among States whose political and social organizations had been so extensively developed, no valid and binding code for the regulation of international relations should have been adopted. The fact is, that among the ancient Greeks and Romans such a code did exist, though no doubt in a very imperfect form; that it was composed of the same ingredients and drawn from the same sources as that which now regulates the intercourse of the civilized world; that its guiding principles, though laid perhaps on less solid foundations, and prematurely arrested in their progress, were not unlike those upon which International Law now rests; and finally, that the development of its rules and institutions was analogous, in many respects, to that of the present system.

It would, of course, be impossible, within the prescribed limits, to do justice to so wide a subject. The development of the treaty system and of diplomacy, the rights of ambassadors, the usages of war, the system of arbitration, and that of consular agency, piracy, rights of asylum and extradition, offer ample subject-matter for as many essays of considerable length. Here I propose merely to show the existence of such a law, and of an international spirit recognizing it and giving it effect, and to sketch briefly a few of the institutions which were created and fostered by this sentiment.

With the view of showing that the relationship of the Greek States to one another is properly denoted by the word "international,” it will be well to start with one or two definitions. International Law may be briefly defined as "the system of principles and rules which regulates the mutual intercourse of States;" and a State may be defined as "an Independent Political Community." A community, to be recognized as a State, must have its own organized government, but the form of such government is wholly immaterial.

The States-many of them insignificant in size-which composed the Hellenic world, clearly fall within this definition. Some of them combined from time to time, generally for defensive purposes, in which case the hegemony was assigned to one by express consent or silent recognition; but the system of a central government, though indications of such a tendency appear in the development of Athenian empire, had not then been worked out; and the individual independence of the several States was never so far infringed upon as to render inaccurate the application of the word " international" to their relations with one another.

It is further laid down by various writers of authority, with some variations of form, that International Law comprises International Moral Law and International Positive Law. The question need not here be raised whether this is a correct terminology; the meaning is clear. The latter consists partly of actual agreements embodied in treaties, but mainly of rules which, dependent originally upon the comity of nations, and coming under the head of imperfect obliga

tions, have gradually been sanctioned by custom, and passed into the region of positive law. The former includes those obligations which are still imperfect, and, forming a portion of the jus naturale, is founded upon those moral principles which are now held, in theory at any rate, to be as binding upon States as upon individuals.

It will be useful to cite here, for the purpose of comparing the sentiments which lie at the root of the ancient and modern systems, the celebrated State Paper of 1753, addressed by the British to the Prussian Government, the occasion being an attempt on the part of Prussia to confiscate an English loan charged upon the then lately ceded province of Silesia. The law of nations is therein declared to be "founded upon justice, equity, and convenience, and the reason of the thing, and confirmed by long usage." This statement of the principles which ought to regulate the mutual intercourse of nations finds many an echo in ancient times. The identity of the honestum with the true utile, asserted more than once by Cicero in so many words, was frequently appealed to in international discussions before the public assemblies of the Greek cities. The speeches reported by Thucydides, now recognized, in accordance with his own straightforward statement, as representing substantially the sentiments uttered on the several occasions, fully warrant the assertion that such arguments were constantly advanced, and the inference that they would have been less prominent had there not existed an enlightened public opinion capable of appreciating their force. One or two instances will suffice. The Corinthian envoys (Thuc. i. 42), addressing the Athenian Ecclesia, declare that "the material advantage generally accrues to him whose conduct is least open to the imputation of moral obliquity." The same idea recurs, from time to time, in the speech of Diodotus on behalf of the Mitylenæans and in the Platæan defence.

The argument most frequently used to buttress the theory which is the subject of this criticism is one which Language suggests. The Greeks, it is said, had no phrase to denote this idea; the Romans, no doubt, used the phrase jus gentium, but this is an ambiguous expression, and was used in a sense other than that represented by the words "International Law." A few remarks will be made subsequently upon the meaning of this much discussed phrase. For the present I am rather concerned with the indications of the existence of a Greek Law of Nations.

It is again to the political historian of Greece that an appeal must be made in support of this position. The pages of Thucydides contain frequent and definite allusions to a law recognized in Greece—an International Positive Law-composed partly of treaties, which are referred to as binding documents, and partly of conventional usages, sanctioned by time and general acceptance. The quarrel between Corinth and Corcyra, from this point of view, presents many notice

able features. The Epidamnians, a Corcyræan colony, whose request for aid against the Illyrians had been refused by Corcyra, had recourse for assistance to Corinth, the metropolis of Corcyra, from which city, in accordance with the recognized law of colonization, they had received their Ecist. That this step was a violation of conventional usage, is shown by the hesitation of the Epidamnians to make the application. Though it seems to have been a matter of life or death, they thought it necessary first to obtain the sanction of the Delphic Oracle, the Corcyræans meanwhile protesting indignantly against the infringement of their rights by any interference on the part of the Corinthians. The Corcyræans having declared war against Epidamnus and laid siege to the town, issued a humane and liberal proclamation-viz., that any one-citizen or otherwise might depart in safety if he chose, but that those who remained would be treated as enemies. The Corinthians having despatched an expedition to the relief of the place, the Corcyræans offered to refer the matter in dispute either to such cities as might be agreed upon, or to the Delphic Oracle. The Corinthians, however, being probably aware that they were wrong in point of law, attempted to impose a condition on their opponents, and refused either to submit to a similar condition themselves, or to proceed upon the basis of the status quo. The negotiation, accordingly, produced

no result.

