to C. does not appear on the face of the award to be for A.'s benefit (0). PART III. CH. VII. S. 2. corporation Where the defendants, a railway company, had been served Attorney of with the writ in the action, and their attorney had entered not appointed an appearance for them, and had ultimately referred the under seal. action, it was held they could not show, as cause against a motion for a rule to pay the plaintiff the amount awarded, that the attorney had not been appointed under their corporate seal (p). absolute. On making the rule absolute, the court would impose such Making rule terms as seemed equitable, as that a plaintiff should undertake not to bring an action on the award, the defendant having previously entered into a bond with sureties to abide the event of such an action (q). award back. If the award were shown to be invalid on showing cause Referring against the rule for an attachment, the court would often refer the award back to the arbitrator for amendment (). As in case of an attachment, the rule would not be drawn Producing up without producing and depositing with the master the drawing up original award (8). award on rule. costs. Though, to warrant execution under the statute of 1 & 2 Rule as to Vict., the rule must state on its face the amount of the money which it directs to be paid, yet when a rule directs. costs to be paid, it need not specify their amount in order to receive the benefit of the act; for costs stand on a different footing from other sums payable, and execution, it seems, may issue on the rule as soon as the officer of the court has ascertained how much is due for them (t). These observations respecting costs do not apply to the case of costs payable under an award, and already taxed by the master, and demanded by the party before the motion for the rule; for their amount must be stated in the rule. sum awarded When the award ordered money to be paid on a specified Interest on day with interest to that day, the rule would be granted for not recoverthe payment of the amount and the interest up to the day, able. (0) Laing v. Todd, 13 C. B. 276. (p) Faviell v. Eastern Counties Rail. Co., 2 Ex. 344. (g) Mendell v. Tyrrell, 1 Dowl. N. S. 453, S. C. 9 M. & W. 217. (r) See P. II. ch. 10, s. 1, p. 481. (s) Davis v. Potter, 21 L. J. Q. B. 134. (t) Jones v. Williams, 8 M. & W. 349; Hodson v. Patterson, 4 M. & G. 333; Wright v. Burroughes, 2 D. & L. 94. PART III. CH. VII. S. 2. Scire facias unnecessary. Execution under Arbitration and Judi cature Acts. Summons. but not beyond; though, in an action on the award, a jury might have given further interest (u). Though a year and a day have elapsed since the making of a rule ordering the payment of money or costs, no scire facias or special application to the court is necessary to authorise the issuing of execution (). 11. Execution under the Arbitration and Judicature Acts.]· Whenever the submission is or has been, or has the effect of having been, made a rule of court, the performance of the award may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment by virtue of the Arbitration Act, 1889, ss. 12 and 16, and of the orders made under the Judicature Acts, viz., Order XLII., rules 7, 9, and 24 (1883). The same preliminary steps must probably be taken as when execution is sought to be obtained under the stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 18 (see p. 623). The application under the Judicature Acts to enforce an award, except under very special circumstances, had to be made to a judge at chambers on summons, and this summons should generally have been personally served. The judge, on being satisfied that the right to execution existed, would order execution to issue; or, where the award was for payment of money, would order the money to be paid; and then execution might issue on the judge's order. By rule 20 of the Central Office Practice Rules, settled by the Practice Masters (1880-1888), an application for leave to enforce an award under sect. 12 of the Arbitration Act, 1889, should be made by summons before a master in chambers. The applicant must produce before the master the original award (or a duplicate thereof) together with a copy, both to be verified by affidavit intituled "In the matter of an arbitration between A. B. and C. D." The verified copy of the award must be subsequently filed in the writ, &c. department (without fee) on issuing execution. On an application to enforce an award under the Judicature Acts it was held that a demand of payment by the solicitor's clerk was not sufficient unless he was authorised by (u) Doe d. Moody v. Squire, 2 Dowl. N. S. 327. (x) Spooner v. Payne, 12 Jur. 282. power of attorney. It was also held that a demand in writing of performance of the award was not necessary (y), though stated in Archbold's Practice to be required (≈). PART III. CH. VII. S. 2. III. Enforcing award under the Railway Companies Arbitra- Railway tion Act, 1859.]