well as the preceding one, which deprives the attorney of any claim in cases not exceeding 408., should be understood of fees "for appearing and acting in court on behalf of another," and expressed that opinion in the commencement of their judgment; observing that "the words of the section are very clear, that no attorney shall be entitled to have or recover therefore (that is, for appearing or acting on behalf of any other person in the county court) more than the sums therein specified."

It appears, therefore, on considering the words of the enactment, taking the language of the legislature in its ordinary sense, that the restriction in question does not apply to business done out of court, before a suit is commenced: and we think, that, looking at the general scope of the enactment, we ought to come to a similar conclusion.

The act

The subject of the section, is, proceedings in county courts,-a very fit subject of regulation in an act for establishing such courts. certainly contemplates that the hearing of cases in the county courts will usually be short and summary. The limitation of fees for acting for a party at such a hearing, is a natural incident to such courts; and such limitations are not unusual in respect of proceedings in courts. But, where one man employs another to do work and labour for him, for a reasonable remuneration, it seems unreasonable to say the contract shall not be binding if the employment end in a suit in a county court, but will be binding if it do not. We think such a restriction as this would be, on the liberty of entering into such contracts as the parties. think fit, ought not to be implied, unless by a necessary implication; and there is none such here.

*The Court of Queen's Bench is reported to have said, in Ex [*347 parte Clipperton, in re Green, that the legislature did not intend to make any distinction between an attorney's right to recover from the opposite party, and from his own client: but we think there is no reason for construing the act as abolishing the existing distinction between the costs which may be allowed between party and party, and the remuneration which an attorney may recover from his client. The framers of the act use appropriate words, in speaking of both kinds of claim,-the attorney's claim against his client being described as a right to have or recover," while costs between party and party are described as costs "allowed on taxation."

On the whole, we think there is nothing in this section to take away the right of an attorney to be paid a reasonable amount for work done out of court, before the institution of a suit, or to take away the right of the superior courts,-which alone have jurisdiction to tax attorneys' bills,-to allow a reasonable remuneration for this description of labour The rule must, therefore, be made absolute. Rule absolute.

*348]

*TEMPLE v. SLEIGH. Jan. 25.

A certificate under the debtors' arrangement act (7 & 8 Vict. c. 70, s. 13) must certify the filing of the petition, and not merely that a resolution or agreement was duly assented to, and approved and filed by the commissioner.

Quare, whether a certificate under this act requires confirmation,—or whether a plea setting up such a certificate, need show that the debt is not of the excepted classes mentioned in s. 2? ASSUMPSIT on a bill of exchange for 150l., bearing date the 25th of July, 1846, drawn by the defendant upon one W. W. Sleigh, payable one month after date, and endorsed to the plaintiff; with a count upon an account stated.

The defendant pleaded, amongst other pleas, that, after the bill of exchange in the first count of the declaration became due and payable according to the tenor and effect thereof, and after the making of the promise in the last count of the declaration, and after the passing of a certain act of parliament made and passed in a session of parliament holden in the seventh and eighth years of the reign of Her present Majesty, intituled "An act for facilitating arrangements between debtors and creditors," and before the commencement of this suit, to wit, on the 18th of October, 1847, the defendant, being a debtor unable to meet his engagements with his creditors, and not being a trader within the meaning of the statutes in force relating to bankrupts at the time of the passing the said act, with the concurrence of one-third in number and value of his creditors (testified by their having signed his petition), did present to the court of bankruptcy a petition setting forth a full account of his debts, and the consideration thereof, and the names, residences, and occupations of his creditors, and particularly stating the name, residence, and occupation of the plaintiff, and an account of the plaintiff's alleged debt, and the consideration thereof, and also a full account of his, the defendant's, estate and effects, whether in possession, reversion, or *expectancy, and of all debts and rights due to or claimed by *349] him, and of all property, of what kind soever, held in trust for him, and also setting forth that he was unable to meet his engagements with his creditors, and the true cause of such inability, and also setting forth a certain proposal which he, the defendant, then made for the compromise of his said debts and engagements, and also setting forth that one-third in number and value of his creditors had assented to his said proposal; and which petition prayed that his said proposal, or such modification thereof as by the majority of his creditors should be determined, should be carried into effect under the superintendence and control of the said court, and that he, the defendant, should in the mean time be protected from arrest, by order of the said court: That the said petition was afterwards, to wit, on the day and year last aforesaid, and before the commencement of this suit, duly filed of record in the said court; and that H. J. Shepherd, Esq.,-the said H. J. Shep