In the celebrated debate before the Athenian Assembly, to which these proceedings gave rise, and which lasted for two days, the rules of International Law were more than once summoned to the speakers' aid. The respect in which treaty obligations were held is shown by the pains which the Corcyræan envoys took to remove Athenian scruples as to the violation of the Thirty Years' Truce, which the granting of their request might involve. Furthermore, they commented upon the injustice caused by the absence of a Foreign Enlistment Act at Athens, and criticized severely that benevolent neutrality which has failed to find a footing in modern International Law. Their strongest argument, however, was one founded to some extent on the doctrine of the Balance of Power, and this it was which undoubtedly had most influence with the audience. The Corinthian reply is well summarized by Mr. Wilkins :—

"They appealed warmly to the sentiments of honour and of moral obligation, resting their claim on the impregnable grounds of International Law (κατὰ τοὺς ̔Ελλήνων νόμους), and a just construction of the clause their opponents had perverted on the natural instincts of gratitude for their repeated support of the Athenian cause, and on the harmony of true policy with right."

Their defence of the refusal to submit to the proffered arbitration was undeniably weak; but the rest of their address was vigorous, and had for the moment a considerable effect upon the Athenians.

Finally, however, the political necessity of the latter got the better of their finer feelings, and they concluded a Corcyræan alliance, in such terms as, in the opinion of Thucydides, did not lay them open to the imputation of having violated the treaty.

The next debate reported by Thucydides, which was carried on in the presence of the Spartan citizens and the delegates of their confederacy, together with the negotiations which ensued, clearly shows the anxiety of intending belligerents to set themselves right in public opinion. The tenor of the address of the Corinthian delegates upon this occasion, and their vigorous efforts to raise feelings of hatred and alarm against Athens, are described with much force by Mr. Grote. Some Athenian envoys, being present on other business, obtained leave to reply to the Corinthian attack, and offered to submit to a reference upon the whole question; while King Archidamus, who followed them, pressed strongly upon his audience the expediency of adopting such a course. He even goes so far as to say (Thuc. i. 85) that it is not lawful (vóμipov) to proceed before trial against one who offers such satisfaction, as against a notorious offender. But a large majority of the Spartan citizens having declared for war, on the ground that Athens had violated the Thirty Years' Truce, that decision, in accordance with the practice of the confederacy, was shortly afterwards submitted to a general congress and confirmed.

Though war had thus been decided on in the most formal manner possible, the Spartans evidently had some doubts as to the soundness of their position. In order, therefore, to establish a better casus belli, they addressed to the Athenians a series of requisitions, one of which was to the effect that the latter should repeal the decree which excluded the Megarians from their ports and commerce. This was refused on the ground that the Megarians had been guilty of two distinct violations of public law--one in harbouring fugitive Athenian slaves, and the other in annexing a portion of certain consecrated ground.

Slavery, being a long established and universal institution in Greece, had of course its special regulations, which, by degrees, acquired the force of positive law. It seems to have been the rule that those to whom slaves had fled were bound to restore them to their masters on payment of a prescribed sum. A fragment of a decree inscribed upon a tablet found in the Acropolis recounts the honours conferred by the Athenians upon a Chian who had, at his own expense, sent back to them some runaway slaves (Rangabè, Antiq. Hellen. No. 472). This practice may have suggested to Antimenes, Governor of Babylon under Alexander, the idea of establishing an insurance office, for the purpose of securing masters against losses occasioned by the attempts of their slaves to escape.

The second charge brought against the Megarians involved the

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crime of sacrilege, an offence generally resented as touching the whole Hellenic community. The Spartan demand in this case was unjust in the extreme; the Megarian decree was in accordance even with the rules of modern International Law, and, as hinted by Pericles in the speech in which he urged the expediency of making no concession, was no more than a particular form of the Xenelasia -a practice which Spartan jealousy had incorporated in their political system. He also dwelt strongly upon the refusal to submit to arbitration, and speaking from a different point of view intimated an opinion coinciding with that of Archidamus mentioned above-viz., that States of equal rank, before appealing to arms, should endeavour to find in this way a peaceful solution of the question at issue.

It cannot well be doubted that Pericles was honest in the expression of his anxiety to avoid war by a reference to arbitration; and his readiness to adopt this course, showing that he thought it possible to obtain a fair tribunal, is therefore a valuable testimony in favour of the public morality of the time. The position of Athens at this period with regard to the other States, in respect of the smallness of her territory, and the extent of her colonial empire and her commerce, is remarkably analogous to that of England in the civilized world now. She was thus regarded with a jealousy similar to that which the naval ascendancy of England has always provoked among the Continental States. One might readily imagine Pericles addressing the assembly in the words of Lord Palmerston, used in the House of Commons in 1849, when, opposing a proposition that England should pledge herself to submit to the arbitrament of a third party, he said:" I confess that I consider that it would be a very dangerous course for this country to take, because there is no country which, from its political and commercial circumstances, from its maritime interests, and from its colonial possessions, excites more anxious and jealous feelings in different quarters than England does; and there is no country that would find it more difficult to obtain really disinterested and impartial arbitrators." It is needless to remark upon the manner in which this prediction has been verified.

An analysis of all the passages in Thucydides in which allusion is made to public law, and to the principles upon which it is founded, would occupy more space than is desirable. I shall, therefore, add a few passages only, which contain a direct and positive recognition of an International system. The Mitylenæan episode, from this point of view, is in many ways suggestive. The Mitylenæans, having revolted from Athens, and been blockaded by an Athenian fleet, sent envoys to Sparta to solicit assistance. The envoys were invited to attend at the Olympic festival, and state their case to the assembled members of the Peloponnesian Confederacy. They commenced their speech with a reference to "the established law of the Greeks"—TÒ μÈV KAƉEOTUS