English commodity, as we have seen, is cheaper than the French, because profits in England, as compared with profits in France, are low; in other words, because wages in England are high. If this proposition be true-and in our eyes it bears he aspect of mathematical precision the existence of the Corn Laws afford no argument in favour of perpetuating the restraints on other branches of trade and commerce. Having pursued the subject thus far, we are now more able to judge of the futility of the objection to a further change in the Corn Laws, which is founded on the unfitness of the time. an objection repeated so frequently in the course of last year's debates, as to render particular citations needless. any other period. To the ruined occu piers, the repeal would be simply indiffe cent; the loss woula oe confined to those who might still be able to retain their occupations, and who would be deprived of the opportunity of retrieving their ruined fortunes. But is the public advantage an insufficient set-off against such an interest ?-an interest, too, conferring no permanent advantage, but which would only restore the farmer to the old state of temporary prosperity and periodical loss? To us, we confess, this appears the "ac"ceptable time;" although we are far from averse to begin a system of repeal at a period of prosperity. In that case we have only to observe that the sooner it is begun the better; for the higher the rise in agricultural prices, the more impracticable will such a system become; the mischief will attain more inveteracy, and the evils which follow in its train will assume their most incurable type. Entertaining these opinions, we look with anxious concern to the ensuing deliberations in parliament. With a mi nistry both zealous and instructed, and a large portion of the respectable classes well inclined to a modification of the Corn Laws, it might be thought that there would be but little room for apprehen, sion. But neither of these parties are arbiters in the case. The power is in the hands of that party whose advantage is unfortunately so opposed to that of the community-although, if not considered in a bare pecuniary light, it is less op posed than might at first appear-end, however we may rely on the enlightened integrity of a portion of that body, we find little to hope for in the mass. If we were inclined to play the part of advocates, we might observe that the gentlemen who oppose alteration now, on account of the flourishing condition of agriculture, were the same who demanded more complete prohibitions in the late periods of distress. Their argument, therefore, goes the length of demanding a perpetual prohibition. We should, however, be sorry to resort to this dishonest argument ad hominem; we will leave Mr. Gooch to justify his personal inconsistency, and debate the question on its merits. A change, then, must be commenced, either in a period of distress or in one of prosperity. If in a period of distress, we may regard the consequences as affecting two sets of agriculturists: those who are driven from their occupations, and those whose losses fall something short of that acme of distress, and who are still able to carry on their business. A repeal of the Corn We judge from the principles of human Laws at such a time-and the depression nature; from their habitual conduct 3 may be so great that prices would sink no from their confessions; from their threats. lower even from their total repeal-would" The men of landed property," says confirm the loss of both parties; a con- Lord Enniskillen, "ought to stand by tinuance of those laws, would, in time," one another. If they do not, the moenable the occupiers who had not been"nied interest will overwhelm them:" driven from their trade, to retrieve their condition in a great degree; but the rest would be ruined past redemption. What is said of the occupiers, is also true of the owners of land. Now it seems past questioning, to our minds, that a juncture like that we have described, affords the best possible opportunity for a repeal. In the first place, the repeal might be complete; in the next, the remediable mischief would be less than at as if this were a civil war between the partizans of high profits and high rents. and the only question for the legislature, were to secure a victory for the landed interest! This sentiment was repeatedly expressed in many speeches, most of which, we are happy to observe, were not distinguished, either for their intrinsic merit, or the reputation of their authors. * Ante, p. 401. But this monstrous ground has been taken by one individual of grave character and eminent legal attainments, whose opinions it is impossible to slight and absurd to ridicule. We speak of the late Lord Chancellor of Ireland, Lord Redesdale. "The constitution of this country," he says, ** is founded upon, and can never be safely separated from, the landed interest. To talk, therefore, of a free trade in corn, is at once absurd and dangerous. It is impossible that such a free trade can ever exist consistently with the safety and prosperity of the kingdom. Any measure would be