of his benefit under the will through the creditor seizing upon (as he may) the fund intended for him, such disappointed person may recoup or com pensate himself for that disappointment by similarly going against the fund intended for and disappointing in his turn any one or more of the persons prior in the above list; and such secondly disappointed person or persons may in his or their turn do the like against those prior to him or them; so that eventually the next of kin have to bear the disappointment which was occasioned by the act of the creditor. Moreover, persons who stand in the same position in the above list, may MARSHALLING OF ASSETS-continued. have contribution (if not compensation) as against each other. But no one has any right to compensation as against persons posterior to himself in the above list. See also title ADMINISTRATION ASSETS. MARSHALSEA. OF The court or seat of the marshal of the king's house. This Court was originally held before the steward and marshal of the king's house, and was instituted to administer justice between the king's domestic servants, in order that they might not be drawn into other Courts, and thus deprive the king of their services. This Court latterly merged into the palace court (curia palatii) which was erected by King Charles I. to be held before the steward of the household and knight marshal, and the steward of the Court or his deputy, with jurisdiction to hold plea of all manner of personal actions which should arise between any parties within twelve miles of the king's palace at Whitehall. The Court was held once a week, together with the ancient Court of Marshalsea, in the borough of Southwark, and a writ of error lay from there to the Court of King's Bench. The business of this Court has of late years much decreased, owing to the new Courts of request or conscience and the County Courts that have since been established. The word "Marshalsea" is also sometimes taken for the prison belonging to the Court of Queen's Bench, commonly called the Queen's Bench Prison, but by 5 Vict. c. 22, the style of it is changed to the Queen's Prison. See title MARSHALSKA PRISON. MARSHALSEA PRISON. This prison, which was also styled the Prison of the Marshalsea of Her Majesty's Household, was a prison for debtors, and for persons charged with contempt of Her Majesty's Court of the Marshalsea; the Court of the Queen's Palace of Westminster, commonly called the Palace Court, and the High Court of Admiralty; and also for Admiralty prisoners under sentence of courts martial. By 5 Vict. c. 22, this prison, the Fleet, and the Queen's Bench, were consolidated under the title of the Queen's Prison. See 5 Vict. c. 22; 6 Jur. 254. MARTIAL LAW. The law which is properly designated Martial Law consists of no settled code, but of the will and pleasure of the king or his lieutenant; for in the time of war, on account of the great necessity there is for guarding against dangers that often arise, and which require immediate attention, the king's power is absolute and his word is law. Neverthe MARTIAL LAW-continued. less, martial law in that sense does not exist in time of peace (Grant v. Goubl, 2 H. Bl. 69, 100); and the law of Courts Martial, sometimes called Military and Naval Law, is to be distinguished from it as that law which governs soldiers and sailors as such in times of peace, and for the due administration of which there are special Courts military or Courts naval provided. Yet so jealous of these jurisdictions is the Common Law of England that they have continuance for one year only, being annually reconstituted by the Mutiny and Marine Mutiny Acts which are passed at the beginning of each session of Parliament. ters in Chancery were officers of that Court whose duty it was to make inquiries (when so required by the Court) into matters which, from the constitution of the Court, it could not conveniently, without the assistance of such officers, make for itself, and to report to the Court their findings or conclusions with respect to such matters. The duties of these masters were of a mixed character, being partly judicial, and partly ministerial, the powers which they possessed in both respects having been delegated to them by the Court. Whenever a master had acted in obedience to the directions of the Court, he used to inform the Court, by a document in writing, of what he had done, or what conclusion he had come to; and in most cases this document was called the master's report. The masters in Chancery, in addition to their ordinary functions, acted as messengers from the House of Lords to the House of Commons. Two attended the House in rotation each day, and sat on the woolsacks, their duties consisting in carrying bills to the Commons which had been passed in the Lords, or in conveying any message which their Lordships might be desirous of communicating to the Commons. On arriving at the latter House they took their seats behind the chair of the sergeant-at-arms, and this officer, bearing the mace, walked up to the table and acquainted the Speaker that there was a message from the Lords." The Speaker said, "Let the messenger be called in;" upon which the masters in chancery, accompanied by the sergeant-at-arms, approached the table, making their obeisances, and having deposited the bills thereon, or delivered their message, they |