tlement, if he have one, or, if not, then to the place of her maiden settlement. Therefore, where a man abandoned his wife, and she did not know that he had any place of settlement, the court held that, upon her becoming chargeable, she was properly removed to the place of her maiden settlement (?). So, where a man, who had no settlement, abandoned his wife, the court held, that upon her becoming chargeable, she was properly removed to the place of her maiden settlement (m). So, where a woman married a man who had no settlement, and he died: the court held that upon her becoming chargeable, she was properly removed to the place of her maiden settlement (n). As to the cases in which a woman shall be removed to the place of her maiden settlement, generally, see ante, p. 417. But if the husband have or had a settlement, she must be removed to that parish, and not to the place of her maiden settlement. Where a woman and her child were removed to Higher Watton, by an order that described them as "Mary the wife of Samuel Bennet, and her daughter," and Higher Watton was adjudged to be the place of their last legal settlement; and it was objected that it did not appear whether this was the woman's maiden settlement or her husband's: but the court said that they must presume it to be the husband's, for the husband's settlement (if he had any) was the place of the last legal settlement of his wife and daughter, as described in the order (o). Where the wife of a transported convict, being entitled with her three sisters to a house, under the marriage settlement of their deceased father, went to live in the house with one of her sisters: the court held that, whilst she chose to reside there, she could not be removed from it to the place of her husband's settlement (p).

Where however a wife is residing with her husband, and he has a settlement, she cannot be removed alone, so as to separate her from her husband, without the consent of both (g). Even where an order was made for the removal of Sarah Stafford, the wife of George Stafford, a prisoner in her Majesty's gaol in the city of Bristol, and their five children, from a parish in Bristol to Stogumber; and it appeared that the man was a prisoner for debt, and the gaol was in the same parish in which the house where he previously resided, and where his wife and family resided until their removal, was situate; it appeared also that he was imprisoned 100 days, and was then discharged, and came home to his wife and family, whom he

(1) R. v. Harberton, 13 East, 311. S. P. R. v. St. Botolph's, Bishopsgate, Burr. S. C. 367. See Stratford v. Norton, Burr. S. C. 122, cont. but not law.

(m) R. v. Cottingham, 7 B. & C. 615.

(n) St. Giles v. St. Margaret's, Fol. 251.

(0) R. v. Higher Watton, Burr. S. C. 162.

(p) R. v. Brington, 7 B. & C.

546.

(9) R. v. Leeds, 13 Law J. 107, m.

afterwards supported by his labour: the court held the order bad, as having the effect of separating husband and wife, and not stating any sufficient reason for doing so (b). Where a married woman and her child were removed from Nunney to Bath as the place of her husband's settlement, and it appeared by the order that the husband was alive, but it did not state where: the court said that they could not presume that they were living together at the time, and therefore confirmed the order; but they said that if he were residing at Nunney at the time, that fact, if it appeared, would vitiate the order (c). Where upon an appeal against an order for the removal of a man, his wife, and two children, the sessions confirmed the order as to the man, but quashed it as to the wife and children; it was objected that the order of sessions was bad, as it would have the effect of separating the wife and children from the husband, which was admitted; but it being suggested that the woman was not married to the man, and that this was the reason of the decision of the sessions, the court sent the case back to be more fully stated (d). So, where a woman, living with her husband, was removed to the place of her maiden settlement, with his consent; and upon an appeal against the order, the husband's mother was examined as a witness for the respondents, and, upon her cross-examination, stated that her son was born at Ipswich, whilst she and her husband (who was a soldier) were on the march, but in what parish in Ipswich she was delivered she could not tell, nor could she point out the place if she were there: the court held that the order ought to be quashed, for it appeared from the respondent's evidence that the husband had a settlement in Ipswich, although the exact parish was not known; if, indeed, this evidence had been given on the part of the appellants, it would have been otherwise, for it would have been incumbent upon them to have proved the exact parish in which the husband was born (e). And even where the husband has no settlement, the wife, although she become chargeable, cannot legally be removed from him to the place of her maiden settlement, without the consent of both (ƒ). And therefore, where a woman, residing in Hoylandswain under a certificate from Carleton, married a man who had no settlement, and had three children by him; but she and her children becoming chargeable, they were removed to Carleton, leaving the husband still residing in the house in Holylandswain: the court held that this could not legally be done; the wife and children could not be separated from the husband, even although he had no settlement; if, indeed, he had aban

(b) R. v. Stogumber, MS. H. 1839; 9 Ad. & El. 622.

(c) St. Michael's, Bath, v. Nunney, 1 Str. 544; Burr. S. C. 815.

(d) R. v.Cuckfield, Burr. S. C. 290. (e) R. v. St. Mary, Beverley, 1 B. & Ad. 201.

(f) R. v. Leeds, 13 Law J. 107, .

doned them, or were dead, then they might be removed to the place of the wife's maiden settlement, but not whilst he was living with them (g). Where, however, an order for the removal of a wife and children to Eltham, as the place of the wife's maiden settlement, stated her to be the wife of a man who had no settlement, and purported to have been made upon the examination of both husband and wife, and with the consent of both the court held it to be good; for if the husband had no means of supporting them, and had no settlement to which they might be removed, why should he not be allowed to consent to their having the benefit of her settlement (h)? So, where a man, who had no settlement, became lunatic, and an order was made for the removal of his wife and children to the place of her maiden settlement; it was objected that the order was bad, as it stated no desertion of the wife or children by the husband: but the court held that they would not presume that they were living together at the time of the removal, or any other fact which would have the effect of vitiating the order; and as the order stood, it was perfectly consistent with it that they were not living together, or that he was living in the parish to which the wife and children were about to be removed (i).

By stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, s. 1, after enacting that no person shall be removed, nor shall any warrant be granted for the removal of any person, from any parish in which such person shall have resided for five years,-it is provided that whenever any person shall have a wife or children having no other settlement than his or her own, such wife and children shall be removable, whenever he or she is removable, and shall not be removable when he or she is not removable (j). And where upon appeal against an order, dated 29th April, 1847, for the removal of Mary Elsbury and her three children from the parish of St. Andrew the Less, in the borough of Cambridge, to the parish of St. Ebbe, Oxford, it appeared that the pauper's husband came to dwell in the respondent parish, with his wife and three children, at Midsummer, 1846, and they resided there together until March, 1847, when he deserted them; the wife and children however continued to reside there until the making of the order, but the husband was still absent when the order was made, and up to and after the trial of the appeal, and his residence was unknown: upon a case stated, it was contended that as the husband was not residing in the parish of St. Andrew in April, 1847, and could not therefore be then removable from it, his wife and children were not removable from it, by the proviso at the end of the

(g) R. v. Carleton, Burr. S. C. 813.

(h) R. v. Eltham, 5 East, 113.

(i) R. v. Stockton, 5 B. & Ad. 546.

(j) See stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 111.

first section of stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66: but the court held that the proviso merely meant that the wife and family of a man should not be removed from a parish, if the husband, supposing him to be there, would not be removable; here, if the husband were in the parish and chargeable, he would be removable, and his wife and children were so likewise (k).

Widow.] By stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, s. 2, “ no woman, residing in any parish with her husband at the time of his death, shall be removed, nor shall any warrant be granted for her removal, from such parish, for twelve calendar months next after his death, if she so long continue a widow." And where on an appeal against an order, dated the 11th August, 1846, for the removal of Sarah Badman, widow, and her five children, from the parish of St. Mary Magdalen, Bermondsey, to the parish of St. Mary, Whitechapel, it appeared that her husband died the 6th June, 1846, and was then residing with her in the said parish of St. Mary, Magdalen; and on the 3rd September following, the pauper and her five children were removed on a case stated, it was argued that the case was not within the second section of the stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, as the woman had become a widow before the Act passed: but the court held that it was the removal of the widow which was prohibited by the section, the rest of the clause being merely descriptive of the party excepted; if her husband died within less than twelve months before the making of the order of the removal, it was immaterial whether he died before the passing of the Act or after it (1). It was also contended that the irremovability of the pauper was no good ground of appeal: but the court held otherwise (m). Where the husband was in her Majesty's service as a marine, and on quitting the service he went to live with his wife and family at East Stonehouse, and resided with them for two years; he then entered the navy as a seaman, and served three years, his wife and family all the time inhabiting the same house in East Stonehouse; he then quitted the service, and came back and resided with his wife for about two months, when he was hired as a seaman on board a mail packet, and in a few months, whilst serving on board of it, he was lost at sea: it was holden that the widow could not be removed from East Stonehouse for twelve months after his death; for although not personally present, East Stonehouse was the place of his domicile, and she must be deemed to be residing with him at the time of his death, within the meaning of the above section (n).

(k) R. v. St. Ebbe, Oxford, 18 Law J. 14, m.

(1) R. v. St. Mary, Whitechapel, 17 Law J. 172, m.

(m) R. v. St. Mary, Whitechapel, supra.

(n) R. v. East Stonehouse, 24 Law J. 121, m.

Children.] By stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, s. 1, already noticed, ante, p. 688, whenever any person shall have children having no other settlement than his or her own, such children shall be removable whenever he or she is removable, and shall not be removable when he or she is not removable (o). And by sect. 3, "no child under the age of sixteen years, whether legitimate or illegitimate, residing in any parish with his or her father or mother, stepfather or stepmother, or reputed father, shall be removed, nor shall any warrant be granted for the removal of such child, from such parish, in any case where such father, mother, stepfather, stepmother, or reputed father may not lawfully be removed from such parish" (p).

Also, it is a general rule that a child cannot be removed from its parent, if it be under the age of seven years, which is called the age of nurture, even although the parent consent to or wish it (q); but if it become chargeable, and have a different settlement from its parent, still it must be allowed to remain with the parent until it attain the age of seven years, or if the parent be removed, it must be removed also to the same parish. And therefore where a mother, and her infant child of two years of age, were removed to different parishes, as their respective places of settlement: the court held that a child of that age could not be separated from its mother, but must remain with her for nurture; and they therefore quashed the order (r). So, where three poor men of the parish of A. married three poor women settled in and receiving relief from the parish of B., each of whom had children by her former husband: the court held that such of the children as were nurse children, under the age of seven years, should be sent with their mothers to A. for nurture, but that the parish of B. would be bound to maintain them there (8). So, where a widow, having a child by her deceased husband, married again it was holden that her child, being under the age of seven, must go with her for nurture, but he must be maintained by the parish in which his father was last settled previously to his death (t). But where three children, under the age of seven, were removed by an order which adjudged that their lawful settlement was in the parish of Bradfield; it was objected that children of such tender age could not be removed without their parents, unless it appeared on the face of the order that the parents were dead; and the order should have stated Bradfield to be the place of their father's last legal settlement, for he might possibly have gained another settle

(0) See stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 111; and see R. v. St. Ebbe, Oxford,

supra.

(p) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, s. 3. (q) R. v. Birmingham, 13 Law J. 1, m.

(r) Skeffreth v. Walford, 2 Sess. Ca. 89.

(8) Wangford v.Brandon, Carth. 449. Semb. S. C. Anon., 2 Salk.482. (t) R. v. Sazmundham, Fort. 307; 2 Bott, 22.