herd then being one of the commissioners of the said court, and the commissioner acting in the matter of the said petition,-did, upon the presentation of the said petition, to wit, on the day and year last aforesaid, privately examine into the truth of the several matters alleged in the said petition; and that the said H. J. Shepherd,-being satisfied of the truth of the said several matters in the said petition alleged, and that the debts of the defendant had not been contracted by reason of any manner of fraud or breach of trust, or without reasonable probability at the time of contract of being able to pay the same, or by reason of any judgment in any prosecution for breach of the revenue laws, or in any action for breach of promise of marriage, seduction, criminal conversation, libel, slander, assault, battery, malicious arrest, malicious suing out a fiat in bankruptcy, or malicious *trespass, and that the defendant had made a full disclosure of [*350 his debts and credits, estate and effects, and was desirous of making a bona fide arrangement with all his creditors, and that his proposal to that effect was reasonable and proper to be executed under the direction of the said court,-did thereupon direct a meeting of all the creditors of the said defendant to be convened according to the provisions of the said act, and that such meeting should be holden, to wit, on the 3d of November, 1847, at the office of G. J. Graham, at No. 25, Coleman Street, in the city of London,-the said G. J. Graham then being one of the official assignees of the said court of bankruptcy; and that the defendant should give notice in writing to every creditor of him the defendant, not less than seven or more than twenty-eight days before the holding of such meeting: That afterwards, and before the commencement of this suit, to wit, on the said 18th of October, 1847, the said H. J. Shepherd did appoint the said G. J. Graham (the said G. J. Graham then being one of the official assignees of the said court of bankruptcy) to preside at such meeting of creditors. and to report the resolutions thereof to the said H. J. Shepherd, Esq.: That, in pursuance of such direction of the said H. J. Shepherd as aforesaid, and according to the provisions of the said act, he, the defendant, gave notice in writing to every creditor of him, the defendant, and particularly to the said plaintiff, of such intended meeting, and of the time and place of holding the same, not less than seven, or more than twenty-eight days before the holding of such meeting: That a meeting of the creditors of the said defendant was afterwards, and before the commencement of this suit, to wit, on the 3d of November, 1847, at the office of the said G. J. Graham, No. 25, Coleman Street, in the city of London, convened and held; at which meeting the said G. J. *Graham did preside: That, at the said meeting, the major part [*351 in number and value of the creditors of the said defendant did assent to the proposal of the said defendant; and that thereupon the said G. J. Graham did, according to the provisions of the said act, appoint VOL. IX.-16

