ever being a cause applied without being followed by effect, or a change (commonly regarded as an effect) taking place without being preceded by a caufe; and a motive being applied without being followed by action, or an action being done without any motive. The former point is a fundamental, and I believe a just, principle in physics; the latter is the fundamental principle and effence of the philofophical doctrine of Neceffity, which I am here confidering. And whatever may be thought of the truth of the principle with respect to motives and actions, it must at least be evident, that an action being done without a motive, and a motive being applied without any action following upon it, would equally be instances of the feparation of them, and equally repugnant to the principle of their conftant conjunction.

Yet, after all thefe allowances and explanations, all of which we may reasonably suppose to have been thought of by Mr HUME, when he first laid down the doctrine, and introduced the phrase, of Conftant

Conftant conjunction, and by Dr PRIESTLY, and others who have adopted them, the inferences strictly deducible from that principle are fo palpably and ridiculously false, and fo inconsistent with the common notion of motive, that I fear it will be thought improper, and almost uncandid, seriously to impute that principle to them, and to fuppose them to have meant literally what they have afferted fo exprefsly; as it appears fcarce credible that they should not have known, that in numberlefs familiar inftances, there is a complete feparation of motive and action, while in the parallel examples in phyfics there is no fuch feparation of caufe and effect. Yet it would be unreasonable to fuppofe them deliberately to have faid what they did not mean, nay almost the reverse of what they meant, and to have called that a constant conjunction which they conceived to be only occafional and feparable, and where the things fometimes conjoined are much oftener completely separated. Mr HUME's expreffion, however, is precife; and he constantly maintains the perfect analogy or identity of the relation

of

of motive with that of phyfical caufe, in all the cafes to which he feems to have attended.

If one Scotchman may prefume to judge of the English style of another, I fhould not fcruple to fay, that Mr HUME understood and wrote English abundantly well to have been able to exprefs himself justly on this point, had he conceived justly concerning the two relations in question. Then Dr PRIESTLY, who has acquiefced in Mr HUME's obfervations and reafonings on this fubject, and even adopted his phrafeology, is not only a native Englishman, but also a profeffed philologist, and the author of an English grammar, and a most experienced writer, both on physical and metaphyfical fubjects. It would be ftrange, indeed, if an inaccuracy of expreffion, fuch as I allude to, conveying a meaning quite different from what was intended and illuftrated by many examples, should have escaped his observation.

Still, however, I own I fhould not have ventured

ventured to regard the doctrine of the conftant conjunction of motive and action as feriously maintained by any men of fcience, were it not for the following confideration, which with me is decifive: There can be no doubt, that many men of distinguished talents and eminence in fcience, and among the reft Mr HUME and Dr PRIESTLY, have feriously maintained the neceffity of human actions, as proceeding from, or referable to motives, without any felf-governing power in a perfon. Now, this being fuppofed to be the cafe, the relation of motive and action, it is plain, must be either a constant conjunction, or not a conftant conjunction; that is, an occafional and feparable one. But I find, on tracing them carefully, that the neceffary confequences of both these fuppofitions are equally falfe, equally ridiculous, and equally inconfiftent with the common notion of motive. Those who deny the felf-governing power in persons, may choose which of those fuppofitions they please; but they must take one of them, with all its confequences, however ridiculous, or however inconfiftent with T

the

the common notion of motive these may be. And it is furely the most candid and civil way of proceeding, to suppose them to have meant and believed what they have plainly and strongly afferted.

But this difcuffion relates merely to the civility and decorum due to individual authors, to whofe fentiments I fhould be forry to do any injuftice. The method I take, I own, is rigorous; but it is not uncandid; and in this cafe it appears to be neceffary. At any rate, with a view to the decifion of the general question concerning the nature of the relation of motive, and its difference from that of phyfical cause, it is of no confequence whether the fuppofition of constant conjunction ever was seriously maintained by any author or not. It would ftill be reafone able and proper to state and confider it as one of the two poffible fuppofitions with respect to the relation of motive and action, and to trace its confequences rigorously, in order to find whether it were true or falfe.