has been called a science, he is not satisfied with a mere collection of arbitrary, unconnected, and it may be often contradictory dogmas; a mere digest of abstracted cases arranged without any relation to their mutual dependence, or to their bearing upon general principle. He expects, at least, a connected and continuous narrative, having a reasonable commencement, middle, and termination. If there be any general principles pervading the whole or parts of the subject, he naturally wishes to see those principles stated, the qualifications and exceptions more or less adverted to, and the leading authorities grouped round them. If there be cases which cannot be brought within the operation of these principles, or of any legitimate exceptions to them, he will, of course, be anxious to know how this happens, and to have it explained how this anomalous course of decision has sprung up, and through what error or miscarriage it has gained the recognition of the Courts. If, for example, he find it laid down by great Judges in one case that all contracts by an infant are void,-by other great Judges in another case that they are all voidable,-by other Judges equally eminent, in a third, that such contracts are sometimes void and sometimes voidable,-in many other cases, that they are voidable or void, according as they are or are not beneficial to the infant,-that a contract for necessaries binds him, because it is for his benefit, and that, therefore, a contract by an infant widow with an undertaker to furnish her husband's funeral can be enforced against her,-that a power of attorney to receive seisin is voidable only, while a power of attorney to deliver seisin is absolutely void;-the law student will naturally look for some help to guide him through this labyrinth of contradictions, and will inquire whether any of these statements involves the true doctrine-what is the governing principle, if any there be-whether all the

decisions be reconcileable with it--and whether any of them be anomalous and incapable of explanation. These, however, are inquiries that belong to the spirit of the generation in which we live, not of that which is expiring.

With the fullest appreciation, therefore, of the merits of Sir E. Sugden's Treatise,-entirely sensible of its great excellence in many particulars,-it appeared to me (b) that the time had come, for making an attempt at least, to recast the whole subject, and substitute for the pragmatical dogmas and fragmentary style of the Vendors and Purchasers, a simple exposition of the general principles of this branch of the law, and a more connected, consecutive, and continuous statement of its details,—to attempt, in short, to accomplish for the Law on the Contract of Sale, what had been so admirably done for the Law of Evidence by Mr. Phillipps and the late Mr. Starkie,— by each of them certainly in his own peculiar mode, but by both in a high spirit of philosophy and logical accuracy.

In writing the following work, my primary object was, therefore, to present the subject in a more concise, simple, and intelligible form. It appeared to me that many things, which Sir E. Sugden had treated at great length with reference rather to their former than their present importance, might be more briefly disposed of; and that many others might be altogether omitted, as having reference to points which were settled, or which had ceased to have any value, or which did not seem properly to belong to the subject. The publication of Mr. Dart's Compendium, and shortly after of Sir E. Sugden's Concise View (c),-both of them, in point of

(b) In the autumn of 1848.

(c) I have not read "The Concise and Practical View," but in turning casually over its pages I fell accidentally on a curious error. After referring, without

disapprobation or remark, to the old cases, in which it was held that a mere license was not within the Statute of Frauds, the learned author adds:-" But in the case of Wood v. Leadbitter (13 Mees. & W. 838),

fact, abridgments of the Vendors and Purchasers,-partially accomplished this part of my design. I conceived also that Sir E. Sugden, for reasons which must be obvious and were very natural, had attributed an undue degree of weight, and had given undue prominence, to the decisions and dicta of the Judges of the past generation, to the neglect of the more important decisions and judicial arguments of a later period. It was part of my design, therefore, to bring out more distinctly the mass of important cases, both at law and in equity, which had been determined within the last twenty years. During that interval the judicial power in the various Courts, and especially in the House of Lords, had been of an unusual degree of strength; and a series of cases, touching almost every part of the subject of this volume, had been determined with a degree of learning and logical precision which our Courts had not witnessed for a long period. Two or three extraordinary minds, which sprung up almost contemporaneously on both sides of Westminster Hall, had given a great impulse to judicial energy, and had evolved a vast amount of new principle and recondite learning. We see the fruit of their genius in the elaborate and learned judgments which are now of daily occurrence,―judgments which frequently exhaust the subject, and resemble rather the carefully elaborated essays of the

it was held that no incorporeal inheritance, or for life or years, affecting land, can be created without deed, and that a mere license is revocable, although granted by deed and for a price paid " (p. 74). As to the former part of this proposition, which, from the language employed, it might be supposed the Court had here decided for the first time, it is certainly as old as the common law; as to the latter part of it, the Court held just the reverse, that is to say, that a mere license is revocable though paid for, unless

