power.

But to be uncertain and fortuitous, and yet to be foreknown as certain and neceffary, conftitutes a non-entity.

PROP. XIX. p. 79.

On Inspiration.

THE different opinions held concerning divine infpiration may be conveniently reduced to three. Thefe our author mentions, with the grounds for them; but ftill fome other grounds may be added. There are alfo fome general confiderations which must have weight with every rational and thinking follower of the chriftian religion, in deciding to which of the three the preference fhould be given. This muft first of all be laid down as a principle, as it indeed is by Hartley, that, which ever of the three be embraced, we pay fuch refpect to revelation, as to be amended, affured, and inftructed in the way of falvation. Thus he who adopts the loweft hypothefis confiders the fcripture as his rule of faith and life, and as the ground of his hopes and expectations. But whether his opinion of divine inspiration be in reality fufficient to this purpofe or not, appears to me not to be so properly determinable on general principles, and from a general view, as from the particular way of thinking of the party, and from the point of view from which he forms his judgment. It may feem to us, that no one can attain a true confidence through revelation, or a practical conviction of the truth of its doctrines, if he have not fo high an opinion of its divine origin and authority as appears to us neceffary for our own truft and conviction. In this, however, we frequently err. How many pious chriftians are fhocked and hurt by the various readings of the fcriptures, and the detection

of

of faults that have crept into the modern text from careleffness and ignorance! Unquestionably this arifes from their opinion of the divine origin of the facred books extending itself to the moft trifling circumstances, to words, fyllables, and letters, with which overftretched notion the remark of fuch errors. does not accord. To ftill more is the idea, that premeditated additions, defalcations, or corruptions of the fcriptures have taken place, totally inadmiffible. Now as these find fuch a fuppofition incompatible with their high veneration for the fcriptures, they are too prone to conclude, that all who affert, or even think poffible, fuch falfifications of particular paffages, altogether reject the divine authority of the whole. It will probably be admitted, that in this cafe the inference from ourselves to others is precipitate and unjuft. But we muft on the fame principles admit, that it is equally unjust for those who entertain the highest poffible opinion of divine inspiration, to deny all true and wholesome reverence for the fcriptures to thofe who content themselves with the lowest. I fay on the fame principles. For, if every thing in the fcriptures, even to each individual word, fyllable, and letter, were the immediate work of God, it is but reasonable to conclude, that the fame causes which moved God himself immediately and miraculously to fix and determine every thing in the fcriptures, even to the most unimportant objects, would have moved him to have fuperintended the fecurity and preservation of what he had fo exactly and minutely established. Were it neceffary, that every word and letter fhould have been inspired, we muft alfo fuppofe it neceffary, that every inspired word fhould retain the letters appointed by God, and be incapable of alteration by human words or letters. Yes, perhaps fome one will fay, but how many continual miracles must be requifite to this! Let us however confider, that, from the fuppofition, 004

fuch

fuch a minute infpiration being neceffary to the falvation of mankind, if it could and must have happened, its requiring more or fewer miracles is of no moment to the omnipotence of God. It may be faid, if every thing in the fcriptures were not so accurately and minutely determined by divine inspiration, we could not have fufficient certainty and confidence in the divine doctrines. Were this true, there must be no blunders of copyifts, no inaccuracy in the text, and no accidental error in the fcriptures; or each individual reader of them muft have an infallible fenfe, by which he might diftinguifh the divine original from the additions made by men. Even had he this, in places where alterations have actually been made, the requifite certainty and confidence could not poffibly be obtained and if a man extend his faith to words and letters, this very cir cumftance muft greatly embarrass him. If the pretext, that fo many continual miracles are necessary to preferve an unalterable purity of the text, be at all valid, the general principle must be firft admitted, that God performs as few miracles as poffible, and never more than are indifpenfably neceffary to the attainment of his divine purpofes. But it would be the extreme of rafhnefs in us to determine how many or how few miracles are requifite to anfwer the defigns of God. However, when we find, that a certain miracle has not produced certain effects, we may venture humbly to prefume, that fuch a miracle was not neceffary. But here this is actually the cafe. For fince fo many variations are to be found in respect to words, fyllables, and letters, he who fees, and is confcious of these variations, cannot poffibly confirm his faith and hopes by the notion, that the words, fyllables, and letters which he has before him were immediately infpired by God.

1

Should any one hence conclude, that in this case we can never be certain of the true fenfe of any book

book in the Bible, or of any part of a book; b answer, that, in determining the meaning of a whole book, or of any connected propofition, we must not attend fo much to particular words, as to the connection of all the words taken together, the scope of the whole, and all concomitant circumftances. Thus, though a particular word might be falfified, we may be fufficiently certain of the tenour of the whole for it is highly improbable, that the whole fhould be falfified; and were there any part altogether corrupted and erroneous, either it would have no rational meaning, or it would have a fenfe contradictory to the purpose of its writer, and the general tenour of the fcriptures. In this cafe, we could make no use of fuch a text, particularly if it were not to be amended and restored by the help of criticifm, and a comparison with other manufcripts and verfions. If, however, a text of fcripture have an intelligible meaning, confonant to the defigns of its divine author, and the general fenfe of the whole, we may be fufficiently certain, that it is not throughout altered and corrupted. But this does not prevent a word here and there in it from being erroneous and hence it follows, that the more we build on particular words in our expofition, and the less we confider the connection of the whole, the purpofe of the writer, and the like, in explaining the fenfe of a paffage, the lefs certain muft our interpretation be. However numerous the faults and errors that may have crept into a book of Cicero, if the whole afford an intelligible meaning, we can determine with fufficient certainty the fenfe of the author, and what he intended to fay, notwithstanding all these errors and imperfections, if we proceed according to the rules of found criticifm. But fhould we fet afide the connection of the whole, fhutting our eyes against the light to be derived from the confideration of all its parts, and a comparison

of them with each other, and explain his fyftem from a fingle expreffion, founding our conviction of his defign to maintain this or that on the authenticity of a word, our certainty would reft on very flight grounds. The lefs probable it is, that all we employ to afcertain his meaning, fhould be falfified and corrupted, the more certain is our interpretation; for it is far more improbable, that the whole fhould be erroneous, than that a particular word fhould be fo.

Of the fame nature is the well-known difpute, whether inspiration extend only to the subject or to the words of holy writ. I do not think, however, that this properly expreffes the true point in difpute. This fhort answer may be given to the queftion couched in fuch terms: a fubject without words is inconceivable, fo that if God infpired the fubject, he must have infpired words expreffing it. But this answer decides nothing at bottom: it rather leads to the following questions. What is the general notion of inspiration? How many kinds of infpiration are there, according to this notion? And how may all this be applied to the holy fcriptures, and their feveral parts?

In the most extenfive fenfe of the word, we may term every communication of our thoughts and perceptions to another, or, which is the fame thing, every action by which we determine the thoughts and perceptions of another to accord with our thoughts and perceptions an inspiration. There are as many kinds of infpiration, therefore, as there are modes in which this may be effected.

A

The ways in which a man may occafion certain thoughts and perceptions, or certain notions, judgments, and opinions in another, or in which he may determine him to think and judge thus of a fubject, and not otherwife, are various; and fo many kinds of infpiration must we admit. Language is the

moft