Court here, it is considered, adjudged and ordered by the said Chief Justice, that for the offence specified in the sixth count of the within-mentioned indictment, whereof the within-named defendant Richard Dunn is convicted, the said Richard Dunn be imprisoned in the Queen's Prison for the space of eighteen calendar months, to commence and be computed from the day on which he shall be first taken to and confined in the said prison in execution of this sentence; and that he, the said Richard Dunn, do give security to keep the peace and be of good behaviour towards her Majesty and all her subjects, and especially towards Angela Georgina Burdett Coutts within mentioned, for the space of two years, to commence and be computed from and after the end and expiration of the aforesaid eighteen calendar months; the said Richard Dunn to be bound in the sum of 100l., with two sufficient securities in the sum of 50l. each, and that he, the said Richard Dunn be committed to the custody of the keeper of the said prison, to be by him kept in safe custody, in execution of this judgment. (Signed) Denman."

A rule nisi to arrest the judgment was granted, and discharged after argument in the Court of Queen's Bench.-See supra, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 382.

The errors assigned in substance were, that the affidavit was not taken in pursuance of any statute; that it was not on a material matter; that the registrar had no authority to administer the oath; and that the falsehood of the matters in the affidavit was not suf ficiently alleged. It was further assigned as ground of error in the judgment, that the Chief Justice had no authority to order him to find security to keep the peace, or to order him to be imprisoned until such security was found; that the said judgment was indefinite and uncertain, and manifestly unjust, inasmuch as although the said Richard Dunn was ordered and adjudged to give security to keep the peace for two years only after the expiration of the said imprisonment for eighteen months as therein mentioned, yet if he did not give such security he was ordered and adjudged to be imprisoned for an indefinite and unlimited time; that the said indictment upon which the said judgment was so given by the said Chief Justice, was not a record of the Court

of Queen's Bench, but a record of the Central Criminal Court; that the judgment of the said Chief Justice had not the force and effect of a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, or any force or effect, inasmuch as the said Court did, within six days after the commencement of the term ensuing the said trial, grant a rule to shew cause why the said judgment should not be arrested.

The Plaintiff, in person.-The registrar had no authority to administer this oath, for the affidavit was made under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. s. 8, which was impliedly repealed by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 122. The 11th section of the last-mentioned act gives a different affidavit and a different mode of proceeding, which must, therefore, be considered as a substitute for the proceedings under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110.

[ALDERSON, B.-If the two can stand together the former is not repealed.]

The 112th section of the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 122. directs before whom the affidavit is to be sworn, and does not mention the registrar. His authority depends upon the 67th section, empowering him to take affidavits only" in matters of bankruptcy, or under or by virtue of any statute relating to bankrupts and this act." This is neither an affidavit under the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 122. nor in a matter of bankruptcy, nor relating to bankrupts. The title of the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. shews that it is not a statute relating to bankrupts.

[PARKE, B.-The title is no part of the act, and affords no legitimate ground of interpretation.]

Under sect. 8. of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. there is no power to make a person a bankrupt, which is the object charged in this indictment. Miss Coutts never could have been made a bankrupt upon it, and therefore there is no sufficient materiality to support an indictment for perjury. He referred to Cowp. Rep. 72, Teesdale v. Clement (1), Shepherd v. Bliss (2), and The King v. Burdett (3).

[PLATT, B. referred to The King v. Dowlin

(4).]

[ALDERSON, B.-It is material as part of the act of making a bankrupt. The debt

(1) 1 Chit. Rep. 603.

(2) 2 Stark. 510.
(3) 4 B. & Ald. 314.

(4) 5 Term Rep. 311.

may be followed by an act of bankruptcy: Proof of the debt would be tending towards the result of bankruptcy.]

The affidavit is not shewn to be false. It is stated in the indictment as alleging a debt due from Angela Burdett Coutts, and the indictment only negatives a debt from Angela Georgina Burdett Coutts. The substance of the document or the document itself must be set out-Wright v. Clements (5).

[PARKE, B.-There is nothing in that point.]

[ALDERSON, B. The innuendo to the words Angela Burdett Coutts, is "meaning the said Angela Georgina Burdett Coutts." That must have been proved, and it was proved at the trial.]

The sentence is wrong, for the requiring sureties of the peace is not warranted by law, and the judgment is vitiated by the excess -2 Geo. 2. c. 25; 9 Geo. 2. c. 8; 3 Geo. 4. c. 114; Hawk. P.C. 1, 326, c. 69. s. 10, The King v. Ellis (6), O'Connell v. the Queen (7).