This nary.
ns. held as
stald h5E.S.

granted by deed (See post, p. 112, n. (b).
The question arose upon the right con-
ferred by a ticket of admission to the
Grand Stand at Doncaster, for which a je 13W.
guinea had been paid. The unfortunate P45
holder was nevertheless expelled without
having his guinea returned, for which
he brought an action of trespass against
the servant of the steward of the course;
but the Court of Exchequer held that the
right purchased by the ticket was in the
nature of a license, and that such right
could only be granted by deed.

closet, than the comparatively extemporaneous decisions of the Bench (d). It appeared to me also, as I have already intimated, that, in Sir E. Sugden's work, the general principles of the law on this subject had not been stated with sufficient point and clearness. I proposed, so far as I might be able, to supply the deficiency, which I conceived to exist in this respect. Lastly, I never could discover any good reason why the law on the sale of real estate should be separated from that on the sale of personalty. Neither branch of the subject can be adequately treated without drawing considerable illustration from the other. It was a further part of my plan, therefore, to include both branches of the law, and treat them as parts of the same subject. The law relative to the sale of personal estate is chiefly administered in Courts of law; while that as to the sale of real estate is, to a great extent, administered in Courts of equity. The diversity of the tribunal, as well as the difference of the subject-matter, has, doubtless, given rise to some distinctions. By bringing them into juxta-position, each part of the subject is made to illustrate the other; sometimes by the similarity, sometimes by the identity, and sometimes by the contrast, of the principles which govern them.

It has been usual, in treating on this subject, to give chapters on the law of stamps, the registration and enrolment of deeds, the operation of judgments, the effect of non-claim, and some other matters incidental to the title. As to the first of these topics, there are several good treatises, one or other of which would be consulted by every practitioner in a question involving difficulty. As to the rest, they are merely questions of title, and may all be more conveniently stu

(d) It would be easy to exemplify these remarks by referring to particular instances. It will be sufficient, however, to mention Baron Parke's judgment in

Morley v. Attenborough, (3 Exch. 500); and that of Lord Campbell in Morton v. Tibbett, (15 Q. B. 428), as happy illustrations of what is here meant.

died in separate publications, where they are specially treated of. I have also in general avoided the discussion of all matters merely collateral. For instance, I have thought it sufficient to state, that, primâ facie, a purchaser of land is entitled to a sixty years' title, without going into any detail as to what is a good title, that being a question which belongs to the general law of real property. So I have thought it sufficient to state, that a purchaser is, under like circumstances, entitled to a verified abstract, without entering into particulars as to the form of the abstract or its verification—the former being familiar to the youngest clerk in an attorney's office, and the latter being a point which belongs to the general law of evidence, as to which all the information that can be required may be most easily and completely found in any of our admirable treatises on that subject.

Having regard to these considerations, I have endeavoured to present a coup d'oeil of the law of Vendor and Purchaser, embracing everything which fairly belongs to the subject, excluding whatever did not appear to me a legitimate part of it. I have not over-crowded my notes with the names of cases. A large mass of reference, which twenty years ago was important, has been entirely superseded, partly from changes in the law, and partly from the results of subsequent decision. I have, therefore, unsparingly rejected it, as being useless to the student and embarrassing to the practitioner. Every authority, which I have adduced, has been fairly and honestly examined, and, with very few exceptions, bears, I believe, directly upon the point for which it is cited. The book in all its parts has undergone much reflection and care, and the utmost pains have been taken to insure its accuracy. That there are errors and mistakes I cannot doubt. I trust, however, and believe, that they are neither numerous nor important.

I have given the usual apparatus of reference,-Tables of