objectionable which might have the effect of placing the corn-trade of England upon the same footing as that of any foreign country. To do this would be to adopt a false and dangerous policy, and one which is opposed to the soundest maxims of national economy. The land is the foundation of all our wealth, and from it every other description of advantage flows. This has been the idea entertained by all our old writers on political economy, and experience has proved that they were not mistaken." This will never bear investigation. Men will suffer any finite evils, rather than incur the hazard or inflict the misery of shaking them at once from their shoulders; but perpetuity is an element in pain, which makes even "the wise man "mad." We harbour no inveteracy against the landed gentry; we have no hostile feelings against any class or party: we wish to see all prosper without sacrificing any single interest. Any relief which may be afforded to the landlords, consistently with the general good-and we have shewn how great the measure of that relief may be-we are heartily willing to concede. But when they attempt to justify the peculiar privileges, which their power has enabled them to usurp, we cannot refrain from advising them and it is an act not of enmity but friendship-to be wise in time. Country Banks. What is chiefly to be remarked in this extract, with regard to the man, is the strange contrast it presents with his judgments in the Irish Court of Chancery A PETITION, presented by Mr. Hume, -the contrast between strength and weak- on behalf of a Mr. Jones, complaining of ness, knowledge and ignorance, and each the misconduct of a country banker in reequally profound-the miracle of hearing fusing to cash his five pound notes, profrom the same lips acute and lucid argu- duced a short discussion on the currency. ment, and the babbling anilities which This debate is worthy of notice, both as the reader has just perused. What is indicating the state of the political econochiefly to be noticed in the opinions-my of parliament, and in consequence of and with them we have most concern- an intimation from several members that is the new light which Lord Redesdale they intended to move the subject in has thrown on the theory of the British the ensuing session. Constitution. The basis of the government he has found in the landed aristocracy: the fact has been long suspected, but it required the oak and triple brass round the breast of this noble lawyer to avow the system in terms, and stamp it with his public sanction. This busy meddling period is an ill time for such candid disclosures. Not to mention the mass of temporary taxation incurred, in defence of "the mixed government," we have now a second permanent prop in the shape of another corn-tax. The people have long murmured against the title; they are consoled with the prospect of a perpetual corn-law. Such is the account: Tithe (say) Ante, p. 401. Per Ann. £5,000,000 15,000,000 £20,000,000 To these members we offer the following concise reflections. We may perhaps be pardoned for observing that, when a thing is to be bought, it cannot be bought too cheap. If, for instance, of two media of circulation, gold and paper (for we will keep the silver out of view), the prime cost of one be twenty million, and of the other but a few thousand pounds, no man, who can "count ten upon his fingers," will as far as cost is concerned, elect the gold in preference to the paper. Now, if the manufacture of a paper note be estimated at so high a price as 3d. a paper currency might still be had for one-eightieth of the cost of a gold one. That being the case, we must hear something much more decisive than any hon. gentleman has been able to borrow from Mr. Cobbett, before we can abandon our maxim, in favour of a metallic currency. Suppose, for the sake of argument, the circulation of the country to be that of the precious metal-which brings us to the former case. But we are told by Mr. Hume and others, that the quantity of country paper is so great, that "" no gold can be got in "the country" at all. So much the better. Who wants it? Of what use is it? How should we be the better if we had it? We know of but one case worth mentioning, in which gold can be preferable to Bank paper; and that is, when the issuers of paper become so blind to the suggestions of interest, as to send it forth in too great abundance. When a sovereign, worth 20s., can be had at the Bank for a note which may be got for 18s.