consequent upon abandonment after seduction; it being conceived that the damage was too remote (z). Loss of Where this action is brought by a parent for the seduction of a daughter who resides with him, evidence service of of very slight acts of service (a), such as milking cows (b), daughter residing making tea (c), and the like, has been held sufficient to with parent. prove the allegation of loss of service. Nay, the Courts are disposed to infer service from residence with the parent, where there is a capacity to serve (d). Whether or not the same inference could be drawn in the case of one standing in loco parentis, is not settled. The action for seduction cannot be brought in the County Court (e). It would seem, however, that a defendant might be held to bail if about to quit England (ƒ). The daughter or servant may be a witness (g), but Evidence. the plaintiff is not bound to call her (h). The omission to do so, however, would afford ground for such strong observations on the part of the defendant, that, in practice, it is usual to call her. She can, however, only be asked as to circumstances occurring before and immediately after her connexion with the defendant, to shew that it was against her consent (i). And she is not Cross-exabound to answer, on cross-examination, whether before mination. her acquaintance with the defendant she had not been criminal with other men (k). And when she has been cross-examined at length as to circumstances of extreme indelicacy and great levity of conduct in submitting to the defendant's embraces, those circumstances must be (z) Boyle v. Brandon, 13 M. & W. 738. (a) Mansell v. Thomson, 2 C. & P. 303; Holloway v. Abell, 7 C. & P. 528. (b) Bennett v. Alcott, 2 T. R. 168. (e) Carr v. Clarke, 2 Ch. Rep. 260. (d) Maunder v. Venn, M. & M. 323; Torrence v. Gibbins, 5 Q. B. 300. See Jones v. Brown, Peake, 233; S. C. 1 Esp. 217, and per Parke, B., in Harris v. Butler, 2 M. & W. 539. (e) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, s. 58. (f) See Bullock v. Jenkins, 1 L. M. & P. 645. That, however, was an action of crim. con. (g) Cock v. Wortham, 2 Str. 1054; S. C. Selw. N. P. 1114; and see Tullidge v. Wade, 3 Wils. 18. (h) Farmer v. Joseph, Holt, 451. (i) Colyer v. Magne, 2 Carr. & K. 1011. (k) Dodd ▼. Norris, 3 Campb. 519. general good character. explained, if capable of explanation, on re-examination; for the plaintiff cannot, in answer, call witnesses to her general character (1). Though, in one case, where the cross-examination went to shew that the plaintiff's daughter had conducted herself immodestly towards the defendant before her seduction, and that she kept improper company, witnesses were allowed to be called, on the part of the plaintiff, to prove the general good character and modest deportment of the daughter, and the general Evidence of respectability of the family (m). The plaintiff cannot give evidence of the general good character of the person seduced, except in answer to evidence of general bad character. And, therefore, where evidence is given of a specific breach of chastity, the plaintiff is restricted to disproving that specific act (n). Nor can evidence be admitted, on the part of the plaintiff, to shew that the defendant accomplished the seduction by means of a Promise of promise of marriage (o); at least, not directly, for the purpose of increasing damages, though such evidence may be given indirectly, and is frequently received, for the purpose of vindicating the girl's character (p). Declarations of the defendant's wife tending to shew that she aided and colluded with the defendant in seducing the plaintiff's daughter, have been admitted in evidence in aggravation of damages (9). marriage. Defence. The defendant may plead that the person seduced was not the plaintiff's servant (r), though it appears unnecessary to do so (s). It is, however, safer to add such a plea, if it is intended to rely on that fact as a defence to (1) Dodd v. Norris, ubi supra; and see Barnfield v. Massey, 1 Campb. 