[WILDE, C. J.—I do not wonder at the omission; for, many judges have said that they did not know what it meant.] There can be no hardship in putting such a construction upon the act, which was intended to favour these arrangements, as will deprive a hostile creditor of the power of harassing his debtor. [WILDE, C. J.-To justify us in construing a statute to be retrospective, the words must be very explicit.] That, no doubt, is the general rule, as is laid down in Moon v. Durden, 2 Exch. 22,† where it is said that "the general rule, in construing recent statutes, *is, Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere *564] debet, non præteritis;' but that rule, which is one of construction only, will yield to a sufficiently expressed intention of the legislature that the enactment should have a retrospective operation." Many instances might be cited, of statutes, the language of which construed grammatically would import the future only, being read retrospectively. Thus, in Towler v. Chatterton, 6 Bingh. 258 (E. C. L. R. vol. 19), 3 M. & P. 619, the first section of Lord Tenterden's act, 9 G. 4, c. 14,— which enacts," that, in actions of debt, &c., no acknowledgment or promise by words only shall be deemed sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract whereby to take any case out of the operation of the statute of limitations (21 Jac. 1, c. 16), or to deprive any party of the benefit thereof, unless such acknowledgment or promise shall be made or contained by or in some writing, to be signed by the party chargeable thereby," was held to have a retrospective operation. The same point had already been ruled by Lord TENTERDEN, in Hilliard v. Lenard, M. & M. 297, and Ansell v. Ansell, M. & M. 299, n., and by HULLOCK, B., in Kirkhaugh v. Herbert.(a) So, in Freeman v. Moyes, 1 Ad. & E. 338 (E. C. L. R. vol. 28), 3 N. & M. 883 (E. C. L. R. vol. 28), under the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42, s. 31, executors were held liable to costs in actions commenced before the statute came into operation, and tried after. And see Doe d. Payne v. The Bristol and Exeter Railway Company, 6 M. & W. 320.†

The plea alleges that the defendants had suspended payment before the making of the deed, and that the plaintiff, to wit, on the 1st of November, 1847, had notice of the suspension, and of the deed. The day, though laid under a videlicet, being material, the videlicet may be rejected. The word "month" in the *plea must, at all events *565] after verdict, be read with the aid of the interpretation clause, and therefore means "calendar month." Reading it with the context, even without the aid of the interpretation clause, it must be so intended: Titus v. Lady Preston, 1 Stra. 652; Lang v. Gale, 1 M. & Selw. 111; Cockell v. Gray, 3 Brod. & B. 186 (E. C. L. R. vol. 7), 6 J. B. Moore, 483 (E. C. L. R. vol. 17). [Cresswell, J.-All the cases on the subject are considered in Simpson v. Margitson, 11 Q. B. 23 (E. C. L. R. vol. 63.] Where the opposite party has pleaded over, and the

(a) Carlisle Spring Assizes, 1829.

pleading is capable of a construction which will support it, the court will give it that construction. Besides, the day is involved in the issue; and the jury have found it. It may be said, as was said in Gibbons v. Vouillon, 8 M. Gr. & S. 483 (E. C. L. R. vol. 65), that this defence might have been pleaded puis darrein continuance: but the three months since the passing of the act have now elapsed, and the court will give the right judgment on the whole record, although the prayer of the plea may be informal: Le Bret v. Papillon, 4 East, 502; Charnley v. Winstanley, 5 East, 266; Allen v. Hopkins, 13 M. & W. 94;† Cobbett v. Sir George Grey, 4 Exch. 729.† [TALFOURD, J.-The plea is bad or good at the time of pleading.] The defendants might have pleaded puis darrein continuance at nisi prius.

