attachment to truth; and an entire command, acquired by the unwearied exertions of a long life, over all his passions. --STEWART, DUGALD, 1803, Account of the Life and Writings of Thomas Reid.

Dr. Reid's great achievement was, undoubtedly, the subversion of the Ideal system, or the confutation of that hypothesis which represents the immediate objects of the mind in perception as certain images or pictures of external objects conveyed by the senses to the sensorium. This part of his task, it is now generally admitted that he has performed with exemplary diligence and complete success; but we are by no means so entirely satisfied with the uses he has attempted to make of his victory.―JEFFREY, FRANCIS LORD, 1804, Stewart's Life of Dr. Reid, Edinburgh Review, vol. 3, p. 281.

A sincere inquirer after Truth, who maintained indeed the existence of certain principles of knowledge, independent of experience, but considered philosophy as the science of the human mind, which must be founded on the principles of Common Sense, regarding the latter as species of Intellectual Instinct. TENNEMANN, WILLIAM GOTTLIEB, 1812-52, A Manual of the History of Philosophy, tr. Johnson,

ed. Morell.

You can read in the translation of one

of the best pupils of the Normal School, now my colleague in this faculty, the judicious Reid, with the truly superior commentary of M. Royer-Collard. The Scotch philosophy will prepare you for the German philosophy. It is to Reid and to Kant that I refer in great part the polemics which I have instituted against empiricism in the person of Locke.-COUSIN, VICTOR, 1828-52, History of Modern Philosophy, tr. Wight.

A patient, modest, and deep thinker, who in his first work ("Enquiry into the Human Mind") deserves a commendation more descriptive of a philosopher than that bestowed by Professor Cousin, of having made a vigorous protest against scepticism on behalf of common sense. His observations on suggestion, on natural signs, on the connection between what he calls sensation and conception, though perhaps occasioned by Berkeley, whose idealism Reid had once adopted, are marked by the genuine spirit of original

observation. MACKINTOSH, SIR JAMES, 1830, Second Preliminary Dissertation, Encyclopædia Britannica.

Reid, who carried into the recesses of the human mind the torch of reason. ALISON, SIR ARCHIBALD, 1833-42, History of Europe During The French Revolution, vol. XIV, p. 3.

Dr. Reid has many merits as a speculator, but the only merit which he arrogates to himself, the principal merit accorded. to him by others, -is, that he was the first philosopher, in more recent times, who dared, in his doctrine of immediate perception, to vindicate, against the unanimous authority of philosophers, the universal conviction of mankind. But this doctrine he has at best imperfectly developed, and, at the same time, has unfortunately obscured it, by errors of so singular a character, that some acute philosophers for Dr. Brown does not stand alone-have never even suspected what his doctrine of perception actually is.

But if all he did was merely to explode the cruder hypothesis of representation, and to adopt in its place the finer, -why, in the first place, so far from depriving idealism and scepticism of all basis, he only placed them on one firmer and more secure; and, in the second, so far from originating a new opinion, he could only have added one to a class of philosophers, who, after the time of Arnauld, were continually on the increase, and who, among the contemporaries of Reid himself, certainly constituted the majority. His philosophy would thus be at once only a silly blunder; its pretence to originality only in proclamation of ignorance; and, so far from being an honour to the nation from which it arose, and by whom it was respected, it would, in fact, be a scandal and a reproach to the philosophy of any country in which it met with any milder treatment than derision. . . . I then detailed to you the grounds on which it ought to be held that Reid's doctrine of Perception is one of Natural Realism, and not a form of CosmotheticIdealism, as supposed by Brown.

Having concluded the argument by which I endeavoured to satisfy you that Reid's doctrine is Natural Realism, I should now proceed to show that Natural Realism is a more philosophical doctrine than Hypothetical Realism. -HAMILTON, SIR

WILLIAM, 1836-56, Lectures on Metaphysics, Lectures, xiii, xxiv.

It may be here remarked that what Malebranche has properly called the judgment of the mind as to the cause of its sensations, is precisely what Reid denominates perception; a term less clear, and which seems to have led some of his school into important errors. The language of the Scottish philosopher appears to imply that he considered perception as a distinct and original faculty of the mind, rather than what it is, a complex operation of the judgment and memory, applying knowledge already acquired by experi

ence.

Neither he nor his disciple Stewart, though aware of the mistakes that have arisen in this province of metaphysics by selecting our instances from the phenomena of vision instead of the other senses, have avoided the same source of error. -HALLAM, HENRY, 1837-39, Introduction to the Literature of Europe, pt. iv, ch. iii, par. 43.

Reid's philosophy made a great stir at first, but has for some years past been sinking into merited neglect. The appeal to Common Sense as arbiter in Philosophy, is now pretty well understood to be on a par with Dr. Johnson's kicking a stone as a refutation of Berkeley. -LEWES, GEORGE HENRY, 1845-46, Biographical History of Philosophy, p. 619.

The great aim of Reid's philosophy, then, was to investigate the true theory of perception; to controvert the representationalist hypothesis, as held in one sense or another by almost all preceding philosophers; and to stay the progress which scepticism, aided by this hypothesis, was so rapidly making. .

That

Reid has done much for the advancement of mental science, is almost universally admitted to complain that he did not accomplish more, or follow out the track which he opened to its furthest results, is perhaps unreasonable; since we ought rather to look for the completion of his labours from the hands of his followers, than demand from himself at once the foundation and the superstructure. MORELL, J. D., 1846-7, An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century.