[ALDERSON, B.-It is objected that the time of commencement is not defined in the judgment, but there is no difficulty in this, for the time will commence at the expiration of the imprisonment.]

The judgment is bad, because pronounced at Nisi Prius, and that judgment has no force under 11 Geo. 4. & 1 Will. 4. c. 70. s. 9. where the Court grants a rule nisi to arrest the judgment, as was done in this case (8).

(5) 3 B. & Ald. 503.

(6) 8 Dowl. & Ry. 173.

(7) 11 Cl. & F. 156, 214.

(8) That section is as follows:-"That upon all trials for felonies or misdemeanours upon any record of the Court of King's Bench, judgment may be pronounced during the sittings or assizes by the Judge before whom the verdict shall be taken, as well upon the person who shall have suffered judgment by default or confession, upon the same record, as upon those who shall be tried and convicted, whether such persons be present or not in court, excepting only where the prosecution shall be by information filed by leave of the Court of King's Bench, or such cases of informations filed by his Majesty's Attorney General wherein the Attorney General shall pray that the judgment may be postponed; and the judgment so pronounced shall be indorsed upon the record of Nisi Prius, and afterwards entered upon the record in court, and shall be of the same force and effect as a judgment of the Court, unless the Court shall, within six days after the commencement of the ensuing term, grant a rule to shew cause why a new trial should not be

[PARKE, B.-We know nothing of the rule. The proper course would have been if you were dissatisfied with the transcript of the record sent here, to have alleged diminution of errors. We cannot notice what is not upon the record.]

Sir F. Thesiger (with him Clarkson and Bodkin), contrà.

[PARKE, B.-There are only three questions: first, whether the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. is repealed? Second, had the registrar power to take the affidavit? Third, is there power to require sureties of the peace?]

Without reference to the statutes this indictment is good, for it is at common law.

[PARKE, B.-Can we treat this affidavit as material if no step could have been taken upon it? The materiality must be averred in the indictment, or must appear by necessary implication. If the affidavit is wholly inoperative, how is this rule complied with? Under the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 122. all the facts must be stated in the affidavit.]

The question is not whether it is material in law, but whether it is a proceeding material for the purpose intended. Perjury could be assigned upon an affidavit to hold to bail, although insufficient. At common law a false oath before a competent tribunal upon a matter material to the question amounts to perjury. Here, it is stated that Miss Coutts was a trader and liable to the Bankrupt Laws, and the intention was to make her a bankrupt. But the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. s. 8. is still in force. There is a difference in the amount of the debt upon which a summons may issue under the former and the latter statute, as also in the time within which the further proceeding is to take place under the former twenty-two days, under the latter fifteen.

[ROLFE, B.-You say they are not necessarily inconsistent.]

[PARKE, B.-The former statute is not repealed. A creditor under 1001. cannot avail himself of the first act. The two are

had or the judgment amended; and it shall be lawful for the Judge before whom the trial shall be had either to issue an immediate order or warrant for committing the defendant in execution, or to respite the execution of the judgment, upon such terms as he shall think fit, until the sixth day of the ensuing term; and in case imprisonment shall be part of the sentence to order the period of imprisonment to commence on the day on which the party shall be actually taken to and confined in prison."

quite consistent. Then had the registrar power to administer the oath ?]

Unless it appears that he clearly had not authority the indictment will be supported. But the 67th section extends to all matters in bankruptcy or relating to bankrupts, and this is within the meaning of those words. Lastly, the sentence is correct. The superior courts have ex officio power to require sureties of the peace, and by 11 Geo. 4. & 1 Will. 4. c. 70. s. 9. the presiding Judge at the trial has the same power as the Court of Queen's Bench.

[PLATT, B.—Is perjury an offence against the peace?]

It is so laid here. He cited Butt v. Conant (9), Haseldine v. Grove (10), Burn's Justice, Sureties for good Behaviour,' Wilkes v. the King (11).

[ALDERSON, B.-In The King v. Hart (12) it was held this might be done.]

