ing to £995 18s 7d." The bill for £451 14s 4d did not form one of the four bills mentioned as not accepted in the defendants' letter. The letter of the defendants was communicated on the 2nd of April by R. Jackson, by letter, to the holder; and at the foot of it R. Jackson also sent him a list of the four drafts which were alluded to in the defendants' letter as not being accepted, and forming the amount of £995 18s 7d. as follows, viz.

D. and Company .........£144 12 9

A third person

self of a Parol

R. Jackson became bankrupt, and the defendants refused to pay the bill at maturity; and at the trial of the cause, Lord Ellenborough, C. J. held that the letter of the defendants did not amount to an acceptance, and the plaintiffs were nonsuited").

A third person may avail himself of a parol may avail him- acceptance, though he was not aware of it when he received the bill). In Fairlee v. Herring(2), Best, C. J. stated, "It has been determined in a great variety of cases, that if a bill comes into a

Acceptance, though not

aware of it when he received the Bill.

(1) Bateson and another v. Jones and others, in K.B. before Lord Ellenborough, C.J. Guildhall Sittings after Trinity Term, 1817. (2) Fairlee v. Herring, 3 Bing. 629.

man's hands with a parol acceptance, though the party who receives the bill does not know of that parol acceptance, he has a right to avail himself of it afterwards. It is impossible for any man to doubt, on principles of common sense, that such ought to be the law, for if I take a bill, I take it with every advantage the holder had before it came into my hands."

existing Bill.

A promise to accept a foreign bill to be after- Promise to wards drawn, is no acceptance of the bill when accept a Nondrawn, unless some person be thereby induced to take or retain the bill; and indeed it may be doubted whether, in any case, a promise to accept a non-existing bill would now be considered as an acceptance of the bill when drawn". It has been said formerly, that there were also instances in which an acceptance might be implied, from the unreasonable length of time during which the drawee kept the bill(2), or where he has destroyed or cancelled it, or has done any act which deceives, or was intended to induce the holder to consider the bill as accepted; the drawee is clearly responsible

(1) Bayley on Bills, 4th edition, p. 144; Pierson v. Dunlop, Hilary Term, 17th Geo. III, Cooper R. 571; Johnson v. Collings, 1 East, 98; Milne v. Prest, 4 Camp. N.P.C. 393; Mason v. Hunt, 20th Geo. III, 1 Douglas R. 297; Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1663.

(2) Harvey v. Martin, 1 Camp. N.P.C. 426; Trimmer v. Oddie, cited in Mason v. Barff, Barn. and Ald. 26.

(3) See Observations of Lord Ellenborough, C. J. in Jeune v. Ward, 1 Barn. and Ald. 658.

the Bill.

Loss of the Bill for the loss (by any want of care or caution) of by the Drawee. a bill left with him for acceptance"". The modern doctrine, however, appears to be, that the mere Detention of detention of a bill by the drawee, for an unreasonable time, will not amount to an implied or constructive acceptance", though there can be no reason to doubt that he may be sued for any Destruction of damage arising from such detention; and the the Bill by the destruction of the bill by the drawee would render him liable in an action at law in another form, for the full amount, though the action must not be brought against him as acceptor); and so Alteration by improper an act, as the intentional altering or defacing of it, would, doubtless, render him liable to an action specially brought at the suit of the holder, in which the latter would recover for any damage or injury which might be proved to have been sustained in consequence.

Drawee.

the Drawee.

The holder must not consent to the drawee's altering the bill, and accepting it so altered, or he will discharge the drawers and indorsers(5).

(1) Morrison v. Buchanan, in 1833, before Littledale, J. 6 Car. and Payne, 22.

(2) Mason v. Barff, 2 Barn. and Ald. 26.

(3) Per Bayley, J. in Jeune v. Ward, 1 Barn. and Ald. 660.

(4) Jeune v. Ward, 1 Barn. and Ald. 653, in which Lord Ellenborough, C. J. differed from the other Judges, and thought that the Defendant, by not having notified his refusal to accept in a reasonable time, and having destroyed the bill, was liable for it as the Acceptor.

(5) Paton v. Winter, 1 Taunt. R. 420, Selwyn's Ni. Pri. 9th edition, 318.

an adequate

to accept a

A person promising, by letter, to another, upon Drawee proan adequate consideration, to accept a non-mising, upon existing foreign bill, and on presentment refusing consideration, to accept it, cannot be sued on it as an acceptor; Non-existing yet an action at law will lie against him in Bill, may be another form, and he may be sued specially, and sued in another damages recovered from him for the breach of

his engagement".

form.

There may be a conditional acceptance by Conditional parol, which will be binding on the drawee as Acceptance by soon as the condition has been performed(2).

Parol.

There are several cases also where ambiguous, Ambiguous or or equivocal expressions, have been decided not equivocal to amount to acceptances of the bills().

expressions.

Parol Accept

ance by

Whenever the holder receives an acceptance Waiver of by parol, or by letter, if he intend to treat it as a valid acceptance, he must not cause the bill to noting or be noted or protested, or he will discharge the protesting. drawee from all liability as acceptor("). But when the drawee has verbally accepted a bill, and a party receives it who is ignorant of that fact, he has a right to avail himself of it after

(1) Smith v. Brown, 6 Taunt. 340.

(2) Pierson v. Dunlop, Cowp. R. 571; Milne v. Prest, 4 Camp. 393; Mendizabel v. Machado, T. T. 1833, before Park, J. 6 Carrington and Payne, 218.

(3) Smith v. Missen, 1 Term R. 269 : Anderson v. Hick, 3 Camp. 179; Rees v. Warwick, 2 B. and Ald. 113; Anderson and others, v. Heath & others, 4 Maule & Sel. 303; Powell v. Jones, 1 Esp. R. 17.

(4) Sproat v. Matthews, 1 Term Rep. 182; Bentinck v. Dorrien, 6 East, 198.

wards against the acceptor, and is not estopped by having protested it in ignorance").

The drawee, after writing his acceptance on Striking out or the bill, and before returning it, may change his cancelling the mind, and release himself from responsibility by striking out, or erasing the acceptance(2).

Acceptance.

Usual mode of
Acceptance.

Lord Mansfield is stated to have said3) that it had been held by all the Judges, that an express refusal to accept written on the bill, when the drawee apprised the party who took it away of what he had written, was no acceptance; but if the drawee had intended it as a surprise upon the party, and to make him consider it as an acceptance, they seemed to think that it might have been otherwise.

The usual and correct mode of accepting a

(1) Fairlee v. Herring, 3 Bing. 625.

(2) Cox v. Troy, 5 Barn. and Ald. 474.

(3) Peach v. Kay, Sittings after Trinity Term, 1781, cited in Bailey on Bills, 4th edition, 6 and 143. There seems to be no reason to believe that it was ever held that the writing on a bill an express refusal to accept merely, was to be considered as an acceptance. The old tale about a Drawee being compelled to pay a bill because he had written upon it, in a passion, "I'll be hanged" (or some similar word) "if I accept this bill," does not appear to have had any other origin than in the fertile imagination of some jocose person who invented it. A case before Lord Macclesfield, upon a Promissory Note, which was alluded to in Peach v. Kay, by Lord Mansfield, and in 2 Atkyns's Rep. 32, by Lord Hardwicke, C. was under very different circumstances, as it arose in consequence of a palpable fraud, or cheat, the note being to the following effect: "Borrowed of J. S. £50, which I promise never to pay."