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PERPETUITY—continued. Chancery, in moulding such trusts will take care not to exceed the limits of the rule (Humberston v. Humberston, 1 P. Wms. 332); neither does it apply to cases of cyprès, and for the like reason, that the Court coops up the excess within the lawful period of limitation (Nicholl v. Nicholl, 2 W. Bl. 1159). And there are also the following further exceptions to the application of the rule:

(1.) Gifts to charities, e.g., contingent limitations over from one charity to another charity (Christ's Hospital v. Grainger, 1 Mac. & G. 460): but not of course a gift or gift over in the like case from a charity to an individual. Hope v. Glôster (Corporation), 7 De G. M. & G. 647.

(2.) Lands whereof the reversion or remainder subsists in the Crown (31 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 20), not being put into the Crown in fraud of the rule. Johnson d. Anglesea (Earl) v. Derby (Earl), 2 Show. 104.

(3.) Any provision for the payment of the debts of the settlor (Briggs v. Oxford (Earl), supra), including therein a provision to indemnify a purchaser against an incumbrance. Massey v. O'Dell, 10 Ir. Ch. Rep. 22.

That

See also title ACCUMULATIONS. PERPETUITY OF THE KING. fiction of the law which for certain political purposes ascribes to the king in his political capacity the attribute of immortality: for though the reigning monarch may die, yet by this fiction the king never dies; that is, the office is supposed to be re-occupied for all political purposes immediately on his death.

PER QUE SERVITIA. A judicial writ that issued out upon the note of a fine; and which lay for the conusee of a manor or seigniory to compel the tenant of the land at the time the fine was levied to attorn to him. Les Termes de la Ley.

PERQUISITES. Such advantages and profits as come to a manor by casualty, and not yearly; as escheats, heriots, reliefs, estrays, and such like things. The word "perquisite" is also used by some of our old law writers to signify anything obtained by industry, or purchased with money, in contradistinction to that which descends from an ancestor (Cowel; Les Termes de la Ley.) It is also, at the present day, used of the casual profits of any

office.

PER QUOD. When an action is brought by a person for defamation of character, and the offensive words do not apparently and upon the face of them import such

PER QUOD-continued.

defamation as will of course be injurious, it is necessary that the plaintiff should aver some particular damage to have happened, which is called laying his action with a per quod: as if I say that such a clergyman is a bastard, he cannot for this bring any action against me, unless he can shew some special loss by it; in which case he may bring his action against me for saying he was a bastard, per quod he lost the presentation of such a living. In all actions for slander, other than for slander to a person in his or her profession, trade, or occupation, it is necessary to add this per quod clause in effect, although no longer in form, inasmuch as damage is an essential part of the ground of action.

PERSONAL (personalis). Anything connected with the person, as distinguished from that which is connected with land. Another characteristic of personal property (or personalty, as it is sometimes called) is, that it is usually of a transitory or moveable nature, and capable of being taken away by the owner wherever he pleases to go; whereas real property (or realty, as it is sometimes termed) is of a local and not transitory nature, and does not possess the attribute of mobility, or the capacity of being moved about with the person of the owner; and hence, from its substantial and permanent nature, it is termed real. Having stated thus much, it would be advisable further to illustrate the word by explaining it in conjunction with other words with which it is usually associated.

Personal Actions, for instance, signify such actions as are brought for recovery of some debt, or for damages for some personal injury; in contradistinction to the old real actions, which related to real or landed property, &c.

Personal Estate, property, things, or chattels, &c., signify any moveable things of whatever denomination, whether alive or dead; as furniture, money, horses, and other cattle, &c., for all these things may be transmitted to the owner wherever he thinks proper to go, and may therefore be said to attend his person, according to the maxim Mobilia ossibus inhærent.

See also following titles. PERSONAL PROPERTY. Property of a personal or moveable nature, as opposed to property of a local or immoveable character, such as land, or houses, and which are termed real property.

See also title PERSONAL.

PERSONALTY. Signifies generally any personal property, in contradistinction to realty, which signifies real property. In

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the progress of a suit in Chancery the interference of the Court is frequently required in order to the regular and effectual prosecution or defence of the suit, and in order to the immediate attainment of many objects connected with it.

When

such interference is required, an order of Court, embodying the particular object, is applied for, and such application is frequently made by what is termed a petition, which is a statement in writing made to the Lord Chancellor, or the Master of the Rolls, shewing the cause which the petitioner has for some order of Court. Petitions to the Court of Chancery are either made in a suit or under a statute, or both; but where no suit is pending and no statute gives the right of proceeding upon petition, then a bill is the only course open to the suitor, unless in certain matters regarding infants, which may be done on petition without either suit or enabling statute.