-By this act (the 22 & 23 Vict. c. 59), s. 26, Companies it is enacted, that "full effect shall be given by all the Act. superior courts of law and equity in the United Kingdom, according to their respective jurisdiction, and by the companies respectively, and otherwise, to all agreements, references, arbitrations, and awards, in accordance with this act: and the performance or observance thereof may, when the Distress courts think fit, be compelled by distress infinite on the property of the companies respectively, or by any other process against the companies respectively, or their respective property, that the courts, or any judge thereof, shall direct, and, where requisite, frame for that purpose.' Under the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 61), s. 24, and under the Allotments and Cottage Gardens Compensation for Crops Act, 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 26), s. 17, where any money awarded is not paid within. fourteen days, it is recoverable upon order made by the county court judge of the district, as money ordered to be paid under the court's ordinary jurisdiction is recoverable. (y) Salter v. Roberts, Q. B. D. 14th June, 1882, S. C. per Cave, J., at Chambers, 2nd June, 1882. (z) 13th ed., p. 1367; 14th ed., p. 1652. infinite. 632 CHAPTER VIII. PART III. CH. VIII. Contents of the eighth chapter. ENFORCING THE AWARD BY PROCEEDINGS IN THE It is often convenient for a party in whose favour the arbitrator has determined the cause referred to enforce the award by issuing execution in the cause for the money or costs. awarded, instead of applying for an attachment, or a rule under the statute of Victoria on the award itself; as these latter courses would frequently be more dilatory, and cannot be obtained without a personal demand of payment of the money due, a thing sometimes difficult to effect, and not necessary when proceeding in the cause. This chapter, therefore, is confined to investigating, in its separate sections, under what circumstances, and in what manner, a verdict may be entered, costs taxed, judgment signed, and execution issued in the cause, according to the effect of the award. SECTION I. PART III. CH. VIII. S. 1. Award in the cause as a verdict. ENTERING THE VERDICT PURSUANT TO THE AWARD. When a cause was referred at Nisi Prius before the Judicature Acts, and a verdict taken subject to the reference, the award of the arbitrator respecting the cause stood in the place of the finding of the jury, and was followed with similar consequences. The verdict might be entered, the costs might be taxed, judgment might be signed, and execution might be issued, for the amount found due in the cause, and for that portion of the costs of the cause to which, under the submission and award, the party was entitled (a). PART III. CH. VIII. S. 1. submission. In one instance the arbitrator was to make two awards, in Enforcing the first of which he was to state a case for the court, and payment by judgment assess contingent damages; in the second he was to dispose contrary to of the remaining matters, but payment under the first award was not to be enforced until the final award was made. The first award was made, the case stated and decided by the court, and damages found for the plaintiff on such decision. No second award was ever made, and the time had elapsed for making it. The court set aside the judgment entered by the plaintiff in the action subsequently to get his costs, on the ground that it was an enforcing payment contrary to the terms of the reference (b). Where no verdict was taken on the reference, and the arbitrator was not empowered to order a verdict to be entered, or, being empowered, had not thought fit to direct the entry of a verdict, judgment could not be signed either for the amount awarded or the costs (c). verdict how far available. The plaintiff could take no advantage from the pro formâ Pro formå verdict taken at Nisi Prius, except what the award gave him. Where, after directing a verdict to be entered for the plaintiff on the several issues, the arbitrator awarded to him a gross sum by way of damages in respect of the cause and of other matters in difference, the court held, that although the pro formâ verdict was not vacated, the plaintiff could not avail himself of it in any way, for there were no means of ascertaining how much of the damages was due in respect of the cause (d). It was also said there would be a difficulty about taxing the costs of the cause, as no distinct damages were given in the cause; but though they could not be taxed on the verdict, and enforced by execution, they might, it seems, be taxed on the rule of court founded on the order of reference, and be recovered by attachment, or by execution, under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110 (e). (a) Borrowdale v. Hitchener, 3 B. & P. 244; Lee v. Lingard, 1 East, 400; Cromer v. Churt, 15 M. & W. 310, S. C. 15 L. J. Ex. 263. (b) Wood v. The Copper Miners' Co., 24 L. J. C. P. 34. (c) Grundy v. Wilson, 7 Taunt. 699. (d) Taylor v. Shuttleworth, 6 Bing. N. C. 277; Tayler v. Marling, 2 M. & G. 55. (e) Ibid. |