Powers: A Study in MetaphysicsClarendon Press, 30. nov 2006 - 252 pages George Molnar came to see that the solution to a number of the problems of contemporary philosophy lay in the development of an alternative to Hume's metaphysics. This alternative would have real causal powers at its centre. Molnar set about developing a thorough account of powers that might persuade those who remained, perhaps unknowingly, in the grip of Humean assumptions. He succeeded in producing something both highly focused and at the same time wide-ranging. He showed both that the notion of a power was central and that it could serve to dispel a number of long-standing philosophical problems. Molnar's account of powers is as realist as any that has so far appeared. He shows that dispositions are as real as any other properties. Specifically, they do not depend for their existence on their manifestations. Nevertheless, they are directed towards such manifestations. Molnar thus appropriates the notion of intentionality, from Brentano, and argues that it is the essential characteristic of powers. He offers a persuasive case for there being some basic and ungrounded powers, thus ruling out the reducibility of the dispositional to the non-dispositional. However, he does allow that there are non-power properties as well as power properties. In this respect, his final position is dualistic. This is contemporary metaphysics of the highest quality. It is a work that was almost complete when its author died. It has been edited for publication by another specialist in the subject, Stephen Mumford, who has also provided an introduction that will allow non-specialists to become acquainted with the issues. David Armstrong, one of the greatest living metaphysicians and personal friend of George Molnar, has provided a Foreword. |
From inside the book
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Page 2
... answer these questions because the notion of a disposition has been useful in both the philosophy of mind, most notably in Ryle (1949), and the philosophy of matter. Physical dispositions are long recognized; indeed, Ryle explained ...
... answer these questions because the notion of a disposition has been useful in both the philosophy of mind, most notably in Ryle (1949), and the philosophy of matter. Physical dispositions are long recognized; indeed, Ryle explained ...
Page 6
... answer to Kneale's argument. It deems that from the falsity of 'something is F' one cannot infer that 'nothing is F' states a law of nature. More importantly, the strategy, once endorsed, resists Kneale's argument without any ...
... answer to Kneale's argument. It deems that from the falsity of 'something is F' one cannot infer that 'nothing is F' states a law of nature. More importantly, the strategy, once endorsed, resists Kneale's argument without any ...
Page 9
... answers some of the further questions that must be addressed before we have a completed theory of powers. Chapters 8 is on the relationship between powers and their grounds in a so-called causal base. Molnar rejects the claim that all ...
... answers some of the further questions that must be addressed before we have a completed theory of powers. Chapters 8 is on the relationship between powers and their grounds in a so-called causal base. Molnar rejects the claim that all ...
Page 13
... answers such a concern by arguing that there are states or properties that are (a) mental, (b) not semantic or representational, but (c) intentional. Showing that there are such states provides a model of non-semantic directedness ...
... answers such a concern by arguing that there are states or properties that are (a) mental, (b) not semantic or representational, but (c) intentional. Showing that there are such states provides a model of non-semantic directedness ...
Page 14
... might naturally arise of what makes any such conditional true. What, in the world, is the truthmaker, where a truthmaker is whatever in the world makes a truth true? (Armstrong 1997: 2). Ordinarily, an answer 14 / Introduction.
... might naturally arise of what makes any such conditional true. What, in the world, is the truthmaker, where a truthmaker is whatever in the world makes a truth true? (Armstrong 1997: 2). Ordinarily, an answer 14 / Introduction.
Contents
1 | |
POWERS | 19 |
Properties | 21 |
On What There Is | 47 |
3 Directedness | 60 |
4 Independence | 82 |
5 Actuality | 99 |
6 Intrinsicality | 102 |
8 Do Powers Need Grounds? | 125 |
9 The Ontology of Powers | 143 |
10 NonPowers | 158 |
11 Objections Considered | 173 |
12 Powers at Work | 186 |
References | 224 |
Index | 233 |
7 Objectivity | 111 |
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Common terms and phrases
accept According actual analysis answer appear applied argued argument Armstrong atomic basic bearers behaviour believe causal cause Chapter claim complex concept conclusion conditional connections consider contains contingent definition depends derivative determinate directed dispositional distinct effects entail essential example exist experience explain express extrinsic fact force fundamental give given grounded Hume Humean idea identity important impossible independent intentional object intentionality intrinsic intrinsic properties involve kind laws Lewis logical manifestation matter meaning mental metaphysics modal Molnar nature necessary necessity non-powers object occur ontological pain particles particular philosophers physical position possible powers predicates principle priori probability problem properties propositions qualities question realism reason reduction relation respect response seems sense shape sides simple space statement strong structural suggests theory Thesis thing tion tropes true truth truthmakers turn types universals whole