Keating and Winston, in support of the rule.-To give a retrospective construction to an act of parliament, the court will require very clear and unambiguous words indicating an intention on the part of the legislature that a vested right of action should be thereby affected. Moon v. Durden is a strong instance of the disinclination of the courts to construe statutes retrospectively. PARKE, B., there says:(a) "It seems a *strong thing to hold, that the legislature could have meant that [*566 a party who, under a contract made prior to the act, had as perfect a title to recover a sum of money as he had to any of his personal property, should be totally deprived of it without compensation. It is a still stronger thing to hold, that, if he has already commenced an action with an undoubted right to recover both his debt and costs, he should not only forfeit both, but also be liable, as he would in the ordinary course of a suit, to pay the costs of his adversary, by being obliged to discontinue, or be non-prossed, or have his judgment arrested. These considerations afford a strong reason for limiting the operation of the words of this section, (b) and holding that they apply to future contracts, and actions of such future contracts, only,-at all events, to future actions only, if any distinction can be made in the degrees of apparent injustice." In Hitchcock v. Way, 6 Ad. & E. 943 (E. C. L. R. vol. 33), 2 N. & P. 72, it was expressly decided, that, where the law is altered by statute pending an action, the law as it existed when the action was commenced must decide the rights of the parties, unless the legislature, by the language used, show a clear intention to vary the mutual relation of such parties. [WILLIAMS, J.-This statute violates the general principle of construction, by applying itself to deeds already executed. The difficulty is, to say where that violation is to stop.] Reading the words of the 225th section fairly and according to their ordinary grammatical (a) 2 Exch. 22.t

(b) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18: "All contracts or agreements, whether by parol or in writing. by way of gaming or wagering, shall be null and void; and no suit shall be brought or maintained, in any court of law or equity, for recovering any sum of money or valuable thing alleged to be won upon any wager, or which shall have been deposited in the hands of any person to abide the event on which any wager shall have been made."

*567]

construction, they clearly import future dealings only. Many *material words in the clause are wholly inconsistent with any other construction.

No doubt, in construing mercantile contracts, "month" may mean lunar or calendar, according to the intention of the parties, as evidenced by custom or the surrounding circumstances. But, in a record, it means prima facie a lunar month only. [WILLIAMS, J.-Upon this record, it is capable of meaning "calendar month :" and, if so, it must be assumed that the judge told the jury so. CRESSWELL, J.-What is the object proposed to be attained by the notice? Aspland suggested that it was to give the creditor an opportunity of inquiring into the genuineness of the deed. CRESSWELL, J.-That's a strong reason for holding the provision in question to be prospective. The creditor would have had no interest in making the inquiry before the passing of this statute.]

WILDE, C. J.-The court is placed in great difficulty in dealing with this act of parliament; and we are by no means enabled to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion as to some parts of it. We must, however, enter upon the consideration of it with a due regard to the well-known general principle, that statutes are not to be held to operate retrospectively, unless they contain express words to that effect. Sometimes, no doubt, the legislature finds it expedient to give a retrospective operation to an act to a considerable extent; but then care is always taken to express that intention in clear and unambiguous language. It is plain that this act was meant to be retrospective to a limited extent, to establish certain deeds executed before the passing of the act. It is contended that the act was meant to operate retrospectively in another respect, which is quite contrary to the ordinary practice of the legislature,— viz., to take away an action which has been *well commenced in *568] respect of a vested right. It must have been well known to both branches of the legislature that strong and distinct words would be necessary to defeat a vested right to continue an action which has been well commenced and we have carefully considered the act with a view to discover if it will bear such a construction as is contended for on the part of the defendants; but we are unable to arrive at any certain and satisfactory conclusion in the affirmative. Some expressions have been relied on as showing that a retrospective operation was contemplated. But those expressions do not seem to us necessarily to bear the interpretation sought to be put upon them; for, we find the very same words used elsewhere in a sense which clearly could not be retrospective. The general rule of construction being as I have already stated, viz., that the words of an act are to be construed to be prospective only, unless the intention of the legislature to the contrary is unequivocally expressed, and there being nothing to show that the act was intended to be retrospective with reference to the matter now in question, we must construe it as being prospective only. This action, therefore, having been well

:

brought, and there being nothing in the act to warrant us in saying that the legislature meant to take it away, the plaintiff is entitled to the judgment of the court.