PARKE, B.-We all think that the indictment is good. By the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 122. additional power is given, and at a different time, and for debts of a different amount, and the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. s. 8. is therefore not repealed. Then does it appear that the affidavit was material? We think it does, because it is taken under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. s. 8. The other point in the indictment is, whether the officer had authority to take the affidavit. It is stated that he took it as registrar, and under the 67th section of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 122. the registrar has authority to take affidavits upon every matter in bankruptcy or relating to bankrupts. Now this, if not a matter in bankruptcy, at all events is relating to bankrupts. There is, therefore, no error in the indictment. We will consider the point as to the sentence requiring sureties of the peace.

were disposed of at the time, except as to one point upon which part of the Court entertained some little doubt. The question was, whether upon a conviction for perjury it was competent for the Court of Queen's Bench to make an addition to the sentence of imprisonment, and order that the defendant should find security for his future good behaviour, and to keep the peace, and to be imprisoned until that time. I believe no doubt would have been entertained if we had had access to the Journals of the House of Lords in the case of The King v. Hart, in which that point was decided. It now appears on referring to the Journals that the learned Judges delivered their unanimous opinion in answer to the House of Lords, that in all cases of misdemeanour it was competent for the Court to give that sentence. Therefore the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench must be affirmed. There would not have been the least difficulty if we had fortunately had the opportunity of looking at the Journals of the House of Lords (13).

1849.

THE QUEEN . THE INHABIT

Jan. 17. J ANTS OF TACOLNSTONE.

Order of Removal, Irremovability under9 & 10 Vict. c. 66.-Five Years' Residence -Absence-Animus Revertendi.

A pauper was settled in parish T. He was a weaver, aad had resided in parish M. for more than five years next before January 1841, when, being out of work, he left his wife and family in two rooms, which he had hired by the quarter in parish N, and went to parish T. for the purpose of obtaining work or relief. He was there employed by the overseer of T. for six or seven weeks, during which

(13) The question put to the Judges arose out of the sentence against Hart and White, the printers and publishers of the Independent Whig, for libels upon the administration of justice, and upon Lord Ellenborough then Chief Justice. The question put was, "Whether a person convicted in the Court of King's Bench of a misdemeanour punishable by imprisonment, could by the judgment of the Court be adjudged to give security for his good behaviour for a reasonable time, to be computed from and after the expiration of such imprisonment in a sum named in such judgment." The answer was unanimously in the affirmative (see 30 St. Tri. pp. 1337, 1316; House of Lords Journals, vol. 47, 271).

time he was lodged in the workhouse, and paid wages by his employer. At the end of that term he returned to his wife and family at N, having maintained them there during his absence, and he continued to reside with them there till December 1846, when an order of removal was applied for. For four years before the passing of the statute 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, he had been in receipt of relief from parish T-Held, that there was no disruption of the five years' residence at N, and that the pauper was irremovable on the facts as stated, as it was clearly to be inferred from them that there was an animus revertendi to N, during his residence at T.

The question, whether there has been an animus revertendi in cases of this sort, is a question of fact which should be decided by the Sessions.

This was an appeal against a warrant of two Justices of the Peace of the city and county of Norwich, applied for and obtained on the 2nd of December 1846, for the removal of John Gell and Elizabeth his wife from the parish of St. Martin at Oak, in the city of Norwich, to the parish of Tacolnstone, in the county of Norfolk. The warrant was confirmed, subject to the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench on the following

CASE.

The pauper John Gell, whose settlement was in the appellant parish, had resided in the respondent parish more than five years next before a certain day in the month of January, A.D. 1841, when he was still residing there with his wife and family, in two rooms, hired by the quarter, being part of a dwelling-house in the respondent parish. He was a weaver, and being, on the day referred to, out of work, he went on that day to the appellant parish for the purpose of obtaining work or relief, and was then employed by Mr. Homes, the overseer of that parish, and continued to be employed by him for a period of six or seven weeks, during which time he lodged in the poorhouse there, being paid wages by Mr. Homes.

At the end of the six or seven weeks, during which he was so employed by Mr. Homes, he returned to the respondent parish to his wife and family, who, whilst he was so absent, resided in the same two

rooms, and were maintained there by him, and he resided with his family in the respondent parish from the time of such return, until and up to the time of the application for the warrant of removal. For the four years next before the passing of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, the pauper was in the receipt of relief from the appellant parish; and on the passing of the said statute such relief was discontinued, and he became chargeable to the respondent parish, to which parish he continued to be and was chargeable up to and at the date of the said warrant of removal.

The settlement of the pauper in the appellant parish was not questioned; but it was contended, that through his residence in the respondent parish he was irremovable, under the statute referred to at the date of the said warrant.