-when the paper is too abundant by one-tenth, a sovereign is better than a note by 2s. exactly. We have already intimated our dissatisfaction with the Establishment of The Governor and Company of the Bank of England;" we are also anxious that our remarks may not be misconstrued into an approval of the system of Country Banks. It has not been our business, on this occasion, to discuss the merits of either system, but to ascertain the policy by which things, as they are, may be rendered most conducive to the public service. The only point remaining to be noticed, is Lord Folkestone's dismal account of the hazard, expense, and dilatoriness of the legal process, which the holder of a country note must have recourse to, to get it cashed by a refractory Hanker. Summary process, as we have shewn elsewhere, is by no means unpalatable to our taste; but in exposing the difficulties of exchanging a note for a sovereign, Lord Folkestone has only described the obstacles which lie in the Way of justice, whenever and for whatever cause it is sought for in an action at law. The foregoing remarks were written shortly after the debate took place, to which they are appended. We have lately witnessed a series of failures amongst the London and country bankers, which may be supposed to have modified the opinion expressed above. A moment's consideration, however, will shew, that the circumstances were in no degree calculated to affect our previous opinion; and were, in fact, altogether unconnected with the grounds upon which it had been formed. The late failures prove, and prove beyond all doubt, that the system of country banking in England is essentially bad. We are so far from denying this, that we not only cautioned the reader against misinterpreting our re marks on the impolicy of compelling country bankers to pay their notes in gold, so long as we should possess a convertible Bank of England paper, into an approval of that system; but it has met the constant reprobation of those eminent writers whose opinions form the basis of most of the economical reasonings in the present work. It was not, however, our business to enter into the merits of that system. We contended, and still contend, that so long as Bank paper shall remain on its present footing, the holder of the country note will be armed with no additional security by a liability on the part of the country banker to pay in gold, nor will the public be protected against the over-issues of provincial notes; whilst a large portion of the general capital must remain inert in the shape of the precious metal. There was nothing in the late occurrences to disprove this proposition. Those who held the notes of country bankers suspected of insolvency, were well satisfied if they could get Bank paper in exchange, and never dreamed of asking for gold.The notes of the Bank of England passed as currently during the time of the panic. as gold or silver, and experienced no loss of confidence. These events, therefore, may prove the insecurity of allowing so large a portion of the currency to be supplied by individuals, or small companies, consisting of at most five partners; but they leave the question as to the inutility of compelling country bankers to pay in gold altogether untouched. We see, therefore, nothing in those circumstances which should induce us to alter a single line of what we have advanced above, with respect to Mr. Hume's petition. Having touched upon this subject, we may conclude by expressing a hope, that the late distresses will be duly applied for the purpose of exposing the enormous evils, resulting from the monopoly of the Bank of England. So long as that monopoly shall exist, it is impossible to make any effective change in the system of provincial banking. Joint Stock Companies. ~I. A TRADE, or a particular trading enterprise, may be of such a nature, that a solitary individual, or a few individuals in partnership, would not, probably, undertake it, or would not undertake and conduct it with the greatest possible advantage to the community at large. For, first, it might be physically impossible to carry it on, without a larger capital than a solitary individual, or a small body of individuals, can commonly command. Secondly, a capital embarked in it might be put to unusual hazard. Thirdly, the return to an extensive capital would be proportionally, as well as absolutely, larger than the return to a moderate or a small one; in other words, the commodity or service, to be produced or rendered, might be provided, with an extensive capital, at a smaller cost. On the first and second of these suppositions, the trade or enterprise, though certainly or probably advantageous to the community, would hardly be undertaken by a solitary individual, or by a few individuals in partnership. On the last, individuals would engage in the trade, singly, or in limited partnerships (unless it were likely that they would be encountered in the market by more extensive associations); but they would not undertake and conduct it with the greatest possible advantage to the community at large. On any of these suppositions, the establishment of large trading associations (call them extensive partnerships, or call them joint stock companies) would be advantageous to the public. On the first or second supposition, the commodity or service would not be provided at all, by any but joint stock companies. On the last supposition, it would not be provided by any but joint stock companies, at the smallest possible cost, and for the smallest possible price. II. 1. The extent to which joint stock companies will be established, must be more or less affected by the law of partnership; especially by that portion of it, which regards the obligation of the individual partner to satisfy