avoid a fimilar conduct. Thofe, then, to whom examples of punition are edifying and neceffary, must be ftill vicious; at least they must have no fuch inclination to virtue as is founded on a knowledge of its excellence, or a fenfe of its fitnefs and beauty. They must as yet have acquired no tafte for it. A man practises it not freely, or of his own powers, whilft fear is the fole or ftrongeft link which binds him to it. He is therefore but a child in virtue, a mere beginner, and very imperfect compared with the virtuous man, who is fo voluntarily, and from a conviction that virtue is happinefs. Now as even in this imperfect state we fee examples of virtuous men, who are not fo from fear of punishment, but from a real love of goodness, we cannot but fuppofe, that the virtue of thofe intelligent beings whom God will reward with eternal blifs muft find every thing necessary to secure it, in the perception of their actual happiness, in the remembrance of the lower degree of it which they felt when they were lefs virtuous, and in the profpect of its ever increafing with their increafing virtue; whence they will need no warning, no image of terror. This view of the cafe is alfo exprefsly propounded in fcripture, particularly in those memorable words of the apostle John: fear is not in love, but perfect love excludes fear. For fear gives pain. But whofo feareth is not perfect in love. This is what we have been maintaining. Fear can be neceffary only to those who have just entered the paths of virtue, to make them overcome the difficulties they will have to encounter on their first steps in this to them unbeaten way, by the profpect of ftill greater ones that they must meet if they deviate from it, thus countervailing their impatience, and aptitude to be difcouraged. But the farther they advance, the lefs will they need fear, to induce them to proceed steadfastly, and with perfeverance. Every. difficulty, against which fear was the weapon to be. employed, employed, will diminish: the path will become fmooth, and eafy to their feet and they will find it fo excellent and agreeable, that pleafure will redouble their speed. Then will they wonder, that thofe terrifying objects were neceffary to impel them to feek their own happiness, and be afhamed of their folly. As foon as we know God and virtue, we cannot but love virtue and God: and in the fame degree does fear vanish, for fear is incompatible with a perfect love of God and virtue. As it is our duty in this world to strive after a love that excludes fear, which is by no means unattainable here, we may eafily admit, that happy, beings fo love as to know no fear, or, which is the fame thing, that their virtue needs no longer being fecured by the warning example of vice in wretchedness. Otherwife, indeed, the virtue of thefe happy beings must be as feeble, forced, and imperfect, as the probity of a man who could not be reftrained from thieving but by the conftant spectacle of robbers hanging upon the gibbet before his eyes. Finally, for the condemnation of a part, may be adduced the experience, that, in this world, the welfare of one man is often founded on the ruin of another, and that the happinefs of one is the unhappiness of another. With respect to certain earthly advantages at leaft, this is true. But as the poffeffion of thefe does not conftitute the proper happiness of man, and as we may be difcontented whilft in poffeffion of an abundance of them, and contented under a want of them, if not extreme, no conclufion can be drawn from this experience. A variance or collifion may arise between men's inclinations and wifhes refpecting the goods of fortune, whilft the number of thofe goods which they covet is fo confined, that it is infufficient to fatisfy all, and what augments the poffeffions of one diminishes thofe of another. But, as experience teaches us, that on which true happi nefs nefs is founded, is not fo fcarce, that, like wealth, honour, and power, it can only be participated by a few at the expence of the many. If, as Pope juftly obferves, health, peace, and competence, alone constitute man's earthly happiness, the happiness of one individual does not require to be purchased at the expence of another. An accurate attention to the frame of men's minds teaches us, that all, notwithftanding the variety of their external circumftances, enjoy a very fimilar, if not an equal degree of happinefs: thus analogy feems to decide against this hypothefis. Surely the benevolence of the most perfect being, the Father of all his creatures, cannot be fo circumfcribed, as not to embrace all the beings he has created; nor can he be fo poor in happiness as to be unable to make all his children happy. PROP. VI. p. 31. Before the Corollary. THE proofs of the immateriality of God here adduced by Hartley are liable to fome not unfounded objections; particularly the firft. This is derived from the vis inertia as the fundamental property of matter. From this fundamental property is matter merely paffive; confequently, the grounds and cause of its motion are not in itself, but in an effence which is not matter. The first position is taken from experience, that all the active powers of matter, as they are termed, prefuppofe the vis inertia, by means of which alone the exercife of thofe active powers is poffible. In my opinion, this proof is deficient both in ftrength and perfpicuity. Our author has not fufficiently explained what he means by vis inertia. Is it the power of refifting every motion, or only a certain determinate motion? In the firft cafe only can it be faid, that matter is merely paffive; not in the last. But then matter never could be properly active, and all its active powers as they are called, which appear to be exerted, would be nothing but immediate impreffions of fome power of an immaterial effence, and itself would have no power to act, or to refift. For what is refiftance but a power acting against another power? And do not paffion, and the capability of paffion, prefuppofe a capability of action? We may, therefore, with more juftice, term the vis inertia a power of refifting a certain determinate motion. And, indeed, it seems to be nothing but the power of motion itself, which, being always determinate in its exertion, must necessarily refift every other motion which oppofes fuch determinate exertion. Thus the power of refiftance is only poffible from the power of motion: in other words, the vis inertia is not the fift power conceivable of matter. It prefuppofes the power of moving itself, and is nothing more than a modification of that power. Thus, for example, a ftone refifts the power that would imprefs on it an horizontal motion, because it poffeffes gravity, or a power of moving itfelf towards the centre of the earth. Now, that this direction of its moving power is the ground of its resistance to that power which would give its motion another direction is evident from this, that its refistance is always proportional to the quantity of its gravity, or the force of its determinate moving power. Thus we must conclude, that, if it exerted no determinate moving power, and indeed poffeffed no fuch power, it would exert no refiftance; or, in other words, if matter had no active power, it would have no power of being paffive. Hence, as we must conceive the point in queftion, the power of motion muft be the firft mode of matter, and the power of refiftance refiftance the second, fince the latter presupposes and includes the former, and fince we muft abfolutely deny all power to matter, unless we grant it an original power of moving itself. Our author, indeed, inverts the propofition; maintaining, that all motion is poffible only by prefuppofing a vis inertiæ; and that the active party which generates gravitation, magnetism, and the like in the paffive one, must have a motion, and a vis inertia, whereby it endeavours to perfift in that motion, elfe it could effect nothing. But motion and vis inertia are here the fame thing, fo that this amounts to just what I have afferted, namely, that the power, which in one point of view is a moving power, in another, and oppofite view, is the power of refiftance. If this be fo, as long as the original power is exerted in a determinate manner, it must refift every other direction, or the body must perfift in the motion begun. But if motion and vis inertia be two different things, no grounds for their diftinction are to be found. If a certain determinate motion be once begun, the conti nuance of that motion requires no new power distinct from the first original one, whereon fuch motion was founded, and by which it was determined. If this be juft, the firft argument, for the immateriality of God, deduced from the vis inertia, falls to the ground. The second proof of the immateriality of God from his infinite intelligence prefuppofes the principle, that a blind unintelligent caufe, acting either according to no laws, or to laws contradictory to the effects to be produced, cannot generate intelligent being, much lefs the higheft and most perfect intelligence. What our author oppofes to the difficulty of our conceiving an immaterial effence deferves our attention. We have, indeed, no original ideas, fays he, but what are impreffed by matter: whence we are led to |