If the Court should be of that opinion, the warrant was to be quashed; but if not, it was to be confirmed.

Pashley and Bulwer, in support of the order of Sessions.-The absence of the pauper at Tacolnstone during the seven weeks was a disruption of his residence in the respondent parish. To render a pauper irremovable within the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66. personal residence is necessary. The appellant parish would not have relieved him but on condition of his submission to the rules of the workhouse, which is wholly inconsistent with the idea of his residing in the respondent parish; and the appellants might, if they had subsequently discovered that his settlement was in a third parish, have removed him there. There cannot be concurrent residences for the purposes of settlement by the same person at the same time- The Queen v. the Inhabitants of Pott Shrigley (1), The Queen v. the Inhabitants of Salford (2), The Queen v. the Inhabitants of Halifax (3). There was no animus revertendi in this case.

[COLERIDGE, J.-You would not say that absence for a single day from the place where a man resided with his family would be a break in the residence.]

It might be inconvenient to do so; but a line must be drawn somewhere. Would not a year's absence be a break? At all

events, the Recorder, by confirming the order, must be taken to have found as a fact that there was no animus revertendi. If there had been an animus revertendi, it should have been distinctly found; and in the absence of such finding it will not be inferred by the Court-The King v. the Inhabitants of Woolpit (4).

Biggs Andrews and Palmer, contrà.The Recorder has not drawn any inference himself as to whether there was an animus revertendi, but has stated every fact for the opinion of the Court.

[LORD DENMAN, C.J.-But if he has left the matter in doubt, we should not be disposed to disturb the finding.]

He finds in effect that the pauper went to the appellant parish in 1841 for a temporary purpose only, and that he was paid wages. It is like the case of a man leaving home at harvest time to get work in a foreign parish. In The Queen v. the Inhabitants of Halifax there was a compulsory removal, which was inconsistent with an animus revertendi (5).—(They were then stopped.)

LORD DENMAN, C. J. There is, no doubt, much force in the last observation of Mr. Bulwer, that if the animus revertendi had been clear, it should have been so found by the Recorder, and he has not so found. Upon the whole state of facts, however, presented to us, we think that we can come to no other conclusion than that there was an animus revertendi.

PATTESON, J.-I think that there was clearly an animus revertendi on the part of the pauper in this case.

ERLE, J.-I am of the same opinion. The actual animus revertendi will be always a matter of evidence; and it certainly is of importance that it should be found one way or the other, as it is decisive of the question as to disruption of evidence in cases like the present. It has not been distinctly found here; but if it is left to us to infer it from the facts stated, we cannot hesitate in doing so.

Order of Sessions quashed.

1848. Jan. 20.

}

HABITANTS OF TOTNES.

Settlement - Apprenticeship - OrderAllowance - Separate Jurisdiction-Judicial Act-Intendment.

The allowance of an indenture of apprenticeship should appear on the face of it to be locally made within the jurisdiction of the allowing Justices, except in cases where such jurisdiction appears in the order for binding, and the allowance is made by the same Justices.

Two Justices of the borough of T, in the county of D, made an order for binding a child apprentice in the parish of H, also in the county of D. The indenture of apprenticeship purported to be allowed by the two Justices of the borough, and also by G. P. A. and R. H. F, "two of her Majesty's Justices of the Peace for the county of D.”— Held, that there being two jurisdictions shewn, and the allowance being a judicial act, it was void for not being shewn to have been done within the county into which the apprentice was bound.

This was an appeal against an order of two Justices of the county of Devon for the removal of Mary Blight, single woman, and her illegitimate child from the parish of Milton Abbott to the parish of Totnes. The Court of Quarter Sessions confirmed the order subject to the following

CASE.

The

The respondents relied on, and proved, the birth and settlement of the pauper Mary Blight in the parish of Totnes. The appellants, by their ground of appeal, alleged the subsequent settlement of the said pauper, Mary Blight, in the parish of Milton Abbott, by binding, service, and residence as a pauper apprentice. appellants gave in evidence the order of Justices of the borough of Totnes, dated the 28th of October 1833, directing the pauper to be bound to W. Easterbrook, in the parish of Holme, in the county of Devon. This order was addressed to Edward Heath, William Leach, Richard Adams, and William Worth, overseers of the poor of the parish of Totnes. The appellants also gave in evidence the indenture of apprenticeship executed by Charles Taylor,