needed no explanation, and could admit of none, have maintained, that the relation in question is very different from what mankind have generally conceived it to be; and, in particular, that it is effentially the fame with that of cause and effect in phyfics; it will not, I hope, be thought fo abfurd as at first fight it might appear, to endeavour to inveftigate, in a more accurate manner than has hitherto been attempted, that feemingly obvious point; and to ascertain, by a kind of evidence which has hitherto been fuppofed free either from fallacy or from difpute, if not the full extent, and all the particulars, at least the reality, and fome of the most important and interefting circumstances of that difference which the vulgar have fo generally acknowledged, and which fo many philofophers have been fond of denying.

In the first place, it is obvious, not only that there is a very intimate relation between the motives and actions of men, but likewise that this relation bears a ftrong resemblance or affinity to that of

caufe

caufe and effect in phyfics, as well as to that of agent and action. Even the language which we commonly employ in fpeaking of the relation of motive and action, is in a great measure formed on these analogies.

We often inquire and speak about the causes of the actions of men, meaning the motives of them, just as we do about the causes of any occurrences in the material world. We fpeak currently of actions proceeding from, or produced by certain motives or caufes; we speak of the influence, the power, the irresistible force of motives, juft as freely as we do of expansion, fluidity, and evaporation, as proceeding from or produced by heat; or as we do of the influence or the actions of men on the objects around them, or of the influence of the fun and moon on the tides, of the power of medicines, or of the irresistible force of steam or of gunpowder.

These modes of expreffion, which are by no means peculiar to any one language,

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nor confined to a few languages, but feem to be common in all, and to have been fo in all ages and nations, and which may be employed in long difcourfes and chains of reasoning, without producing any obfcurity or embarraffment, fhew plainly how close and striking the analogy is, in many obvious circumftances at least, among the different relations in question.

And as a proof that the analogy fo generally acknowledged is not vifionary, but very real, any man of good fenfe, enlightened by a little experience, may undertake with confidence, from knowing what people's motives are, to foretell what their actions will be; or, from knowing their actions, to infer what their motives have been: just as in phyfics, with the same kind of aid from experience, we can foretell an effect from knowing the caufe; or infer the cause from knowing the effect.

Yet it cannot justly be said, that Cause is the generic, Motive the Specific term; and that the latter is employed only in a more limited

B

limited fenfe than the former, being applied exclufively to denote those particular caufes which, by influencing * the will, indirectly produce the actions of men; for mankind in general how plainly, that they conceive fome further difference between the two relations in question, than merely that of Genus and Species; and that they even believe there is fomething in the fuppofed genus which is not in the fuppofed fpecies; particularly the constant, and, with respect to us at least, infeparable connection between caufe and effect; while the connection between motive and action is conceived to be only occafional and feparable, and, in all ordinary cafes, in a great meafure dependent on ourfelves.

* These and such like phrases I ufe in compliance with custom, quem penes &c. and because it is diffi cult to avoid them, and would look like affectation to attempt to avoid them. But I am aware of the impropriety and incongruity of them, as mifreprefenting the nature of the will, and confounding the three different notions and relations of Agent, Caufe, and Motive.

That

That fuch has always been the perfuafion, whether right or wrong, of the bulk of mankind, whatever words or phrases they may have employed in fpeaking of both or either of thofe relations, is not in general, difputed even by thofe who maintain that there is no fuch difference between them. Nor can it reasonably be difputed, though, to be fure, Mr HUME has made a very ingenious and elaborate attempt to that purpofe; as the aftonishment and indignation of the bulk of mankind at the doctrine of Neceffity, when they first hear it, and their incredulity with respect to it even when it seems most unanswerably proved, plainly fhew what is their general and natural perfuafion.

It is evident, that if mankind had conceived, as foine of their expreffions feem to imply, that their motives were the caufes of their volitions and actions, in the fame fenfe of the word Caufe that it has in phyfics; as, for instance, when we fay that heat is the cause of fufion, impulfe the caufe of motion, the fun and moon the caufes of the tides; then the doctrine