It may be necessary to mention, that there is no appeal against an order of relief (z).

To what sessions.] By stat. 8 & 9 W. 3, c. 30, s. 6, “the appeal against any order for the removal of any poor person from out of any parish, township, or place, shall be had, prosecuted and determined at the general or quarter sessions of the peace for the county, division, or riding, wherein the parish, township, or place, from whence such poor person shall be removed, doth lie, and not elsewhere." After the passing of this statute, in all cases where the respondent parish was situate in a borough, which was not a county of itself, the appeal must have been, not to the borough sessions, but to the sessions of the county or riding in which the borough, or rather the respondent parish, was situate. But since the late Municipal Corporation Act came into force, in all cases where the respondent parish is situate within a borough, to which a separate court of quarter sessions has been granted, the appeal against an order of removal must now be to the quarter sessions of the borough (a).

The appeal must be to the next quarter sessions of the peace (b); that is to say, the next practicable sessions after the service of the order. The substance and result of all the cases upon the subject is this: the appeal may be entered and tried at the first sessions after the service of the order; or it may be entered and respited at the first sessions, and tried at the second; or it may be entered and tried at the second sessions, if it were impracticable to try it at the first.

It may be entered and tried at the first quarter sessions after the service of the order, if the appellants wish it, and have given the requisite notice of appeal. For it is only in a case where no notice of appeal, or an insufficient notice, has been given, that the justices at sessions are authorized by stat. 9 G. 1, c. 7, s. 8, to respite it (c). Where the wife and family of a prisoner under sentence for larceny, were removed, and the order of removal served, on the 22nd August, and afterwards on the 5th September notice of appeal was given for the next sessions; but the removing parish, finding that a certain examination of the prisoner could not be received in evidence, it having been taken after conviction, procured and served a supersedeas under the hands and seals of the magistrates who made the order, requiring the other parties to deliver up the

(2) R. v. JJ. of Devon, 4 M. & S. 421. R. v. North Shields, Doug. 331; Cald. 68.

(a) R. v.JJ. of Salop, MS. B. R. T. 1841. S. C. nom. R. v. JJ. of Shropshire, 2 Q. B. 85. R. v. St. Edmund's, Sarum, Id. 72. R. v.

JJ. of Lancashire, Id. 85. R. v. JJ. of Suffolk, Id. 85; 10 Law J. 138, m.

(b) 13 & 14 C. 2, c. 12, s. 2; 3 W. & M. c. 11, s. 9, supra. (c) Vide post.

order to be cancelled; at the next sessions, however, the appellants tendered their appeal and proposed to have it tried; but the justices refused to receive it, saying that the order was completely put an end to by the supersedeas: upon an application for a mandamus, the court held that it was perfectly discretionary with the sessions, under such circumstances, to receive the appeal or not, as might best answer the purposes of justice; if, for instance the removing parish refuse to pay the costs of maintenance, the sessions ought to receive the appeal, in order to enforce payment (d).

Or the appeal may be entered at the first quarter sessions after the service of the order, and then respited to the next following sessions. For by stat. 9 G. 1, c. 7, s. 8, after enacting that no appeal against an order of removal shall be proceeded upon, unless reasonable notice of the appeal be given, it is provided, that if it shall appear to the justices "that reasonable time of notice was not given, then they shall adjourn the said appeal to the next quarter sessions, and then and there finally hear and determine the same." Where an order of removal was made in November; and an application was made at the Epiphany sessions to enter and respite an appeal against it, which the sessions refused, as no notice of appeal had been given: the court of King's Bench held that they ought to have received it, and granted a mandamus requiring them to do so (e). But the recent statute, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 31, s. 9, is likely to alter the practice much in this respect. By that section, no appeal shall be allowed against an order of removal, unless notice of appeal have been given within twentyone days after the notice of chargeability and statement of the grounds of removal shall have been sent. If, therefore, where notice of appeal has been given, it be practicable to try the appeal at the first sessions, the appellants must enter and try their appeal then; the justices will have no power, under the 9 G. 1, c. 7, to respite it as a matter of course, because a sufficient notice of appeal will have been given; but if respited at all, it must be by virtue of that discretionary power, vested in the sessions, in common with all other courts, of adjourning any case before them, and which they may do on such terms as they think proper (ƒ). On the other hand, if it be not practicable to try at the first sessions,- -or if there be not time to give a statement of the grounds of appeal fourteen clear days before the first day of the sessions, the practice no doubt will be to give the notice of appeal for the second sessions. The parish seem to have the whole of the twenty-one days to

(d) R. v. JJ. of Norfolk, 5 B. & Ald. 484.

(e) R. v. JJ. of Gloucestershire, Doug. 191.

(f) See R. v. JJ. of Lancashire, 17 Law J. 45, m.

consider whether they will appeal or not (e); and if then they resolve to appeal, but have not time to serve their grounds of appeal before the sessions, the correct practice I think will be to give their notice of appeal for the next following sessions.

After the passing of the Poor Law Amendment Act, it was holden that the appellants might consider themselves aggrieved either by the order, or by the removal, at their option, and might appeal to the first session after the removal of the pauper. But this can no longer be done. By stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 31, s. 9, notice of appeal must be given within twentyone days after the sending of the notice of chargeability and grounds of removal, or, if a copy of the examinations be applied for, within fourteen days after they are sent; and before which time the paupers are not to be removed. And as the notice of appeal must now in all cases be given before the removal, the removal cannot of course be deemed the grievance appealed against.

