for payment.

for neglecting to make due presentment, or Presentment attempting to do so, and the mode of presenting or making an attempt to present it for payment, in the case of the death, absconding, absence, insolvency, or bankruptcy of the drawee, acceptor, or maker, or of there being no such person to be found, is similar to the mode to be pursued respecting the presentment of bills of exchange for acceptance in any of those special cases which has been fully explained in a former chapter(2), and to which the reader is referred, it being considered as merely travelling over the same ground to go again into detail on that subject.

Bills accepted,

payable at a

place.

Where the acceptor died before the bill became Presentment of due, and he had previously accepted it payable at a particular place, it was held that it was particular sufficient in an action against the drawer, to prove presentment at the specified place, and that it was not necessary to show presentment to the deceased's representative().

Whenever the drawee has, by his acceptance, expressed that a bill is to be payable at a banker's,

(1) Bayley on Bills, 4th edition, p. 204; and Russel v. Langstaffe, 2 Dougl. 497, 515, there cited to show that Lord Mansfield had frequently ruled, that Bankruptcy of the Drawer of a Note, or Acceptor of a Bill, formed no excuse for neglecting it; referred to also in Bickerdike v. Bollman, 1 Term, Rep. 408. See also (as to Insolvency) the dictum of Lord Ellenborough, C. J. in Esdaile v. Sowerby, 11 East, 117; Selwyn's Ni. Pri. 9th edition, p. 357.

(2) Chapter 3, Supra, p. 48, 49, 50, 70.

(3) Philpott ". Bryant, 3 Carr. and Payne, N.P. Rep. 244.

Р

Presentment it is the usage of the mercantile classes in England to cause it to be presented there").

for payment.

Acceptor of a

general remain

It

may be taken as a general rule, that (except Bill and Maker in the cases where an alteration has been made of a Note in in the law, respecting the liability of acceptors of liable notwith- bills by the act 1st and 2nd George 4th, c. 78, and sion to present except in the few instances after mentioned resit for payment. pecting promissory notes,) the acceptor of a bill,

standing omis

and the maker of a promissory note, remain always liable, and cannot set up as a defence, that no presentment of it had ever been made for payment, before the commencement of an action against him, at the suit of the holders().

(1) Harris v. Packer, Berks Lent Assizes, 1833, before Parke, J. (note) Tyrwhitt, Rep. 370; Assumpsit by Indorsee against the Drawer of a Bill drawn at Newbury, May 28th, 1831, upon Messrs. Tomkins and Goslin, Malt Factors, Upper Thames-street, London, payable at three months after date, and by them accepted, payable at Messrs. Ladbrokes and Co. Bankers; the declaration did not state the acceptance at all, but stated that it was presented to the Drawees for payment, and that they refused to pay. The proof was presentment at the Clearing House, to the Clerk of the London Bankers named in the acceptance, held that as the declaration did not state the acceptance, the presentment at the place fixed by the Acceptors was sufficiently proved, and that the London Bankers were agents to the Acceptors for that purpose. In Smith v. Thatcher, 4 Barn. and Ald. 200, which was an action by the Drawer against the Acceptor of a Bill accepted payable at a Bankers, Abbott, C.J. expressed himself in similar terms as to the agency of the Bankers. See also Parks v. Edge, 1 Cromp. & Mee. 429; and vide Infra, p. 113, 114.

(2) Anderson v. Cleveland, Sittings Easter T. 1799, 1 Espinasse's Dig. 58; and per Gibbs, C. J. in Head and another v. Sewell, 1 Holt, N.P.C. 363; and per Bailey, J. in Fenton v. Goundry, 13 East, 472.