PETITION OF RIGHT: See title MONSTRANS DE DROIT.

PETITION OF RIGHTS. A Parliamentary declaration of the liberties of the people assented to by King Charles I., in 1629. It is to be distinguished from the Bill of Rights, 1689, which was passed into a permanent constitutional statute.

See title BILL OF RIGHTS.

The cre

PETITIONING CREDITOR. ditor at whose instance an adjudication of bankruptcy is made against a bankrupt. The debt of the creditor so petitioning required formerly to amount to £100, but if it amount to £50 that is now sufficient. Bankruptcy Act, 1869.

PETTY BAG OFFICE. Is an office which belongs to the Common Law Courts in Chancery, and out of which all writs in matters wherein the Crown is interested do issue. Such writs, and the returns to them, were in former times preserved in a little sack or bag (in parvâ baga), whereas other writs, relating to the business of the subject, were originally kept in a hamper (in hanaperio), and thence has arisen the distinction of the Hanaper Office and Petty Bag Office, which both belong to the Common Law side of the Court in Chancery. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 103.

PETTY LARCENY: See title LARCENY.

PETTY SERJEANTY: See title SERJEANTY.

PETTY SESSION. A special or petty session is sometimes kept in corporations and counties at large by a few justices, for dispatching smaller business in the neighbourhood between the times of the general sessions; as for licensing ale-houses, passing the accounts of the parish officers, and so forth.

PETTY TREASON: See title TREASON.

PILOTAGE. The act of steering or guiding a ship by the pilot or helmsman, either during an entire voyage, or on the departure from, or on the approach to, port. The dangerous navigation of the coasts and of the rivers of England has led to the appointment of qualified persons, who receive a licence to act as pilots within a certain district, and who enjoy the monopoly of conducting vessels out of, and up, the various rivers, and to and from the various ports of the country. By different Acts of Parliament the master of every ship engaged in foreign trade must put his ship under the charge of a local pilot so licensed, both in his outward and in his homeward voyage. The power of appointing these "duly licensed pilots" is mainly vested in the corporation of the Trinity House, Deptford, whose jurisdiction extends from Orfordness to London Bridge, from London Bridge to the Downs, from the Downs westward to the Isle of Wight; and all bodies or persons having the power of appointment in other places (as the commissioners of the Cinque Ports, the Trinity Houses of Hull, Newcastle, and Liverpool) are, to some extent, subject to their authority. Where the master is bound by Act of Parliament to place his ship under the command of a licensed pilot, he is relieved from the liability of any damage which is done by it while so under the pilot's command. The rates of charge for pilotage are regulated partly by statute and partly by usage, but also by the corporation of the Trinity House. See Maude and Pollock on Merchant Shipping.

PIN-MONEY. An allowance set apart by a husband for the personal expenses of the wife; i.e., for the dress and pocketmoney of the wife. It is that money which the husband allows the wife for the purpose of decking or attiring her person, or to pay her ordinary personal expenses. It is not a gift from the husband to the wife out and out; it is not to be considered like money set apart for the sole and separate use of the wife during coverture excluding the jus mariti; but is a sum set apart for a specific purpose; it is due to the wife in virtue of a particular arrangment, and is

PIN MONEY-continued. payable by the husband by force of that arrangement only, and for that specific purpose and no other (Howard v. Digby, 8 Bligh's Rep. N. R. 269). Consequently, if pin-money should not be duly paid by the husband, and should be found to be in arrear at his death, his wife surviving him can claim only one year's arrears of it (Aston v. Aston, 1 Ves. Sen. 267); also, the husband may find his wife in apparel, instead of paying her this apparel-money, as it may be called. Howard v. Digby,

supra.

PISCARY (piscaria vel privilegium piscandi). The right or privilege of fishing. Thus free fishery, which is a royal franchise, is the exclusive right of fishing in a public river. Common of piscary is the right of fishing in another man's water. Several fishery resembles free fishery, only that he who has a several fishery must also be (or at least derive his right from) the owner of the soil, which in a free fishery is not requisite.

See also title FISHERY.

PIX JURY (from Lat. Pyxis, a box made of the box-tree (Pyxacantha), used by the ancients for gallipots, and to hold the Host in Catholic churches). A jury consisting of the members of the corporation of the Goldsmiths of the city of London, assembled upon an inquisition of very ancient date, called the trial of the pix. The object of this inquisition is to ascertain whether the coin of the realm, manufactured at Her Majesty's mint, is of the proper or legal standard. This investigation as to the standard of the coin is called pixing it, and hence the jury appointed for the purpose is called a pix jury. The investigation takes place usually once a year, and the Lord High Chancellor presides, and points out to the jury the nature of their duties. They have to ascertain whether the coin produced is of the true standard, or "sterling" metal, of which, by stat. 25 Edw. 3, c. 13, all the coin of the kingdom must be made. This standard has been fixed at various times by statute; for it seemeth that the royal prerogative doth not extend to the debasing or enhancing the value of the coinage below or above the sterling value. 2 Inst. 577.

