Powers: A Study in MetaphysicsClarendon Press, 30. nov 2006 - 252 pages George Molnar came to see that the solution to a number of the problems of contemporary philosophy lay in the development of an alternative to Hume's metaphysics. This alternative would have real causal powers at its centre. Molnar set about developing a thorough account of powers that might persuade those who remained, perhaps unknowingly, in the grip of Humean assumptions. He succeeded in producing something both highly focused and at the same time wide-ranging. He showed both that the notion of a power was central and that it could serve to dispel a number of long-standing philosophical problems. Molnar's account of powers is as realist as any that has so far appeared. He shows that dispositions are as real as any other properties. Specifically, they do not depend for their existence on their manifestations. Nevertheless, they are directed towards such manifestations. Molnar thus appropriates the notion of intentionality, from Brentano, and argues that it is the essential characteristic of powers. He offers a persuasive case for there being some basic and ungrounded powers, thus ruling out the reducibility of the dispositional to the non-dispositional. However, he does allow that there are non-power properties as well as power properties. In this respect, his final position is dualistic. This is contemporary metaphysics of the highest quality. It is a work that was almost complete when its author died. It has been edited for publication by another specialist in the subject, Stephen Mumford, who has also provided an introduction that will allow non-specialists to become acquainted with the issues. David Armstrong, one of the greatest living metaphysicians and personal friend of George Molnar, has provided a Foreword. |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 37
Page 1
... consider the argument of Powers itself, during which I will try to identify what is important and controversial in the work. I will justify a claim that Molnar's theory is a substantial contribution to the existing debate. There will be ...
... consider the argument of Powers itself, during which I will try to identify what is important and controversial in the work. I will justify a claim that Molnar's theory is a substantial contribution to the existing debate. There will be ...
Page 5
... considers this troublesome class of proposition and shows how no simple and reductive treatment of them is easily found. Defeasible propositions have the unusual feature of being both general but also permissive of counter-examples ...
... considers this troublesome class of proposition and shows how no simple and reductive treatment of them is easily found. Defeasible propositions have the unusual feature of being both general but also permissive of counter-examples ...
Page 6
... considers that Armstrong cites relatively few sources and that 'Kneale's Argument Revisited' is still held as an exemplar fourteen years after publication. In the passing of those years, others had attempted more illuminating ...
... considers that Armstrong cites relatively few sources and that 'Kneale's Argument Revisited' is still held as an exemplar fourteen years after publication. In the passing of those years, others had attempted more illuminating ...
Page 10
... considering whether there are any non-powers, that Molnar states his own preferred position. Because he thinks there are non-powers, he opts for a property dualism: there are both powers and non-powers. What are the non-powers? In brief ...
... considering whether there are any non-powers, that Molnar states his own preferred position. Because he thinks there are non-powers, he opts for a property dualism: there are both powers and non-powers. What are the non-powers? In brief ...
Page 12
... truth-functions of F. And the intentional object cannot always be replaced with a co-referring expression in an account of that power. After first considering some other objections, Molnar concentrates on providing 12 / Introduction.
... truth-functions of F. And the intentional object cannot always be replaced with a co-referring expression in an account of that power. After first considering some other objections, Molnar concentrates on providing 12 / Introduction.
Contents
1 | |
POWERS | 19 |
Properties | 21 |
On What There Is | 47 |
3 Directedness | 60 |
4 Independence | 82 |
5 Actuality | 99 |
6 Intrinsicality | 102 |
8 Do Powers Need Grounds? | 125 |
9 The Ontology of Powers | 143 |
10 NonPowers | 158 |
11 Objections Considered | 173 |
12 Powers at Work | 186 |
References | 224 |
Index | 233 |
7 Objectivity | 111 |
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Common terms and phrases
accept According actual analysis answer appear applied argued argument Armstrong atomic basic bearers behaviour believe causal cause Chapter claim complex concept conclusion conditional connections consider contains contingent definition depends derivative determinate directed dispositional distinct effects entail essential example exist experience explain express extrinsic fact force fundamental give given grounded Hume Humean idea identity important impossible independent intentional object intentionality intrinsic intrinsic properties involve kind laws Lewis logical manifestation matter meaning mental metaphysics modal Molnar nature necessary necessity non-powers object occur ontological pain particles particular philosophers physical position possible powers predicates principle priori probability problem properties propositions qualities question realism reason reduction relation respect response seems sense shape sides simple space statement strong structural suggests theory Thesis thing tion tropes true truth truthmakers turn types universals whole