And the appeal may be thus entered and tried at the second sessions, where it is impracticable to try it at the first sessions. Where an order of removal was made on the 22nd September, but the pauper was not removed until the 5th October, and the sessions (which were holden at a distance of sixty miles from the parish to which the pauper was removed) commenced on the 6th: the court held that, under these circumstances, it was not necessary to enter the appeal at the October sessions, but it might be entered at the Epiphany sessions; the words "next sessions" in the statute, must be understood to mean the next practicable sessions; and it was impossible in this case to lodge the appeal on the 6th of October (ƒ). So, where an order of removal from Mold in Flintshire, to Leek, which is at the distance of fifty-four miles, was made on the 24th September, but not served until the 3rd of October, and the sessions were holden on the 7th; no appeal having been entered at those sessions, the court refused to receive it at the following sessions, and a mandamus was applied for to compel the justices to enter continuances and try the appeal: the court held that, under the circumstances, the parish of Leek had until the second sessions to enter their appeal, as it was impracticable for them to prosecute it at the sessions immediately after the service of the order (g). So, where an order of removal was made on Tuesday, but not served until twelve o'clock on Saturday, and the sessions commenced on the Tuesday following; the appellants did not enter their appeal at those sessions,

(e) See R. v. JJ. of Suffolk, 4 Ad. & El. 319. R. v. JJ. of Leicester, 4 Dowl. 633.

(ƒ)R. v.JJ. of E. R. Yorkshire, Doug. 192.

(g) R. v. JJ. of Flintshire, 7 T. R. 200.

but at the next sessions afterwards they tendered it, and the justices refused to receive it, on the ground that it ought to have been entered at the first sessions after the order: but the court of King's Bench held, that although the statute required the appeal to be made at the next quarter sessions, yet that must mean the next practicable sessions; the parish officers must have a reasonable time to make inquiries, that they may judge of the propriety of appealing or not; and here the appellants had but one day, namely, the Monday, for that purpose, which the court considered insufficient (h). So, where an order of removal, made on the 2nd January, was served on the 7th, and the sessions commenced on the 14th; as by the practice of the sessions eight days' notice of appeal was required, the appeal was not entered at the Epiphany sessions, but in due time before the Easter sessions, notice of appeal was given, and the appellants at those sessions offered to enter and try the appeal; but the sessions would not permit it, on the alleged ground that the appellants ought to have entered and respited the appeal at the preceding sessions: the court of King's Bench were of opinion, that as the respondents, by their delay in serving the order, had prevented the appellants from trying their appeal at the Epiphany sessions, the appellants should be at liberty to try it at a subsequent sessions, and therefore granted a mandamus to the justices to receive and enter the appeal (i). So, where an order of removal from Lenham to Pluckley was made on the 7th April, served on the 8th, and the sessions commenced on the 15th; when the order was served the officers of Pluckley said they would appeal; to which the officers of Lenham observed, that nothing could be done at the next sessions, as there was not then time to give eight clear days' notice of trial, which the practice of the sessions required; the officers of Pluckley did not appeal to the next sessions, but gave due notice of appeal for the Midsummer sessions, and then applied to enter and try the appeal, which the sessions refused, on the ground that the appeal ought to have been entered and respited at the Easter sessions: upon an application for a mandamus, the court said that it was reasonable that the appellants should be let in to try their appeal, as they might have been misled by what the officers of Lenham had said when they served the order; but independently of that, it appeared to the court to be wholly unnecessary to enter and respite the appeal at the first sessions, when it could not then be tried (k). So, where an order of

(h) R. v. JJ. of Essex, 1 B. & Ald. 210,

(i) R. v. JJ. of Southampton, 6 M. & S. 394; 8 B. & C. 641, n.

(k) R. v. JJ. of Kent, 8 B. & C. 639.

removal was served on the 8th of April, and the sessions were to be held on the 15th, and by the practice of the sessions, eight days' notice of appeal was required; notice of appeal was given for the July sessions, but the justices then refused to allow the appellants to enter or to try it, on the ground that, although the appellants could not have given notice of appeal for the preceding sessions, they might have had their appeal then entered and respited: but the court of King's Bench held that, as entering an appeal merely for the purpose of having it adjourned was an useless act, it was unnecessary; it was sufficient to enter it at the sessions at which the party by his notice was bound to try it; they therefore granted a mandamus to the justices, requiring them to enter continuances and try the appeal (y). This point had formerly been ruled otherwise (z).

But if the appeal be thus entered at the second sessions, it is not within the clause in stat. 9 G. 1, already mentioned (a); and the sessions, in that case, will not allow it to be respited until the following sessions, merely on the ground of there having been no sufficient notice of appeal given. And therefore, where an order of removal from a township in the West Riding of Yorkshire to the parish of St. Luke, Middlesex, was made on the 3rd January, executed on the 12th, and the sessions for the West Riding were holden on the 18th, the parish of St. Luke did not appeal to the Epiphany sessions, but at the Easter sessions they moved to enter and respite the appeal, and the sessions then refused to receive it: the court of King's Bench held that they had done rightly, and refused a mandamus to the justices to enter and respite the appeal (¿).

But where an appeal against an order of removal was entered at the Michaelmas sessions, and then respited as of course; and evidence of the settlement not being fully obtained until it was too late to give notice and grounds of appeal for the Epiphany sessions, the appellants applied to adjourn the appeal until the following sessions, on payments of costs, which were paid; but at the next sessions, in April, the respondents persuaded the sessions that they had no power to adjourn the appeal at the former session, and the justices accordingly refused to hear the appeal; as it appeared however that the justices in their discretion would have adjourned the appeal, if they thought they had authority to do so, Patteson, J., granted a rule for a mandamus commanding them to enter continuances

(y) R. v. JJ. of Devon, 8 B. & C. 640, n.

(z) See R. v. JJ. of Herefordshire, 3 T. R. 504. R. v. JJ. of Wilts, 2 Bott, 717.

(a) Ante, p. 771.

(b) R. v. JJ. of West Riding of Yorkshire, 4 M. & S. 327.