PLAINT (from the Fr. plainte, complaint). The instrument or process by which actions are commenced in the County Courts. It has been described as a private memorial tendered in open Court to the judge, wherein the party injured sets fort his cause of action.

See title COUNTY COURTS. PLEA (placitum).

Is used in va

PLEA-continued.

senses. In its usual acceptation it signifies the defendant's answer to the plaintiff's declaration; and when this answer sets forth at large or in detail the subject matter of the defence, it is denominated a special plea, in contradistinction to those direct and concise answers to the declaration termed the general issues. The word is also frequently used to signify suit or action. Thus holding pleas means entertaining or taking cognizance of actions or suits; common pleas signifying actions or suits between man and man, as distinguished from such as are promoted and prosecuted at the suit of the Crown, which are thence denominated pleas of the Crown. The word is used in this sense by Finch in defining an issue: "An issue is when both the parties join upon somewhat that they refer unto a trial, and to make an end of the plea, i.e., suit or action. So the plea side of a Court means that department of a Court which takes cognizance of civil actions, as distinguished from criminal proceedings or matters which peculiarly concern the Crown." See Finch, Law, 396, c. 35; and see titles ABATEMENT, PLEA IN; PEREMPTORY PLEA.

PLEA SIDE. The plea side of a Court means that branch or department of the Court which entertains or takes cognizance of civil actions and suits, as distinguished from its criminal or Crown department. Thus the Court of Queen's Bench is said to have a plea side, and a Crown or criminal side; the one branch or department of it being devoted to the cognizance of civil actions, the other to criminal proceedings, and matters peculiarly concerning the Crown. So the Court of Exchequer is said to have a plea side and a Crown side; the one being appropriated to civil actions, the other to matters of revenue.

PLEAD. The defendant in is said to plead when he answer to the plaintiff's cause his answer its Steph. Plead. 52.

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PLEADINGS.

The mutual allegation

or statements which are made by the plaintiff and defendant in a suit or action are so termed. These are now written or printed and delivered between the contending parties, or to the proper officers appointed to receive them; but formerly they were actual vivá roce pleadings in open Court. The pleadings in an action are designated according to their nature by the following terms: declaration, plea, replication, rejoinder, surrejoinder, rebutter, and surrebutter. The principles on which these pleadings or contending statements are framed, and the manner in which they govern or affect the subsequent course of the cause, form the principal feature in the art or science of pleading, or, as it is popularly called, special pleading. See Read v. Brookman, 3 T. R. 159, per Buller, J.; Steph. Pl. 24; and the particular titles mentioned in the course of this present title.

PLEDGE: See titles BAILMENT; PAWNBROKER.

PLEDGES. In the ancient law no person could prosecute a civil action without having in the first stage of it two or more persons as pledges of prosecution; and if judgment was given against the plaintiff, or he deserted his suit, both he and his pledges were liable to amercement to the king pro falso clamore. In the course of time, however, these pledges were disused, and the names of fictitious persons substituted for them, two ideal persons, John Doe and Richard Roe having become the common pledges of every suitor; now, however, even these are not used in personal actions. And since the C. L. P. Act, 1852, the use of such pledges has been discontinued even in the action of ejectment; and inasmuch as all the real actions were abolished by 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, it would seem that the use of such pledges is now discontinued altogether.

PLENARTY.

Is applied to a benefice being full or occupied, and is directly opposed to vacation, which signifies a benefice being void.

PLENARY CAUSES. In the Ecclesiastical Court causes were divided into plenary and summary. Plenary causes were those in whose proceedings the order and solemnity of the law was required to be exactly observed, so that if there were the least departure from that order, or disre gard to that solemnity, the whole proceedings were annulled. Summary causes were those in which it was unnecessary to pursue that order and solemnity. The present distinction between the contentious and the non-contentious jurisdiction of the Court of Probate seems to be very closely analogous to this old distinction between causes as plenary or summary.

A plea

PLENE ADMINISTRAVIT. pleaded by an executor or administrator, on an action being brought against him, to the effect that he has fully administered, that is, that he has exhausted the assets before such action was brought. Toller's Exec. 267.

PLIGHT. An old English word, signifying the habit or quality of anything. Thus, to deliver up a thing in the same plight and condition, or to be in the same plight and condition, are phrases analogous to the phrase "assemble and meet together," the latter of the two words explaining the former of them, but being otherwise tautological. This use of the word "plight is the same as that which occurs of the word "causa" in Just. Inst. iv. 17, 3. The word applies to real and personal property equally, and to any estate, even to a rent-charge or possibility of dower, in land. This seems to be the meaning of Cowel, title Plight.

