Powers: A Study in MetaphysicsClarendon Press, 30. nov 2006 - 252 pages George Molnar came to see that the solution to a number of the problems of contemporary philosophy lay in the development of an alternative to Hume's metaphysics. This alternative would have real causal powers at its centre. Molnar set about developing a thorough account of powers that might persuade those who remained, perhaps unknowingly, in the grip of Humean assumptions. He succeeded in producing something both highly focused and at the same time wide-ranging. He showed both that the notion of a power was central and that it could serve to dispel a number of long-standing philosophical problems. Molnar's account of powers is as realist as any that has so far appeared. He shows that dispositions are as real as any other properties. Specifically, they do not depend for their existence on their manifestations. Nevertheless, they are directed towards such manifestations. Molnar thus appropriates the notion of intentionality, from Brentano, and argues that it is the essential characteristic of powers. He offers a persuasive case for there being some basic and ungrounded powers, thus ruling out the reducibility of the dispositional to the non-dispositional. However, he does allow that there are non-power properties as well as power properties. In this respect, his final position is dualistic. This is contemporary metaphysics of the highest quality. It is a work that was almost complete when its author died. It has been edited for publication by another specialist in the subject, Stephen Mumford, who has also provided an introduction that will allow non-specialists to become acquainted with the issues. David Armstrong, one of the greatest living metaphysicians and personal friend of George Molnar, has provided a Foreword. |
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Page 5
... statement of a law of nature) that 'Nothing is F'. But this entails that 'Something is F' is inconsistent with a law of nature and thus not a possibility. Hence, if there is never, anywhere, a river of lemonade, the statement 'there ...
... statement of a law of nature) that 'Nothing is F'. But this entails that 'Something is F' is inconsistent with a law of nature and thus not a possibility. Hence, if there is never, anywhere, a river of lemonade, the statement 'there ...
Page 6
A Study in Metaphysics George Molnar Stephen Mumford. statements to be false but possible. The argument sets up a puzzle, therefore. It shows that there are problems for this account of laws when coupled with certain accounts of truth ...
A Study in Metaphysics George Molnar Stephen Mumford. statements to be false but possible. The argument sets up a puzzle, therefore. It shows that there are problems for this account of laws when coupled with certain accounts of truth ...
Page 12
... Statements of a capacity to F are not truth-functions of F. And the intentional object cannot always be replaced with a co-referring expression in an account of that power. After first considering some other objections, Molnar ...
... Statements of a capacity to F are not truth-functions of F. And the intentional object cannot always be replaced with a co-referring expression in an account of that power. After first considering some other objections, Molnar ...
Page 14
... statement. The question might naturally arise of what makes any such conditional true. What, in the world, is the truthmaker, where a truthmaker is whatever in the world makes a truth true? (Armstrong 1997: 2). Ordinarily, an answer 14 ...
... statement. The question might naturally arise of what makes any such conditional true. What, in the world, is the truthmaker, where a truthmaker is whatever in the world makes a truth true? (Armstrong 1997: 2). Ordinarily, an answer 14 ...
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Contents
1 | |
POWERS | 19 |
Properties | 21 |
On What There Is | 47 |
3 Directedness | 60 |
4 Independence | 82 |
5 Actuality | 99 |
6 Intrinsicality | 102 |
8 Do Powers Need Grounds? | 125 |
9 The Ontology of Powers | 143 |
10 NonPowers | 158 |
11 Objections Considered | 173 |
12 Powers at Work | 186 |
References | 224 |
Index | 233 |
7 Objectivity | 111 |
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Common terms and phrases
accept According actual analysis answer appear applied argued argument Armstrong atomic basic bearers behaviour believe causal cause Chapter claim complex concept conclusion conditional connections consider contains contingent definition depends derivative determinate directed dispositional distinct effects entail essential example exist experience explain express extrinsic fact force fundamental give given grounded Hume Humean idea identity important impossible independent intentional object intentionality intrinsic intrinsic properties involve kind laws Lewis logical manifestation matter meaning mental metaphysics modal Molnar nature necessary necessity non-powers object occur ontological pain particles particular philosophers physical position possible powers predicates principle priori probability problem properties propositions qualities question realism reason reduction relation respect response seems sense shape sides simple space statement strong structural suggests theory Thesis thing tion tropes true truth truthmakers turn types universals whole