award, if that other fail to do what the award requires him (h). PART II. CH. VIII. 8. 4. Award on stranger's property void. III. Directions affecting a stranger's property.]—As the submission only refers to the arbitrator questions between the parties, the moment he touches the interests of strangers, he exceeds his authority (i). A direction, however, to pay money at the house of a Award to pay at stranger's stranger is good; for the party ordered to pay can come to house. the house without entering it, and a payment as near to the house as can be is, it seems, sufficient, and so the party can obey the award without being guilty of a trespass (k). But if the payment is to be on the land of a stranger, or at the house, and the owner of the house has the adjacent land, so that the party cannot go there without committing a trespass, the direction is void (1). In an old case, where money was awarded to be paid in the bishop's palace, it was held a good award, for it was said a licence would be intended, especially as in the particular case the bishop himself made the award (m). payment out Where the arbitrator ordered some bankers, parties to the Directing reference, to pay to the other party, the defendant, out of of stranger's funds in their hands belonging to a firm of which the funds. defendant was a member, a certain sum, stated to be the amount of a debt due to the defendant from his partners, these latter not being parties to the submission, the direction was held invalid (n). Under the power to say what should be done, an arbitrator must be cautious in directing a party to do anything to property in which strangers are interested. Where the award, under a clause empowering the arbi- Directing trator to direct what should be done, ordered a party to put be done on something to up a stile and footbridge on land which appeared by the stranger's affidavits to belong to a stranger, the court set the award (h) Shelf v. Baily, 1 Com. Rep. 183; Bacon v. Dubarry, 1 Ld. Raym. 246; Cayhill v. Fitzgerald, 1 Wils. 28, 58; Adams v. Statham, 2 Lev. 235; Browne v. Meverell, Dyer, 216 b. (i) Turner v. Swainson, 1 M. & W. 572. (k) Lynsey v. Aston, Rolle Ab. Arb. E. 2, p. 247, S. C. 2 Bulst. (1) Taverner v. Skingley, Rolle (m) Horton v. Benson, Freem. 204. (n) Ingram v. Milnes, 8 East, 444. land. R. G G PART II. CH. VIII. S. 4. Good if conditional on aside so far as regarded that provision; although it was sworn that no doubt the owner of the land would have granted permission to enter it for that purpose, and it did not appear that any attempt had been made to obtain his permission; they added, however, that the award would have consent had. been sufficient if the terms had been conditional, namely, to do the acts required, provided the owners and occupiers of the land should consent (o). And it seems the award need not be conditional, if it can be gathered from the agreement of reference that there was an undertaking on the part of the party ordered to do the act on the stranger's land to procure the consent of the owner and occupier of the land (p). Directing repairs. Directing tenant to commit waste. Ordering a person to repair a river bank not his own property, nor a place to which he has a right to go for the purpose of executing repairs, is an invalid direction (9). When a reversioner complains of an injury to his house, though the arbitrator under the clause in question cannot order the parties to do anything to the house without, it seems, being liable himself to an action of trespass if his orders be obeyed, when the tenant of the injured premises is no party to the reference, yet he may (and if the submission be compulsory, it seems, he should) direct the defendant to do some act to remove the grievance, conditionally if the consent of the tenant can be obtained, or at all events at the end of the term, or he may order some compensation to the plaintiff in respect of the continuance of the injury (r). Under a like power, where the arbitrator ordered the defendants, who were lessees of a water-mill, to make a tumbling bay on the land in their tenancy for the discharge of the water injuring the plaintiff's land, the court held that if the defendant had been seised in fee of the land the direction in the award would have been perfectly good, but that the power given to the arbitrator to determine what he should think fit to be done must be confined to reasonable acts, and that as the making a tumbling bay on the land held by them as tenants would render them liable to be sued (0) Turner v. Swainson, 1 M. & W. 572. (p) Nicholls v. Jones, 6 Ex. 373. (2) Lewis v. Rossiter, 44 L. J. Ex. 136. (r) Angus v. Redford, 2 Dowl. N. S. 735, S. C. 11 M. & W. 69. by their landlord for waste, the award was void as to that direction, but good as to the rest (s). PART II. CH. VIII. S. 4. stranger property. Though to direct a party to meddle with property, with Party and which he has no right to interfere, is an excess of authority, jointly yet where an award ordered the defendant to remove from a interested in river certain hatches, two of which were the defendant's own property, while in the third he had only a share, and also further provided that the directions in the award should refer only to such interest as the defendant should have in the hatches, the court enforced the award by attachment, saying, that though the direction as to the hatch in which the defendant had only a share might be nugatory, the award as to the hatches of which the defendant was sole owner