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ferent counties or divisions of counties, are joined in the same action, the venue may be laid in either of such counties or divisions. (See, as to the former practice, the C. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 41, repealed by the Statute Law Revision, &c. Act, 1883.) But in such cases, if the causes of action cannot conveniently be disposed of together, application might be made for an order to have them tried separately under O. XVIII. r. 1, cited ante, p. 57.

Many statutes which gave special privileges to particular defendants, such as certain public bodies, public officers, and other persons as to actions brought against them for acts done in execution or intended execution of statutory or official duties, contained enactments providing that any such action should be laid and tried only in some specified locality, which was usually the county or place where the facts complained of occurred, or the cause of action arose.

But it appears that all such enactments, when contained in any statutes passed before the Judicature Acts came into operation, were in effect repealed by s. 33 of the Judicature Act, 1875, as being inconsistent with the former O. XXXVI. r. 1, of the Rules of 1875, which purported to abolish all local venues, and that, although that rule (inter alia) was annulled, and the present O. XXXVI. r. 1 (which contains a saving as to local venues provided by statute) substituted for it, by the R. S. C. 1883, the repealed enactments as to venue were not thereby revived, by reason of the express provision to the contrary contained in s. 6 of the Statute Law Revision, &c. Act, 1883. (See Buckley v. Hull Docks Co., (1893) 2 Q. B. 93; 62 L. J. Q. B. 449.)

The only effect of the saving of statutory provisions as to local venues which is contained in the present O. XXXVI. r. 1 was to preserve the validity of such provisions when contained in statutes passed subsequently to the coming into operation of the Judicature Acts (see Ib.), though very few statutes passed subsequently to that date contained any such provisions, and now any enactments requiring a local venue which are contained in any public general Acts have been repealed by s. 2 of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, cited post, p. 946, either specifically (as in the case of the County Courts Act, 1888, s. 53), or, so far as relates to proceedings to which the Public Authorities Protection Act applies, by the general repeal contained in that section of "so much of any public general Act as enacts that, in any proceeding to which that Act applies, the proceeding is to be commenced in any particular place." (See "Public Authorities," post, p. 947.) Practically, therefore, local venues may be considered as having been abolished, for the only cases (if any) in which they can still exist, as obligatory, are cases where they have been prescribed by some local and personal Act passed subsequently to the coming into operation of the Judicature Acts, or cases of actions not falling within the provisions of s. 1 of the Act of 1893, as to which a local venue has been prescribed by some unrepealed enactment contained in a public general Act passed subsequently to the Judicature Acts. (See Buckley v. Hull Docks Co., supra, and "Public Authorities," post, p. 946.) Such cases, if any, must be very rare, but, if they arise, the practice with regard to them appears to be as follows:-If the statement of claim in an action for which a local venue is prescribed by statute names as the place of trial a locality other than the county or place fixed as the venue by the statute (or, it would seem, if the statement of claim names no place of trial, and the statute fixes the venue elsewhere than in Middlesex, see 0. XX. r. 5; 0. XXXVI. r. 1), the defendant may apply for an order amending the statement of claim in that respect, and changing the venue

accordingly, or, it would seem, he may take the objection at the trial, where such objection is covered by his defence.

Formerly, where the defendant was entitled to plead Not Guilty by Statute, he could, in general, take the objection as to venue under that plea (Richards v. Easto, 15 M. & W. 244); and it seems that this may still be done in such cases under the present rules (see O. XIX. r. 12, cited "Not Guilty by Statute," post, p. 931).

In cases where the defendant is not entitled to plead Not Guilty by Statute, or where, though entitled to plead that defence, he prefers to plead specifically the facts on which he relies, he should, if he wishes to raise an objection as to the venue being local by statute, expressly plead the facts which are material as to the venue, unless they appear on the face of the statement of claim. (See Bryson v. Russell, 14 Q. B. D. 720; 54 L. J. Q. B. 144; and, under the former system, Acland v. Buller, 1 Ex. 837.) If the objection appears on the face of the statement of claim, it seems that the defendant may plead it as an objection in point of law. (See Buckley v. Hull Docks Co., supra; and "Proceedings in lieu of Demurrer," ante, p. 598.)

