ship, but as the order was not directed to the officers of the township, he refused to receive him, unless the removing parish would forego some expenses of maintenance which they claimed; this was refused, and the officer of the removing parish took the order and pauper to the churchwarden of the parish, and delivered them to him, who immediately lodged the pauper in the workhouse of the township of Bishop Wearmouth this latter township having appealed, it was now contended that they had no right to do so, as they were not aggrieved by the order, not being mentioned in it; but the court held, that as the order was directed to a parish of the same name with the township, the latter might reasonably apprehend that unless they appealed, they might (on the authority of R. v. Kirkby Stephen) be estopped afterwards from showing that the pauper was not settled in their township: and therefore they were parties aggrieved within the meaning of the statute, and had a right to appeal (u).

The case of R. v. Kirkby Stephen, mentioned in the last case, was thus: upon a removal of a pauper from Kirkby Stephen to Wharton, Wharton appealed against the order; and upon the trial of the appeal, they proved that the pauper had been before removed to Kirkby Stephen, and that township had not appealed; upon production of the order, however, it appeared to be directed to the parish of Kirkby Stephen, instead of the township, and the parish contained ten townships, of which the townships of Kirkby Stephen and Wharton were two, each supporting its own poor, but the order upon that occasion was delivered to the overseers of the township; it was thereupon objected that the order was a nullity, and the township was not bound by it: but the court held that the order, being unappealed against, was conclusive against the township; the direction to the parish must mean the township, as the latter maintained its own poor, the former not; and if the township wished to avail themselves of the misdirection, they should have appealed (v). And where upon the trial of an appeal, it was objected that the order of removal was directed to churchwardens and overseers of the parish of Llanerchimedd, whereas it was not a parish but a vill, and it had no churchwardens; but the sessions, treating this as a defect in form, amended the order: and the court held that they had authority to do so, under stat. 5 G. 2, c. 19, s. 1 (w). So, where the order of removal was directed to the churchwardens and overseers of the township of Bingley, instead of the parish of Bingley; and the parish was divided into several townships, one of which was the township

(u) R. v. Bishop Wearmouth, 5 B. & Ad. 942. See also R. v. JJ. of Denbighshire, 1 B. & Ad. 616.

(v) R. v. Kirkby Stephen, Burr. S. C. 664.

(w) R. v. Amlwch, 4 B. & C. 757.

of Bingley, none of which, however, supported their own poor, overseers being appointed for the parish only; against this order of removal there was an appeal, and the question was, whether the sessions ought not to have quashed the order, as being directed to a township for which no overseers were appointed the court held it to be an informality, which the sessions might have amended; and they sent the order back to them for that purpose (r). But where an order of removal was directed to a parish which contained several townships, one of which bore the same name as the parish; and the officers of the township having appealed against the order, the respondents objected to their being heard, because the churchwardens of the parish had not joined in the appeal; upon which the appellants called a witness, who stated that the township maintained its own poor separately, which however was not believed by the sessions, and they accordingly held the objection to be good and dismissed the appeal :-Upon a motion for a mandamus to enter continuances and hear the appeal, the court refused it, because, the question on which the sessions dismissed the appeal being a question of fact, their decision upon it was final (y). So, where an order was objected to for uncertainty, because the place to which the pauper was to be removed was in one part called a parish, in another a town: the court held it to be immaterial (z). So, where it was objected that the order was directed to "the overseers of the parish of Poole, or town and county of Poole," whereas the name of the parish was "St. James's in Poole ;" but as there was but one parish in Poole, the court held it to be sufficient (a). So, where an order was objected to, because it was directed to the overseers of " the township of Holbeck, in the said borough," whereas no borough was named in the body of the order; but as the borough of Leeds was named in the margin, the court held the direction to be sufficient (b). And where in an order a mistake is thus made in the name of a parish, it cannot be made the subject of an application for a certiorari to bring up the order, that it may be quashed upon this ground (c).

In some cases there may be a doubt as to the boundary line between two parishes, and a doubt as to which of the two is the place of settlement of the pauper. The boundaries of parishes depend entirely upon ancient and immemorial custom (d); and hence it is, that in cases where they are doubted or disputed, the question cannot be determined by the

(x) R. v. Bingley, 4 B. & Ad. 567, n.

(y) R. v. JJ. of Flintshire, 16 Law J. 55, m.

(z) R. v. Eakring, Burt. S. C.

321.

(a) R. v. Topsham, 7 East, 466. (b) R. v. Holbeck in Leeds, Burr. S. C. 198.

(c) R. v. JJ. of Buckinghamshire, 12 Law J. 29, m.

(d) 3 Burn, Ecc. L. 62.

ecclesiastical court, for that court has no jurisdiction to try a prescription or custom, but it must be decided by the temporal courts (e). And in order to preserve the evidence of such custom, by reputation, perambulations of the boundaries are very generally made in most of the parishes in England, in Rogation week in each year; and the parishioners may justify entering and going over a man's land, for that purpose (f) By the General Inclosure Act, 41 G. 3, c. 109, s. 3, authority is given to the commissioner or commissioners acting under any inclosure Act, if the boundaries of the parish in which the land to be inclosed is situate, or of any adjoining parish, should appear not to be sufficiently ascertained and distinguished, to inquire into the same by the testimony of witnesses, and to ascertain, set out, determine, and fix the same; and the boundaries so ascertained and established, shall thenceforth be deemed the boundaries of such parish (g). So, by stat. 2 & 3 Vict. c. 62, s. 34, the tithe commissioners are empowered, where the boundaries of a parish are in doubt or dispute before them, either to ascertain the old boundaries, or to set out and define a new boundary: "and the boundary line so ascertained or newly defined, shall thenceforward be the boundary line of the said parish (h)." By the County Rate Act, 56 G. 3, c. 49, s. 2, the justices in quarter sessions are enabled to inquire into and fix the boundaries of " counties, ridings, divisions, and parts of counties, and other places of distinct and separate jurisdiction;" but no authority is given to them to inquire into or fix the boundaries of parishes.