was to be obeyed (†). the award Whenever an arbitrator embodies in his award a direction Showing in as to anything to be done by a stranger to the submission, direction as or affecting the property of a stranger, which primâ facie to stranger justified. would appear to be exceeding his authority, he is recommended to state on the face of the award sufficient facts to enable the court to see that he is justified in giving such directions. Where an arbitrator awarded that the defendants had no title to a certain roadway, but that they should have and enjoy another road which ran in a different direction (not saying over whose lands), the court held the award bad, as it did not appear by the award that the defendants had any legal title to the road granted them, the award not stating that the ground of the road belonged to either of the parties (u). (8) Alder v. Savill, 5 Taunt. 453. (t) Doddington v. Bailward, 7 Dowl. 640. (u) Harris v. Curnow, 2 Chitt. See Turner v. Swainson, 1 452 PART II. Awarding Lands Clauses Act. CHAPTER IX. THE AWARD UNDER THE LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT, 1845. In this chapter, the provisions of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 (a), respecting awards under that act, and the substance of the various decisions on that point, have been endeavoured to be collected. To what matters the reference should be limited, and how the arbitrator should be appointed, has been previously discussed (b). (1.) PROCEEDINGS AND AWARD UNDER THE LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT. References within the provisions of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, to settle the amount of compensation to be paid to parties for lands taken under the authority of parliament for the purpose of a public undertaking, arise Notice to treat out of a notice to treat by the promoters. This notice binds by promoters. the promoters like an agreement to purchase, and binds the landowner also. Each must abstain from altering his position. Any interest subsequent to service of the notice to treat acquired by or from the person on whom the notice to treat has been served is not a subject for compensation. Requisition under Artisans, &c. Dwellings Service. The publication of the requisition under s. 6 of the schedule to the Artisans, &c. Dwellings Improvement Act, 1875 (c), specifying lands wanted for the improvement, is equivalent to a notice to treat under the Lands Clauses Act (d), which is substantially incorporated. The service of the notice must be in the manner which the Lands Clauses Act directs (s. 18). Service on an agent appears to be insufficient to bind the principal or to found a valid arbitration (e). (a) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18. See Appendix of Statutes. (b) See P. I. ch. 3, s. 7, d. 5, p. 95. (c) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 36. Repealed by The Housing of the Working Classes Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict. c. 73. (d) Wilkins v. Mayor of Birmingham, 25 Ch. D. 78. (e) Shepherd v. Norwich Corporation, 30 Ch. D. 553, PART II. CH. IX. The party whose lands will be taken or injuriously affected by the erection of the works, is expressly required in his notice to the promoters, signifying his desire for arbitration, Claim for compensation to state the nature of the interest in respect of which he claims must state compensation, and the amount of compensation so claimed nature of [ss. 23, 68]. That notice should contain the particulars of his estate and interest in the premises, and give such reasonable information as will enable the promoters to decide what sum they will offer in respect of his interest, or else it will be invalid (f). The costs of the arbitration depend on whether the arbitrators award a greater amount than that offered by the promoters [s. 34]. interest. beyond claim. The question which the arbitrators are appointed to decide Arbitrators [s. 25], is not the amount of compensation generally, but the cannot go amount of compensation in respect of the interest stated in the claim. Giving compensation in respect of a different interest from that claimed, is awarding in respect of a matter not submitted, and consequently an excess of authority (g). tion. The court will not grant an injunction to stay proceedings No injunc by a party claiming compensation by arbitration in the name of a person who had given no authority to use it for the award would be a nullity, and could hurt no one (h). not to try The arbitrators are not to decide any question of title (i). Arbitrators The statute intends the award to be final and conclusive on title. the matters on which the arbitrators have to decide, namely, the amount of compensation; and it is clear that the promoters are not bound by the arbitrators' awarding in respect of a claim to make any compensation to the party, if he have no real title (). For if, on tender of the purchase-money or Party failing compensation awarded, the party "neglect or fail to make to make title deposit of out a title to such lands, or to the interest therein claimed by compensation him, to the satisfaction of the promoters of the undertaking," (f) Healey v. Thames Valley Rail. Co., 34 L. J. Q. B. 52. (g) Rhys v. Dare Valley Rail. Co., 37 L. J. Ch. 719, S. C. L. R. 6 Eq. 429. See Bradshaw's Arbitration, 12 Q. B. 562. (h) London & Blackwall Rail. Co. v. Cross, 31 Ch. D. 354; Farrar (i) Brandon v. London, Chat- (k) Wilkins v. Mayor of Birmingham, 25 Ch. D. 78. in the bank. |