PART I. CH. III. 8. 2. Requires agreement stamp. Effect of acknowledg ment to bar Notwithstanding the schedule, it will be prudent, until it has been decided that the word "arbitrators" in the schedule applies to a single arbitrator, on a reference to a single arbitrator, still to include in the submission clauses giving him all necessary powers. These submissions require in general an ordinary agreement stamp. No stamp used to be necessary if the reference was concerning a matter under the value of 207. (r). Now, however, a stamp of 6d. is imposed on an agreement not otherwise charged, except where the matter is not of the value of 5l. (s). One stamp only is necessary, although there are many parties to the submission having separate legal interests, provided they have a sufficient community of interest in the subjectmatter of the reference; as in the case of a submission between the party who has insured a ship, and the underwriters on the policy (t). Where there was a written agreement that a disputed boundary was to be set out by "an indifferent surveyor residing at a distance," and on the same sheet of paper was added a memorandum of a later date, appointing a particular surveyor, residing in the neighbourhood, to set out the boundary, the two memorandums were held to be only one agreement, and to require only one stamp (u). An agreement, indorsed on an arbitration deed, or bond, enlarging the time, or changing the arbitrator, is a new submission in writing, incorporating into itself all the terms of the original submission (v), and requires an agreement stamp (x). An agreement of reference containing an acknowledgment of the existence of some debt, but providing that the arbithe Statute of trators are to fix the time of payment, is not such an acknowledgment as to support a promise to pay on request, and so to take the case out of the Statute of Limitations (y). Limitations. Submission by bond. III. Submission by bond.]-A submission by bond is a very ordinary mode of effecting a reference. (r) Lloyd v. Mansel, 19 L. J. (8) Stat. 33 & 34 Vict. c. 97. (u) Taylor v. Parry, 1 M. & G. 604. (v) Greig v. Talbot, 2 B. & C. 179; Tunno & Bird, In re, 5 B. & Ad. 488; Evans v. Thomson, 5 East, 189. (x) Stephens v. Lowe, 9 Bing. 32, S. C. 2 M. & Sc. 44. (y) Hales v. Stevenson, Q. B. 11 Nov. 1862, 1 N. R. 23. PART I. CH. III. S. 2. Damages not limited by the Each party usually executes a bond to the other in a certain penalty, subject to the condition of his abiding by and performing the award of the person named as arbitrator. The penalty in the bond does not limit the amount the arbitrator penalty in the may award, although, if he exceed that limit, no larger sum than the penalty can be recovered by action on the bond (≈). bond. bonds. The submission of the parties is contained in the conditions Alteration of submission by of the mutual bonds, for they together make up but one agree- bond. ment of reference. The terms of the condition may be altered. by an instrument under seal, without affecting the bond (a). Where there is a dispute between A. of the first part, and B. Separate and C. of the second, a submission to reference may be effected by a bond given by A. to B. and C. jointly, and by separate bonds given by B. and C. respectively to A., conditioned to perform the award; for the three bonds together will constitute but one submission (b). Two bonds, however, will be a valid, Two bonds, though unskilful, method of settling by arbitration the affairs many parties. of a partnership of several persons. Thus, a joint and several bond of A., B., and C., three of six partners, to D., E., and F., the other three, and a like bond of D., E., and F., to A., B., and C., both conditioned to abide an award respecting all accounts and matters in difference between the six, or any of them, will authorise an award directing, among other things, A. to pay a sum to B., and B. may maintain an action of debt on the award against A., but not an action against him on the bond, for A. is not bound to him by that instrument; it seems also that D., E., and F., to whom A. is bound, might sue him on the bond for his disobedience of the award in neglecting to pay the sum of money to B. (c). Instead of binding themselves by a penalty to each other, the litigant parties may join in a bond to the arbitrator, conditioned to perform his award. Such a bond Bond to the was held good, although it was suggested that the arbitrator might make an unreasonable award in order to entitle himself to the penalty (d). arbitrator. An arbitration bond must be stamped with a bond stamp, Stamp on and it does not require an agreement stamp also, because, in submission by bond. PART I. CH. III. S. 2. Sufficient under the Statute of Frauds as to lands. Submission by deed valid. One party only executing under seal. Submissions orders of court unless contrary intention expressed. No jurisdic tion of the courts by addition to the usual clauses, it contains a stipulation respecting the manner in which the costs are to be paid. Such a stipulation is not to be considered as a substantive agreement (e). A submission by bond, referring to an arbitrator to settle the price per acre the purchaser is to pay for an estate, seems to be a sufficient agreement in writing, respecting the sale of lands, to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, and, when the award is made, to enable the Court of Chancery to enforce a specific performance (ƒ). IV. Submission by deed.]