by reafon and argument. They find the converfation and the actual conduct of thole who profefs fuch ftrange opinions nowife different from their own; and, feemingly at least, quite inconfiftent with the ftrange belief which the Metaphyficians maintain: and they naturally confider thefe Metaphyficians as no more worthy of credit in their profeffions of belief, than they would do men who fhould maintain, that fnow appeared to them black, and ink white; or who, in confideration of the acknowledged imperfection of human reafon, fhould declare, that they doubted the truth of all the axioms of geometry, and the validity of every fyllogifm and of every kind of demonflration.

As belief and doubt are always involuntary, I do not think thofe perfons can reasonably be blamed who doubt the veracity of men whofe profeffions and actions have been fuch as I here allude to. But as this question is not connected with the fubject of my inquiry; as I have nothing new to offer with refpect to it; as I believe

believe the number of those who can be the objects of fuch unfavourable fufpicions is very small, and by no means likely to increase; I think it unnecessary to confider the point more minutely. But there is another inftance of the fame kind of abuse of appeals to confciousness, for the fupport of very erroneous metaphyfical fystems, which I have had in view in these general obfervations, and which will require and deserve more particular attention: I mean the Doctrine of Neceffity, as confifting in the perfuafion, that the influence of Motives in producing the (fuppofed) voluntary Actions of mankind, is either precifely the fame with that of phyfical caufes in producing their several effects in lifeless bodies, or at least fo nearly the fame, (that is, making due allowance for the greater number and different nature of the steps interpofed between the motive applied and the ultimate overt açtion performed in confequence of it), as to be abfolute and irresistible in the one cafe as well as in the other; and completely to exclude the fuppofed exertion, and poffeffion, nay even the poffibility, of any

liberty,

liberty, or felf-governing power, in living perfons, as well as in lifeless bodies.

This much agitated queftion, as being an important part of my own inquiry, I have had occafion to examine minutely and rigorously; and, with every poffible precaution, and every affiftance to strict reasoning that I could contrive; many of which I am fure had never been employed nor thought of before on this fubject. By thefe means, I think, I have been enabled to ascertain some points relating to it with a degree and kind of evidence not formerly thought attainable on fuch a metaphyfical question.

One of the most curious and interesting of these points which I have thus afcertained is, that the ready admiflion and arrogant affertion of the neceflary confequences of the philofophical doctrine which appear the most repugnant to the general opinion, or what is called the common fenfe of mankind, are uniformly limited to those cases only in which the appeal with respect to the truth of them

as

as matters of fact is to be made to consciousness.

The inferences from the doctrine in question, which I have had occafion to hear or think of, are of two kinds; the first kind comprehending all neceffary inferences from it with refpect to the conduct of mankind in certain given or fuppofable circumstances; the second kind comprehending the judgements or moral fentiments of mankind with respect to the merit or demerit of fuch actual or fuppofable conduct.

To the bulk of mankind the fuppofition that there can be moral merit or demerit without felf-governing power in the perfon acting, appears palpably abfurd; the latter notion being as much involved in the former, as those of time and space are in that of motion. But many, Metaphyficians have got over this difficulty, by the eafy expedient of appealing to conscioufnefs; and have boldly declared, not only that felf-governing power is not effential to merit or demerit, according to their notions,

notions, but that it has nothing whatever to do with it. Some of them even, as I have found on actual trial, not only affert this general propofition, but admit it in particular instances, though of fuch a kind that I had felected them as ludicrous, as well as abfurd; in full confidence that thofe to whom I ftated them would never venture to admit them, and would of course give up the doctrine in which they were neceffarily implied. But in this confidence I found myfelf wonderfully mistaken. As in all these cafes the queftion of fact was to be decided by a direct appeal to confcioufnefs; and as thofe with whom I had occafion to argue gave an account of their consciousness, and their fentiments, diametrically oppofite to what I found to be true with respect to mine; and as I was fenfible that I had no fuperiority over them, which could intitle my thoughts to greater regard, or my affertions to greater credit, than theirs in direct contradiction to mine; I thought it expedient to drop entirely the confideration of fuch cafes, and to turn my attention towards thofe other cafes