460. (m) Bate v. Hill, 1 C. & (n) Bamfield v. Massey, 1 V. Norris, 3 (p) Per Garrow, B., (in El liott v. Nicklin, 5 Price, 647), who was counsel in Dodd v. Norris; and see Tullidge v. Wade, 3 Wils. 18, Capron v. Balmond, Exeter Spr. Ass. 1831; Rosc. on Ev. 468. (q) Knowles v. Compigne, Wint. Summ. Ass. 1835; Rosc. on Ev. 44. (r) Torrence v. Gibbins, 5 Q. B. 297; Davies v. Williams, 10 Q. B. 725. (s) Holloway v. Abell, 7 C. & P. 530; Eager v. Grimwood, 1 Exc. 61. the action. But the defendant cannot pay money into Court (t). On the part of the defendant evidence may be given, Evidence. in mitigation of damages, not only of the general bad character of the person alleged to have been seduced, but also of particular acts of unchastity on her part (u). But he cannot call witnesses to prove that she has talked of another person than the defendant as her seducer and the father of her child, unless she be first asked, in crossexamination, whether she ever used those expressions (v). Such evidence, however, might be admissible to shew general misconduct and frequent use of loose language (w). The plaintiff may recover damages for the injury Damages. which his feelings have sustained, in addition to the actual expense incurred by loss of service and payment of doctor's bills (r). And in one case Lord Eldon told the jury, that in estimating the damage sustained by the plaintiff, they might look upon her as a parent losing the comfort as well as the service of her daughter, in whose virtue she could feel no consolation, and as the parent of other children, whose morals might be corrupted by her example (y). (t) 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 42, s. 21. (u) Verry v Watkins, 7 C & P. 308; and see Rex v. Martin, 6 C. & P. 562; Reg. v. Robins, 2 M. & Rob. 512; Melhuish v. Collier, 15 Q. B. 878. (v) Carpenter v. Wall, 11 (r) As to doctor's bills, see CHAPTER IV. THE DUTIES OF THE MASTER TO THE SERVANT, Duty of master to receive ser vant into his service. OF THE MASTER'S DUTY TO RECEIVE THE SERVANT It is obviously the duty of every man who has engaged another person as a servant, to receive such person into his service; and if he refuse to do so, without any good reason for his refusal, such person may maintain an action against him for that breach of contract (a). (a) Bracegirdle v. Heald, I B. & Ald. 722, ante, p. 17; Blogg v. Kent, 6 Bing. 614, where there is only one copy of refusal. Thus, where the defendant agreed to take the plaintiff, Action for who was a shepherd, into his service at certain wages, Clarke v for the then next lambing season, for five weeks next Allatt. ensuing after the 28th of February then next, but afterwards refused to allow him to enter into his service, the plaintiff recovered damages in an action brought for such breach of contract on the part of the defendant (b). To sustain this action, however, it would of course be necessary to prove a legally binding contract of hiring and service (c). It is obvious that what would be a good reason for discharging a servant, would be an equally good reason for refusing to receive him into one's service after having engaged to do so. But it is Conspiracy no answer to an action for not performing an agreement from agree. to depart to employ the plaintiff, that he has entered into a ment no conspiracy to depart from the agreement, unless the answer, conspiracy has been acted on (d). unless acted on. retain ser It is the duty of a master to retain the servant during Duty of the whole time that he has contracted to do so; and if master to he dismiss the servant before the expiration of that vant. period without lawful cause (e), the servant may maintain an action against him for such wrongful dismissal. Where a servant is dismissed by his master during Court of the period of service agreed upon, for alleged miscon- Chancery duct or other cause, the Court of Chancery will not grant ininterfere by injunction to restrain the master from so junction to compel doing, but will leave the servant to his action at law. master to In a recent case (ƒ), Lord Cranworth, V. C., granted retain ser the contract of hiring the Court will compel the party in whose possession it is, to produce it to the other party, ibid. (b) Clarke v. Allatt, 4 C. B. 335. (c) Bracegirdle v. Heald, ubi supra. As to the requi sites of the contract, see ante, Ch. 2. (d) Hemingway v. Hamil ton, 4 M. & W. 115. See the pleadings in Mercer v. Whall, 5 Q. B. 447. (e) See the preceding Chapter as to what causes will justify the dismissal of a servant. (f) Stocker v. Brockelbank, 20 L. J., N. S., Ch. Cas. 408. Where the master is a trustee, however, as in the case of trustees of a school, the Court of Chancery will sometimes, on a fit case being made out, interfere. See Willis v. Child, 13 Beav. 117; S. C. 20 L. J., N. S., Ch. Cas. 113, where Lord Langdale, M. R., granted an injunction to restrain the trustees of a charity school from discharging the master; and see Doe v. Willis, 5 Exc. 894. will not vant. |