—A mode of referring not unfrequently adopted is by indenture, containing mutual covenants to stand to the award (g). Such a submission cannot be altered by parol, or written agreement, even when indorsed upon it (h). It seems to be no objection to the validity of the submission, that one party is bound by deed and the other by agreement not under seal: as, for instance, on a reference between a private individual and a corporation, which the former signs, but to which the seal of the latter is affixed (i)、 v. Disadvantage of submissions which cannot be made orders of court.]-If the parties wish the reference to be one over which the courts of law shall have no cognizance, they must, when the submission is in writing, express their intention that it shall not be made or deemed to be a rule of court by apt words in the submission (k). But the case must be peculiar to render such a course advisable, for its disadvantages are many. A submission of matters in difference when there is no cause in court does not, by common law, give the court any common law. jurisdiction, either over the submission itself, or over the proceedings before the arbitrator, or over the award. Submission revocable. Either party may, if the submission be by parol, or is not to have the effect of an order of court, at any time before the (e) Wansborough v. Dyer, In (f) Cooth v. Jackson, 6 Ves. 11. C. P. 225; Bac. Ab. Arb. B. (h) Morphett, In re, 2 D. & L. 967. (i) Tomlin v. Mayor (Fordwich), 6 N. & M. 594. (k) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 49, s. 1. award is made, revoke the authority of the arbitrator(7), and render all that has been done in the reference ineffectual, though by so doing he makes himself liable to an action. PART I. CH. III. S. 2. No setting aside im proper The awards made on such submissions could not have been set aside by a court of law, however gross the misconduct or corruption of the arbitrator (m). The only remedy was by awards. bill in equity (n); and it is doubtful whether sect. 11 (2) of the Arbitration Act, 1889, enables the court to interfere. enforcement Nor could the awards, when valid, be enforced by attach- No summary ment or other summary process of the court. The benefit of award. of them could only be obtained, as on a contract, by action, Action and or sometimes, when the nature of the award admitted, by suit only proceedings for specific performance (o). Sect. 12 of the Arbitration Act, 1889, does not seem to apply to these awards. means. SECTION III. OF SUBMISSIONS BY CONSENT WHICH HAVE THE EFFECT OF PART I. CH. III. S. 3. 1. Effect of the Arbitration Act, 1889.]-The Arbitration Act, 1889, sect. 27, defines a submission as follows:-"In this act, unless the contrary intention appears, submission Submission. means a written agreement to submit present or future differences to arbitration, whether an arbitrator is named therein or not." Sect. 1 of the same act is in these words: "A submission, Effect of. unless a contrary intention is expressed therein, shall be irrevocable, except by leave of the court or a judge, and shall have the same effect in all respects as if it had been made an order of court." statute of 9 & Before the statute, the 9th & 10th W. III. c. 15, entitled, Object of the "An Act for determining Differences by Arbitration," now 10 W. III. (1) See P. II. c. 3, s. 3, d. 1, Revocation at Common Law. (m) Veale v. Warner, 1 Saund. 327, c. note. (n) Greenhill v. Church, 3 Rep. in Chanc. 89, p. 49; 2 Vern. 100, pl. 95; Cavendish v. 1 Cas. (0) Blundell v. Brettargh, 17 Ves. 232; Bishop v. Bishop, 1 Rep. in Chanc. 75; Bendick v. Thatcher, Noy, 141; Vin. Ab. Arb. H. a. 1. PART I. CH. III. S. 3. Construction put upon the statute. repealed by the Arbitration Act, 1889, when persons were out of court, they could not, by any agreement, bring themselves into court, and create a jurisdiction to issue process of contempt (q). Experience had proved the beneficial effect of terminating by arbitration suits actually existing; and it was thought that it might be extremely desirable to afford the same opportunity also where only a cause of suit subsisted, but no suit had been instituted (). To effect, therefore, these two objects, first to give the parties the process of contempt for enforcing the award, and next, to make awards final unless complaint was made within a limited time (s), the statute of W. III. was passed (t). The statute was not very clearly worded, but the whole act taken together was construed to mean that, though there were no cause in court, if the submission contained an agreement for making the submission a rule of court, the party in whose favour the award was made might have his costs taxed by the master of the court (u), and might enforce the award by the process of the court of which the submission was made a rule, unless it appeared to that court that it ought to be set aside as unduly made, and in such case the same court would not merely refuse the aid of its process, but, if complaint were made within the time limited, would set the award aside (x). Many cases were decided on the effect of this repealed act of W. III., which it is now unnecessary to cite. A reference to them is, however, preserved in the notes (y). Ves. 530; Heming v. Swinnerton, 1 Coop. C. C. 386; Cooke v. Cooke, L. R. 4 Eq. 77; Lomax Arbitration, 42 L. T. N. S. 391; 2 Madd. Chanc. Practice, 840, 3rd ed.; Pownall v. King, 6 Ves. 10; Webster v. Bishop, 2 Vern. 444; Smith v. Symes, 5 Mad. 74; Joseph v. Webster, In re, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 496; Dawson v. Sadler, 1 S. & S. 537. As to time for proceedings, Davis v. Getty, 1 S. & S. 411; Auriol v. Smith, 1 Turn. & R. 121; Allardes v. Campbell, 1 Turn. & R. 133, n.; Pedley v. Goddard, 7 T. R. 73; Harvey v. Shelton, 7 Beav. 455. As to enforcing award, Webster v. Bishop, Prec. in Chanc. 223. |