PLOUGH-BOTE. An allowance of wood which tenants are entitled to, for repairing their implements of husbandry.

or

PLURIES. A writ of summons capias was termed a pluries writ, when two other writs had been issued previously, but to no effect; and it was so termed, because the words ran thus: "You are commanded as often you have been commanded" (alluding to the commands contained in the two previous writs) (Smith's Action at Law, 63). But the pluries writ is now abolished, and by s. 11 of the C. L. P. Act, 1852, the original writ may be renewed at any time before its expiration for six months from the date of such renewal, and so on from time to time during the currency of the renewed writ, this renewal saving the Statute of Limitations as from the date of the original writ.

POCKET SHERIFFS. Sheriffs appointed by the sole authority of the Crown without the interposition of the judges.

POLICE. Regarding the police of the metropolis (see title METROPOLITAN PoLICE). With reference to police generally, these are of various degrees. (1.) The high constable of a county, appointed by the justices of the county at quarter sessions, and not at petty sessions (Reg. v. Wilkinson, 10 A. & E. 288); (2.) Special constables who are appointed for cases of sudden public tumult, or other like emergency, under the stats. 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 41, and 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 43; (3.) County and district constables, being the regular officers of police for counties and districts, appointed under the stats. 2 & 3 Vict. c. 93, 3 & 4 Vict. c. 88, and 19 & 20 Vict. c. 69; and (4.) Parish constables, being principally the officers of police in towns, appointed under the stat. 5 & 6 Vict. c 109, and some Amendment Acts, and whose duties are regulated by the Town Police Clauses Act, 10 & 11 Vict. c. 89.

By the constitution of England, every man is responsible for the preservation of the public peace (see title FRANKPLEDGE); and if any one upon being duly called upon by the magistrates to serve as a special constable refuses to do so, the magistrates may and ought to cause him to be indicted (Reg. v. Vincent, 9 C. & P. 91). A special constable, when duly appointed, is appointed for an indefinite time, and until, in fact, his services are either determined or suspended; and during the term of his office he has all the authority of an ordinary constable. The office, it appears, may be served by deputy (Rex v. Clarke, 1 T. R. 679); but a naturalised foreigner may not serve either as deputy or as principal. Rex v. Ferdinand de Mierre, 5 Burr. 2787.

In the case of a breach of the peace actually continuing, or reasonably likely to be renewed, any private person may arrest the offenders, or any of them; but when the affray is over he may not do so, nor even require a policeman, who has not seen the affray, to do so (Baynes v. Brewster, 2 Q. B. 375). In the case of a felony being actually committed, he may arrest the felon; and in case the felony is completed, he may give the felon in charge to a policeman (Atkinson v. Warne, 1 Cr. M. & R. 827). All these things he may do without warrant, and, à fortiori, a regular policeman may and ought to do the like. But further, in the case of a felony actually committed, a policeman may, upon probable suspicion merely, arrest the felon without a warrant, and may even break open doors, and, if necessary for his apprehension, kill the felon (Hogg

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POLLS, CHALLENGE TO: See title CHALLENGE.

PONE. An original writ, formerly used for the purpose of removing suits from the Court Baron, or County Court, into the superior Courts of Common Law. It was also the proper writ to remove all suits which were before the sheriff by writ of justicies (Les Termes de la Ley). But this writ is now in disuse, the writ of certiorari being the ordinary process by which at the present day a cause is removed from a County Court into any superior Court.

POOR. Upon the dissolution of the monasteries in the reign of Henry VIII., it became necessary to make some provision for the poor, as well those who were properly called indigent, i.e., unable, even with labour, to earn their own livelihood, as also those who were properly called poor, i.e., unable to live without labour. The oldest Poor Law Act (43 Eliz. c. 2) preserves this distinction; but abuses arising out of it, of which the principal one, perhaps, was the extension of out-door relief to able-bodied paupers, the whole system of Poor Law administration was re-modelled by the stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, and has since been still further improved. Under the stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, which continued in force until 31st of July, 1847, the administration of relief to the poor throughout England and Wales, was placed under the control of three commissioners, styled, "The Poor Law Commissioners for England and Wales;" but under the stat. 10 & 11 Vict. c. 109, a new board of commissioners, styled, "Commissioners for Administering the Laws for the Relief of the Poor in England," was appointed in their place, and was invested with all the powers and duties of the former commissioners; the style has been since altered by the stat. 12 & 13 Vict. c. 103, to that of the "Poor Law Board," and the Board under that name has been perpetuated by the stat. 30 & 31 Vict. c. 106.

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