The merits of Dr. Reid, then, as a reformer of philosophy, amount in our opinion to this he was among the first to say

and to write that the representative theory of perception was false and erroneous, and was the fountain head of scepticism and idealism. But this admission of his merits must be accompanied by the qualification that he adopted, as the basis of his philosophy, a principle which rendered nugatory all his protestations. It is of no use to disclaim a conclusion if we accept the premises which inevitably lead to it. Dr. Reid disclaimed the representative theory, but he embraced its premises, and thus he virtually ratified the conclusions of the very system which he clamorously denounced. In his language he is opposed to representationism, but in his doctrine he lends it the strongest support by accept ing as the foundation of his philosophy an analysis of the perception of matter.FERRIER, JAMES FREDERICK, 1847-66, Reid and the Philosophy of Common Sense, Lectures, vol. II, p. 417.

The positive doctrines of Reid's own system could not be understood without much explanation; and his own exposition of them is very imperfect. Indeed the constant occurrence of polemical matter, and the repetitions which his Essays derived from their original shape of Lectures, are the circumstances that chiefly injure the literary value of the work. He is a bald and dry, but very clear and logical writer; and never was there a more sincere lover of truth, or a more candid and honourable disputant. His slow and patient thinking, notwithstanding a strong aversion to close analysis, led him to some very striking results, out of which his whole scheme is developed. The originality of these is much greater than his own manner of expounding them would lead us to suppose; and their importance in the history of philosophy may be estimated from this fact, that Reid's metaphysical creed does really coincide with the first and most characteristic step in that of his German contemporary Kant. SPALDING, WILLIAM, 1852-82, A History of English Literature, p. 352.

Since the first edition of this work, Sir W. Hamilton has published an edition of Reid, illustrated and enriched by notes. and dissertations of incomparable erudition and acuteness. Respecting the interpretation Sir William gives to Reid's doctrines, I will only say that he has shown what a subtle mind can read into the

philosophy of common sense; but he has not in the least produced the conviction in me of Reid's having meant what the illustrious successor supposed him to have meant. At the same time, I will add that, the limits of my work having restricted me to the consideration of Reid's contributions to Philosophy, (in the narrow sense of the term), I have not done justice to his many excellent qualities as a teacher. His works are well worthy of diligent study, and their spirit is eminently scientific.-LEWES, GEORGE HENRY, 1857, Biographical History of Philosophy, p. 629,

note.

Reid is a bold, dry, but very clear and logical writer, a sincere lover of truth, and a candid and honorable disputant; his system is original and important in the history of philosophy.-BOTTA, ANNE C. LYNCH, 1860, Hand-Book of Universal Literature, p. 510.

Was the most eminent among the purely speculative thinkers of Scotland, after Hume and Adam Smith, though in point of merit, he must be placed far below them. For, he had neither the comprehensiveness of Smith, nor the fearlessness of Hume. The range of his knowledge was not wide enough to allow him to be comprehensive; while a timidity, almost amounting to moral cowardice, made him recoil from the views advocated by Hume, not so much on account of their being false, as on account of their being dangerous. With Reid, the main question always is, not whether an inference is true, but what will happen if it is true. He says, that a doctrine is to be judged by its fruits; forgetting that the same doctrine will bear different fruits in different ages, and that the consequences which a theory produces in one state of society, are often diametrically opposed to those which it produces in another. He thus made his own age the standard of all future ones. He also trammelled philosophy with practical considerations; diverting thinkers from the pursuit of truth, which is their proper department, into the pursuit of expediency, which is not their department at all. Reid was constantly stopping to inquire, not whether theories were accurate, but whether it was advisable to adopt them; whether they were favourable to patriotism, or to generosity, or to friendship; in a word, whether they were

comfortable, and such as we should at present like to believe. Or else, he would take other ground, still lower, and still more unworthy of a philosopher.BUCKLE, HENRY THOMAS, 1862-66, History of Civilization in England, vol. III, ch. v.

The mere fact of his originating a school of philosophy, even though we allow that his conclusions were supported by popular feeling, argues a large measure of intellectual force, in one direction or another; but very different opinions have been expressed as to his capacities for mental analysis. Various particulars in his style and his favourite studies indicate a tendency to dwell by preference upon the concrete. He had no great turn for style; his composition deserves the praise of "ease, perspicuity, and purity;" it is, besides, neat and finished, and often moves with considerable spirit: but it has neither the incisive vigour of Campbell, the copiousness of Smith, nor the original freshness of Tucker.-MINTO, WILLIAM, 1872-80, Manual of English Prose Literature, p. 471.

If he was not the founder, he is the fit representative of the Scottish philosophy. He is in every respect, a Scotchman of the genuine type: shrewd, cautious, outwardly calm, and yet with a deep well of feeling within, and capable of enthusiasm; not witty, but with a quiet vein of humour. And then he has the truly philosophic spirit seeking truth modestly, humbly, diligently; piercing beneath the surface to gaze on the true nature of things; and not to be caught by sophistry, or mislead by plausible representations. He has not the mathematical consecutiveness of Descartes, the speculative genius of Leibnitz, the sagacity of Locke, the spirituel of Berkeley, or the detective skill of Hume; but he has a quality quite as valuable as any of these, even in philosophy he has in perfection that common-sense which he so commends, and this saves him from the extreme positions into which these great men have been tempted by the soaring nature of their inexorable logic.--McCOSH, JAMES, 1874, The Scottish Philosophy, p. 192.

Reid's appeal to the common-sense of men, was taken without sufficient analysis, and hence bears a dogmatic character. He has left it uncertain, whether he regarded sensation itself as a direct contract