Powers: A Study in MetaphysicsClarendon Press, 30. nov 2006 - 252 pages George Molnar came to see that the solution to a number of the problems of contemporary philosophy lay in the development of an alternative to Hume's metaphysics. This alternative would have real causal powers at its centre. Molnar set about developing a thorough account of powers that might persuade those who remained, perhaps unknowingly, in the grip of Humean assumptions. He succeeded in producing something both highly focused and at the same time wide-ranging. He showed both that the notion of a power was central and that it could serve to dispel a number of long-standing philosophical problems. Molnar's account of powers is as realist as any that has so far appeared. He shows that dispositions are as real as any other properties. Specifically, they do not depend for their existence on their manifestations. Nevertheless, they are directed towards such manifestations. Molnar thus appropriates the notion of intentionality, from Brentano, and argues that it is the essential characteristic of powers. He offers a persuasive case for there being some basic and ungrounded powers, thus ruling out the reducibility of the dispositional to the non-dispositional. However, he does allow that there are non-power properties as well as power properties. In this respect, his final position is dualistic. This is contemporary metaphysics of the highest quality. It is a work that was almost complete when its author died. It has been edited for publication by another specialist in the subject, Stephen Mumford, who has also provided an introduction that will allow non-specialists to become acquainted with the issues. David Armstrong, one of the greatest living metaphysicians and personal friend of George Molnar, has provided a Foreword. |
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Page xiv
... 12.2.4 Eliminativism: The regularity theory of logical truths 12.2.5 Conclusion 200 12.2.1 200 12.2.2 202 215 219 223. References. Index. 224. 233. Introduction: George Molnar and Powers Stephen Mumford This is a xiv / Contents.
... 12.2.4 Eliminativism: The regularity theory of logical truths 12.2.5 Conclusion 200 12.2.1 200 12.2.2 202 215 219 223. References. Index. 224. 233. Introduction: George Molnar and Powers Stephen Mumford This is a xiv / Contents.
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... truth of a conditional that has no dispositional elements. An ascription of solubility to x, for instance, means nothing more than 'if x is placed in liquid, x will dissolve'. The opposite view is that dispositions are real and ...
... truth of a conditional that has no dispositional elements. An ascription of solubility to x, for instance, means nothing more than 'if x is placed in liquid, x will dissolve'. The opposite view is that dispositions are real and ...
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... truth of counterfactual conditionals, therefore, which disposition ascriptions seem to entail. Molnar has arguments against this position, mostly presented in Chapter 8. Realism about powers is a view that has gathered momentum in the ...
... truth of counterfactual conditionals, therefore, which disposition ascriptions seem to entail. Molnar has arguments against this position, mostly presented in Chapter 8. Realism about powers is a view that has gathered momentum in the ...
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... Truth' (2000). In 1998 he was appointed the Senior Research Fellow at Sydney University to edit John Anderson's papers. According to Carlotta McIntosh, this was the happiest time of his life. He was pursuing his work with a renewed ...
... Truth' (2000). In 1998 he was appointed the Senior Research Fellow at Sydney University to edit John Anderson's papers. According to Carlotta McIntosh, this was the happiest time of his life. He was pursuing his work with a renewed ...
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... truth and possibility. Molnar went on to discuss four possible ways of resisting Kneale's conclusion, for example, placing extra empirical requirements on laws such that, if 'something is F' is false, it follows that 'nothing is F' is ...
... truth and possibility. Molnar went on to discuss four possible ways of resisting Kneale's conclusion, for example, placing extra empirical requirements on laws such that, if 'something is F' is false, it follows that 'nothing is F' is ...
Contents
1 | |
POWERS | 19 |
Properties | 21 |
On What There Is | 47 |
3 Directedness | 60 |
4 Independence | 82 |
5 Actuality | 99 |
6 Intrinsicality | 102 |
8 Do Powers Need Grounds? | 125 |
9 The Ontology of Powers | 143 |
10 NonPowers | 158 |
11 Objections Considered | 173 |
12 Powers at Work | 186 |
References | 224 |
Index | 233 |
7 Objectivity | 111 |
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Common terms and phrases
accept According actual analysis answer appear applied argued argument Armstrong atomic basic bearers behaviour believe causal cause Chapter claim complex concept conclusion conditional connections consider contains contingent definition depends derivative determinate directed dispositional distinct effects entail essential example exist experience explain express extrinsic fact force fundamental give given grounded Hume Humean idea identity important impossible independent intentional object intentionality intrinsic intrinsic properties involve kind laws Lewis logical manifestation matter meaning mental metaphysics modal Molnar nature necessary necessity non-powers object occur ontological pain particles particular philosophers physical position possible powers predicates principle priori probability problem properties propositions qualities question realism reason reduction relation respect response seems sense shape sides simple space statement strong structural suggests theory Thesis thing tion tropes true truth truthmakers turn types universals whole