Note expressed in the body of

at a particular

place.

in the margin

It has, however, been decided", that if the Promissory maker of a promissory note introduce words in the body of it, making it payable at a particular it to be payable place, (or in the language of Lord Ellenborough, C. J. in Sanderson v. Bowes(2), "here words restrictive of payment at the place named, are incorporated in the original form of the instrument, which alone creates the contract, and duty of the party,") and not in the nature of a mere note, or memorandum, at the foot, or in the mar- Memorandum gin, the promissory note must be presented at at the foot of or that particular place, in order to give the holder of the Note. a right of action, against either the maker or indorsers(); and the doctrine has been even carried further by Lord Ellenborough, C. J.), who in an action on a printed promissory note in the usual form, but with the words, "at Barclay, Tritton and Co." printed also at the bottom of it, held, "that it was necessary to prove a special presentment, since the stipulation for payment at a particular place being printed, was to be considered as part of the note, having been made at the same time." But if the words referring to the place of payment are a mere memorandum,

(1) Sanderson v. Bowes, 14 East, 500; Dickenson v. Bowes, 16 East, 110; Bowes v. Howe, in the Exchequer Chamber (in error), 5 Taunt. 30; Roche v. Campbell, 3 Camp. 247, against an Indorser; also, per C. J. Gibbs, in Price v. Mitchell, 4 Camp. 200.

Presentment written at the foot, or in the margin of the note, for payment. it is not necessary for the holder to allege in the declaration, or to prove the presentment for payment at any particular specified place".

Presentment

of a Bill made

payable by the

a particular

place.

There have been many conflicting decisions of the superior Courts at Westminster, upon the Acceptance at point whether in the case of a bill made payable by the acceptance at a particular place, as for example, at a London bankers, the acceptance was so far qualified as to render it necessary for the holder to present it for payment at that place when due, and to allege and prove such a presentment there, in order to entitle himself to maintain an action at law, against the acceptor.

The point was at length set at rest, after a full argument, and after hearing the sentiments of the Judges who differed in opinion, by the House of Lords(2); and it was then decided, that if a bill be by the acceptance, made payable in the following manner, viz. "Accepted, payable at Sir John Perring's and Co. bankers, London,” it became a qualified acceptance, and the declaration in an action on the bill by the indorsee against

(1) Saunderson v. Judge, 2 Henry Black. 509; per Bayley, J. in commenting upon Wild v. Rennard, 1 Camp. 425, in Sanderson v. Bowes, 14 East, 501; Price v. Mitchell, 4 Camp. 200; Richards v. Lord Milsingtown, Holt, Ni. Pri. C. 364; Exon v. Russell, 4 M. and Sel. 505; (Sed vide Pannell v. Woodroffe, H. T. 1818, cor. Abbott, J. 2 Starkie, N. P. 319,) Williams v. Waring, 10 Barn. and Cress. 2.

(2) Rowe v. Young, (in the House of Lords,) 2 Bro. and Bing. 165.

for payment.

the acceptor, must allege that it was presented Presentment at that place, and such allegation must be proved; and Mr. Justice Bayley, in delivering his opinion in the case, said, "the effect of such an acceptance is this, that to entitle the holder to sue the drawer or indorser, it casts an obligation upon him to present the bill at Sir John Perring and Co.'s for payment, and to aver in his declaration that the same was so presented."

within the Act

of 1st and 2nd

George IV, c.

78.

This decision being considered to be productive Presentment for payment in of inconvenience, the act 1st and 2nd George the case of 4th, c. 78, was passed on the subiect of the qualified liability of acceptors of bills, and section the 1st Acceptances enacts, "That from and after the 1st day August now next ensuing, (1821,) if any person shall accept a bill of exchange, payable at the house of a banker or other place, without further expression in his acceptance, such acceptance shall be deemed and taken to be to all intents and purposes a general acceptance of such bill; but if the acceptor shall in his acceptance express that he accepts the bill payable at a banker's house, or other place only, and not otherwise or elsewhere, such acceptance shall be deemed and taken to be to all intents and purposes, a qualified acceptance of such bill, and the acceptor shall not be liable to pay the said bill, except in default of payment, when such payment shall have been first duly demanded at such banker's house or other place."

If the acceptance do not contain words adapted