It seems that statutes as to local venues do not exclude the discretion of the Court or a judge (or master) to order the trial to take place in some other locality if the justice of the case requires such order to be made. (See O. XXXVI. r. 1; Itchin Bridge Co. v. Local Board of Southampton, 27 L. J. Q. B. 128; Buckley v. Hull Docks Co., supra.)

Change of Venue.]-Under O. XXXVI. r. 1, and O. XX. r. 5 (above cited), the plaintiff, except in cases where the venue is made local by some statute (vide supra), has the power of laying the venue where he pleases in the first instance (Plum v. Normanton, W. N. 1876, p. 105; Shroder v. Myers, 34 W. R. 261; Benyon v. Lamb, 6 Times Rep. 146), subject to a possible risk, if it should ultimately appear at the trial that his selection was an abuse of the privilege granted by the above rule, of being mulcted in costs under O. LXV. r. 1 (Willey v. G. N. Ry. Co., (1891) 2 Q. B. 194; 60 L. J. Q. B. 441), and subject to the power of the defendant at any time before trial to apply by summons at chambers to change the venue to a more suitable or convenient place. (Ib.)

If the plaintiff, after delivering a statement of claim, wishes to change the venue, he must obtain an order for that purpose; he cannot himself change the original venue by delivering an amended statement of claim under O. XXVIII. r. 2. (Locke v. White, 33 Ch. D. 308; 55 L. J. Ch. 731.)

It was formerly a sufficient prima facie ground for an application by the defendant to change the venue in a transitory action, that the cause of action arose in a different county or division of a county from that in which the venue was laid (see Bullen & Leake, 3rd ed., p. 3); but now that circumstance alone, and apart from considerations of convenience, or expense, or local prejudice, &c., would not be sufficient ground for an application to change the place of trial named by the plaintiff (Durie v. Hopwood, 7 C. B. N. S. 835; Church v. Barnett, L. R. 6 C. P. 116; Shroder v. Myers, supra).

Upon the hearing of a summons to change the venue the trial will be directed to be held at whatever place appears upon the facts to be the most proper and convenient place. (See Green v. Bennett, 54 L. J. Ch. 85; 32 W. R. 848; Old Mill Co. v. Duckingfield Local Board, 54 L. J. Ch. 160; Lotinga v. Commercial Union Ass. Co., 1 Times Rep. 277; Admiralty Commissioners v. McGregor, ib. 679; Power v. Moore, 3 Times Rep. 586; Benyon v. Lamb, supra; Jackson v. Braithwaite, 63 L. T. 231.)

It seems clear that, even where the venue is made local by statute, the Court or a judge or a master has a discretion to order the action to be tried in another county or place than that in which the cause of action arose, if the justice of the case requires it.

If the statement of claim, in a case where the venue is made local by statute, names as the place of trial a locality other than the county or place fixed as the venue by the statute (or, it would seem, if the statement of claim names no place of trial, and the statute fixes the venue elsewhere than in Middlesex (see O. XX. r. 5; 0. XXXVI. r. 1)), the defendant may apply for an order amending the statement of claim in that respect, and changing the venue accordingly, or, he may perhaps take the objection at the trial, where he has given notice by his pleading of his intention to do so.

Formerly, in such cases as above mentioned, if the defendant was entitled to plead Not Guilty by Statute (see "Not Guilty by Statute," post, p. 930), he could in general take the objection as to venue under that plea (Richards v. Easto, 15 M. & W. 244); but, in order to avoid any question as to whether the old practice would now be followed in this respect, it would seem prudent that in any defence raising this objection, more specific notice of such objection should be given, and, where the objection does not appear from the statements in the statement of claim, that the facts as to venue should be expressly pleaded (see Bryson v. Russell, 14 Q. B. D. 720; 54 L. J. Q. B. 144).