Description of the pauper and his family.] The pauper must be named in the order, otherwise it will be bad. And therefore, where an order merely stated that a certain woman had intruded, &c., without naming her, the court held it to be bad, saying that in an order of removal, the pauper must either be so named, or described as a person unknown (¿).

The names and ages of the children (if any) should also be set out the names, in order that their identity may thereafter be the more readily proved (k); and their ages, for if they be above the age of seven, they may possibly have gained a settlement in their own right. And therefore, where the order was for the removal of a man and "his family," the court held it to be bad (1). So, where an order was for the removal

(e) Duke of Rutland v. Bagshare et al., 19 Law J. 234. (f) Godday v. Michel, Cro. El. 441.

(9) See R. v. St. Mary in Bury St. Edmund's, 4 B. & A. 462.

(h) See R. v. Madeley, 19 Law J. 187, m.

(i) Southwell v. Needwell, Set. & Rem. 57.

(k) See R. v. Withernwick, 6 Ad. & El. 278, 273, per Coleridge, J. (1) Johnson's case, 2 Salk. 485.

of a woman and her "five children," the court quashed it for uncertainty as to the children, because their names and ages were not set out (A). So, where the names, but not the ages of the children, were set out, the court quashed the order as to the children ()); for either their ages must be set out, or there must be an express adjudication that they have gained no other settlement (k). But an omission of the ages of the children is remedied by adjudicating, in the order of removal, that the parish to which they are about to be removed, is the place of their last legal settlement (7). And therefore, where an order for the removal of a man, his wife and three children to Bramshaw, did not state the ages of the children, and it was objected to on this account, the court held that as it adjudged Bramshaw to be the place of settlement of the children, and not merely of the father, it was unnecessary to state their ages (m So, where an order for the removal of a man, his wife and three children to Ufculm, adjudged to be "their" last place of settlement: the court held that the word "their" referred to the children as well as the father and mother, and as the order therefore adjudged the place of settlement of the chidren, it was unnecessary to state their ages (n). Where an order for the removal of "Mary, the wife of Samuel Bennett, and her daughter," to Higher Walton, adjudged that to be their place of settlement, it was objected that it was not stated whether it was the husband's settlement, or the maiden settlement of the woman: but the court said that they must presume it to mean the settlement of the husband (0).

And it is no objection that two persons of the same family (mother and son), having gained different settlements in the same parish, are included in the same order of removal (p).

Statement of chargeability, &c.] The order in that part reciting the complaint, must state as part of it that the paupers had come to inhabit in the parish, not having gained a last legal settlement there, that they are still residing there, and that they have actually become chargeable to it; and it then proceeds to adjudicate the truth of such complaint. Where the complaint set out stated that the pauper had

66

endeavoured to intrude into the parish, but did not state that he had actually come into it; the court held it bad, and quashed it (g). And the same, where the order did not state that the party was chargeable (r). But where the recital of the complaint was that the pauper intruded and came into the parish of M., and hath actually become chargeable to, and is now inhabiting in the same parish," and this was objected to, because it did not state that the pauper "had come to settle" or 66 come to inhabit," in the words of the stat. 13 & 14 C. 2, c. 12, s. 1: but the court held that the complaint must follow, not the words of the stat. of Charles, but those of 35 G. 3, c. 1, under which magistrates now exercise their power of removal, and which only requires that the pauper be inhabiting in the parish, and be actually chargeable to it, both of which conditions were satisfied by this order (8). But where an order of removal stated a complaint that the paupers "have lately intruded and come into the said parish of St. Giles, and have become actually chargeable to the same:" it was holden bad, as not being equivalent to stating that they had come to inhabit (t). Where an order for the removal of a woman stated, that she was unmarried and pregnant; but because it did not state expressly that she was actually chargeable, the court held it to be bad; for the pregnancy was but presumptive evidence of chargeability, which might be rebutted by showing that the woman was a person of property, or one who could satisfactorily indemnify the parish from any charge with respect either to herself or her child (u). In one case, where the complaint stated that the paupers had become chargeable, without saying to what parish, the court held it to be sufficient, as they would intend that they had become chargeable to the parish from which they were removed (v). But in more recent cases, where the justices had adjudged in their order that the paupers had become chargeable, without saying to what parish, the court held the omission to be fatal, and quashed the order (w). A very common defect in orders is, that they state that the pauper had become chargeable, in the past tense: this seemingly is incorrect, and renders the order bad; it must appear upon the face of it, that the pauper is chargeable at the time of making the order.

16.

(q) R. v. Graff ham, Set, & Rem.

(r) R.v. Angell, Ca. temp. Hardw. 124. R. v. St. Giles-in-the-Fields, 15 Law J. 122, m.; 7 Q. B. 529.

(8) R. v. St. Paul's, Covent Garden, 16 Law J. 11, m.; 7 Q. B. 533. (t) R. v. Willatts et al., 14 Law J. 157, m.; 7 Q. B. 516.

(u) R. v. Holm, East Waver, 11 East, 381.

(v) R. v. Witham super Montem, 1 Str. 142.

(w) R. v. Bourn, Burr. S. C. 39. R. v. Ufculm, Burr. S. C. 138. St. Nicholas, Gloucester, v. St. Peter's, Bristol, 2 Sess. Ca. 73.