the obligations of the body. By the general law of partnership which obtains in England, every partner is liable for all the debts and engagements of the body, not only to the extent of his interest in the joint stock, but also to the whole extent of his separate property. As between the partners them selves, the extent to which each is liable, en nom collectif, or en commandite, at the 6 Geo. IV. cap. 91, sec. 3. partners liable without limitation (associés responsables et solidaires), and one or more partners liable to a limited extent (commanditaires ou associés en commandite). If there be more than one partner liable without limitation, the partnership, is, at one and the same time, a partnership en nom collectif, as to the two or more who are so liable, and a partnership en commundite, as to those whose liability is qualified. A commanditaire, or partner en commandite, is not liable to creditors or other claimants upon the society, beyond the amount of the capital which he has contributed, or engaged to contribute, to the joint stock. On the other hand, he is prohibited from acting for the partnership in its dealings with third persons. Its trade or business is exclusively conducted, in the name or names, and by, or under the control of, one or more of the partners, who are liable without limitation. The name of a commanditaire is not permitted to appear in the name or firm of the society; and if he engage or intermeddle in any dealing with strangers, either in his character of partaer, or as agent of the partners who are liable without limitation, he instantly loses his immunity, and is thenceforth responsible, to the same unlimited extent, for the partnership debts and engagements. We have seen that a commanditaire is prohibited from acting for the partnership in its dealings with third persons. It would also appear, that he is not directly liable to any third person having a claim upon the society, even to the extent of the capital which, by contract with the partner responsible in solido, he engaged to contribute to the joint stock. The debts and engagements of the partnership are exclusively contracted by, or in the name of the partner responsible in solido; and so long as he is solvent, the creditors or other claimants upon it must look to him alone for satisfaction. If the commanditaire has not advanced the capital which he engaged to contribute, he may be compelled to advance it by the partner responsible in solido, and may thus indirectly satisfy the partnership obligations. But, directly, the creditors or other claimants have no remedy against him, unless the partner responsible in solido become bankrupt; on which event, the joint stock (including the debts due to it) and the separate estate of the bankrupt partner (subject to such prior claims as his separate creditors may have upon it) are applied in satisfaction of the partnership obligations, so far as they are required for the purpose, or will extend to answer it. Now, on that event, the joint stock, together with the separate estate applicable to the purpose, may be, and probably will be, insufficient to satisfy the obligations of the society. In this case, if the commanditaire has advanced the capital which he engaged to contribute, and has not taken money or money's worth from the joint stock, the whole of that capital, as forming a part of that stock, is applied in liquidation of those obligations; but there his liability ends. In the same case, if he has not advanced capital in pursuance of his engagement, or has taken money or money's worth, he is a debtor to the joint stock, to the whole extent of what he has taken, and of what he has failed to advance; and the assignees in bankruptcy, or such other persons as represent the claimants upon the partnership, may proceed against him for this debt, as against any other debtor to the partnership estate. We have presumed that he is liable to account for whatever he has taken from the joint stock, even as his share of foregone profits; for he is obliged to bear the losses of the partnership, to the extent of the capital, which he has contributed, or is bound to contribute (jusqu'à cóncurrence des fonds qu'il a mis ou dû mettre dans la société): the terms of which obligation would not, it should seem, be satisfied, if he were not compellable to refund.It may happen that the joint stock, together with the separate estate, applicable to the purpose, are more than sufficient to satisfy the obligations of the society. In that case, the partner en commandite (who is a creditor of the partner responsible in solido, though a debtor to the creditors of the partnership) may resort to the joint stock and the separate estate, for whatever was due to him at the bankruptcy, or the assignees have obliged him to pay: but not in competition with creditors who are not also partners. In favour of their paramount claims, he is excluded from the fund, ull they are satisfied to the uttermost farthing. Finally, the formation of the partnership must be evidenced by instrument in writing; and an extract of that instrument (containing, amongst other things, |