CRESSWELL, J.-I am entirely of the same opinion. At the time this action was commenced, the plaintiff had a clear right to bring it; and it is for the defendants to make out that the statute is retrospective, for the purpose of ousting the plaintiff of that right. If there is any ambiguity in the language of the act, the defendants' argument fails. I cannot say that the statute has any such effect, though it is possible that it may have been intended to be retrospective. Construing it, *therefore, according to the general rule, we are bound to hold [*569 it to be prospective only. The words at the commencement of the 225th section which seem capable of a retrospective construction, are again used at the close of the section, where they clearly can only be construed prospectively. Two or three instances have been cited where statutes have been allowed to have a retrospective effect so as to take away a vested right of action. There is no question that such things have occurred,-whether intentionally or not, is not for us now to inquire, the language used admitting of no doubt. One of the examples referred to arose upon the 1st section of Lord TENTERDEN'S act of 9 G. 4, c. 14, which was passed for the purpose of relieving parties from the difficulties arising from the doctrine of the revival by new promises of debts barred by the statute of limitations. The language of that provision is, that "no acknowledgment or promise by words only shall be deemed sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract," &c., necessarily referring to the time when the judge is to determine whether the evidence tendered is sufficient or not. The court, therefore, could not escape from the inevitable conclusion that the section was intended to have a retrospective operation. The defendants in this case failing to satisfy us that the statute in question is retrospective in the manner contended for, fail to establish the validity of the plea, and, consequently, the plaintiff must have judgment.

WILLIAMS, J.-I am of the same opinion. It is a general rule, in the construction of acts of parliament, that new laws are to be understood to apply to future things, and not to things past. That rule, no doubt, like every other rule of construction, will yield to a clearly expressed intention that the language used should be taken to be retrospective. In that part of the statute now under consideration, I find no such clearly expressed intention, and therefore I feel bound to hold the act to be prospective only.

[*570

TALFOURD, J.—I am of the same opinion. The general rule of construction is not denied; and it seems to me that its application to this case is sufficiently clear. "Such time," in the 225th section, means such time as a future deed or memorandum of arrangement has been duly signed by or on behalf of a majority of the creditors, and therefore

must mean time future,-after the passing of the act. My Brother Byles suggests that the court may give judgment on the whole record, and that, after verdict, it will be assumed that the three months had elapsed after the passing of the act. That, however, would be an unwarrantable application of the rule of pleading. We must construe the pleadings as they are, not as they might have been. This plea being no good bar, the rule for entering judgment for the plaintiff non obstante veredicto must be made absolute. Rule absolute.

That an Act of the Legislature is not to be construed retrospectively so as to take away a vested right, see Dash v. Van Kleck, 7 Johnson, 477; Sayre v. Wisner, 8 Wendell, 661; Quackenbush v. Danks, 1 Denio, 128; Hastings

v. Lane, 3 Shepley, 134; Forsyth v. Masbury, R. M. Charlton, 324; Guard v. Rowan, 2 Scam. 499; Garrett v. Doe, 1 Ibid. 335; Brown v. Wilcox, 14 Smedes & Marshall, 127.

ELLISON v. COLLINGRIDGE.

April 15.

Held, that an instrument in the following form,-"Port of London Sea, Fire, and Life Assurance Company. To the cashier. Fifty-three days after date, credit Messrs. P. & Co., or order, with the sum of 5007., claimed per Cleopatra, in cash, on account of this corporation.-A. C., Managing Director," was properly declared on as a bill of exchange.

ASSUMPSIT. The first count was upon a policy of assurance made by the Port of London Sea, Fire, and Life Assurance Company. The second count charged the defendant as the drawer of a bill of exchange for 500l., endorsed to the plaintiff. The third count described the same instrument as a promissory note. The fourth count was upon an account stated.

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*The defendant pleaded non assumpsit to the first and last counts, traversed the drawing and making respectively of the bill and note in the second and third counts, and further pleaded a plea of fraud to the whole declaration.

The cause was tried before WILDE, C. J., at the sittings in Middlesex. after the last term. The plaintiff put in an instrument as follows:"Marine Department. "Port of London Sea, Fire, and Life Assurance Company.

"To the cashier.

"£500. 31, Cornhill, 10th September, 1849. "Fifty-three days after date, credit Messrs. Plummer & Co., or order, with the sum of five hundred pounds, claimed per Cleopatra, in cash, on account of this corporation.

"AUGUSTUS COLLINGRIDGE, Managing Director."

A verdict was entered for the plaintiff on the second court for 500l., subject to leave reserved to the defendant to enter a verdict for him if