It would seem, however, that the better mode of taking the objection is, in general, by summons at chambers.

As to the former practice in such cases, see Bullen & Leake, 3rd ed., p. 2; and for an instance of a former special plea as to venue, see Acland v. Buller, 1 Ex. 837.

As to the venue in actions by the Attorney-General on behalf of the Crown, see the Crown Suits Act, 1865 (28 & 29 Vict. c. 104), s. 46. (Dixon v. Furber, 17 Q. B. D. 658; 18 lb. 43.)

Time for delivery of statement of claim.]-The plaintiff, unless he has indorsed the writ with a notice that he intends, if the defendant appears, to go to trial without pleadings under O. XVIIIA., cited ante, p. 4, may deliver a statement of claim either with the writ or at any time afterwards, whether the defendant has appeared or not; and he may do so even if the defendant has appeared and has not required the delivery of a statement of claim; but a statement of claim cannot in any case be delivered more than six weeks after an appearance has been entered, unless otherwise ordered. (0. XX. r. 1 (d), cited ante, p. 44; and see Delivery of Pleadings," ante, p. 14.)

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Where no statement of claim has been delivered, and the defendant gives notice requiring the delivery of a statement of claim, the plaintiff must, unless otherwise ordered, deliver it within five weeks from the time of his receiving such notice (O. XX. r. 1 (c)), except in cases where the trial is to proceed without pleadings under O. XVIIIA., cited ante, p. 4.

It seems that in an action where there are several defendants who appear at different times, or who give such notice as above mentioned at different times, the time for delivery of statement of claim runs, in the case of each defendant, from the date of his entering an appearance or giving such notice, irrespectively of the dates of appearance being entered or of such notice being given by the others.

As to obtaining further time, if required, for delivering a statement of claim, see "Time for delivering Pleadings," ante, p. 17, where see also as to the computation of time, and as to Sundays, Long Vacation, &c.

Statement of Claim by a Plaintiff who has been described in the Writ by a wrong Name (b).

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C. D.

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Defendant.

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A plaintiff cannot deliver a statement of claim during a stay of proceedings obtained by the defendant. (See 1 Chitty's Pract., 14th ed., p. 289; "Pleading in General," ante, p. 19.)

By O. XXVII. r. 1, "If the plaintiff, being bound to deliver a statement of claim, does not deliver the same within the time allowed for that purpose, the defendant may, at the expiration of that time, apply to the Court or a judge to dismiss the action with costs for want of prosecution; and on the hearing of such application the Court or judge may, if no statement of claim shall have been delivered, order the action to be dismissed accordingly, or may make such other order on such terms as the Court or judge shall think just."

It seems that a statement of claim delivered after time, while the action is still pending, though irregular, is not a nullity. (See O'Connell v. O'Connell, L. R. 6 Ir. 470; and see " Time for delivering Defence," post, p. 553.)

As to the time for delivering an amended statement of claim, see O. XXVIII. rr. 2, 10; "Amendment of Pleadings," ante, p. 17.

As to the time for delivering a statement of claim after an order for security for costs has been obtained and served, see O. LXIV. r. 6, cited "Time for delivering Pleadings," ante, p. 18.

(b) See "Misnomer,” ante, p. 47.

Form of an Amended Statement of Claim (c).

In the High Court of Justice,

18. B. No.

Queen's Bench Division.

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Delivered the

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day

L. M.

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Statement of Claim by a Surviving Joint Contractee, the other having died before the Commencement of the Action (d).

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of

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The like, by a surviving Plaintiff, the other having died after Writ

issued (d).

Between A. B.

and

E. F.

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

The writ of summons herein was sued out by the above

(c) See "Amendment of Pleadings," ante, p. 14.

(d) See "Change of Parties," ante, p. 30, and "Number of the Parties," ante, p. 47.

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