another meeting of the creditors of the said defendant to be convened and held under the provisions and directions of the 4th section of the said act, not earlier than seven nor later than twenty-eight days from such last-mentioned meeting: That of such second meeting, and the purpose thereof, he, the defendant, did give notice in writing, and did personally serve the same on every creditor who was not present, by himself or his appointed agent, at such first meeting, and particularly on the plaintiff, three clear days at least before the day appointed for such second meeting: That such second meeting was convened and held according to the provisions of the said act; and, at the said second meeting, three-fifths in number and value of all the said defendant's creditors then present, the said creditors so present being one full third in number and value of all the creditors of the defendant,-did agree to accept such composition as was assented to at the said first meeting of creditors: That the said creditors so present at such second meeting, the same being three-fifths in number and value of all the creditors of the defendant,-did reduce the terms of the said composition into writing, and signed the same: That, afterwards, and before the commencement of this suit, and within fifteen days next after the said agreement for acceptance of the said composition, and the signing of the same at the said second meeting of creditors, the same agreement was submitted to the said H. J. Shepherd, the commissioner acting in the matter of the said petition; and the said H. J. Shepherd did afterwards, and before the commencement of this suit, to *wit, *352] on the 18th of November, 1847, cause the said agreement and resolution to be filed and entered of record in the said court of bankruptcy, and did grant to the said defendant a certificate of such filing, and endorsed on such certificate his protection of the said defendant from arrest: That, afterwards, and before the commencement of this suit, to wit, on the 18th of December, 1847, the said agreement was carried into effect, and the creditors of the said defendant were satisfied according to the tenor of the same; and that thereupon the said H. J. Shepherd, the commissioner acting in the matter of the said petition, did cause a meeting of the said creditors of the defendant to be held before him on the 25th of February, 1848, at which meeting the said H. J. Shepherd,-the same meeting being before the commencement of this suit, and the said H. J. Shepherd, then being the commissioner of the court of bankruptcy acting in the matter of the said petition,did give to the said defendant a certificate under his hand and seal, certifying that he, the said H. J. Shepherd, had caused such meetings of the creditors of the defendant to be held as are directed by the said act, and that a certain resolution or agreement had been duly assented to at such meeting, as he the said H. J. Shepherd thought reasonable and proper to be executed under the direction of the said act, that he the said H. J. Shepherd had caused the same to be filed and entered of record,

and that the said resolution or agreement had been fully carried into effect,(a)-verification.

To this plea the plaintiff demurred specially, assigning for causes,that it does not appear in and by the plea, that the said petition of the defendant set forth such proposal as he at the time of presenting his said petition *was able to make for the future payment or the [*353 compromise of his debts or engagements, or that the proposal in the said petition set forth was the proposal which, at the time of the prosecuting the said petition, the defendant was, most beneficially to his creditors, able to make; that it appears thereby that the said petition only set forth a certain proposal which he the defendant then actually made for the compromise of his said debts and engagements, and that it is quite consistent with the said plea, that the defendant was, at the time of presenting his said petition, able to carry into effect a proposal more beneficial to his creditors than the proposal in the said petition set forth, or that he was unable to carry into effect the said proposal, or any modification of the same:-That it is not averred in, or shown by, the plea that the said resolution or agreement therein mentioned, embodied the very terms of, or was equivalent to, the proposal in the said petition of the defendant mentioned, or was in fact a modification of such proposal, and it is quite consistent with the plea, that the said resolution or agreement was neither substantially identical with, nor a modification of, the said proposal:-That it is not averred in, or shown by, the plea, that the said H. J. Shepherd, when he the said H. J. Shepherd, as in the plea alleged, privately examined into the truth of the several matters alleged in the said petition, did examine the defendant upon oath, and any creditor concurring in his petition, and any witness then produced by the defendant; and that it is quite consistent with the plea, that the said H. J. Shepherd, when he privately examined into the truth of the matters alleged in the said petition, did not examine, either upon oath, or at all, the said defendant, or any creditor concurring in his said petition, or any witness then produced by the defendant:-That it is not averred in, or shown by, the plea, that the resolution or agreement therein mentioned contained any terms for the compromise or future payment of [*354 the said debt due from the defendant to the plaintiff, or that the same could not be carried into effect, according to the tenor of the same, without in fact satisfying the said debt due from the defendant to the plaintiff:-That it is not averred or shown in or by the plea, that the plaintiff, before or at the time when the resolution or agreement in the plea mentioned was carried into effect, or at any time by reason of the said resolution or agreement being or having been carried into effect, received any payment or satisfaction, either wholly or in part, of his said debt, and it is perfectly consistent with the plea, that the said

(a) See note (a) at the end of the case.