from decency, you may sometimes see a father or mother running out into the street after a child who is fled from them, with looks of fury and words of execration; and they are often stupid enough to imagine, that neighbors or passengers will approve them in this conduct, though in fact it fills every beholder with horror. There is a degree of the same fault to be seen in persons of better rank, though expressing itself somewhat differently. Ill words and altercations will often fall out be tween parents and children before company; a sure sign that there is a defect of government at home or in private. The parent, stung with shame at the misbehavior or indiscretion of the child, desires to persuade the observers, that it is not his fault, and thereby effectually convinces every person of reflection, that it is.

I would, therefore, recommend to every parent to begin the establishment of authority much more early than is commonly supposed to be possible: that is to say, from about the age of eight or nine months. You will, perhaps, smile at this: but I do assure you from experience, that by setting about it with prudence, deliberation, and attention, it may be in a manner completed by the age of twelve or fourteen months. Do not imagine I mean to bid you use the rod at that age; on the contrary, I mean to prevent the use of it in a great measure, and to point out a way by which children of sweet and easy tempers, may be brought to such a habit of compliance, as never to need correction at all; and, whatever their temper may be, so much less of this is sufficient than upon any other supposition. This is one of my favorite schemes; let me try to explain and recommend it.

Habits in general may be very early formed in children. An association of ideas is, as it were, the parent of habit. If then, you can accustom your children to perceive that your will must always prevail over theirs, when they are opposed, the thing is done, and they will submit to it without difficulty or regret. To bring this about, as soon as they begin to show their in

clination by desire or aversion, let single instances be chosen now and then (not too frequently) to contradict them. For example, if a child shows a desire to have any thing in his hand that he sees, or has any thing in his hand with which he is delighted, let the parent take it from him, and when he does so, let no consideration whatever make him restore it at that time. Then at

a considerable interval, perhaps a whole day is little enough, especially at first, let the same thing be repeated. In the mean time, it must be carefully observed, that no attempt should be made to contradict the child in the intervals. Not the least appearance of opposition, if possible, should be found between the will of the parent and that of the child, except in those chosen cases, when the parent must always prevail.

I think it necessary that those attempts should always be made and repeated at proper intervals by the same person. It is also better it should be by the father than the mother or any female attendant, because they will be necessarily obliged in many cases to do things displeasing to the child, as in dressing, washing, &c. which spoil the operation; neither is it necessary that they should interpose, for when once a full authority is established in one person, it can easily be communicated to others, as far as is proper. Remember, however, that mother or nurse should never presume to condole with the child, or show any signs of displeasure at his being crossed; but on the contrary, give every mark of approbation, and of their own submission, to the same person.

This experiment, frequently repeated, will in a little time so perfectly habituate the child to yield to the parent whenever he interposes, that he will make no opposition. I can assure you from experience, having literally practised this method myself, that I never had a child of twelve months old, but who would suffer me to take any thing from him or her, without the least mark of anger or dissatisfaction; while they would not suffer any other to do so, without the bitterest comVOL. II. No. 2. E

plaints. You will easily perceive how this is to be extended gradually and universally, from one thing to another, from contradicting to commanding them.But this, and several other remarks upon establishing and preserving authority, must be referred to another letter: [To be continued.]

On the Necessity of Knowledge to Moral Agency.

Question. WH

WHETHER light be necessary to moral action; or, to the exercise of virtuous

or vicious affection?

Answer. No moral affection can be exercised otherwise than in the view of an object. We can neither love nor hate, without some object in view to terminate the affection. And if the inquiry be, whether moral affection can be exercised without any speculative idea, or without the existence of any object in the view of the mind-it is a plain case, that it cannot. It is manifest, that there can be no moral affection without an object. Whenever the will is exercised, it is toward some object. When we love, we love some object; when we hate, we hate something. That light by which we discover the objects of our several affections, is essential to the exercise of these affections.So far is light necessary to the existence of moral action.

But if the inquiry be, whether that light by which we compare our affections with the rule of duty, and discern their conformity to it, or the reverse, be essential to moral action-I think we may venture to say, that it is not. I know of no other sense than one of these, in which the question can be taken. Light must here mean, either that by which we discover or apprehend the object of affection; or, that by which we discern the rule which is prescribed for the exercise

of our affections, and by which they are determined to be either virtuous or vicious. That light, in the former sense, is necessary, and in the latter unnecessary, to the existence of moral action, of virtue and vice, is equally obvious. For, the idea of a rule by which af fections are to be tried, and their moral nature and quality to be determined, presupposes the existence of the affections themselves, and of all the nature and quality which belong to them. The nature and quality of an object, we know, belong to the object itself, and cannot be separated from it. The nature and quality of an affection cannot, even in idea, be separated from the affection itself. This is plainly implied in the idea of a rule by which the nature and qualities of affections are to be tried, and the virtuousness or viciousness of them to be determined. But, though affections themselves, and their proper nature and qualities, are absolutely inseparable from each other, it is not so with regard to affections and the rule by which we are to judge of their moral qualities. These are perfectly distinct objects; each possessed of its own proper character and qualities: And their own proper characters and qualities no more depend on each other, than the characters and qualities of any two other objects whatever. The nature and quality of an affection no more depend on the rule by which it is to be tried, than the nature and characters of the rule depend on the qualities of the affection which is to be tried by it.

If the moral nature and qualities of voluntary affections are found in the affections themselves, and are inseparable from them, they then certainly exist previously to any comparison with the rule of duty by which they are to be tried, and independently of any such comparison: yea, the very supposition of the existence of a rule by which actions are to be tried, and on a comparison with which their moral beauty or deformity is to be discovered, necessarily presupposeth the actions themselves to be either beautiful or deformed.

No action or affection can be determined to be either virtuous or criminal, otherwise than on a comparison with some given rule or standard. It is true, that the actions themselves may be discovered, and every thing that belongs to their proper nature and essence, may be seen-But, whether the nature and qualities which they really possess, are to be denominated either virtuous or vicious-whether they are friendly to the general good, or opposed to it, can be known only by comparing them with the general rule and boundary of moral actions. With this view of the matter do the Apostle's words correspond when he says (Rom. iii. 20.)

For, by the law is the knowledge of sin." But, to suppose that a knowledge of the rule of duty must go to make up the nature of every moral affection, just as idea of object is necessary to the existence of affection, implies the necessity of some still further rule, or standard, with which to compare the moral action, in the essence of which was contained the knowledge of the rule of duty. And if this more distant rule must be applied, in determining moral actions to be either virtuous or vicious, the knowledge, the present idea of this rule must be equally necessary as that of the former rule of duty, in order to the practice of holiness, or the commission of sin-and, consequently, must as necessarily go into the very nature and essence of the affection. But, this supposition implies the necessity of taking another step still further back, in order to find a rule by which we may try the affection in question, in its whole nature and qualities, and so on in infinitum; and, after all, the affection itself, comprehending every thing that goes into the very nature and essence of it, is incapable of being determined to be either beautiful or deformed, either friendly to the general good, or in opposition to it, by any rule whatever with which it is compared, or by which it can be tried. For, the supposition that a knowledge of the rule of duty goes into the very nature and essence of moral affections, just as idea or object are essential to the existence of any affec